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While conducting research for this dissertation, I ran across an odd article 
from 1996 in a short-lived Ukrainian newspaper called Film Currier (Kinokur”er), 
which excitedly reported on the front page that Planet 3963, discovered by 
astronomer Liudmila Chernykh from the Crimean Astrophysics Observatory in 
1969, had been renamed in honor of the recently deceased Soviet filmmaker 
Sergei Paradzhanov.  The editors thanked Tat’iana Derevianko at the Oleksandr 
Dovzhenko Museum for her efforts at achieving recognition for the change with 
international organizations, writing that it was important that the “universe have 
as many of ‘our’ planets as possible.”  While affirming the national significance of 
the re-naming, which fit with the larger project of re-imagining Ukrainian history 
and its canon of heroes and villains – Turgenev Street in L’viv, for example, 
became Heroes of the UPA Street – the editors nonetheless kept “our” in quotes, 
suggesting either an ironic detachment from the possessive pronoun, or an 
inability to commit to such stellar possessions when the newly independent 
republic did not even have firm possession over its own coastline.  Perhaps they 
felt the Museum was overstating Paradzhanov’s importance, but just as likely the 
editors were ambivalent about associating the filmmaker’s name with Ukraine in 
particular.   
Despite being the creator of the most internationally heralded Ukrainian 
film, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors (Tini zabutykh predkiv) in 1964, the Tbilisi-
born, Russian-speaking Armenian Paradzhanov spoke derisively about the 
“provincial” mind set of Ukrainian writers and artists, once joking that he was the 
“leader of khokhol nationalism.”1  After his exile from the republic, the director 
worked in Armenia and Georgia.  Today, the city of Erevan claims the 
                                                 
1 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 588, l. 15.  The word “khokhol” is a derogatory term for Ukrainians 




                                                
Paradzhanov museum, and an independent Armenia competes with Ukraine and 
Georgia for the ethno-national significance of the filmmaker’s life and 
memorialization.  In many ways, Paradzhanov’s life and work highlighted the 
tensions between particularistic notions of nation in the USSR after Stalin and a 
Soviet cosmopolitanism proceeding from the vast movements of individuals and 
whole population groups within the largest geo-political entity the world has ever 
known.  Just as his film became both a highly exoticized ethnographic spectacle 
of a small Carpathian tribe, with all the problematic associations that this might 
suggest, and a meaning-producing moment for a new generation of Ukrainian 
nationalists, Paradzhanov himself skirted between engagement with nationalist 
discourse and ridicule of those who identified with what he considered narrow-
minded concerns.   
While the “our” remained ambivalently in quotes for director Paradzhanov, 
the short article in Film Currier concluded with an effusive statement for the 
“unforgettable Ivan Mykolaichuk,” the actor who played the leading role of Ivanko 
in Shadows.  The newspaper demanded that astronomers also discover a planet 
for this Carpathian-born actor, writer, and filmmaker.2  While Mykolaichuk’s life 
and work is associated with Paradzhanov and what continues to be celebrated 
as “Ukrainian poetic cinema,” his memorialization signified a different tension in 
post-Stalinist representational politics, this one between an “authentic,” 
spacialized image of the non-Russian and a historically situated and “realist” 
conception of Soviet “multinationality.” 
This dissertation looks at the ways individuals become placed onto 
particular landscapes within certain formal and aesthetic modes of 
memorialization and representation.  I look at two decades of stability and 
(relative) prosperity in the Soviet Union, a period absent of Great Events like war, 
revolution, mass terror and famine.  Ukraine, the second-most populous 
federative unit in the USSR, possessed a diverse economy, geography and 
social composition, yet its cinema between 1960 and 1980 became fixated on the 
small portion of the Carpathian Mountains that straddled the Southwestern 
 
2 “Shturm kosmosa,” Kinokur’er, no. 19 (1996), 1. 
 
portion of the republic along the Romanian border.  In discovering a broader 
significance in this remote region, filmmakers appealed to prior author-architects 
of the Ukrainian nation, including Taras Shevchenko, Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi, 
and Oleksandr Dovzhenko, to name just a few.   
As Roland Barthes suggested in Mythologies, images become a 
fundamental part of the national landscape, which works in tandem with 
narratives to locate, articulate, and reproduce myths of collective belonging.3  
Images themselves, like narratives, enter canonical usage, and thus narrow their 
significatory possibilities.  Of course, myths are not self-contained systems, 
closed off from newer narratives, and newer significances for older ones.  The 
singing peasants dressed in bright folk costumes in the Ukrainian films of the 
1960s were not the same ones from an earlier cultural discourse, even if we 
continue to see the shadows of these cinematic ancestors in the films that I 
examine.  In Stalinist cinema, such “national” characters were incorporated into a 
heroic narrative of the “friendship of peoples,” and the victory of socialist 
modernity over “feudal” backwardness.  These same figures later signified the 
loss of a particular national history and folkloric mythology, owing to the forces 
set in motion by the First World War, Revolution, Civil War, collectivization, 
industrialization, and the Great Patriotic War.  These shifts in meaning emerged 
in large part out of the same convergences of political de-Stalinization in the 
1950s and subsequent disillusionment with the limits set upon it over the 
following decades.  In freeing the significatory function of cinematic iconography 
from Stalinist narrative and stylistic models, however, authorities and filmmakers 
alike struggled to discover not only something affirmative with which to replace 
them, but also an audience willing to make sense of these changes.    
This dissertation concerns a moment in the history of Soviet Ukraine when 
support for, and opposition to, Soviet power took on particularly national and 
nationalist dimensions, a period during which supporters of the regime and 
dissidents alike could appeal to the same structure of feeling contained within a 
popular iconography and national narrative.  Amidst dissident politics and the 
                                                 
3 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, tr. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 109-110. 
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official rejection of de-Stalinization during the mid-1960s, a group of filmmakers, 
writers, and actors working at the Oleksandr Dovzhenko Feature Film Studio 
attempted to rearticulate and re-imagine a vision of the geographic and ethnic 
unity of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.  Surviving members of the group 
under investigation in this dissertation became part of a self-fashioned nationalist 
cultural elite in a new independent nation-state.  Today, Paradzhanov’s camera 
man on Shadows, and later one of the most important Ukrainian filmmakers, Iurii 
Illienko, calls for a “Ukrainian Ukraine,”4 with all of the anti-Russian and, perhaps, 
anti-Semitic connotations of such a nationalist invective.  The era’s deceased, 
like Mykolaichuk, Paradzhanov and others, became sanctified objects of a 
nationalist pedagogy.  This dissertation emerged from a desire to understand the 
cultural tensions of the nationality question in the Soviet Union during the 
emergence of the Brezhnev system.  Ukrainian cinema occupied a crucial space 
lodged between the dissident and nationalist intelligentsia and the stagnant realm 
of official culture.   
*   *   * 
Since coming to graduate school at the University of Michigan, questions 
of nationality, ethnicity, and empire have been at the center of my studies, both 
more generally and specifically in relation to the Soviet Union.  The previous 
decade had seen a plethora of innovative work on how multinational political 
states – the British Empire, the Hapsburg Empire and the USSR, to name a few 
– functioned as discursive entities.  During my first semester of coursework, I 
read Yuri Slezkine’s article, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a 
Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” which, in its subtle complexity, 
argued that early Bolshevik leaders developed an idea of ethnic and national 
difference even as they affirmed the Marxist principle of internationalism.  In the 
same way, the state affirmed both the separate space of the individual along with 
the principle of communalism.5  Later, I became more familiar with the sources of 
Slezkine’s ideas, in Benedict Anderson’s notion that nations become discursively 
                                                 
4 Iurii Illienko, Za ukrains’ku Ukrainu: vidkrytyi lyst ukraintsiam (Kyiv: Arata, 2005). 
5 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994), 414-452. 
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produced through the emergence and spread of print culture, and in Ronald 
Suny’s elaboration of how non-Russian Marxists articulated a vision of ethnic 
nationality compatible with radical leftist ideologies during the Revolution and 
Civil War.  According to Suny, this articulation continued to inform the 
development of Soviet nationalities policy, eventually contributing to the demise 
of the Soviet state itself.6   
Recent scholarship on questions of nation and nationality further 
investigated how the Soviet Union itself was an “empire,” despite the ideology of 
anti-imperialism that lay at the root of the state’s formation.  One reason for 
“Soviet empire” studies involves Russian historians’ engagement with recent 
work on the history of European colonialism and theories of post-coloniality.7  
While I remain uncertain that calling the Soviet Union an “empire” is useful for 
me, largely because such a pejoratively defined term would limit the type of 
questions I am interested in asking, it poses a number of interesting problems for 
studying this most vociferously anti-imperial state.8  While the 1950s and 1960s 
saw a flurry of books that referred to the Soviet Union as the new “empire,” my 
own familiarity with such scholarship came from Terry Martin, whose use of the 
term was revisionist in its assertion that the Soviet “affirmative action empire” 
was an “empire” that sought firm centralization even as it empowered non-
Russian elites and put into place systems of privilege for them.  Martin attempted 
to demonstrate that the relationship between center and periphery that Stalin 
created in the 1930s was endemic of a peculiar kind of imperial practice, one that 
was dissimilar from both European and Russian empires of the past, but 
                                                 
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Ronald Suny, Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, 
Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
7 See, for example, Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony: 
Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, 
eds. Cooper and Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 1-56. 
8 I believe that Patrick Wolfe stated it most eloquently in the AHR over a decade ago when he 
wrote, “Imperialism resembles Darwinism, in that many use the term but few can say what it really 
means.  This imprecision is encouraged by a surfeit of synonyms.  Two stand out: imperialism is 
taken to be interchangeable with colonialism reducible to the word ‘empire.’  Add to these the 
compounding effects of elaborations such as hegemony, dependency, or globalization and the 
definitional space of imperialism becomes a vague, consensual gestalt.”  Patrick Wolfe, “History 
and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism,” AHR 102 (1997), 388. 
 vi
 
remaining fundamentally imperial.9  Serhy Yekelchyk, in his examination of 
“Stalin’s empire of memory,” was the first historian of the Soviet Union that I read, 
who engaged directly with post-colonial theory in his argument that non-Russian 
elites actively defined the parameters of the center’s “imperialistic” nationalities 
policy.10  What interested me about these two major studies of Soviet “empire” 
during the Stalinist era was that they both used Ukraine as a test case for 
exploring its workings.11  While scholars, including Martin, have also examined 
“Soviet empire” in Central Asia,12 I remain intrigued by the problems of 
articulating difference from Russia and Russians that are particular to the 
Ukrainian case. 
Studying Ukraine’s role in the Soviet Union raises a number of unique 
questions, which are particularly suited for an analysis of the problem of visually 
representing difference.  In many ways, this dissertation is also a process of 
working through my own uneasiness with these questions of difference, and with 
my personal attempts to “see” it.  As I imagine is true for most historians of the 
Soviet Union, our knowledge of Ukraine came to us in the form of Russian 
History courses that continue to provide a more or less clear trajectory from Kiev 
to Moscow to St. Petersburg (and back to Moscow) as the explanation for the 
development of the modern Russian state.  Ukraine re-appears in Russian 
history in 1654 with the Treaty of Pereiaslav, which united Cossack-controlled 
Eastern Ukraine with Moscow.  Apart from the Battle of Poltava in 1709, 
however, Ukraine disappears again until the twentieth century.  In many 
respects, Russian historiography continues to define Ukraine’s importance in 
terms of its effects on the Russian state. 
At the same time, a native sense of Ukrainian difference has existed at 
least since the Cossack era, in the sixteenth century, and a modern nationalist 
                                                 
9 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-
1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 19.  
10 Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet 
Historical Imagination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 5. 
11 Martin also dedicates significant space in The Affirmative Action Empire to the Soviet east, 
Belarus, and the RSFSR. 
12 Douglas Taylor Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press, 2004). 
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movement has existed since the late nineteenth century.13  By the same token, 
just what is meant by “Ukraine” and “Ukrainian” has been a contentious issue, 
not the least of which because of its existence between several different empires 
and states since the late medieval era.  Only after World War II did one Ukraine 
exist as a nation, albeit within the pseudo-federal structure of the Soviet Union.  
Even today, perhaps especially today, Ukraine remains politically and culturally 
divided between Southeast and Northwest, Ukrainian-speakers and Russian-
speakers, urban and rural, advocates of EU participation and those who desire 
stronger ties with Russia.  In many ways, these divisions are the stuff of 
uninformed sound bites, and the contemporary political state of Ukraine is 
infinitely more complex, but perhaps also simpler.  The Soviet project, call it 
“imperial” or “multinational,” aimed to establish a unified image of what “Ukraine” 
signified, and what it meant to be Ukrainian.  It was particularly in the realm of 
images that these meanings could be articulated and questioned. 
My selection of these images has had to be extremely limited in order to 
engage in both formal analysis and contextual and theoretical interpretation.  But 
I followed certain principles in this selection process that I believe conform to the 
methodology employed herein and the questions I am interested in resolving.  
First, I only look at one of the several film studios operating in Ukraine during the 
1960s and 1970s, the Oleksandr Dovzhenko Studio of Feature Films in Kyiv.  
Odessa Studio, a film production facility that made movies even before the 
Revolution, constituted a vibrant showcase for young talent especially in the late 
1950s, with Soviet auteurs Marlen Khutsiev, Petr Todorovskii, and Kira Muratova 
getting their start there during the Thaw.14  In the 1960s and 1970s, the identity 
of Odessa Studio shifted to one that was at the forefront of production in popula
genres like adventure and comedy.  Stanislav Govorukhin, Boris Durov and 
r 
                                                 
13 Serhii Plokhy, “The Making of the Ruthenian Nation,” in The Origins of Slavic Nations: 
Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 161-202; John A. Armstrong, “Myth and History in the Evolution of 
Ukrainian Consciousness,” in Peter J Potichnyj, ed., Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical 
Encounter (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, University of Alberta, 
1992): 125-39. 
14 The moniker for Odessa Studio in the late-1950s and early-1960s was “Studio molodykh (The 
Studio of Youth).” 
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Vasilii Levin are the three most associated with this movement.  Odessa Studio, 
thus, made a significant transition from the politics of film authorship (which I 
explore in Chapter 4) that characterized the Thaw, to a politics of audience 
demand and mass culture, which characterized the post-Thaw moment 
(examined in the final chapter).  Nonetheless, filmmakers at Odessa did not 
participate in the specifically Ukrainian cultural politics that pervaded Dovzhenko 
Studio during this period.  The Odessity did not, like the Dovzhenkovtsy, consider 
themselves “Ukrainian filmmakers,” nor did they consider their work to be 
emblematic of “Ukrainian national cinema.”  Therefore, I feel it necessary to 
exclude this studio from analysis in this dissertation, believing that film production 
in Odessa must be examined in relation to central studios like Mosfil’m and 
Gor’kii.  Documentarists working in Kyiv (at the Kyiv Studio of Documentary Films 
and Newsreels), however, did participate in the cultural politics that emerged in 
Ukraine during the early 1960s, but I have felt it necessary to limit myself to 
fiction film in this dissertation, largely because the aesthetic assumptions behind 
documentary are quite different from feature film production.  Moreover, 
documentary was largely divorced from both auteurism and audience politics of 
the 1960s and 1970s.   
Because this dissertation deals overtly with the confluence of cinema, 
mass culture and nationality politics in Ukraine, Dovzhenko Studio is the site of 
my examination.  Yet, this one Ukrainian studio alone produced a daunting 
number of films to examine, which also would have made it impossible for me to 
accomplish the kind of rigid analysis of such texts that I desired.  Therefore, I 
have had to be selective in my choice of films, and have chosen those directors 
who made movies about the Carpathians, largely because so much of the 
discussion of “national character” and “national culture” centered on the small 
portion of this Eastern European mountain range located in Ukraine.  Alongside a 
number of films generally considered artistic achievements for the 1960s and 
1970s, I explore an assortment of genre films that engaged in the politics of 
Carpathophilia.  Chapters 3, 4, and 5 include analyses of specific films of 
importance, while Chapters 1, 2, and 5 will treat the dual phenomena of popular 
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and “official” filmmaking.  In stating the previous, I in no way want to argue for an 
antiquated dichotomy of high and low culture, or of propaganda and 
entertainment: In fact, I demonstrate in Chapter 3 how the Carpathian film was 
part of a generic system of film and literary production in Ukraine that emerged 
even before the Revolution.  At the same time, the cycle of Carpathian films 
during the 1960s and 1970s were in many cases conceived as “author-driven” 
expressions, and were highly modernist in their aesthetic outlook. 
 Apart from the films, I wanted to tell the story behind them, principally 
about the people who made them, but also about the authorities who put so 
many restrictions on the production of cinema in the Soviet Union, but who, 
perhaps more importantly, made these films possible.  I spent close to a year 
putting these stories together, from largely unused documents found in Ukrainian 
archives, principally at the Central State Archive Museum of Literature and Art of 
Ukraine, but also in the Ukrainian Party Archive, and the Ukrainian State Archive.  
In Moscow, I completed my research at the Russian State Archive of Literature 
and Art and the Russian State Library.  In addition to following debates about 
nationality and cinema in the central press, I read its much more extensive 
coverage in the Ukrainian-language press.  Ukraine was the only republic to have 
its own mass-circulation film monthly, modeled on Sovetskii ekran (The Soviet 
Screen), which emphasized and promoted Ukrainian cinema.  This magazine, 
Novyny kinoekrana (Screen News) has been a largely unexplored source for 
examining how one of the Union republics possessed its own culture industry 
even into the 1970s.  I find it particularly interesting that the Union of Ukrainian 
Cinematographers, who operated the magazine, clearly perceived Novyny 
kinoekrana as a means to promote a vernacular mass culture, with its emphasis 
on light reviews, full-color images of Ukrainian actors and actresses, and the 
promotion of their localized celebrity status.  Roman Szporluk has argued that 
Ukrainian-language newspapers dealing with art and culture were restricted in 
their coverage of high culture and folk culture, but neglected to articulate a 
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Ukrainian mass culture.15  Yet, we clearly see this represented in Novyny 
kinoekrana, the circulation of which reached 500,000 copies in the mid-1970s. 
In examining filmmakers’ attempts to create a Ukrainian mass culture 
through cinema, I also wanted to tell the story of those who watched these films, 
people who participated in the discursive construction of nationalistic value.  
Unfortunately, this latter task proved unrealistic.  The quantitative data that I 
found on audience reception is filtered through the lens of film sociology and the 
clichés of Soviet film critical discourse.  While I take up this topic in Chapter 5, 
such data does not tell us how individuals understood their relation to such 
nationalist texts as I examine in this dissertation.  For an understanding of 
audience subjectivities, I have relied largely on the words of those few who wrote 
letters to Ukrainian newspapers, magazines, and Dovzhenko Studio itself, but I 
cannot generalize about their words.  Instead, I view such rare texts as ways in 
which “ordinary spectators” (as they typically called themselves) self-consciously 
placed themselves within larger discourses that the much more accessible words 
of cultural and political elites contained. 
 Undoubtedly, the most difficult aspect of writing this dissertation was in its 
aim to take the visual quality of the filmic message seriously.  In this decision, I 
was reacting to two separate but related methodological problems:  First, I 
refused to treat films epiphenomenally as an “effect” of other, “larger” processes.  
Instead, I have found that films and filmmakers participated in the construction of 
history.  Second, in looking at the particular films that figure prominently in this 
dissertation, I wished to avoid reducing their meaning to the literary components 
of story and plot and to examine questions of visual style and iconography in a 
suitable complex manner.  In this respect, my graduate school experience was 
formative.  I consider myself lucky that my mentors in the History Department 
continually supported my desire to pursue extended coursework in Film Studies, 
rather than treating it as ancillary to historical research.  The colloquia and 
roundtables dedicated to “History of the Visual” held throughout the 2006/2007 
                                                 
15 Roman Szporluk, “The Press and Soviet Nationalities: The Party Resolution of 1975 and Its 
Implementation,” in Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2000), 277-297; originally published in Nationality Papers, 1986. 
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academic year at the Michigan’s Eisenberg Institute for History Studies also 
helped me in my interdisciplinary endeavors.  In particular, I hope to answer 
claims from art historians and films scholars that historians use images merely to 
“illustrate” supposedly larger points.  While I continue to use images by way of 
illustrating points outside of the filmic text (as, I believe, all historians should), in 
accepting that politics, and nationalist politics in particular, are infused with 
pathos and sentiment, I cannot help but ask what is available to embody such 
emotion.  The problem of national identity, I would argue, is fundamentally 
aesthetic in nature, and to avoid the visual dimensions that films contain in such 
a complex system of representation is to misunderstand its effects. 
 
*   *   * 
 Several individuals and institutions deserve my gratitude for the 
completion of this project.  First and foremost, my advisor, Bill Rosenberg, 
provided me with unconditional support and, equally important, the confidence to 
pursue such an unusual topic for a historian of the Soviet Union.  In a style that 
meshed nicely with my own method of working, Professor Rosenberg offered 
advice and deadlines when I needed them, but left me alone when I did not.  
Moreover, I hope that his way of approaching intellectual problems has worn off 
to some degree on my own thinking.  Johannes von Moltke, a brilliant film 
historian, has shown me the importance of taking film analysis seriously, and in 
particular for working so closely with me on Chapter 3.  Ronald Suny and Valerie 
Kivelson have shown patience in reading and listening to my frequently illegible 
ramblings.  Professor Kivelson, in particular, has been a good friend and, 
deservedly, a tough critic.  Of course, I would not be asking questions about 
Soviet nationalities policy if not for the pioneering work of Professor Suny.  I am 
honored that he agreed to read and advise me on this project, despite his 
absence from the University of Michigan until later in my graduate studies.  
Finally, Scott Spector has been an important influence on my studies in 
introducing me to work by historians on film outside of my Soviet field, and in 
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reminding me that my work needed to speak to a broader community of 
historians.   
Outside of Michigan, I owe a huge debt to Denise Youngblood for her 
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work on a film-related topic.  I also owe a lot to Josephine Woll, who tragically 
passed away as I was completing this dissertation.  Although I never met her in 
person, I was constantly influenced by her work on Thaw cinema.  I also want to 
thank my undergraduate advisor at the University of Missouri, Charles 
Timberlake, whose guidance of my thesis project helped prepare me for the 
rigors of graduate school. 
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IREX Individual Advanced Research Opportunities fellowship during the 2004-
2005 academic year.  While such support was essential for completing this 
project, all views expressed in it are entirely my own. 
 In Kyiv, I would like to thank Olena Ovcharenko at the Central State 
Archive Museum of Literature and Art of Ukraine for offering tea and her only 
space heater during the cold months I spent in her reading room.  Thanks to Irina 
Fomenko at the Oleksandr Dovzhenko National Film Center for screening a 
number of films unavailable through other means.  I am grateful to have met 
Svetlana and Miron Petrovskii, who not only provided a reasonably priced place 
to stay during part of my research, but also with their personal recollections about 




bearings when I first arrived in Kyiv and took time out of her busy life periodically 
to show me around town. 
 I am also grateful to have met a number of wonderful people while in 
graduate school, colleagues, friends, and my wife, who positively contributed to 
my intellectual development and influenced this project.  Conversations and 
arguments with Pete Soppelsa, Matt Ides, Anatoly Pinsky, Allison Abra, and 
Sonja Luehrman have all enriched this period of my life.  My wife, Sara Babcox 
First, deserves more gratitude than I could express in such a formulaic 
declaration, but I thank her most recently for taking so much time away from her 
own dissertation to read and comment extensively on this project.  Finally, I want 
to thank my parents, Sallie Spence and Bill First, in addition to my grandfather, 
Melvin First, for their unyielding support during my graduate studies. 
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Soviet cinema was an immense and costly cultural and industrial project, 
the medium’s novelty striving to assist the work of constructing new socialist and 
Soviet identities, while establishing a space for collective amusement.  While 
prior scholarship has examined Soviet cinema in terms of its role in reproducing 
class, state and gender identities, this dissertation, in its examination of the 
nationality question, expands upon the very definition of the goals of the cultural 
and industrial project itself.1  In affirmation of the complex relationship between 
the “nations” that composed the USSR and the centralized state in Moscow, 
authorities instructed its loyal servants in the film industry to create scenes of 
national belonging that did not contradict the function of a highly centralized and 
Russian-dominated political and cultural system.  Soviet cinema participated in a 
cultural project, which invested motion picture studios with the purpose to create 
and reproduce meaning out of categories of national difference within the USSR, 
while also attempting to reconcile these conceptions of difference.  As historians 
Ron Suny and Yuri Slezkine have pointed out, this creation and attempted 
resolution of national differences had dire consequences, both for how the Soviet 
Union functioned and how it eventually disintegrated.2  In my examination of the 
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nationality question in Soviet cinema, I intend to point toward the ways that 
cultural producers understood their relationship to national categories, how films 
made sense of them, and to examine the seemingly ancillary mediating factors 
on attempted cinematic resolutions to this key problem in Soviet cultural politics.   
The nationality question was not a new problem with the formation of the 
Soviet Union in the early 1920s, nor was it particular to the space of the former 
Russian Empire.  Central and East European Marxists during the late-nineteenth 
century found themselves not only in opposition to the Imperial governments, 
under which they resided, but also to a variety of nationalist movements that 
were emerging simultaneous to social democracy.  Whereas the overthrow of 
aristocratic and bourgeois class privilege that characterized imperial regimes 
remained an unproblematic goal for the political Left, the nationalities question 
resisted easy resolution, precisely because nationalists shared similar goals.  
The Left responded to such nationalist movements in a variety of ways.  Rosa 
Luxemburg most famously argued against the struggle for an independent 
Poland, believing that such nationalist interests were counter to the spirit of 
Marxist internationalism and socialist revolution.  Rather, they were merely a ruse 
by national bourgeoisies to erode workers’ consciousness of how capitalism 
functioned.3  Austrian social democrats Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, however, 
countered that, because nations had become historical realities, socialism could 
incorporate principles of national autonomy and the protection of national 
minorities within a federative state structure (in their case, one which maintained 
the territorial integrity of the Hapsburg Empire).4  Soviet leaders, and Lenin and 
Stalin in particular, too believed that nations would not disappear with the victory 
of communism, but defined them more restrictively than the Austrian Social-
Democrats.  In his 1913 tract, “Marxism and the National Question,” Stalin 
defined a nation as a “stable community” that shared a “common language,” 
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which he distinguished from “state communities” like Russia and Austria.5  As 
such, the “nationality question” related to how the promotion of national self-
determination could be mobilized in support of a distinctly transnational 
movement like socialism.  Yet, whereas sovereign nation-states emerged out of 
the disintegration of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires, a socialist “Union” of 
nationally defined “republics” replaced the Russian Empire.   
Thus, nationality remained a salient question in the USSR insofar as the 
rights the state granted to nations, collectively, and to members of particular 
nationalities, individually.  Soviet nationalities policy stretched far beyond the 
question of political rights, however, to embrace both highly essentialist and 
highly ambiguous claims about the very meanings of particular nationalities and 
national identities.  Thus, the nationality question refers both to the problem of 
national rights and to that of defining self and other within the context of a 
multinational socialist state.  Historian Terry Martin argues that even during the 
mid-1930s, with the terror against “bourgeois nationalism,” and various 
“affirmative action” indigenization policies halted, Stalin invented the metaphor of 
the “Friendship of Peoples” to describe the Soviet Union’s positive multinational 
character.  The “Friendship” celebrated non-Russian folk songs, dances, material 
culture and theater with countless “Festivals of National Culture” being held 
throughout the late 1930s in Moscow and all the Union republics.6  Moreover, the 
“Stalin Constitution,” adopted in 1936 at the beginning of the Great Terror, gave 
the right to each Republic of seceding from the USSR, but held that the entire 
Union had to ratify any territorial alteration.7  This formulation of mandated 
identity expression alongside an abnegation of political will nonetheless insisted 
that national units composed the Soviet Union, and that the state was essentially 
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above-national (sverkh-natsional’naia) or, perhaps, postnational.8  Martin refers 
to this political system as an “affirmative action empire,” which he labels a 
“strategy aimed at disarming nationalism by granting what were called the ‘forms’ 
of nationhood.”9  He understands the simultaneous promotion of non-Russian 
national identity and the vigorous persecution of “bourgeois nationalism” as the 
result of a bureaucratic division between “hard-line” and “soft-line” policies and 
institutions.  Whereas the central leadership considered the Soviet of 
Nationalities, commissioned to oversee and maintain non-Russian cultural 
institutions, a “soft-line” organization, the NKVD, a “hard-line” institution, was 
called on to persecute nationalism.  Each had their duties, and they rarely 
conflicted with each other in practice, even if they did in theory.10   
With Stalin’s articulation of the “Friendship of Peoples” metaphor in the 
late 1930s as a stable and unquestionable definition for the relationship between 
Soviet unity and multinational diversity, the nationality question had been 
resolved.  While Martin concludes his study with “soft-line” nationalities policy 
victorious in the late 1930s through such a metaphor expressed within a static 
system of cultural production, I argue that questions of national identity became 
newly contentious after Stalin’s death.  During the mid-1950s, several high-level 
Soviet authorities, including NKVD head Lavrentii Beriia and Deputy Premier 
Anastas Mikoian, voiced disapproval with the Russian bias of CPSU cadre 
development in the national republics during Stalin’s final years.  They expressed 
a renewed commitment to advancing the titular nationalities within the republics.  
In its re-deployment of personnel along national lines, many authorities also 
intended for the project of cultural nation-building to continue after the hiatus of 
high Stalinism.  Writers’ Unions in Georgia, Lithuania and Ukraine petitioned for 
an expansion of publication in non-Russian languages, and claimed exclusive 
rights over the thematic material related to their territory in art and literature.  
After 1960, the new filmmakers’ unions developed similar ideas for a new 
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construction of “national cinemas” in the republics, one which emphasized 
national difference over Soviet unity and the “Friendship of Peoples.”  While party 
leaders later questioned the loyalty of many filmmakers who constructed such 
images of national difference, they could never deal adequately with the 
presence of categories that determined meaningful resolution.  Why was the 
Soviet Union divided into Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, etc.?  Because Ukrainians, 
Georgians, Lithuanians, etc., live in those places.  But what did it mean to be 
Ukrainian, Georgian, Lithuanian, etc.?  By the late-1970s, Soviet authorities 
opted to leave this question unanswered, and thus ripe for the nationalist 
movements that emerged with glasnost’ a decade later, which eventually divided 
the country along strict republican lines.  Before the certainty about national 
identity that gripped non-Russian independence movements during 1989-92, and 
before the enforced silence on the issue a decade and a half earlier, cinema 
proved to be one of the primary sites of publicly exploring categories of national 
difference. 
*   *   * 
This dissertation defines nations as “imagined” and ideologically 
“constructed” sites of political and cultural action, emerging, in their present form, 
only under the conditions of modernity, which include a mass press, 
industrialized economy, compulsory education and conceptions of participatory 
politics.  As many historians have argued recently, people had to “invent” Ukraine 
as a nation and Ukrainians as a nationality before these ideas became political 
facts.11  This project proceeds from these ideas, but offers an interpretation of 
how “Ukraine” and “Ukrainian” functioned as constructs after the Soviet Union 
had supposedly solved the “nationality question.”  Not surprisingly, most 
scholarly work on the Soviet Union as a “nation-building” state deals with the 
1920s-1930s, that is, the period when Soviet leaders defined nationalities policy 
and its intended goals.  Due to this search for origins to the “question,” we have 
comparably less knowledge and methodological tools for evaluating how the 
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Soviet nations continued to be reproduced after the death of one of the architects 
of nationalities policy, Joseph Stalin.  In comparison to this earlier period, the 
1960s appear both stable and peaceful.  The post-Stalin political and economic 
order was in the process of consolidation, and there were few major challenges 
to it.  Soviet citizens could be proud of their country’s growing affluence, its 
advances in science and technology, and its superpower status in the world, 
even if they did not entirely accept the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the press and 
their leaders.  Within this context, we must view the nationality question 
alongside other elements of cultural dissent that emerged during this decade.  
Ukrainian dissidents, like their more famous brethren in Moscow, rejected the 
homogenization of “contemporary (sovremennyi)” Soviet life.  For them, 
nationality was a question of self-discovery, an experiential rather than rights-
based discourse that resembled what American commentators would call 
“identity politics.”12  While Ukrainian dissidents like Ivan Dziuba did appeal to 
political rights in their writings, more often they highlighted problems of media 
and popular representation, stereotyping, and the everyday and unofficial acts of 
discrimination that self-conscious Ukrainians experienced.  Against conformist 
notions of “contemporaneity (sovremennost’)” and the “Soviet image of life 
(Sovetskii obraz zhizni),” nationality was posed as a question of cultural diversity.   
Many Ukrainian filmmakers participated in this project of national self-
discovery, although not in an openly oppositional manner.  They crossed paths 
with Ukrainian dissidents, but did not enter their world entirely, principally 
because to do so would mean the end of their careers as filmmakers.  Yet, in 
working squarely within the field of Soviet cultural bureaucracies, and subject to 
economic plans and the desires of film audiences, Ukrainian filmmakers 
attempted to establish a more or less popular imagery and narrative of what it 
meant to be Ukrainian, both in the past and within the contemporary Soviet 
Union.  Cinema, much more so than literature or the other visual arts, is an 
inherently collaborative form, however, and subject to the interests, goals, and 
                                                 






intentions of a diverse and dispersed network of writers, directors, 
cinematographers, actors, studio and industry officials, Communist Party and 
government authorities, critics, and the administration of film distribution.  Many 
of these groups, and many within each of these groups, had little interest in 
questions of Ukrainian identity.  Others objected to what they labeled as 
Ukrainian cinema’s “ethnographic” conception of “national character” during the 
1960s, suggesting, also from the perspective of defending Ukrainian culture, that 
such a “fetishistic” and essentializing imagery denied Ukrainians’ position within 
the contemporary world and as beneficiaries of socialist modernity.  Nonetheless, 
the leadership of Kyiv’s Dovzhenko Feature Film Studio during this decade made 
a conscious decision to support a group of predominantly young filmmakers with 
a decidedly different image of Ukraine than the “Friendship of Peoples” metaphor 
could contain. 
As Anthony Smith argues, “The nation […] is not only known and 
imagined: it is also deeply felt and acted out.”13  While case studies on national 
formations investigate the ideologies of certain politicians and intellectuals, they 
rarely address the politics of representation: In the present case, this includes 
questions of what Ukrainians looked like, what Ukrainians sounded like, and in 
what kinds of spaces Ukrainians inhabited, especially as they took shape in 
popular imagery.  These issues too belong to a particular historical context, and 
constitute meaningful areas of investigation.  The construction and imagining of 
nations constitutes an essential historical problem, but this story in no way 
dispels how such an abstraction as that of a nation is reproduced.  This latter 
problem stretches beyond the moment of construction, and, in the Soviet Union, 
was implicated in the process of knowing oneself as a nationalized subject.  
Cinema offered entirely new representational possibilities for those who would 
promote a nationalist agenda, especially in establishing a vivid connection 
between national space and the natural landscape.  Film, moreover, provided a 
means to move away from the association of national identity exclusively with 
                                                 





national rights, and language rights in particular, that area of politics that 
dominated earlier efforts of Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals. 
The majority of filmmakers and writers in Ukraine were invested in the 
problem of revealing national difference, of coming to terms with what it meant to 
be Ukrainian in the absence of any project for achieving political sovereignty.  As 
such, the nationality question in the 1960s was tied to the problem of artistic, 
rather than political, representation.  In unintentional conformity with Charles 
Taylor’s definition of multiculturalism, the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia sought 
recognition for a culturally sophisticated notion of Ukrainian nationality, in some 
cases, as a precondition for political loyalty.14   
Two other factors contributed to the shift of nationality from a question of 
political rights to one of artistic representation and a striving for recognition of 
ethnic difference: First, in an attempt to overcome the effects of Stalinism in the 
arts, literary critics in particular demanded that authors look into themselves to 
find truth and authenticity in representation.  Khrushchev, moreover, gave tacit 
approval for this project in his critique of Stalin’s “personality cult” during the 
Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956.  According to their reasoning, artists 
and authors possessed power to create meaning, rather than simply charged 
with the responsibility to creatively interpret and “propagandize” a definitive 
political theme.  Ukrainian filmmakers saw the basis of “national cinema” located, 
not within a system of production based on a Stalinist imagery of non-Russians, 
but as a function of the artist’s/author’s personal expression.  In this function, 
filmmakers and writers were engaged in questioning the categories of national 
representation that the Stalinist system of cultural production had established 
with the “Friendship of Peoples” mythology.  In turn, the artist/author gained new 
credibility and importance as the producer of nationality itself, precisely because 
more cultural authorities were willing to view art as an autonomous “field” after 
Stalin.15 
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A second factor influencing the development of the nationality question 
during the 1960s emerged from the first: If nationality had become a problem of 
artistic representation, the ways the Soviet culture industry structured reception 
of cultural products was of key importance.  The spectator/reader was no longer 
exclusively the “object of reshaping,” as one scholar recently characterized early 
Soviet reception theory, but an active consumer of an increasingly diversified 
amount of media.16  The artist/author had to consider who would be interested in 
their work on self-consciously national subject matter.  On the one hand, this 
revision of Soviet media reception theory that took place in the 1960s intended to 
forge more particularized relationships between artists/authors and media 
consumers, but it also aimed to market particular types of “products” to specific 
segments of the population, in order to maximize financial returns on them.  
Thus, in cinema, melodrama would be directed toward women, adventure films 
toward young men, art films toward intellectuals (at home and abroad) and, at 
least potentially, national films toward members of those nationalities they 
claimed to represent.  In practice, however, the increasing commercialization of 
the Soviet film industry during the following decade meant that authorities were 
most interested in the desires of the most active segments of the film-going 
public.  Thus, Ukrainian filmmakers had to compete for the same spectators as 
Moscow filmmakers, rather than for “their own.”  Due to the considerably less 
cost involved in book production, literature did not have the same demands to 
generate profits as cinema did, and the relationship between text and reader less 
determined by new sociological theories of media consumption.  Thus, cinema 
provides us not only with a method to examine the new representational context 
of the nationality question, but also allows us to investigate new ways that 
cultural producers were conceptualizing a “national” public.   
While much that is contained in the previous negotiations between a 
Stalinist system of national representation and an author centered vision, and 
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between different types of conceptions of the media consumer, was common to 
all the cinemas of the national republics, Ukraine, and Dovzhenko Studio in Kyiv 
in particular, presents a number of unique issues for understanding the 
nationality question during the “long 1960s.”17  First, Ukraine was the most 
populous of the national republics that constituted the USSR, as Russia was 
itself a non-national federated republic composed of multiple national territories.  
Moreover, Ukrainian was the second largest “nationality” in the country, after 
Russian.  As such, they were the largest “national minority” in the 1960s with 
approximately 40 million people in the republic and elsewhere in the country 
(predominantly in the RSFSR and Kazakh SSR).18  Indeed, when Ukraine 
declared its independence on July 17, 1990, it signaled that the Soviet Union’s 
days were numbered.19  Second, Ukraine was an important component of the 
nationality question during its formation because it was the site of major 
resistance to Soviet power twice before the end of the Second World War.  
Between the Russian Civil War and World War II, Ukraine became a major 
testing ground for Bolshevik indigenization policies that, according to Martin, 
aimed to diffuse nationalism through granting “the ‘forms’ of nationhood” to non-
Russians.20   
Nonetheless, the common Soviet epithet of “bourgeois nationalism” 
frequently applied to Ukrainians in particular during the post-Stalin period, 
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suggesting an inherent quality that they possessed, and against which authorities 
always had to maintain strict vigilance in order to detect the subtleties of 
dangerous expression.  One interesting example of this occurred after the 
famous Kirghiz writer Chinghiz Aitmatov spoke “on the problems of national 
cinemas” at a 1967 conference.  After listening to a draft of the speech, film critic 
and industry functionary Aleksandr Karaganov stated that it contained a “small 
manifestation of nationalism,” which could “bring a Ukrainian under the yellow 
banner [of national independence].”21  Despite Aitmatov’s discussion of larger 
inequalities in the Soviet film industry that prevented the further development of 
cinema in the republics, critics read such complaints exclusively as a provocation 
for impressionable Ukrainians.   
While affirming an inherent connection between Ukraine and nationalism, 
central authorities also considered Ukrainians as one of the most easily 
assimilated groups into a Russian – that is, non-national – Soviet state identity.  
In many respects, the problem of Ukrainian identity in the 1960s related to the 
republic’s bilingual atmosphere combined with the high degree of Russian 
language comprehension among Ukrainians.  According to the 1970 census, only 
85% of ethnic Ukrainians in the USSR considered Ukrainian as their “native” 
language, the lowest of any nationality with a Union republic attached to it.  Not 
coincidentally, 86% of Ukrainians lived in the Ukrainian SSR, the implication 
being that Ukrainians living outside of the republic were almost certain to 
assimilate into the Russian-speaking population around them.22  Thus, Soviet 
conceptions of Ukrainian identity present us with an interesting paradox: On the 
one hand, Ukrainians were thought to be prone to “bourgeois nationalism,” 
something central authorities certainly feared, while also being marked for easy 
assimilation, partly in order to spread the civilizing mission to the more 
“backward” Soviet nations of Central Asia.  To many of those in power during the 
1960s, the Ukrainian language itself constituted a type of cultural excess, 
something that lacked practical necessity and thus possessed potentially 
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dangerous consequences.  Leonid Brezhnev indicated this fear during a 1969 
discussion of the “nationality question” with CPU First Secretary Petro Shelest, 
the latter a Russian-speaking Ukrainian who learned his “native” language after 
assuming his post in Ukraine.  Brezhnev asked Shelest why Soviet publishers 
needed to print materials in Ukrainian when almost all Ukrainians also knew 
Russian.  Offended, Shelest responded that Brezhnev would never ask a similar 
question of party leaders in the other republics.23  To him, mere knowledge of 
Russian was not equivalent to the absence of a separate national identity rooted 
in language itself.  The problem of Ukrainian language, then, related less to the 
needs of comprehension, and pointed more toward the recognition of cultural 
difference.   
The project for filmmakers and writers then became a justification for the 
maintenance of a Ukrainian cultural identity, and which defended a conception of 
cultural difference within the context of a largely bilingual population.  A fairly 
typical and mundane argument that emerged during a professional discussion in 
July 1968 of a now-forgotten Ukrainian film demonstrates the everyday political 
significance that filmmakers placed on the minutia of artistic representation.  One 
member of Dovzhenko Studio’s Artistic Council, the group that workshopped 
early footage before the studio sought final state approval, asked of director 
Volodymyr Dovhan whether his latest film would be released in Ukrainian or 
Russian.  The latter replied that he would shoot the material in Russian and 
immediately dub it into Ukrainian for republican release.  Dovhan’s interrogator 
continued, apparently unsatisfied with his answer:  
You understand, we have a lot of enemies [vorohiv] right now who position 
themselves against our activity.  Even among our brother republics such 
people appear, who come here sometimes, and say it all into the 
microphone, particularly about the language that we speak here.  Thus, 
[our] material works as propaganda.24 
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The very existence of a Ukrainian-speaking public was fragile at best, 
necessitating the work of “propaganda” to generate recognition from potential 
“enemies” on the outside.  The questioner’s point of contention in Dovhan’s film 
was more specific, however, as he took the director to task for the presence in 
the footage of a municipal sign that contained the Russian words, 
“Автоинспекция УССР (Automobile Inspection U[krainian] SSR),” rather than the 
Ukrainian “Автоінспекція УРСР.”  Such a representational faux pas, minor as it 
might appear to the contemporary viewer, was tantamount to a denial of national 
difference, according to Dovhan’s critic.25  Like Dovhan himself, most of the 
younger filmmakers who came to work at Dovzhenko Studio during the 1960s 
were Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and consequently perceived less meaning in 
representing Ukraine as linguistically pure.  While individuals like Dovhan’s critic 
promoted their political rights to speak Ukrainian in conducting party and state 
business, the younger generation found little incentive to learn a language that 
they had lost while being raised in an urban and cosmopolitan environment.  In 
coming to work at Dovzhenko Studio, an institution that promoted Ukrainian 
national identity, younger filmmakers butted heads with earlier conceptions of the 
nationality question, while attempting to forge a new politics of artistic 
representation that incorporated post-Stalinist interest in modernism.  As the 
above example indicates, language could not remain the sole dimension of the 
nationality question for Ukrainians, despite what Brezhnev indicated to Shelest.   
Filmmakers during the 1960s pushed for other forms of recognition of 
Ukrainian difference, principally located in a modernist exploration of Ukrainian 
folklore, but one which rejected the stereotypical notions of non-Russians 
contained in an earlier system of folkloric representation.  In part, this new 
interest in folklore was a means to play with such canonical forms of 
“Ukrainianism,” but it also suggested that folklore remained the idiom through 
which Soviet citizens, including the filmmakers themselves, understood the 
republic and its people.  For filmmakers during the 1960s, however, cinema could 
function to reveal the authentic character of Ukrainian folklore rather than its 
                                                 





ideological function to justify the Soviet political system.  In contrast to a Stalin-
era mobilization of a “folklore of consensus,”26 such filmmakers relied on 
representations of exceptional Ukrainian spaces, ones which were unfamiliar, 
and thus outside of the “Friendship of People’s” canon of national characters and 
landscapes. 
Much of the cultural work that went into this project emerged from the 
possibilities of Ukrainian “re-unification” in 1939, which brought the regions of 
Galicia, Volynia, Bukovyna and Trans-Carpathia into the Ukrainian SSR.  While 
there were early attempts to assimilate eastern and western parts into a “whole” 
Ukraine during the Stalin era, the results were predictable in their teleology of 
Russian/Soviet liberation of Western Ukraine from the Austrian, Polish and 
Romanian landlords.  During the 1960s, filmmakers at Dovzhenko Studio would 
discover an exceptional and unfamiliar space of Ukrainian authenticity in the 
western oblasts, which had been lost in the east to a Soviet-style modernity and 
Russian cultural hegemony.  While not all of the filmmakers that I examine in this 
dissertation set all their films in the western oblasts, they approached Ukraine as 
unfamiliar territory, a territory that required re-exploration and a reimagining of its 
landscape and principle historical tropes.  But this kind of knowledge of Ukraine 
was predicated on the continued existence of the Soviet Union itself, as an image 
of a conformist and Russocentric dystopia, which engaged Ukrainian filmmakers 
dually in the post-Stalinist cultural politics of personal expression and national 
awareness.  Filmmakers’ explorations of Ukrainian identity were as much, or 
more so, self-explorations as they were attempts to propagate a collective 
national imaginary.  
Despite their personal-centered vision of the Ukrainian nation, filmmakers 
frequently found themselves forced to address real audiences.  In approaching 
the “problem of cinema and spectator,” as Soviet film industry authorities and 
critics alike identified what they viewed as the changing relationship between 
cultural producers, texts and publics after Stalin, filmmakers had to show 
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willingness to engage with a consumer-centered media landscape.  During the 
1960s, discursive divisions between “elite” cinema and popular cinema were 
taking shape, with many of the newer directors at Dovzhenko Studio acquiring 
associations with the former category.  Ukrainian identity, as envisioned by these 
(mostly) young filmmakers working in Kyiv during the 1960s, was an intentionally 
exclusive project, made to appeal to a particular kind of educated audience.  Yet, 
Soviet authorities demanded that filmmakers make “cinema for everyone (kino 
dlia vsekh),” rather than cinema, as one critic put it, “for my friends.”27  At the 
same time, films on “national” subject matter were by definition tied into a Soviet 
cultural policy that fostered the development of non-Russian literatures, theaters 
and other “high” forms.  Popular cinema in the 1960s, however, engaged with 
generic models of entertainment cinema – melodrama, adventure, science 
fiction, etc. – which appeared uninterested in what the industry defined as “the 
national theme.”  Thus, engagement with audiences presented its own series of 
problems that filmmakers were hard-pressed to resolve within the context of 
“national cinema.”  As I show in this dissertation, the nationality question 
emerged anew during the 1960s within these tensions: first, in the articulation of 
national difference against a supposedly conformist notion of Soviet culture, and 
second between conceptions of elite and popular publics. 
In the remainder of this introduction, I hope to address some persistent 
problems in Ukrainian historiography and argue that film and the practice of 
filmmaking provide sources for understanding the complex relationship between 
nationalism, socialism and the growing space of commercial culture in the Soviet 
Union.  The majority of historiography on Soviet Ukraine between the end of the 
Second World War and the fall of the Soviet Union was concerned with the 
problem of negotiating national rights between the Soviet state and the Ukrainian 
people.  This dissertation aims to move the problem of Soviet nationalities policy 
away from questions of rights to explore the problem of artistic representation, in 
part because the period under examination demands that we look at different 
questions than had been present during the 1920s and 1930s.  In this respect, I 
                                                 





not only intend to address the relationship between Ukrainian cultural producers 
and the Soviet ideological regime, but also ideas about artistic production in 
Ukraine during the 1960s, its relationship to specific filmic texts, and between 
such texts and audiences.  Only then can we begin to understand the new 
context of the nationality question after Stalin, where tensions not only existed 
between particularlistic national identities and “Soviet” identities, but also 
between so-called national representation and personal expression, and between 
national representation and the growing space of commercial culture, tensions 
which came out of post-Stalin literary debates and the stagnation of the Brezhnev 
period.  
 
The Politics of Ukrainian Historiography 
 
Prior historiography concerning the Ukrainian lands assumed a marked 
distinction between the historical processes that produced contemporary Ukraine 
and those that produced Russia, and which attempted to dispel the idea that the 
former was only a region of the latter rather than a separate nation.  One of the 
first ruptures in this methodological focus on “national history” came a few years 
after Ukrainian independence, with historian Mark von Hagen asking, “Does 
Ukraine have a history?”  Of course, the question suggested more than its literal 
meaning.  While rejecting the conception of Ukraine as “Little Russia,” von Hagen 
nonetheless questioned whether the territory of the recently independent Ukraine 
had a specifically “national” history of its own.  Instead, he argued that Ukrainian 
history, with its division between several empires and states throughout most of 
its past, points to the greater importance of regional and local spaces than what a 
contemporary nationalist agenda would indicate.28  Von Hagen pointed toward a 
certain political investment in Ukrainian history, calling the few who had studied it 
during the Cold War, both in the West and in Soviet Ukraine, “professional 
ethnics.”  Ukrainian historiography in North America did, in fact, have its political 
motivations, largely in tune with the politics of the broader diasporic communities 
                                                 





in Canada and the United States, which generally viewed Russian/Soviet control 
as a violation of Ukrainian claims to national sovereignty.  In the decade since 
von Hagen’s article, the study of Ukraine has followed broader trends in 
Russian/Soviet historiography, particularly in its increasingly complex analysis of 
the origins and development of the nationality question.  In its move toward an 
examination of the constructed dimensions of national identity and the political 
imaginary of nationalist ideologies, scholars have looked at the ways that the 
USSR was a “nation-building” state, rather than a new “prisonhouse of 
nationalities,” as one critic of the Soviet Union once put it.29  Thus, von Hagen’s 
rhetorical question has become less relevant with Ukraine now serving as an 
interesting scenario for discussing the construction of nations during the 
Revolutions of 1917 and into the Stalinist period, rather than continuing to serve 
the goals of the Cold War or Ukrainian diaspora agendas.   
This newer trend followed larger developments in Soviet historiography, 
first evident in Ronald Suny’s work, which argued against calling Moscow’s 
relations with the Soviet periphery solely “imperialistic,” and instead for the 
importance of the central government’s efforts to further pre-revolutionary 
nationalist goals.  In this conception, national identities underwent further 
articulation only under the conditions of a Soviet nationalities policy.30  Yuri 
Slezkine further explicates Suny’s conception, itself grounded in “modernist” and 
“constructivist” explanations of nations and nationalism, drawing on the metaphor 
of the “the USSR as a communal apartment.”  For Slezkine, the “communal 
apartment” shows how the Soviet state attempted to celebrate both the separate 
“space” of each “nation” that comprised the Soviet Union, alongside the image of 
inter-ethnic unity that had emerged with Soviet modernity.  Moreover, Slezkine 
sees nationality as a construct that eclipsed class’s importance for the Soviet 
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project beginning in the Stalin era.31  Later monographs dealing with Soviet 
nationalities policy, such as Martin’s, Amir Weiner’s, David Brandenberger’s and 
Francine Hirsch’s work, took this line of argumentation further, stating that we 
can see a virtual erasure of class as a useable political, social and legal category 
by the mid-1930s.  Based largely on a pragmatic approach to state power, Lenin, 
Stalin, and company realized that nationality was the only way to rule such an 
ethnically diverse political entity.32  The novelty of this interpretation becomes 
apparent only within the context of earlier Sovietology, which viewed non-
Russian nationalism only as a challenge to the totalitarian order, rather than as 
constitutive of the political system itself.33   
A nascent Ukrainian studies emerged during the 1950s, at once affirming 
a Ukrainian diaspora agenda and a broader Cold War narrative of Soviet/Russian 
imperialism.  One of the earliest studies of Soviet Ukraine was John Reshetar’s 
The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism (1952), which 
examined the development of the Ukrainian nationalist movement from the late-
nineteenth century to its crescendo during the Russian Revolution and Civil 
War.34  Like many scholars who would follow, Reshetar described the 
development of Ukrainian national consciousness through the acquisition of a 
literary voice: In this formation, nationalist politics emerged from cultural 
awareness.  Ukrainian nationalism’s point of origin was poet and painter Taras 
Shevchenko, who was the first to use the vernacular in his published work during 
the 1830s.  Shevchenko himself moved from cultural engagement to politics in 
co-founding the underground Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius in 1845, 
which promoted a pan-Slavic confederation of nations, based on equal relations, 
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rather than on Russian imperial dominance.  In the later years of the century, use 
of written Ukrainian was severely restricted in Russian-controlled Ukraine, and in 
1876, Emperor Alexander II issued the Emskii Ukaz, which forbid written 
Ukrainian entirely.35  Thereafter, vernacular culture developed in Hapsburg 
Western Ukraine.  In Galicia, Ukrainian organizations and the Ukrainian language 
itself was tolerated and, in some cases, encouraged by the government, largely 
in its potential role in challenging their neighbors to the east.  Within such a geo-
political framework, early Ukrainian nationalism perceived the acquisition of 
language rights as a fundamental component of its ideological program.  
In the manner that Miroslav Hroch suggested in Social Preconditions of 
National Revival in Europe, cultural nationalism developed into political 
nationalism, and underground political parties formed in Kyiv and Kharkiv by the 
turn of the century.36  When the Romanov dynasty fell in February 1917, a 
conglomeration of socialist, liberal, and populist parties formed the Central Rada 
in Kyiv a month later, and declared full independence for the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic (UNR) at the same time as the Bolsheviks were dissolving the 
Provisional Government in Petrograd.  As Reshetar pointed out, the Rada 
supported Lenin only insofar as Lenin genuinely supported “national self-
determination” for the “oppressed nations” of the former Russian Empire.   
Shortly thereafter, however, the small Bolshevik faction of the Rada 
attempted to seize power in Kyiv, and created an alternate Ukrainian capital in 
Kharkiv to form the first Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic when that failed.  
Meanwhile, nationalists in Hapsburg controlled Ukraine declared independence 
and formed the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (ZUNR), adding yet another 
nascent political entity to the territory.  With the gathering momentum of the 
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Bolsheviks from the east, and Anton Denikin’s anti-Communist Volunteer Army 
from the south, some members of the disintegrating Rada looked to Germany for 
support.  After several violent changes of power between 1918 and 1921 – from 
a moderate socialist Ukraine under historian Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, to the 
German puppet government of Pavlo Skoropads’kyi, to Symon Petliura’s 
nationalist regime – Ukraine came under Bolshevik control and became a 
founding member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.37  For members of 
the original Rada, this turn of events represented a total failure for the Ukrainian 
national movement, not only because Ukraine entered into union with a political 
entity that resembled the same Russian Empire that fell in 1917, but also 
because Ukrainian lands remained divided between a reconstituted Polish 
Republic, which defeated the ZUNR government, Romania (which controlled the 
province of Bukovyna) and Bolshevik controlled Eastern Ukraine.  Reshetar 
concluded that the independence movement failed as a viable political entity 
because Ukrainians, and especially the peasantry, had yet to develop a sufficient 
level of national consciousness.  In Reshetar’s conception, consciousness was 
something that naturally emerged under certain social and political conditions, 
but which failed to materialize in the Ukrainian case, implicitly due to its “temporal 
lag” behind the more modern nations of East Central Europe.38   
In John A. Armstrong’s seminal Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945, 
published a few years later, he took up the problem of Ukrainian nationalism 
during the Second World War.  In his work, Armstrong explored Ukraine’s second 
major challenge to the Soviet state, focusing on the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists (OUN) and its military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) 
during and after World War II.  The OUN emerged in 1930s Polish-controlled 
Ukraine under the auspices of national liberation.  After the 1938 German 
invasion, OUN leader Stepan Bandera found military support from Nazi Germany 
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to aid in ethnically cleansing Poles from western and central Ukrainian lands.  
After the initiation of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1941, 
and the increasingly violent approach to the war-time occupation, the OUN 
began to fight the Germans and Soviet partisans.39  In 1943, members of the 
OUN formed the UPA, with the express goal of fighting the Red Army after the 
elimination of the German threat.  By the end of the German occupation, UPA 
had up to 100,000 soldiers,40 who continued to fight the Soviet Army from 
underground during the remainder of the decade.  Like Reshetar, Armstrong 
attributes the failure of the nationalist movement against Soviet Russia to 
questions beyond practical issues of unequal resources to the problems of 
national “consciousness” itself, particularly its absence among the eastern 
Ukrainian population.  In essence, UPA’s vision of an independent Ukraine was 
much too divisive for Soviet Ukrainians to assimilate.   
After Armstrong, studies of Soviet Ukraine turned directly toward an 
examination of the repressive organs of Soviet power, along with positing an 
understanding of Eastern Ukrainian national consciousness.  After all, scholars 
had to deal with the fact that the richest flowering of Ukrainian culture occurred 
within the context of Soviet control during the inter-war period.  While Armstrong 
and Reshetar were interested in actions that would lead to national 
independence, much of the later historiography would concern itself with the 
production of national consciousness itself, particularly within the context of 
Bolshevik indigenization policies in the 1920s.  Literary scholar, George S. N. 
Luckyj, himself a World War II-era refugee from Soviet-occupied Galicia, was 
among the first to examine this topic in his 1956 monograph Literary Politics in 
the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934.  Luckyj viewed Ukrainian literature as the nexus 
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of Bolshevik-inspired Ukrainianization policies during the 1920s.  Through the 
promotion of cultural production and vernacular education, Ukrainianization 
aimed to construct a linguistically pure space in Eastern Ukraine, aiming to force 
assimilated Ukrainians and Russians residing in the republic to speak Ukrainian, 
and thus reproducing national consciousness and undoing the repressive 
practices of Imperial Russia.   
Luckyj contended, however, that the Ukrainian people had matured as a 
nation by the 1920s, but that the Bolsheviks, as duplicitous Russian chauvinists, 
wanted to keep Ukrainian culture provincialized.  He proposed to study “the 
conflict between the Communist Party and Ukrainian literature,” making it clear 
that he viewed these two institutions as irreconcilable.41  While admitting that 
such indigenization policies in Ukraine emanated from Moscow, Luckyj argued 
that they were merely pragmatic considerations to appease a largely hostile 
native intelligentsia at the end of the Civil War.42  Ukrainianization was merely a 
self-interested attempt by Russian Bolsheviks to bring Ukrainian culture back 
under Russian culture’s imperial wing.43  Given the freedom to express itself, 
Luckyj posited, the Ukrainian intelligentsia was more “Western” oriented than 
their Russian counterparts.44  He concluded his story with Stalin’s consolidation 
of power through the First Five-Year Plan, during which the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia had been demolished in a series of violent purges.  
“Ukrainianization” had ended by 1932, with many of its promoters shot under the 
charge of “bourgeois nationalism.”  In what appears as the crux of Luckyj’s 
argument, he writes that Ukrainian intellectuals “welcomed the opportunity to 
propagate Ukrainian language and culture, forgetful of that part of the bargain in 
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which they were required to pay the devil his due.”45  His story ends in 1934 
because that year essentially marked the end of “literary politics” itself in the 
republic. 
Apart from Yaroslav Bilinsky’s The Second Soviet Republic, which 
focused on the immediate post-war and early Khrushchev years, there was 
relatively little historical scholarship in the West on Soviet Ukraine until the 
1980s.  Most of the work published during the 1960s and 1970s was on 
contemporary politics in Ukraine.  The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a series 
of new works focused on the Revolution and 1920s in Ukraine, but they offered 
little in the way of original analysis.  One such work was James Mace’s 
Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation (1983), which once again 
took on Ukrainianization.  A student of Roman Szporluk and Luckyj, Mace paid 
due attention to Bolshevik leaders’ pragmatic and honest attempts to support 
Ukrainianization, but largely remained fixed to an explanation of conflict between 
Ukrainian nationalism and Russian Bolshevism.  Mace, however, took the Luckyj 
argument further – Russians not only wanted to provincialize Ukraine and 
Ukrainian culture, but also practiced genocide against the Ukrainian people for 
the few who refused to participate in the Soviet project.  Thus, he concluded his 
study with the assertion that the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine was a deliberate 
policy meant to crush the remnants of Ukrainian nationalism unleashed with 
Ukrainianization.  Essential to Mace’s promotion of the genocide argument was 
that Stalin and a faction of Russian chauvinists in the CPSU personally sought 
revenge against the Ukrainian people for the actions of nationalist intellectuals 
during the 1920s.46 
The first revisionist attempt at understanding inter-war Ukrainian history is 
Terry Martin’s Affirmative Action Empire, although he places Ukrianianization 
within a broader framework of the 1920s-30s Soviet indigenization drive, 
exploring how it occurred in unique ways in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Soviet 
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East.  Martin significantly departs from the “consciousness” paradigm to explore 
how a myriad of political interests were at play in the nationality question.  Using 
an extensive body of archival evidence, Martin not only speaks of Moscow’s 
active support of Ukrainianization, but also demonstrates how Stalin and his 
colleagues were instrumental in forming and enforcing it.  The much-maligned 
Lazar Kaganovich, who was CPU First Secretary during 1925-28, forbade anti-
Ukrainianization statements in the press, and mandated firings for party leaders 
who did not make an effort to learn and speak Ukrainian.  Thus, while Ukrainian 
“national communists” like Oleksandr Shums’kyi and Mykola Skrypnyk drafted 
Ukrainianization, it took a Russian-speaking Jew to pursue it as a “core Bolshevik 
project,” and to use force to back up its policies.47  Moreover, Martin shows that 
by the late 1920s ethnic Ukrainians themselves were among the most openly 
hostile to Ukrainianization, precisely because it did not contain the possibility that 
Ukrainians might speak Russian as their “native” language.48  In its rejection of 
“forced Ukrainianization,” the center demanded the establishment of a truly 
bilingual ethnic space in 1933, with a particular concern not to ignore the 
concerns of Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the republic, 
especially in the industrial Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine.  Martin concludes, 
“Comprehensive Ukrainianization was abolished but it was not replaced with a 
policy of Russification.”49  Thus, he resolves the problem of the simultaneous 
promotion of ethnic particularism and the persecution of bourgeois nationalism, 
without resorting to prior explanations that privileged an essentialized notion of 
“national consciousness.” 
Serhy Yekelchyk’s Stalin’s Empire of Memory offers a different 
counterpoint to Luckyj’s and Mace’s conception of Stalinism in Ukraine.  In 
asserting that “nationally conscious” Ukrainians actively participated in the 
Stalinist politics of culture rather than merely being the victim of it, Yekelchyk 
reconceptualizes agency under Stalin, even as he continues to maintain 
Stalinism’s essentially destructive energy.  Stalin’s Empire of Memory takes up 
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where Luckyj left off in 1934 to examine the story of Ukrainian intellectuals’ 
engagement with the Moscow leadership, from the height of the purges to the 
post-war stagnation of late Stalinism.50  In positing a “dialogue” between center 
and periphery even during the darkest moments of Stalinism, Yekelchyk does not 
so much erase the terror and violence of these years, as he suggests the ways in 
which the Moscow leadership remained involved in a process of negotiation with 
local authorities in Ukraine.  In this way, Yekelchyk also demonstrates how 
Soviet nationalities policy was not merely a “concession” to non-Russian 
nationalism during NEP, but something of essential importance to the ideological 
foundations of the Soviet state.   
Moreover, the nature of Stalinist nationalities policy is the context from 
which we must see the later emergence of the dissident movement and the 
1960s in Ukraine as a whole.  Yekelchyk concludes his study with a note about 
this later period:  
The “sixtiers” took up the restoration of the national narrative not because 
they were nationalists by nature but because they had grown up in Stalin’s 
empire of memory, and that empire had failed to produce a non-national 
version of the past.51 
 
While true to a large extent, Yekelchyk fails to account for the particular 
conditions of the post-Stalin period, and what kind of new interests were 
available for cultural producers during the 1960s. 
A second problem with this literature concerns the central conflict between 
the party and intellectuals that it encompasses.  With few exceptions, historians 
of Soviet Ukraine affirm that “politics” was located within the Party, while “culture” 
was located within the realm of literature.  In this context, the politics of culture, 
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along with the politics of nationality, is explained through a pragmatic approach: 
Ukrainians with national consciousness want autonomy from “Russian 
imperialism,” while the “Russians” want to, alternately, placate or eliminate the 
threat of Ukrainian national consciousness.  Such a research agenda has 
foregrounded explanation over analysis and interpretation of cultural texts.  
Scholars within this field have been convinced that political interaction was the 
basis of national identity formation, without investigating the texts available that 
underlie nationalist appeals.  Cultural products were just that: the product of 
those political negotiations.  In foregrounding questions of artistic representation 
in Ukrainian cinema and the problem of popular reception, this dissertation 
breaks with prior approaches to the nationality question as a function of either the 
“politics of culture” or the political negotiation of power between Moscow and the 
national republics.  My understanding of “politics” is somewhat broader: instead 
of a concern with state power and ideology, I hope to examine those elements of 
politics that emerge from representational practice and knowledge production.  
Within this context, I see the period after Stalin as exceptional, rather than just 
“post-.” 
 
Soviet Ukraine during the “Long 1960s” 
 
CPU First Secretary Mykola Pidhornyi began his speech at the 22nd 
Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party (hereafter, CPU) in October 1961 
with the words, “The contemporary generation of Ukrainians knows about the 
difficult past of our people perhaps only from literature.”  Thus, he highlighted the 
importance of fictional representations for giving meaning to Ukrainian identity 
and national memory.  In proceeding to list writers that belonged squarely in the 
tradition of classical nineteenth-century prose, however, Pidhornyi suggested that 
contemporary reproductions were both unnecessary and thus inherently 
problematic, due to the nationalist polemic that characterized Ukrainian literature 
as a whole.52  In the present moment of the 22nd Congress, Ukraine was 
                                                 





meaningful only insofar as it had overcome its backwardness as a “colony” of 
Imperial Russia, Austria or Poland, and had entered the age of socialist 
“contemporaneity.”  To belabor the presence of Ukrainian difference might open 
a can of worms about the continued oppression of the Ukrainian people, a 
suggestion outside the realm of Soviet possibilities.  Yet, perhaps Pidhornyi’s 
statement included an element of wishful thinking, as the 1960s heralded a new 
period of fictional engagement with interpretations of Ukraine’s past and present.  
Writers and artists, especially among the “contemporary generation,” viewed 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of the “cult of personality” as a signal for a more 
honest system of representation more broadly.  In Ukraine, many segments of 
the creative intelligentsia read Khrushchev’s statements explicitly through the 
lens of nationalities policy, with the possibility to continue the halted traditions of 
both the nineteenth and early twentieth-century masters and the Ukrainian 
modernists of the 1920s.  In a letter to Pidhornyi on the eve of the 22nd Congress 
of the CPU, for example, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Filmworkers’ Union 
(hereafter, SKU) Tymofii Levchuk wrote that the end of the “personality cult” 
should aid in the development of a Ukrainian film culture, the likes of which were 
not allowed under Stalin.53 
Yet, the cultural changes that emerged during the “long 1960s” in the 
USSR were not associated unidimensionally with the (albeit, uneven) processes 
of de-stalinization.  The Ukrainian cultural movement that emerged during this 
period was furthermore engaged with the Thaw project of rediscovering authentic 
experience, something that had immediate resonance in literature and literary 
criticism after Stalin’s death.  Moreover, the protagonists of this movement were 
principally young people, many of who were as interested in contemporary 
cultural developments in Western Europe and the United States as they were 
with promoting a new vision of Ukrainian identity.  While vast cultural, political 
and social differences continued to divide the capitalist democracies of Western 
Europe and the Soviet Union and its satellite states, we can see a certain 
convergence that occurred during this time that British historian Arthur Marwick 
                                                 





characterized as the phenomenon that we understand as “the sixties.”54  Like in 
the United States and the countries of Western Europe, young people were 
newly present in public life in the Soviet Union, many of them defining 
themselves in opposition to the World War II generation.  Just as young people in 
the west established “underground” bookstores, record labels, and movie 
production facilities, Soviet youth began to self-publish anti-authoritarian 
literature and political tracts in what came to be known throughout the world as 
“samizdat.”  At the same time, communist party authorities, even into the 1970s, 
believed it inherently good to support young people in the party hierarchy and in 
the specialist and creative professions.  Thus, the new leadership after Stalin 
enabled youth initiative, despite the wide range of such activities that it 
considered detrimental.  Most important, Soviet youth during the 1960s 
participated in a pan-European cultural exchange, whereby contact with Western 
pop music, movies, fashions and ideas became widespread.  In part, this 
occurred through the unprecedented presence of Soviet citizens in western 
Europe and westerners in the USSR, but also through official and unofficial 
modes of market exchange between eastern and western Europe.   
Within this context, young people had different reasons to be interested in 
the nationality question than their parents’ generation, who came of age on the 
eve of World War II.  For this later generation, interest in Ukrainian identity was 
connected with a rejection of mainstream cultural policy, associated as it was 
with opaque bureaucracies and outdated folkloric stereotypes of what Soviet 
ideology had determined that they were.  At the same time, these young 
Ukrainians who participated in the nascent Ukrainian cultural movement were the 
first born under Soviet power rather than in the Russian or Hapsburg Empires or 
inter-war Poland, and as such they had also assimilated the comparably new 
Soviet political culture and its associated identity.  For example, like any Soviet 
political theorist worth his salt, dissident Ivan Dziuba included extensive and 
selective quotation from Lenin in his samizdat tract, Internationalism or 
Russification? (circ. 1966), in order to highlight and argue against a broad policy 
                                                 





of discrimination against Ukrainian culture.  While many young people were 
questioning certain tenants of Soviet life, they were doing so from the position of 
ideological authority.  But rather than conceptualizing themselves as exclusive 
members of one ideological “camp,” this new generation of writers and artists 
were able to borrow freely from multiple creative sources, which circulated across 
Europe and North America.   
The relationship between this young generation of Ukrainian intellectuals 
and the organs of power became more complex with the ascent of Petro Shelest 
as the CPU First Secretary in 1963.  Unlike Pidhornyi, Shelest gave open 
validation to many of the new concerns of this decade, believing in the 
possibilities for a genuinely “contemporary” Ukrainian literature and art.  Yet, in 
sharing many convictions with the older generation of nationally aware Ukrainian 
intellectuals, he maintained a firm belief in the “Friendship of Peoples” mythology, 
implicitly accepting central control over political and cultural life in the republic as 
a precondition to Ukraine’s status as a nation.  In this way, Shelest continued to 
provoke the ire of “non-conformist” Ukrainian writers and artists, who sought 
recognition of Ukrainian difference from Russia.  Most problematic for Shelest 
was the new fixation in Ukrainian art and literature with a loss of cultural identity, 
as the First Secretary continued to believe that new meaning could be inserted 
into the archetypical Soviet concept of “national in form, socialist in content.”   
Nonetheless, Shelest too was a product of the post-Stalin era, and came 
to political maturity in the wake of the Twentieth Party Congress.  Although 
Khrushchev and Pidhornyi had brought Shelest to his post as a trustworthy and 
capable technocrat, it was this new cultural landscape that Shelest felt compelled 
to address more and more frequently as he moved up through the ranks of the 
CPU.  As a full member of the Politburo in the early 1960s, Shelest was at the 
apex of power in Moscow, but seemingly viewed his Ukrainian position as of 
primary importance.  Historian Iurii Shapovala writes that Shelest was the first 





something better in Moscow.55  Thus, he frequently privileged his sentimental 
attachment to Ukrainian space over his political ambitions.  The Shelest idea, 
Shapolava writes, “was based on a peculiar dual loyalty – [one that was] all-
Union and [at the same time] republican, continuously maneuvering between two 
political discourses – centralization and anti-centralization.”56  Shelest became 
one of the political enablers of the “Renaissance” of Ukrainian culture during the 
1960s, but also one who failed to understand the new intentions of young artists 
and writers in the republic, connected as they were with a pan-European 
modernism and, paradoxically, with a sense of loss over an imagined “traditional” 
way of life.  At the same time, as a Russian-speaking Ukrainian whose career 
more closely resembled Khrushchev’s than his supposedly Cossack ancestors, 
the First Secretary looked toward writers, artists and filmmakers for his image of 
an “authentic” Ukraine.  In many ways, Shelest articulated the particular space of 
national politics as a function of artistic representation, while not sidestepping his 
political duties in Moscow, which were divorced from his cultural duties in 
Ukraine.  Whereas Shelest formed alliances and enemies in Moscow based on 
his policy objectives, in Ukraine his network was established based on his 
cultural affinities. 
Of course, culture and politics were never mutually exclusive areas of 
power in the USSR, as evidenced by Shelest’s ouster in the mid-1970s for his 
“independent” thinking.  Despite the emergence of a Ukrainian cultural movement 
that penetrated the CPU hierarchy and mainstream cultural enterprises, policy 
decisions continued to privilege the pragmatic goals of civic unity.  The Third 
Party Program, adopted at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in September 1961, 
for example, continued to deny the importance of national difference in favor of a 
future-oriented and undifferentiated socialist society.  The Program stated, “The 
nations will draw still closer together [sliiat’], and their complete unity will be 
achieved,” suggesting that the final movement of socialism toward communism 
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would naturally erode the cultural and social conditions of nationhood.57  
Pragmatic necessity, moreover, demanded that everyone speak Russian, 
according to the Third Party Program.  Party leaders, Shelest among them, along 
with many intellectuals in Ukraine began questioning the basis of this theory by 
the early 1960s.  Cinema and literature under Shelest had the duty to keep the 
literary language of the republic alive.  Thus, Shelest and dissident intellectuals 
shared many assumptions about the continued importance of the nationality 
question and maintenance of a Soviet nationalities policy to govern center-
periphery relations.  Moreover, Brezhnev became keenly aware of the dangers 
that his cultural affinities posed, especially after the events of 1968 in Prague. 
The space that many younger filmmakers and writers diverged from 
Shelest was in the former’s creative interest with the unfamiliar territory of 
Western Ukraine, or with the desire to discover the unfamiliar within the familiar 
territory of Eastern Ukraine.  These explorations frequently complicated the 
notion of Ukraine as a monolithic ethnic territory, bringing to the forefront 
Ukrainians who did not speak the literary language, and landscapes that did not 
conform to prior stereotypes of the republic.  In delighting in this unfamiliar 
territory, filmmakers sought to show Ukraine, not only as linguistically different 
from Russia, but also different from hegemonic conceptions of Ukraine itself.  
Because representations of Ukrainians and non-Russians in general were 
grounded in a particular formal and stylistic language, established during the 
Stalin era, the rejection of its content necessitated a rejection of its very “look 
(obraz).”  Herein lies the reason that many filmmakers turned toward a modernist 
aesthetic to convey their new conceptions of non-Russian space.  Both domestic 
models, largely from the silent era avant-garde, along with recent trends in West 
European filmmaking, such as Italian Neo-Realism and the French New Wave, 
determined the development of a new style of non-Russian representation during 
the 1960s.  While the legacy of such early Soviet directors such as Sergei 
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Eisenstein and, particularly for Ukrainian cinema, Oleksandr Dovzhenko 
remained fraught with contradictory values, film criticism had largely rescued 
them from their reputations under late Stalinism as formalists and, for 
Dovzhenko, as a Ukrainian nationalist.  The association with Western European 
film movements was less ambiguously problematic, connected as it was with a 
“decadent” and “formalist” aesthetic that socialist realism had declared the death 
of in the mid-1930s.  Famous Stalin-era film director Sergei Gerasimov, for 
example, wrote of the French New Wave’s “intellectually pornographic sauce” in 
a 1960 article critiquing the experimental tendencies of Georgian filmmaker 
Tenghiz Abuladze.58  At the same time, socialist realism was itself under 
question as a monolithic framework, and many cultural authorities encourage
youth “experimentation” as a means to overcome Stalinist cultural tropes.  
Ukrainian cinema sought to engage with a local material, grounded in Ukrainia
folklore and classic literature, but also to update its meaning through stylistic 




nist cinema.   
                                                
 
Soviet Historiography and the Uses of Film 
 
Although still rare, the study of film has enjoyed some prominence in 
Soviet historiography since the early 1990s alongside other explorations of “mass 
culture” in Russia, such as work on popular fiction, the press, theater and other 
leisure practices.59  While diverse in focus, this literature sought to situate Russia 
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and the Soviet Union as peculiar types of media-driven societies, which shared 
key similarities to those of Western Europe, where a diversity of interests 
determined the structure of everyday life and cultural policy.  This perspective 
helped dispel notions of the Soviet Union, in particular, as a “totalitarian” society, 
one in which the state rigidly controlled, or believed it possible to control, popular 
opinion and the ways that individuals responded to methods of propaganda and 
mass education.  Within this literature, cinema functioned as a means to 
understand the complicated tensions between ideology and entertainment.  
Rather than a state that had the means to control social consciousness through 
forms of mass art like the cinema, scholars have posited that authorities were 
constrained by what audiences wanted to watch, and by their own agency as 
interpreters of images.  Peter Kenez’s Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917-1953 
and Denise Youngblood’s Movies for the Masses: Popular Cinema and Soviet 
Society in the 1920s, both from 1992, each address the politics of filmmaking 
practice.  Kenez addresses the unique problems of organizing Soviet cinema as 
a tool for ideological education, and attempts to investigate the degree of 
success films had in eliciting sympathy for Bolshevik policies.60  In her work on 
debates about popular cinema during the 1920s, Youngblood integrates 
questions of production politics, film reception and narrative conventions.  She 
argues that, despite the efforts of certain Soviet cultural organizations and film 
critics in the 1920s to construct a “revolutionary” cinema, “Film culture of the NEP 
was predominantly and aggressively ‘bourgeois.’”  Until the First Five-Year Plan, 
the Soviet film industry was more concerned with profit and issues of resisting 
foreign control than the political dimensions of representational politics.  With the 
onset of Stalinism, Soviet cinema had to serve both a mass audience and 
promote a clearly articulated Soviet “way of life.”  Youngblood sees Soviet 
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cinema under Stalin (and after, according to the implications) as both 
entertainment and ideology.61   
Both books successfully demonstrate the unique importance of cinema for 
establishing a particularly Soviet culture, but Youngblood, and Kenez in 
particular, intentionally avoid a sophisticated analysis of individual films or their 
potential reception.  Consequently, both authors remain invested in such truisms 
as “the Soviet people wanted entertainment,” rather than politics or “propaganda” 
in the films that they watched.  Youngblood, for example, takes the specificity of 
the medium no further than this contextual concern with “popular” reception, and 
very little of her work addresses the visual dimensions of the films under 
discussion, a necessary component for any understanding of film language and 
its intersections with cultural constructions of the “popular.”  In other words, 
Youngblood’s definition of “popular cinema” combines Soviet discourse on the 
problem itself with predetermined conceptions of entertainment and propaganda, 
rather than viewing it as an aesthetic system defined by definite formal 
characteristics.   
Historians of the Soviet Union using film as source material are not unique 
in the discipline in their aversion to formal analysis.  In a September 2006 forum 
that appeared on the H-German online discussion network, which addressed our 
discipline’s recent attempts to “read” visual culture, film scholar Johannes von 
Moltke commented,  
This emphasis on “use” and its historical contexts […] seems both 
promising and appropriate for an exploration of the visual anchored in 
history as a discipline.  However, we should be careful not to confine 
ourselves to such a pragmatics of the visual at the expense of other ways 
of studying visual materials and modes of display.62 
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In his commentary, Von Moltke suggests both the practical and methodological 
constraints on historians attempting to participate in the “visual turn.”  On one 
level, historians are rarely trained to speak about the aesthetics of visual 
expression, and fearful of moving beyond their disciplinary comfort zone.  On a 
second, more significant, level, historians are rarely interested in anything 
beyond what von Moltke calls the “pragmatics of the visual.”  In Youngblood’s 
Movies for the Masses, for example, films function as evidence within early 
Soviet intellectual debates about entertainment and propaganda, rather than 
constitute an area of independent meaning production.  Her reasons for using 
films in such a manner were justified, and her book contributed greatly to our 
understanding of Soviet constructions of a new type of mass culture.  Yet, in 
reading Movies for the Masses, we have to wonder if Youngblood’s analysis of 
films (located in the second half of the book) in fact lends credence to her 
argument, or rather if they only serve to illustrate the debates in the earlier 
sections of the book.  This raises the question of whether historians can move 
from examining a discursive category (i.e., entertainment or propaganda), which 
is historically grounded, to reading that category into the aesthetic fabric of a 
visual text, without de-historicizing the category itself.  This question, in fact, tests 
the very limits of interdisciplinarity, as historians are more often than not unwilling 
to resolve it, rather than being incapable of doing so.   
In addition to the above concerns, the examination of the intersections of 
nation and cinema present their own methodological problems.  The Soviet film 
industry employed the term “national cinemas” to identify film production in the 
non-Russian territories since at least the late 1920s.  The promotion of “national 
cinemas” was necessary in the same ways as that of “national” literatures: 
Cinema, like literature, represented the mark of an advanced nation, and the 
Bolsheviks demanded that “backward” nations catch up by replicating the cultural 
production of their more advanced comrades.  In the mid-1920s, film studios 
were built in the Union Republic capitals of Kyiv, Erevan, Baku, Tbilisi and 
Tashkent to provide the industrial foundation for “national cinema” in the Soviet 





example of “Ukrainian national cinema,” regardless of the film’s subject matter or 
to whom the film was addressed.  Yet, this notion of “national cinema” provides 
the historian with few analytical tools for examining particular films or directors 
and their relationships (or lack thereof) to questions of national identity.  Andrew 
Higson, a historian of British cinema, writes that an understanding of nation and 
cinema also needs to incorporate questions of “exhibition and consumption,” the 
cultural specificity of particular films, in addition to how industries market films as 
“national.”63  Higson’s approach to “national cinema” makes sense, not only from 
an analytical perspective, but also in addressing the specificity of the problem in 
1960s Ukraine.   
In this period, the Soviet film industry understood “national cinema,” not 
only as the context of production, but also as an aesthetic and narrative category 
that had implications for how it would promote particular films, and for how it 
would address filmmakers who made them.  In the 1960s, the “national” film 
represented a subset of cinema production possibilities in the Union republics, 
rather than (only) the totality of production in these nationally defined spaces.  At 
certain studios, Dovzhenko Studio in Kyiv most pronouncedly, the “national” film 
functioned as a sub-genre in terms of their visual and narrative conventions, how 
the industry categorized them and what critics and spectators expected from 
them.  As recent film scholarship has shown, moreover, genre represents a 
historically grounded site of mediation between filmmakers, spectators, the film 
industry and the visual texts themselves.  Film scholar Christine Gledhill writes, 
“Genre provides the conceptual space where questions of how to understand the 
life of films in the social can be pursued.”  She goes on to argue, “In this space, 
issues of texts and aesthetics […] intersect with those of industry and institution, 
history and society, culture and audiences.”64  By approaching films that deal 
with self-consciously “national” subject matter using some of the tools of ge
analysis, we can avoid both the pitfall of reifying a national(ist) conceptual 
nre 
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vocabulary, without limiting our analysis to how people talked about the films.  In 
Von Moltke’s work on the German “Heimat” film, for example, he avoids an all-
inclusive, and thus meaningless, notion of “national cinema,” while grounding the 
nationalist films under discussion within a category located in a particular 
historical context.65  I similarly hope to approach the “national” film in the Soviet 
Union, demonstrating that it functioned as an industry category, and as a broader 
mode of representing non-Russians in the Soviet Union.  In this way, “national 
cinema” does not function as a reified category, but as a political and aesthetic 
problem.  With this approach to text and context, I hope to show how Ukrainian 
cinema might help us understand the particular dimensions of the nationality 
question after Stalin, a period when the exploration of national identity was tied 
into problems of artistic representation, which sometimes had greater effect than 
past questions of national rights. 
Nonetheless, the “national” film did not emerge as a tabula rasa during the 
1960s, as its origins lie squarely within Stalinist aesthetics.  Chapter 1 explores 
shifts in representational strategies from the 1930s through the early 1960s, 
focusing on how non-Russians fit into an image of the “Friendship of Peoples.”  
Under Stalinism, I identify a folkloric mode of viewing the non-Russian in popular 
cinema, whereby Ukrainians, Georgians, Kazakhs, etc. became generically 
identifiable through objects contained on the body (costumes, mustaches, hats, 
hairstyles), in addition to the identification of certain non-essential concerns 
(nature, history) revealed within poetic monologue, song and dance.  Contained 
within and above such a “colorful” spectacle of non-Russianness was a narrative 
of overcoming backwardness combined with political union that typically 
contained a strong component of Russian leadership.  At the same time, many 
films made in the Union republics from the Stalin period attempted to articulate 
that union with “Russia” was of principle benefit to the non-Russian; that is to 
say, “internationalism” was not the principle, to which the films appealed, but 
rather a realization of national consciousness through political union.  The 
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important shift in post-Stalinist modes of representing the non-Russian was the 
reconstitution of ethnic difference.  When filmmakers appealed to folklore after 
Stalin, they frequently rejected the homogenizing narrative of the Stalinist 
folkloric, adopting what I identify as an ethnographic mode, whereby principles of 
national identification were linked to an exoticized image of essential differences. 
Chapter 2 explores several interlocking phenomena related to the 
emergence of viable film studios in the union republics after Stalin: As part of 
Khrushchev’s efforts at the devolution of authority to local enterprises, along with 
promotion of khozraschet – a Russian word alternately meaning self-reliance and 
accountability – film studios outside of Moscow and Leningrad were given some 
degree of autonomy.  Along with this partial devolution of authority came an 
increase in funding for republican studios and a spurt in production.  The 
principal issue that the studio leadership faced during the early 1960s was in 
attracting a new base of creative personnel to Kyiv.  While committed to 
indigenizing the staff of directors, screenwriters and actors, Ukraine lacked a 
viable means to educate “its own” people.  Thus, in encouraging young 
Ukrainians studying at the All-Union Film Institute (VGIK) to return to their native 
republic, the studio also found it necessary to re-nationalize such “Russified” 
cadres.  Under new leadership, which was conversant with both Ukrainian 
national discourse and broader Thaw-era aesthetic questions, Dovzhenko Studio 
began recovering from its reputation in the Soviet Union as a provincial studio 
that continued to represent the world according to Stalinist aesthetic principles. 
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, Dovzhenko Studio produced an 
admixture of folkloric representations of Ukraine and a newer ethnographic, or 
“poetic” orientation.  Chapter 2 also examines Volodymyr Denysenko’s A Dream 
(Son, 1964), a film about a young Taras Shevchenko, the nineteenth-century 
Ukrainian national poet, in his journey from serfdom to freedom.  A student of 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko, Denysenko made A Dream with poet Dmytro Pavlychko’s 
script, which included remnants of the Stalinist biographical genre alongside 
many moments of narrative discontinuity more characteristic of West European 





had co-opted from an older generation of Ukrainian nationalists, A Dream 
updated Shevchenko to signify post-Stalinist ideals of youth, romanticism, non-
conformism and personal expression. 
The young Carpathian-born actor Ivan Mykolaichuk, who played the role 
of Shevchenko in A Dream, continued his rise to fame in Sergei Paradzhanov’s 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors the following year, a film about an oft-exoticized 
tribe of highland shepherds, the Hutsuls.  Chapter 3 focuses on the production of 
this unusual film, shot on location in the Ukrainian Carpathians with the 
participation of local peasants.  The studio marketed the film as a revival of 
“Dovzhenko’s poetic traditions” and appealed to the authenticity of “real Hutsuls,” 
untouched by modernity, on display therein.  While having only modest box office 
success, Paradzhanov’s film became the largest influence on Ukrainian cinema 
into the mid-1970s, with its thematic concern with regional ethnography in the 
republic, and its outlandish visual style.  Paradzhanov and cinematographer Iurii 
Illienko pioneered an observational style of camera movement, which 
emphasized the strange, fairy tale quality of the landscape and its people, even 
as it sought to engage the spectator directly through the erosion of realist 
dramatic conventions.  These techniques and devices of a re-emergent cinematic 
modernism in Ukraine (dubbed “Ukrainian Poetic Cinema”) integrated canonical 
socialist realist representations of the Carpathians and its inhabitants to produce 
a radicalized politics of self-knowledge in the republic.  Paradzhanov, Illienko and 
the other Ukrainian writers and artists who worked on the film presented the 
Carpathians as a site of authenticity and purity through an aestheticized 
ethnoscape.66  The cinematic journey to the Carpathians provoked a nationalist 
pride in a fragment of the Ukrainian people supposedly untouched by socialist 
modernity, the meaning of which could be extended to what the rest of Ukraine – 
and Eastern Ukraine in particular – had lost. 
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When Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors first screened publicly on 
September 4, 1965, as part of Kyiv’s annual “Cinema Days” festival, literary critic 
Ivan Dziuba interrupted the event with an unscheduled speech about the arrest 
of several Ukrainian intellectuals implicated in a supposed nationalist conspiracy.  
The event at the premier sparked the Ukrainian dissident movement and 
Ukrainian cinema’s intersections with this movement.  Common to certain 
Ukrainian filmmakers and dissident nationalists was a conception of personal 
authorship, whereby individuals could embody not some Romantic notion of the 
“national spirit,” but the ability to see and articulate the “authentic” self.  In 
examining Ukrainian cinema’s politics of personal authorship in Chapter 4, I 
explore how Paradzhanov’s largely aesthetic problems generated concerns 
about the unfulfilled promises of Soviet nationalities policy in the 1960s.  This 
transition from the aesthetic to the political, however, was not natural or even 
intentional.  Paradzhanov’s Shadows, for example, represented above all a de-
politicization of the significatory function of the Carpathians and its “strange” and 
unknowable inhabitants.  This later engagement with a new nationalist politics in 
the republic resulted in a number of films, most of them also set in the 
Carpathians, banned or which never made it into post-production.  As I will show, 
these films demonstrate how problems of artistic representation had greater 
political effect within this new politics of nationality than even struggles for 
national rights. 
By the mid-1970s, Shelest’s successor as CPU First Secretary, Volodymyr 
Shcherbyts’kyi, called for the complete repression of the “Ukrainian poetic 
school,” which included many of those filmmakers influenced by Paradzhanov’s 
Shadows.  Later, the CPU even forbade reference to “poetic cinema” in the 
press.  While the Carpathians served these filmmakers as a site of authentic 
communion with a national past beyond the geo-political divides of early modern 
and modern Europe, located as it was in between Eastern and Western Ukraine, 





movement and the conformist Little Russianism of the 1970s CPU leadership.67  
Yet, their modernist sensibilities and thematic focus on ethnography provoked a 
political scandal by the middle of the decade. 
Nationalist politics aside, other tensions were emerging in the early 1970s 
that also jeopardized “Ukrainian poetic cinema,” and which complicated the 
nationality question.  Authorities in Goskino were fed up with what they labeled 
an “elite” cinema, and began to view republican studios as financial liabilities.  
Chapter 5 explores the descent from the politics of artistic representation, which 
was fundamentally embroiled in larger economic changes in the Soviet film 
industry.  Industry authorities demanded a return to comprehensible and “realist” 
understandings of “national character” instead of the “difficult” aesthetic of 
Paradzhanov and his followers in Ukraine.  The growing sociological field of film 
audience research demonstrated that central studios were the only ones that 
continued to make money during the industry’s economic downturn of the 1970s.  
Goskino turned more and more toward film genres that audience researchers 
could guarantee would sell tickets.  Despite the political excision of “poetic 
cinema,” these filmmakers’ concerns initially were integrated into a new generic 
system of artistic representation.  Now a national icon, Mykolaichuk continued to 
play the roles, in which he was coded as “ethnically” Ukrainian, but here these 
character types were determined by the generic conventions of adventure films, 
melodramas, and comedies.  It was only at the end of the decade that Goskino 
completely abandoned the very idea of a “national theme” due to its scientifically 
determined economic liability.  By 1980, Ukrainian films came to be associated 
with a “B movie” aesthetic in the Soviet Union, but otherwise resembled the 
generic and thematic conventions of central productions.  The question of 
Ukrainian difference had been resolved, and, from the perspective of filmmakers, 
industry officials and critics alike, the era of “national cinemas” in the Soviet 
Union had ended. 
*   *   * 
                                                 
67 Paul Robert Magocsi defines “Little Russianism” as interest in Ukraine as a “lower stage in a 






While such concepts as “nationality,” the “nationality question,” and 
“national cinema” were familiar terms for the individuals that interest me in this 
dissertation, I also draw on the admittedly problematic notion of “identity,” which 
became a concept in Russia and Ukraine only through Anglo-American cultural 
studies during the 1990s.  In drawing on this latter concept in my work, I hope to 
avoid the pitfalls of what Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper call “clichéd 
constructivism,” which they define as an unselfconscious repetition of “qualifiers” 
such as “multiple, unstable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, constructed, 
negotiated, […] gestures signaling a stance rather than words conveying a 
meaning.”68  While such jargon is present in much recent work in cultural studies, 
Brubaker and Cooper do not give reason to reject these terms outright, if we 
demonstrate that they have real meaning in a particular context.  In accepting 
that nations and identities are constructed, I nonetheless hope to investigate the 
texts and contexts that produce such essentialist claims.  Brubaker and Cooper 
advocate getting “beyond identity,” largely because “identity” functions as a 
“place holder,” but this leaves us without a vocabulary to study the processes 
and practices of reification itself.  Here, I use “national identity” as one of many 
accepted models for knowing oneself in relation to those around oneself in the 
Soviet Union.69  Although I will speak frequently of “nationalism” in this context, I 
insist on “national identity” for its greater “multidimensionality.”  As Anthony Smith 
writes, whereas “nationalism” refers exclusively to an “ideology or movement,” 
identity as a concept extends “to include a specific language, sentiments and 
symbolism.”70  I do not suggest that everyone need internalize an “identity,” but 
that identity was available for individuals and groups to employ for political, 
social, cultural, or sentimental purposes.   
Every Ukrainian knew they were “Ukrainian,” largely because of the legal 
certainty of line four on Soviet internal passports.  This study, however, examines 
the uncertainties of national identity, a space where certain individuals attempted 
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69 Terry Martin opts for the term “national identity” for the Russian “natsional’naia kul’tura.” 








to make sense of, and propagate, what it meant to be “Ukrainian,” and what 
“Ukraine” was, apart from a territory with fixed borders that were determined 




The Thaw and Modes of Representing the Non-Russian in Soviet Cinema 
 
 
When Nikita Khrushchev delivered the “Secret Speech” at the Twentieth 
Party Congress on February 25, 1956, movies were not among the most 
pressing matters at hand.  Nonetheless, the General Secretary referenced films 
on eleven occasions during the night, clearly demonstrating that cinema was 
relevant to his diagnosis of “Stalin’s personality cult.”  The General Secretary’s 
critique of movies under Stalin would be familiar enough to common 
understandings of Soviet “propaganda:” The image masked reality rather than 
revealed it; the leader figure dominated the plot; and spectators were 
brainwashed by dogmatic ideology.  For Khrushchev, cinema was the most 
evident means by which the Stalinist state reproduced itself in popular 
consciousness.  In this formulation, he also implicated the leader’s own 
consciousness.  Stalin, according to his successor, “only knew the countryside 
and agriculture from film.”  Lenin, in contrast, “was close to the people […] He 
used to visit villages and talk with the peasants.”  Several times during the closed 
session of the Congress, Khrushchev counterposed Lenin, the active subject, 
with Stalin, the subject or mere consumer of his own cinematic image: Stalin 
believed that he was solely responsible for victory during the Civil War because 
Mikheil Chiaureli presented him “literally vanquishing the enemy with his own 
sabre” in The Unforgettable Year 1919 (Nezabyvaemyi 1919, 1952).  He 
accepted that Soviet collective farmers were fat from all the meat, fruit, bread, 
and cheese they ate because Ivan Pyr’ev showed this to be the case in The 
Kuban Cossacks (Kubanskie kozaki, 1949).1  Whether or not Stalin was so naïve 
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is beside the point; important here is Khrushchev’s characterization of what we 
now label “Stalinism.”  Under the conditions of Stalinism, Stalin too mistook the 
image for reality, and had become the spectator of a totalitarian mass culture that 
he himself had helped construct.   
Nonetheless, Khrushchev could only articulate the presence in Stalinist 
cinema of that which was absent in reality, without of course suggesting the 
aesthetic and formal principles at work under the “cult of personality.”  To 
overcome the cult, Khrushchev implied that filmmakers now had to seek out 
reality, to reflect that which was already present.  More than any other film, 
Pyr’ev’s Kuban Cossacks became emblematic during the Thaw for its “varnish of 
reality [lakirovka deistvitel’nosti].”  A year after the “Secret Speech,” Khrushchev 
ordered the film out of distribution in an attempt to purge Soviet culture of the 
remnants of Stalinism.2  A seemingly innocuous Soviet musical comedy, Pyr’ev’s 
film is about two former lovers who find themselves in “socialist competition” with 
each other as chairpersons of neighboring collective farms on the Southern 
steppe.  But it was the imagery of abundance and almost overwhelming sense of 
happiness that bothered authorities and intellectuals alike about Kuban 
Cossacks.  In distinction to Grigorii Aleksandrov’s more famous Soviet musicals, 
The Happy Guys (Veselye rebiata, 1934), Circus (Tsirk, 1936) and Volga-Volga 
(1938), films structured around classic narrative motifs of conflict and resolution, 
and relying on the spectacle of farce and slapstick comedy, Pyr’ev presents us 
with a belabored sound and view of the land and people that inhabit his vision of 
the Kuban.3  The camera moves slowly across fields of wheat and village 
markets overflowing with objects.4  Pyr’ev allows fat peasants in embroidered 
vests and dresses to sing and speak at length about their happiness with such 
material abundance, which their collective labor has produced.  And unlike 
Aleksandrov’s films, Pyr’ev’s heroes constantly reference the past, yet not as 
something to overcome, but as a moment to re-capture.  In such a conservative 
and nostalgic mode, Moscow and other urban spaces are noticeably absent, and 
it is the space of the Soviet periphery that Pyr’ev explores.   
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In fact, the origins of the kolkhoz musical lie in Pyr’ev’s experiences 
making films at Ukrainfil’m in Kyiv during the late 1930s.5  While working at 
Mosfil’m for Kuban Cossacks, Pyr’ev continued to represent a definitively “ethnic” 
space in his mobilization of a Stalinist folkloric aesthetic.  As a culmination of 
Pyr’ev’s style, Kuban Cossacks reduces narrative to a bare minimum in order to 
emphasize the “colorful” people and landscape that it explores.  The speech of 
the Kuban, with its mix of Russian and Ukrainian, is frequently heard, and Pyr’ev 
himself later told the SKU that the film was intended as an homage to the 
Ukrainian national character.6 
Interestingly enough, when Khrushchev was dismissing Kuban Cossacks 
for its “lakirovka,” Pyr’ev was managing director of Mosfil’m, where he became a 
key figure in the articulation of a Thaw-era aesthetic that rejected such Stalinist 
excess.  In Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw, Josephine Woll writes 
that Khrushchev’s words on cinema at the Twentieth Party Congress empowered 
screenwriters and directors to return to the “actual conditions” prevailing in the 
countryside, and on “real people,” rather than such a folksy image of abundance 
found in the kolkhoz musical.7  Without reifying this new realism, we can identify 
certain aesthetic practices that conformed to its appeal.  In supposed emulation 
of Lenin, filmmakers made the journey to the village, factory, schoolhouse, 
private homes, in order to render its existence “authentically” in fiction film.  No 
longer would a political and cinematic education suffice; to overcome the 
distance associated with Stalinist representational models, principally located on 
homogeneous film studio grounds, filmmakers had to be “close to the people” in 
the most spatially literal sense of the term.   
Because “national” film production and the representation of the non-
Russian in particular was grounded in what I label a Stalinist folkloric mode, most 
emblematic in Pyr’ev’s kolkhoz musicals, this chapter explores how such films 
functioned formally, and as components of Stalinist culture.  I demonstrate that, 
while 1960s Ukrainian cinema engaged with Thaw-era cultural and aesthetic 
discourse, it did so within the visual codes of a folkloric mode of representation, 
which emerged during the 1920s and was canonized in the late 1930s.  This 
 46
 
chapter first sets out to define the major principles of Thaw-era cinematic 
discourse, located within a literary centric notion of realism (literaturnost’), and 
grounded in a discourse of “sincerity” and “honesty.”  In the major section of the 
chapter, I lay out the cinematic foundations of what Thaw filmmakers and critics 
railed against in the 1950s-60s, Stalinist monumentalism on the one hand and a 
dogmatic, homogenous teleology on the other.  During the late-1950s, Soviet film 
critics had identified Kyiv Studio as the most common site of reproducing such 
folkloric imagery, condemning its refusal to participate in the new realism that 
characterized Thaw cinema.  Some Ukrainian filmmakers and critics asserted in 
turn that, while perhaps overblown at times, Ukrainian cinema’s “theatricality” – 
its exaggerated, trans-historical iconicity, located in the elaborate costumes, folk 
songs and dance, and comical speech – was the basis for its claim to national 
originality.  While such anti-realism was condemned as a hold-over from the “cult 
of personality,” Ukrainian cinema in the 1960s searched for a means of 
visualizing “national character,” while also engaging in Thaw-era preoccupations 
with authenticity and realism. 
I conclude by showing how Thaw-era Ukrainian filmmakers transformed 
this image of non-Russian space with the articulation of an ethnographic 
aesthetic, which was engaged with more recent theories of the maintenance of 
national difference in the Soviet Union and the consequent de-familiarization of 
ethnic spaces on screen.  Ukrainian cinema did not dispense with folkloric 
representations, but rather further codified and differentiated its mode of 
production, so that the use of folklore in cinema asserted a claim to a 
differentiated, rather than homogenous, Soviet space. 
 
The “Cult of the Little Guy”8 during the Thaw  
 
 
 By the time Khrushchev articulated his rejection of the “cult of personality” 
in February 1956, writers and critics had already voiced many of the General 
Secretary’s concerns about the “varnish of reality” in recent works of literature 
and cinema.  French critic André Bazin was perhaps the first to speak 
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knowledgeably about the “Stalin myth in Soviet cinema” in his 1950 article of the 
same title for the left-wing Paris journal, L’Esprit.  In examining Ihor Savchenko’s 
The Third Blow (Tretii udar, 1948) and Vladimir Petrov’s The Battle of Stalingrad 
(Stalingradskaia bitva, 1949-50), Bazin examined how Stalin himself served as a 
determining influence on the course of victory in the Great Patriotic War, rather 
than military leaders like Marshall Zhukov or common soldiers.  When publishing 
his collected work in 1958, Bazin suggested in an appendix that his ideas in the 
article might have floated to Khrushchev himself because of his statement that 
Stalin “only knew the countryside and agriculture from film.”9  Even if untrue, it is 
clear that Khrushchev took his cues in elements of the “secret speech” from 
literary and art criticism.  His very label of the personality cult was drawn from a 
reference in Vladimir Pomerantsev’s December 1953 Novyi mir (New World) 
article, “On Sincerity in Literature (Ob iskrennosti v literature),” about the 
unbelievable and “superhuman” qualities of Stalin-era literary heroes.  Just as 
such literary heroes allegorically represented Stalin himself, Khrushchev was 
now using the critique of those literary heroes as a critique of Stalin.  The 
metaphor of “the Thaw” to represent the post-Stalin era was also a literary 
reference, from Ilia Ehrenburg’s novel of the same title (Ottepel’), published in the 
May 1954 issue of the journal Znamia (The Banner).  Ehrenburg’s work was an 
indictment against the emotionally opaque and ethically compromised Stalinist 
subject, who has learned “how to say nothing” for careerist ambitions and 
material comforts.  In his novel, Ehrenburg laid out the principal dichotomies of 
post-Stalinist literary discourse - between opportunism and honesty, theory and 
experience, pragmatism and romanticism, imposed loneliness and genuine 
friendship, mere craftsmanship and artistic talent, knowledge and feeling, 
representation and reality and, if we are to believe the novel’s critics, the mass 
and the individual.10  The novel ends in the Spring of 1953 (after Stalin’s death), 
with the multiple psychological and emotional problems of the story suddenly 
resolved.11   
In Soviet film, Grigorii Chukhrai’s Clear Skies (Chistoe nebo, 1961), 
among many other examples from 1956-58 and 1961-1963, presents a similar 
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immediate transformation from the frozen years of the post-war Soviet Union to 
the freer atmosphere after Stalin’s death, when people suddenly became more 
open, honest, and friendlier.  Such discourse was ubiquitous during these years.  
SKU First Secretary Tymofii Levchuk stated during a March 1962 Plenum, “Let 
the elimination of the results of Stalin’s cult of personality quickly teach [us to be] 
compassionate, considerate, and have a beneficial attitude toward one 
another.”12 
Pomerantsev’s article in Novyi mir first introduced readers to the major 
preoccupations of Thaw-era literary politics, calling on writers and artists to reject 
the “stereotypical heroes, thematics, beginnings and endings” of Stalinist cultural 
production.  Instead, creative work should embody the ideas and personal 
expression of its author, rather than the narrow political principles of the day.  
Pomerantsev, of course, offered more substantive advice to the post-Stalin 
generation of creative workers, both in his definition of “sincerity” as “talent,” and 
in identifying its antecedent in “artifice [delannost’ veshchi]” as a component of 
mimicry.  Within the latter, he brought out the problem of “obvious 
constructedness [iavnaia sostroennost’]” and the “far-fetched nature of 
characters and situations,” drawing on the example of Sergei Boldyrev’s 
mammoth novel about increasing the productivity of blast furnaces 
(Reshaiushchie gody, 1956).13   
Fundamentally, he accused such writers like Boldyrev of not “experiencing 
the village.”14  He juxtaposed his principle of “sincerity” with the “varnishing of 
reality [lakirovka deistvitel’nosti],” which showed only the “abundant banquet” and 
not the “foul factory cafeteria.”15  While not necessarily proposing an exploration 
of new content, Pomerantsev concluded that writers needed to refocus their 
attention on “the problem of bringing everyday life to light in literature.”16  That is, 
writers may still insist upon the theme of the Civil War, Revolution, the factory, 
kolkhoz, etc., but they should explore the diversity of human emotion and 
psychology within these settings and events, exactly as Ehrenburg set out in The 
Thaw.  Instead of writing about the deeds of leaders, along with “things and 
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objects” that adorned the kolkhoz market, writers should concern themselves 
with “ordinary” human experience.17   
Film critics writing in Iskusstvo kino during 1954-55 demanded the same 
focus on the “individual personality,” “simple people” and a “struggle for the 
authentic” in Soviet cinema.18  Later in the decade, Viktor Nekrasov, in a highly 
Pomerantsevian voice, explored transformations in Soviet cinema during the mid-
1950s, positioning the new interest in human experience against the “great 
events” of the Stalinist “cinema of leaders.”19  In “Words, ‘Great’ and Simple 
(Slova, ‘velikie’ i prostye),” he distinguished a new “prosaic” style found in Marlen 
Khutsiev’s Spring on Zarechnaia Street (Vesna na Zarechnoi ulitse, 1956) and 
The Two Fedors (Dva Fedora, 1958) from Iuliia Solntseva’s A Poem about the 
Sea (Poema o more, 1959), a film began and based on a screenplay by the 
recently deceased Oleksandr Dovzhenko.  While Khutsiev’s early features were 
everyday stories about ordinary people, Dovzhenko’s Poem addressed large 
issues of modernity and tradition.  With a narrative focused on the friendship 
between a general and a kolkhoz chairman against the backdrop of the 
construction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Station on the lower Dnipro, 
Nekrasov wrote, “I did not believe the film.”  In associating Solntseva’s film with a 
left-over Stalinist aesthetics, Khutsiev came to represent a return to “the realism 
of everyday life [bytovoi realizm]” with Spring and The Two Fedors.  Nekrasov 
advocated a return to Stanislavskii’s method in the precision of realistic details in 
acting.  Solntseva’s and Dovzhenko’s film, he stated, “is based on a highly 
conventional situation and means.”20  Nekrasov pointed toward the use of 
language in Poem about the Sea as an indicator of Dovzhenko’s complicity in 
Stalinist modes of representation:   
Having read a book or watched a film, I always ask myself: Would I like to 
meet these new people?  After Poem about the Sea, I can say, no.  They 
would tire me with their talk.  I know these people.  And they would speak 
for a long time, in a lofty manner, only about the most serious things.  And 
not making any jokes, with their heads raised high, they gaze off into the 
blue distance of the Dnipro.  To argue with them would be pointless, 
because they will speak about correct and indisputable things.  No, I do 




Nekrasov identified a mode of speaking in film that was completely divorced from 
“real life” in its lofty “poetic” voice.  As with Kuban Cosacks, the association with 
a particular place is pervasive.  The Dnipro, the Kakhovka region itself, and the 
rootedness of the main characters all speak to a localist discourse within the film, 
even as these “elements” foreground the “stereotypical” theme of socialist 
construction.   
In contrast, Khutsiev’s films, in addition to other Thaw-era classics like 
Mikhail Kalatozov’s The Cranes are Flying (Letiat’ zhuravli, 1957) and Chukhrai’s 
Ballad of a Soldier (Ballada o soldate, 1959), are local only insofar as they focus 
on private human relations, which prefigure both landscape and event, the latter 
starkly subservient to ordinary human interactions.  In this case, Nekrasov 
identified an entirely different manner of speech – “a passionate, but not 
bombastic, truthful and not utilitarian, a speech, in which ordinary people speak, 
the same [people] who sometimes do great deeds.”22 
Fundamentally, Pomerantsev and Nekrasov promoted a shift in focus from 
event/setting as the literary/cinematic subject to the human subject.  Within this 
formulation, they promoted a de-spacialized image of character, a hero that 
would not be beholden to setting, someone who would exist independent of the 
spaces that they inhabited.  On the contrary, in the Stalinist representation of the 
non-Russian, the human subject was placed within a particularistic landscape, 
one that was essential to their identity, and one which was in line with the 
location of the studio that claimed authority to produce such representations. 
 
 
Socialist Realism and Folkloric Representation: Tractor Drivers (1939) and 
Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1941) 
 
Under a Stalinist mode of “national” representation, the landscapes and 
peoples of the Soviet periphery achieved recognition as unique within a folkloric 
visual vocabulary, replete with costumes, dancing peasants, and other evidence 
of “national color.”  The figures, objects and landscapes, in addition to the plots 
and dialogue, that appeared in such films were rarely unfamiliar to audiences by 
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the late-1930s, most of them conforming to what Katerina Clark called socialist 
realism’s ritualistic mode.  In The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual, she 
characterized socialist realist narrative as ritualistic in its reproduction of a 
“master plot,” the “structuring force” of which consisted of the “spontaneity / 
consciousness dialectic.”23  In the canonical scenario, the hero is a “modest” 
communist, but lacks the discipline and leadership skills to accomplish the 
assigned task.  In the end, he or she "masters his [or her] willful self...  [and] 
attains an extrapersonal identity" of rational consciousness at the exclusive 
service of the collective.24  Frequently, the hero achieves such consciousness 
with the help of someone more politically knowledgeable.  Andrei Zhdanov 
viewed socialist realism as the union of “proletarian realism” with “revolutionary 
romanticism.”  During his tenure as CPSU Ideological Secretary, Zhdanov 
characterized this combination as “the most matter-of-fact, everyday reality with 
the most heroic prospects."25 
Py’rev’s work was highly emblematic of the socialist realist “master plot,” 
along with its mixture of “realism” with “romanticism.”  In fact, his 1939 Kyiv 
Studio production, Tractor Drivers (Traktoristy), provided one of the definitive 
models for socialist realist narration and choice of content.  Klim Iarko, the hero, 
is a demobilized tank driver who had served on the Manchurian border.  
Returning to his native village, now part of a collective farm in Southern Ukraine, 
Klim hopes to rekindle his love with Mar’iana Bazhan, a celebrated Stakhanovite 
tractor driver and the daughter of the kolkhoz chairman.  As the narrative 
develops, he must prove that he can re-join the socialist community by shedding 
his military arrogance and learning to accept the legitimate authority of Mar’iana’s 
father, a stern and capable, yet jovial, apparatchik.  Only after Klim subjugates 
his will to that of the collective does Mar’iana agree to marry him.  In Pyr’ev’s film, 
the consummation of the central relationship is determined, not by physical 
attraction, but through labor initiative and acceptance of social norms.  Moreover, 
Pyr’ev placed the prosaic tasks of plowing the fields and sowing grain on the 
sublime level of going to battle. 
 52
 
In focusing on plot repetition, the lack of individual consciousness, and the 
hyperbolic elaboration of the heroic personality in Stalinist narration, Thaw-era 
critics like Nekrasov followed the literary model of Pomerantsev, and generally 
ignored aspects of visual pleasure present in such films.  As I demonstrate in this 
section, while such critics have identified the ritualistic mode of representing 
canonical events, settings and hero-types, Stalinist cinema also contained certain 
visual codes in marking the non-Russian variations to the socialist realist “master 
plot.”  These variations indicate, not a counter-narrative to socialist realism, but a 
parallel space of meaning production.  One could read Pyr’ev’s film on a different 
level, one which foregrounds the ethno-national elements of “excess” as of equal 
importance to its socialist realist “master plot.”  As Kristin Thompson writes, 
“Excess is not only counternarrative; it is counterunity.  To discuss it may be to 
invite the partial disintegration of a coherent reading.”26  I tend not to accept that 
the visual elements of the Stalinist folkloric were “counternarrative,” but such 
folkloric “play” certainly affected a reading that worked in parallel with the 
narrative, and which occasionally presented moments of tension between style 
and narrative.  I refer to this parallel space as the folkloric mode, which pervaded 
Stalin-era cinema from Chapaev (1934) onward, yet its presence carried 
additional meanings and connotations in the cinemas of the Union republics.  In 
defining a visual folklorics, I hope to point toward the ways in which Stalinist 
cinema domesticated national difference, while maintaining the spectacle of 
particular spaces and the peoples that inhabited them.  With the use of folklore in 
Soviet cinema, we see two principles at work – the spectacle of difference, and 
the narrative articulation of an undifferentiated Soviet narod.27 
As Soviet linguist Vladimir Propp argued, folklore constituted one of the 
most structured and ritualistic forms of narration, the “functions”28 of which have 
appeared in popular cinema among other forms of modern media.  As several 
scholars of literature and mass media have identified, folklore’s reproduction in 
popular art and in political discourse has served to reify notions of tradition and 
authenticity, and to articulate a culturally cohesive and socially level community.  
In Language and Symbolic Power, Pierre Bourdieu writes that the political use of 
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folklore serves to “negate symbolically the hierarchy without disrupting it.”29  
While admitting that even democracies deploy folkloric imagery to blur 
hierarchies, scholars have identified the use of folklore as a dominant source of 
cultural legitimacy in the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, 
Ceauşescu’s Romania and Stalin’s USSR.  In writing about Italian cinema under 
Mussolini, for example, Marcia Landy argues that cinematic folklore in particular 
keys into popular assumptions about the images of national pasts, infusing them 
with a politically motivated teleology.30  Frank J. Miller speaks of a “cult of 
folklore” in the Soviet Union under Stalin, stating, “Under the critical dogma of 
socialist realism, literature and indeed all art were supposed to manifest 
narodnost’,” which he translates as “the folkloric.”31  
While representations of Russians in the Soviet Union made use of 
folkloric codes, they were not confined to it in the way that non-Russians in the 
Soviet Union were.  In its visual vocabulary, the folkloric mode of representation 
was the means through which Soviet filmmakers could articulate ethnic 
difference within the space of a homogenous narrative teleology and static form.  
Such a system sought a simultaneous modernization and historicization of 
nationalistic materials, ostensibly to purge them of their bourgeois elements, 
even as it spectacularized components of non-Russian cultural expression and 
historical material.  The Stalinist folkloric was a mobile form, in the sense that 
filmmakers could easily transport its imagery from Ukraine, to the Caucasus, to 
Central Asia with only minor modifications.32  One participant at a 1967 SK 
Plenum, dedicated to the “problems of the further development of national 
cinemas,” parodied this mobile quality of Stalinism’s representation of non-
Russians: “The Georgian is the one dancing the lezghinka; the Kazakh is the one 
singing about an apple grove; and the Ukrainian is the one relishing his salo.”33  
Each variant of the Soviet ethnic communicates their difference indirectly through 
spectacular means, rather than directly through dialogue.   
Pyr’ev’s emblematic Tractor Drivers introduces his Ukrainian hero, Klim, in 
a train compartment that he shares with a Georgian (identifiable with his thin 
mustache and dopey smile) and a Muscovite (identifiable by his non-
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identifiableness).  The three demobilized tankisty (tank drivers) are returning from 
the Manchurian border to their respective national spaces.  While Klim plays the 
accordion, the three sing about their “native land,” the Soviet Union.  After the 
song, however, each man in turn brags about their own particular native spaces 
– not so much communicating with each other as defining their subjective space 
of belonging.  The Muscovite introduces a letter he received about the exciting 
political events in the capital and the sputtering, grinning Georgian talks about 
the wine and women of his republic, perhaps over-exuberant in his passionate 
gestures.  We cut to a close-up of Klim, hugging his accordion with a romantic 
gleam in his eyes, as he talks about the Ukrainian steppe: “You open the door, 
and the wind rushes in; you open the window and the scent of cherry blossoms 
catches you.”  In Pyr’ev’s vision of the Soviet ethnoscape, “national” characters 
possess a quality of excess in their personalities, but which does not obstruct the 
historicity of the present moment.  The Georgian and the Ukrainian are each in 
love with a timeless quality of their native spaces, while the “Russian” discusses 
the historically contingent “space” of politics.  While Klim becomes the hero of 
Tractor Drivers, we are not yet aligned to him.  Instead, the opening scene aligns 
us with the Muscovite, an emotionally neutral character, one who offers the 
spectator nothing of himself as a member of a national group.  Thus, the film 
presents a dichotomy between a political center and an ethnic periphery 
associated with domesticity and safety, which is encoded onto human bodies in 
the form of national “color” (see Figure 1.1).34  The presence of the non-Russian 
is not based on a principle of inclusion, so much as it situates an extra-narrative 
and spectacular sentiment within the film’s diegesis. 
In transporting socialist realism to the Soviet periphery, the socialist realist 
plot also was called upon to unite periphery with the center.  As I suggested with 
the opening scene, however, Tractor Drivers did so while maintaining a firm 
dichotomy between both spaces.  While the train united East and West, both 
geographically and ethnically, the center continued to function differently from the 
periphery.  The people and landscape of the Soviet periphery were 
fundamentally associated with domesticity, while world events characterized the 
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center; the periphery is associated with a timeless quality, while the center 
becomes rooted in historical time.  To represent this dichotomy further, Pyr’ev 
places the objects of an ethnic material culture solely within the intimate site of 
the domestic realm.  Mar’iana, for example, is adorned in an embroidered outfit 
within the space of the home, while wearing a non-descript workers’ outfit in the 
field.  Similarly, we view Bazhan’s mother, a character that appears only in the 
home, outfitted in ethnic garb (see Figure 1.2). 
Perhaps the most evident interplay between historical time, represented 
through a narrative teleology of uniting individual personality with the collective,  
and the periphery with the center, and folkloric time, represented by “primordial” 
images of “national color,” occurs in Ihor Savchenko’s historical-biographical film, 
Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1941), about the seventeenth-century Zaporozhian 
Cossack Hetman who first brought Left-bank Ukraine under Muscovite control.  
Savchenko’s film represented the culmination of the two parallel sites of meaning 
production in the Stalinist cinema of the periphery: First, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi 
is the quintessential Soviet historical-biographical film, a particular kind of 
socialist realist genre that dominated Stalinist cinema from the late 1930s to the 
early 1950s.  As Russian film scholar Evgenii Margolit shows, the genre is 
characterized by a theatrical and monumental style and a predominant focus on 
the leader as the principle agent of history.  Margolit writes that within this genre, 
the hero ceases to reside within a particular historical period and serves to justify 
the Soviet theory of government.35   
At the same time, the elements in the film that identified a particularly 
Ukrainian ethnoscape came to dominate Soviet cinema at least until the late 
1950s, and in several ways, continued to be present in Ukrainian films during the 
1990s.  Common to the Stalinist folkloric, historical materialism demands that the 
Cossack hero come to national consciousness through his alignment with 
“Russia,” which functions in this case as the agent of political and cultural 
modernization.  The Muscovite state functions here as a counterpoint, not only to 
an enemy nation – i.e., Poland – but also to the spontaneity of Ukrainian “color,” 
both seen as initially destructive forces.  The narrative’s job is not to destroy the 
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Figure 1.1. Stalinism’s “Friendship of Peoples” mythology in Tractor Drivers: (l-r) 




Figure 1.2. The domestic space of the Stalinist folkloric in Tractor Drivers: 
Mar’iana (top) and her mother, Tet’iana Markivna. 
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elements of “color,” however, but to bind it to the safe and domestic space of 
song, dance and material culture (Figure 1.3), and purge it of its “stikhiinye 
elementy (spontaneous elements)” – violence and banditry.  The film ends with 
Khmel’nyts’kyi, victorious over the Poles, signing the Pereiaslavl’ Agreement with 
two Muscovite emissaries.  While the agreement celebrates Muscovy’s control 
over Left-bank Ukraine, the precise relationship between “Russia” and the 
Cossacks is complicated by Savchenko’s framing.  In Figure 1.4, we see the 
Hetman clearly elevated in relation to the Muscovite emissaries, demonstrating 
that, as a sovereign, Khmel’nyts’kyi held a higher rank than the vassals of Tsar 
Aleksei I present during the meeting.  The image shows two “nations” signing a 
treaty as equals, rather than the Russian state with a subordinate people.  In this 
way, the arena of visual representation occasionally overshadowed the strictures 
of the narrative’s teleology. 
Savchenko’s film remains heralded as a high water mark for “national 
cinema” in Ukraine under Stalin.36  According to Tymofii Levchuk, “Ukrainian 
national cinema” was born at the same moment as Soviet cinema itself, when 
Lenin made the nationalization decree in August 1919.  Although seemingly 
arbitrary, considering that films had been produced in Ukraine for a decade prior 
to this date, Levchuk justified his dating of the 50th Anniversary of Ukrainian 
National Cinema on two grounds: First, as he explained to Sviatoslav Pavlovych 
Ivanov, the head of the Ukrainian Goskino, that although film production in 
Ukraine existed before Lenin’s decree, Ukraine had only become a nation during 
that year with the formation of the Bolshevik government in Kharkiv, whereas 
earlier film production had occurred within a Russian colony.  Second, because 
foreign capital financed such pre-Revolutionary production, it was not “Ukrainian 
in character.”37  Merely tautological, Levchuk’s first justification nonetheless 
affirmed the USSR’s nation-building project, along with the continued meaning 
that republican authorities placed on the dual origins of nation (Ukraine) and 
state (the Soviet Union).  His second justification is more specific in its reference 
to questions of representation, despite its being couched in familiar anti-capitalist 





Figure 1.3. Evidence of “national color” in Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi.  
 
 




 into question.   
Levchuk was not offering his reader a new way of thinking about the 
origins of Ukrainian cinema.  Rather, he merely repeated two elements that 
constituted the meaning of “national cinema” since the 1930s.  Around this time, 
we begin to see the ethno-territorial claim of Kyiv Studio to certain thematic 
material, rooted in a folkloric conception of national difference and present in 
visual and aural spectacle.  Pyr’ev, a Russian filmmaker, came to Kyiv to make 
films about Ukraine, before returning to Moscow to make generically Soviet 
productions.  While ethnically Ukrainian, Savchenko too worked in Moscow 
before returning to Ukraine to make Ukrainian-themed films.   
 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko’s Zvenyhora (1927) as the “First Ukrainian Film” 
 
With this alignment of folkloric theme and production space, we begin to 
see the generic origins of the “national” film.  When critics began writing histories 
of Soviet cinema after World War II, it was within the context of this alignment 
that they identified as “national cinema,” rather than as constituting the totality of 
production on the Soviet ethnic “periphery.”  Nikolai Lebedev’s Outline on the 
History of Cinema in the USSR from 1947 provides the first evidence of this 
conception, wherein “one of the founders of Soviet film criticism”38 wrote,  
Despite a quantitatively large film production, Soviet Ukrainian cinema 
during the first years of its existence was Ukrainian only in a territorial 
sense […] But it did not become Ukrainian national cinema in spirit and 
style.39 
 
Like Levchuk, while Lebedev admitted that Ukrainian cinema existed since the 
existence of the Ukrainian SSR, he privileged the system of representation – 
indeed, a formal specificity – over a tautological explanation of “Ukrainian 
national cinema.”  Because the economic fact of film production alone could not 
inject suitable meaning into such a term, Lebedev had to look elsewhere for a 
point of origin, which he found almost a decade after Lenin’s decree in Oleksandr 
Dovzhenko’s film, Zvenyhora (1927).  While narratively and stylistically eclectic 
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and highly modernist, which would later stand at odds with socialist realism and 
Stalinist culture as a whole, the film introduced spectators to a canonical 
Ukrainian ethnoscape that came to visual maturity in the films of Savchenko and 
Pyr’ev.   
According to Soviet film critic Nikolai Lebedev, Zvenyhora was “the first 
genuinely Ukrainian work of cinema,” due not only to its Ukrainian theme, but 
also because Dovzhenko was “organically connected with Ukrainian culture.”40  
Despite his earlier work on such genre-driven films as Love’s Berries (Iagodka 
liubvi, 1926) and The Diplomatic Pouch (Sumka dipkur’era, 1927), Dovzhenko 
too considered Zvenyhora his first “real” film.41  As the first of two efforts explicitly 
located in Ukraine during the Revolution, Zvenyhora introduces a number of 
stylistic and narrative elements that remained consistent throughout his body of 
work.  Here, the filmmaker also articulated a number of character types and 
image tropes that dominated not only the rest of his own work, but Ukrainian 
cinema as a whole.  The main character in Zvenyhora, known only as “old man 
[did],” becomes a symbol of continuity and tradition, and a “generalized national 
image of the Ukrainian peasant,” according to film critic Rostislav Iurenev,42 while 
the Cossack in Zvenyhora represents a historical point of origin for the Ukrainian 
nation, while trans-historically characterizing the particular nature of the 
contemporary Ukrainian revolutionary.  In this case, this trans-historical 
“Cossack” can be either a Ukrainian Bolshevik (the hero, Timosh) or a nationalist 
(his brother Pavlo).  Finally, Zvenyhora introduces the landscape as an important 
visual / narrative component, which, through a stylized tableaux-like imagery, 
invites the spectator to contemplate its meaning-producing quality.   
Although, as Lebedev pointed out, “The content is difficult to convey with 
words,”43  Zvenyhora deals with various disconnected moments of a highly 
mythologized Ukrainian history, from the invasion of the Normans, to the 17th 
century Cossack Hetmanate, to the First World War and post-revolutionary 
Ukraine.  Zvenyhora narrates each of the “historical” episodes separately and a-
chronologically, which suggests a historical progression that never materializes.  
The film opens as seventeenth-century Cossack bandits encounter an old man 
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raving about lost treasure during a routine patrol for Polish soldiers.  The middle 
of the film breaks to tell the story of the ninth-century Princess Roksana, who 
“betrays her nation” by marrying a Varangian lord.  The end relates Timosh’s 
story as he joins the Bolsheviks during the Civil War.  The connecting segments 
between these historical / mythological episodes follow Timosh’s brother Pavlo 
and their grandfather (the “old man”) as they search for a lost treasure (referred 
to as “our Ukrainian treasures” in the intertitles) at Zvenyhora.  After the Civil 
War, Pavlo emigrates to Prague in order to acquire enough money to continue 
his search.  In the final scene, he returns to Soviet Ukraine, attempting to 
convince the old man to bomb a Red Army train carrying Timosh.  He refuses, 
and Timosh and his comrades invite the old man onto the train, believing that he 
can be re-educated, while Pavlo commits suicide.  Most evidently, however, the 
“treasure” of Zvenyhora remains undiscovered at the end of the film. 
The film is stylistically and generically eclectic, mixing rapid montage in 
the scenes of revolutionary change with paced shots of pre-World War I peasant 
communities in Ukraine; slapstick comedy exists alongside highly theatrical 
melodrama and the action of a war film.  Evgenii Margolit pointed out in his 
dissertation that Dovzhenko’s Zvenyhora was one of the first Soviet films that 
borrowed freely from folkloric motifs.  He saw in Dovzhenko’s film the “organic 
union of fairy-tales, legends, songs, and the lubok.”44  The film’s central 
character, the old man, functions as a catalyst for relating the national epos (epic 
poetry), and he himself becomes the preserver of that tradition through his 
appearance in each of the episodes.  Life in contemporary Ukraine is connected 
allegorically to folkloric narratives set against the backdrop of the unchanging 
Ukrainian space of Zvenyhora (loosely translated as “Jingle Mountain” from the 
Russian verb “zvénet’,” to ring, and the Ukrainian word “horá” for mountain).  
Historical / revolutionary time constantly abuts with a de-historicized mythological 
time, which is in essence cyclical, due to the presence of the static images of 
Zvenyhora and the old man.  This is an anti-materialist perspective, where 
humans, in their stability over time, function as objects in nature.  The 
nationalistic value of this perspective is in the stability of place over the mutability 
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of history, and the revolutionary process represented in the film is only legible as 
positive insofar as it conforms to the film’s allegorical constructs. 
The film introduces the viewer to a number of image tropes, which will 
become canonical for Ukrainian cinema.  The Cossacks wear their distinctive 
woolen hats and Turkish sabers, and among them is the iconic bandura player.  
The old man himself is an equally canonical image, which would repeatedly 
signify Ukrainian “tradition” in Dovzhenko’s future films, and in many other 
Ukrainian films from this point forward.  The old man is simultaneously comically 
superstitious, consistently drunk, yet in possession of folk wisdom; he is 
impoverished yet physically strong. 
Like the old man, the treasure under Zvenyhora is also an ambiguous 
symbol, alternately signifying a meaning-producing object held collectively by the 
nation, a space of contamination by “impure powers [nechistye sily],” and an item 
of nationalist fetish.  While the Cossack leader in the first scene shows the 
wisdom to suggest leaving “the treasure in peace,” affirming that the value of the 
treasure lies in its untouched nature, Zvenyhora itself is excluded from the 
socialist modernity that the rest of the country experiences, due to the 
maintenance of the space’s secrecy.  The question remains whether we are to 
read the intertitle that proclaims the onset of modernity in Ukraine as positive or 
negative.  In fact, this remains the problem that the film attempts to address, but 
fails in its much too deliberate “dialectical” ending of reconciliation between old 
and new. 
Bohdan Nebesio writes that while ostensibly anti-nationalist, the 
mythical/historical narrative promotes the idea of Ukrainian history as separate 
from Russian history, and that the grandfather’s stories, and thus “tradition,” “can 
be reconciled with… the new socialist state.”45  The relationship between Russia 
and Ukraine is furthermore non-existent.  Despite its status as the “first Ukrainian 
film,” Iurenev ultimately dismisses the film because it “ignored Ukraine’s 
connections with the Russian people.”46  This critique was equivalent to saying 
that the film rejected socialist realism.  The essential problem that Zvenyhora 
attempts to articulate is the reconciliation of a nationalist mythical time with a 
 63
 
Marxist / materialist historical time.  In this task, the film ultimately fails with its 
unbelievable ending.  This was the reconciliation that Savchenko and Pyr’ev 
worked to establish successfully.  But in formulating the familiar, domestic space 
of “national color,” the implicit spectator is the non-ethnic Soviet citizen, who is 
invited to gaze at the antics of the non-Russian, without any assumed 
identification.  Dovzhenko, in contrast, intended a Ukrainian spectator for his 
early work, with his refusal to make the Ukrainian ethnoscape and the narrative 
itself conform wholeheartedly to an emerging Stalinist folkloric mode.  
Dovzhenko’s image of Ukrainian space is uncanny because it refuses to fit itself 
neatly within the Soviet Union as a whole. 
In contrast, we see in such prominent examples from the work of Pyr’ev 
and Savchenko that the organization of space becomes a method of 
simultaneously defining difference, but within the political space of union or 
sameness.  In Visions of a New Land, Emma Widdis shows how Soviet cinema 
participated in the transformation and reinvention of national space during the 
1920s and 1930s.  Through what she identifies as cultural mapping, Soviet 
authorities sought knowledge and mastery of space, and ways of making space 
one’s own in order to use it effectively.  Widdis identifies the term, “osvoenie 
prostranstva [command of space]” as “embodying [this] duality of knowledge and 
control.”47  The “Stalinist map,” she argues,  
pictured an immobile space, hierarchically organized around a dominant 
center from which lines of influence extended radially, and the relationship 
between center and periphery encoded relations of power.  At the center, 
Moscow functioned as the viewing position from which the whole territory 
could metaphorically be “seen,” and hence controlled.48 
 
Widdis notes from Clark that this notion of “knowledge / control” over space was 
explicitly tied to the Stalinist project of “dominating nature,” to make nature 
conform to the new civilization.  Despite this language of “osvoenie,” Widdis does 
not accept that it tells the whole story.  She opts for the inclusive term, 
“exploration,” which she describes as a “decentered, nonhierarchical vision of 
space in which difference is emphasized over sameness[…]”  In Soviet cinema of 
the 1920s and 1930s, “osvoenie” and exploration “intersected and collided in 
 64
 
cultural texts.”49  While such a decentered vision of Soviet space predominated 
in the 1920s and during the First Five-Year Plan, by the late 1930s, Soviet 
cinema presented “the radially organized landscape of Stalinism,” that is, a spac




50  Francine Hirsch also traces such a movement 
from an “exotic” or exploratory treatment of non-Russians in ethnographic 
exhibits during the 1920s to a “modernized” non-Russian who was struggling to 
rid itself of elements of backwardness, those very traits that were exoticized in an
earlier cultural discour
We can see a movement away from the domesticated folkloric of high 
Stalinism by the 1960s, toward what I define as an ethnographic mode, a use of 
folklore that was static and highly specific, instead of mobile.  Formally, the 
ethnographic mode brought visual “excess” to the foreground of the narrative 
space.  Whereas the folkloric revealed a familiar knowledge of the ethnic subject, 
in the process of assimilation that I outline above, the 1960s ethnographic film 
relished in the spectacle of ethnic difference.  In this shift, the principle variable is 
in how filmmakers conceptualized space, in terms of the relationship between the 
national and the natural.  Whereas Widdis and Hirsch view such an ethnographic 
treatment of the non-Russian during the 1920s, and which I believe is present to 
some degree in Dovzhenko’s early work, I argue that the 1960s ethnographic 
mode represented a qualitatively different phenomenon, in part because the 
intended consumer of the “exotic” was different.  While Hirsch and Widdis 
assume a “central” consumer of the image of the other,52 the ethnographic 
positioning of the spectator in the 1960s is simultaneously other and self.  
According to Widdis, space was “decentered” in 1920s films about the periphery, 
but spectatorship was clearly radial throughout the period: Modernization is 
brought from center to periphery, and “authentic, objective” knowledge is brought 
from the periphery to the center.  As I argue, the material of this knowledge was 
then mobilized for a Stalinist folkloric, where “national color” was itself 
demobilized to the domestic realm, largely for a non-non-Russian consumer.  I 
also disagree with Widdis’s argument that late Stalinist representations of the 
non-Russian was mere “ethnic decoration,” wherein “color was superimposed 
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onto a vision of homogeneity, and real difference was suppressed.”53  In 
Savchenko’s Khmel’myts’kyi, we need only look beyond the function of the 
narrative to find that the image of “difference” continued to dominate non-Russian 
cinema under Stalin.  The difference between a Stalinist ethnoscape of the 
periphery and that of the 1960s “national” film was in the latter’s de-familiarization 
of the former; that is, the 1960s “national” film questioned our knowledge of the 
space of the Stalinist folkloric system, even as it continued to mobilize its visual 
and narrative vocabulary.    
 
Ukrainian Particularity and Overcoming “Theatricality” 
 
The fact that Ukrainian cinema, and Kyiv Studio (renamed in honor of 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko in 1957) in particular, continued to mobilize a folkloric 
imagery as an affirmative mode of national representation into the 1960s, despite 
official condemnation of films like Pyr’ev’s Kuban Cossacks, indicates that we 
need to consider the form of Stalinist representation more seriously than did 
Thaw-era detractors.  As Alla Zhukova and Heorhii Zhurov noted in the second 
volume of the 1959 history of Ukrainian cinema (Soviet Ukrainian Film Art: 
Essays), “In Ukrainian cinema, folklore frequently lies at the basis of the work 
itself, and is one of the sources, which express its ideological content.”54  Without 
folklore, the authors implied, Ukrainian cinema would not exist as an independent 
national cinema.  At the time of its publication, filmmakers at Dovzhenko Studio 
were embroiled in a controversy regarding the very importance of such a mode 
for Ukrainian cinema’s particularity.  In this debate about the “original form of 
Ukrainian film art,” visuality rather than narrative took center stage as supporters 
and detractors of the 1950s style explored the relationship between Ukrainian 
theater, folklore and the cinema.  This debate made evident to many filmmakers 
that an image of Ukrainian difference required the maintenance of folklore as a 




From cinema’s inception as a narrative art in the 1910s, filmmakers and 
critics have striven to define its relationship to the theater.  At first, theater offered 
cinema a comparison with a respectable form.  By the 1920s, however, French 
and Soviet filmmakers and critics in particular articulated the necessity for 
cinema to become explicitly “cinematic,” and to reject elements of “theatricality.”  
French Impressionists like Germaine Dulac argued that theatrical methods 
imparted a degree of dramatic “sterility” when applied to the cinema.55  In a 1925 
article, Soviet filmmaker Abram Room employed a dichotomy of theater and 
cinema, in which the former represented “illusion” and “stylization,” while Room 
characterized cinema as “realism, life, the everyday, objectivity, properly 
motivated behavior, [and] rational gesture.56  Yet, as Charlie Keil and other film 
scholars have noted, “theater” became a floating signifier in modernist critical 
discourse, at times used to advocate for greater realism in cinema, and at other 
times a movement away from narrative, and into an exploration of image and 
movement using the techniques of “deep focus, long takes and staging in 
depth.”57  In post-Stalinist Soviet cinema of the 1950s, however, the latter 
“theatrical” techniques were aligned with the monumentalism of the Stalinist 
folkloric, and thus were not desirable qualities in Thaw-era cinema. 
In the third volume of Soviet Ukrainian Film Art, which dealt with the period 
1941-54, A. A. Romitsyn complained of the pervading aesthetic of “theatricality 
[teatral’shchyna]” that came to characterize Ukrainian cinema after the war, 
which he identified within the realm of dramaturgy and mise-en-scene.  On the 
one hand, there were objective reasons for identifying this quality of Ukrainian 
cinema: As I will explore in Chapter 2, most of the directors and actors at 
Dovzhenko Studio in the mid-1950s were drawn from the theater, or were 
educated at the Kyiv Theatrical Institute (KITM).  Second, a portion of the studio’s 
output in the 1950s constituted “film-plays,” the literal screening of a staged 
performance.58  Tymofii Levchuk, one of the few directors working at the studio 
who had been educated at the Kyiv Film Institute in the 1930s, made several 
film-plays out of a necessity to remain employed during the late-40s and early-
50s.59  Nonetheless, Romitsyn wrote that even after the Ukrainian studio 
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returned to “real cinema” in the latter part of the decade, "A theatrical mise-e
scene continued to prevail," and the Ukrainian actor continued to work in a 
“garrulous” and hyperbolic manner.  The Ukrainian film scholar identifie
certain forcefulness of the composition, stating that filmmakers placed actors in 
the shot as if they were on stage.  Moreover, directors strongly favored medium 
shots, at the expense of close-ups, which had the effect of reducing the 
psychological complexity of the individual roles.  Finally, Romitsyn complain





Thus, critics leveled a similar critique against such “theatricality” as they 
did other aspects of late Stalinist artistic culture, calling it a principle, as veteran 
Ukrainian director Miron Bilinskii stated, in which “living reality” is absent.61  
According to Thaw-era critics, “theatricality” pointed toward the worst aspects of 
heavy-handed socialist realist narration and a stilted imagery that emphasized 
“things and objects.”  Nonetheless, several Ukrainian critics and filmmakers were 
more ambivalent about the term, seeing in it aspects of Savchenko’s and 
Dovzhenko’s work, of which they believed contemporary Ukrainian cinema 
should take influence.  For example, in the October 1958 issue of Iskusstvo kino, 
Ukrainian theater director and KITM instructor Ivan Chabanenko discussed 
Dovzhenko's "theatricality" – in which he recognized the same qualities of the 
filmmaker’s art that Nekrasov lambasted a year later – as the height of Ukrainian 
cinema’s original form.62   
Chabanenko, moreover, admitted that the new theatrical directors at 
Dovzhenko Studio in the 1950s made “imperfect” films, but that the qualities 
contained within these imperfections were “inherent to the features of the 
national particularities of the Ukrainian people."63  He concluded by asking 
whether Ukrainian cinema’s penchant for "theatricality [here, teatral'nost']," is 
“really such a horrible evil.  […]  And don't elements of theatricality, in the best 
sense of the word, have the right to exist in Ukrainian cinema as specific features 
of the national art?"  From its origins, Chabanenko wrote, Ukrainian cinema and 
theater were connected in the extensive cross-over of actors between the two 
forms.  He wrote, "Such a tradition of Ukrainian theater found its continuation and 
 68
 
perfection in the work of directors A. Dovzhenko, I. Savchenko, and many other 
masters of Ukrainian cinema."64  Thus, “theatricality” became a means to define 
new representational principles for Ukrainian national cinema through a Stalinist 
aesthetic system.  Here, however, Chabanenko significantly emphasized the 
visuality rather than the narrative of that system in speaking to concerns of 
Ukrainian specificity.   
In speaking to a broader audience in the literary journal Sovetskaia 
Ukraina in January 1961, Dovzhenko Studio filmmaker Mykola Makarenko wrote 
his own justification for theatricality in the cinema.  He derisively spoke of cinema 
“purists,” who constantly tote the idea of “kinematografichnost’,” arguing instead 
that the (pre-socialist realist) origins of Soviet cinema, and the work of Eisenstein 
and Dovzhenko in particular, contained no “code of laws.”  The early Soviet 
avant-garde borrowed freely from theatrical, as well as literary, conventions, 
largely because directors were working with the artistic knowledge they already 
had.  Eisenstein came from the theater himself, and imparted a theatrical 
understanding of cinema, and Dovzhenko actively worked with theatrical actors 
from KITM.  Makarenko wrote that there were those that claimed, “The Ukrainian 
actor’s nature is anti-cinematic.  He is sluggish, sing-songy [pevuch], and 
unrealistic.”65  Thus, he challenged the exclusively negative association of 
“theatricality” with these extra-narrative elements of Ukrainian national color, 
suggesting instead that they possessed expressive potential.  
Romitsyn returned to the question of “theatricality” in light of Makarenko’s 
article a year later in an article, “Innovation, Traditions and Imitation.”  Therein he 
argued,  
The desire to see in the theatricality of movies a revelation of the eternal 
Ukrainian origins, of course, is unwarranted.  The theatricality of cinema is 
not a national trait, but proof of professional immaturity.  In the interests of 
directors, actors, cinematographers, set designers, and cinema as a 
whole, it is useful to consider teatral’shchyna in the cinema to be nothing 
more than a synonym for inertia, conservatism, and general professional 
illiteracy.66 
 
Miron Bilinskii also complained that Makarenko and Chabanenko had gravely 
misunderstood Dovzhenko as an advocate of such theatrical practices as 
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“wordiness [velerechie], prettiness [krasivost’], and false significance [lozhnaia 
mnogoznachitel’nost’].”  Bilinskii complained, “One-sidedness and a false pathos 
are the main deficiencies in Ukrainian feature filmmaking during recent years.”  
Consequently, there was nothing appearing at Dovzhenko Studio along the lines 
of the best of Thaw-era cinema, evident in the recent work of Chukhai, Kalatozov 
and Tarkovskii.  The only way to get rid of “false theatricality” was to stop 
defending it as the “genuine national form” of Ukrainian cinema.  Dovzhenko, he 
concluded, was both “deeply national,” and “kinematografichen.”67  Yet, the traits 
that he identified in line with the “theatricalists’ [teatral’shchyky]” defamation of 
Dovzhenko’s name were the same as Nekrasov had leveled against the 
filmmaker in his article, “Words, ‘Great’ and Simple.”   
Despite the indication of such a complicated relationship between what 
was defined as the essence of Ukrainian cinema’s “national form” and what I 
have identified as the folkloric representational mode, Moscow critic Igor’ Rachuk 
essentially closed off the debate in his official biography of Dovzhenko, published 
in 1964.  Therein, he wrote that, as a “son of the Ukrainian land, [Dovzhenko…] 
hated all who came out of a national, khutorians'kyi white-wash with the external 
prettyness of folkloric elements.”68  The implication was that, if Kyiv Studio now 
made the claim to Dovzhenko’s name, its filmmakers had to follow the critical 
consensus on their patriarch’s creative work.   
Nonetheless, the concept of teatral’shchyna as Chabanenko and 
Makarenko saw it contained an element of self-reflexivity about the cinematic 
form and about national representation itself.  Perhaps the obvious example of 
“theatricality” in Ukrainian cinema is Dovzhenko’s Roksana scene in Zvenyhora.  
Here, story-telling folds in on itself, in an example of mise-en-abîme, as the film 
contains stories within stories within stories, which, in their self-conscious lack of 
realism could easily morph into a surrealist de-familiarization of folkloric material.  
In the modernist and ethnographic mode of “Ukrainian poetic cinema” during the 
1960s, Sergei Paradzhanov and his followers would notice Dovzhenko’s stylistic 
eclecticism, with its combination of staged, tableaux framing, where medium 
shots predominate, and where actors deliberately moved away from realist 
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verisimilitude in their hyperbolic gestures.  Alongside these practices, 
Dovzhenko’s penchant for location shooting and documentary realism fit well with 
Thaw-era emphasis on the “authenticated” human image.  In approaching Thaw-
era aesthetic discourse within a dovzhenkoist idiom, however, Ukrainian 
filmmakers insisted upon the maintenance of the human subject’s fundamental 
association with the Ukrainian landscape.  In fact, within the ethnographic mode 
of the 1960s, Ukrainian filmmakers made an even stronger claim to the 
determining influence of landscape on human consciousness.   
 The visual representation of the non-Russian under Stalinism was 
fundamentally not about knowledge of different nationalities; rather, the folkloric 
mode was a means to re-create the Soviet periphery as a familiar ethnoscape, 
where “national color” was domesticated and existed in the realm of the 
expected.  We cannot believe, nor did Khrushchev really intend us to accept, that 
Stalin in fact learned about the state of agriculture from watching Pyr’ev’s Kuban 
Cossacks.  Instead, the film was a creative attempt to reflect a familiar image of 
the Russian/Ukrainian periphery, but made no pretense to authenticity.  In this 
respect, it is easy to see the concept of “national cinema” in line with how Terry 
Martin describes the transformation of Soviet nationalities policy in the mid-
1930s.  Within such a system of representation, politics and subjecthood itself 
was re-oriented toward the center, and non-Russian nationalism diffused within 
the safe realm of the folkloric. 
 
Visualizing a Profitable, but “Authentic” Image of Ukraine  
  
To arrive at the previous conclusion, we certainly do not need to look at a 
single film.  The same conclusion can be, and has been, drawn from literature, 
theater, and other visual and performing arts.  As Terry Martin argues, the 
“nationality question” itself had been resolved with the “Friendship of Peoples” 
mythology, articulated and accomplished through the ordered circulation of 
cultural products like books, films and performers, rather than through political 
 71
 
negotiation between the various nations of the Soviet Union.  The specificity and 
formal dimensions of cultural texts come into play, however, when we consider 
how post-Stalinist cultural products drew upon an earlier mode of display.  When 
the nationality question reappeared in Ukrainian cinema during the 1960s, it was 
built upon the visual, if not ideological, foundations of the Stalinist folkloric.  But 
the cultural context for giving visual meaning to nationality had shifted in this later 
period, with Thaw-era discourse on “sincerity” and “authenticity” providing the 
basis for a new understanding of non-Russian folklore. 
The second context from which we must approach the relationship 
between the Stalinist folkloric and the 1960s-era “national film” is in the changing 
conception of the market for mass media.  After all, expectations about non-
Russian subject matter in films necessarily contained assumptions about the 
intended spectator.  As several scholars have identified, the cultural politics of 
the 1930s had dispensed with an idea that there existed distinct “proletarian” and 
“bourgeois” consumers of art, in favor of an undifferentiated Soviet “mass” 
reader/spectator.69  Pyr’ev’s and Savchenko’s films were genuinely successful, 
attracting unprecedented numbers of spectators.  This was the predictable 
outcome for a film industry that had sharply limited domestic film production, and 
dispensed with foreign imports.  Film spectators had little else to watch at the 
time.  Yet, these were also films formally coded for mass consumption.  Their 
iconography of the Soviet periphery and narrative of union contained all too 
familiar tropes, and neither their folksy humor nor nostalgic worldview intended to 
challenge the viewer.  Beginning in 1952, however, both production and 
consumption of films rose exponentially from the low of 1951 (when only twelve 
films were produced throughout the country) to the pivotal year of 1968 (when 
4.7 billion tickets were sold, and the average Soviet citizen attended the cinema 
20 times during the year).70  In many ways, this explosion of film culture that 
occurred during the Thaw and after seemed to affirm the Stalinist precept of “art 
for the masses.”  The film industry of the 1930s under Boris Shumiatskii also 
aimed to establish a kind of Soviet Hollywood, with popular genres such as 
comedies, adventure, and musicals that would attract spectators away from a 
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capitalist mass culture.  From the standpoint of the CPSU and the film industry, 
the emphasis was on penetrating a mass consciousness, rather than on tapping 
new consumer markets.  Filmmakers, like writers and artists, had a responsibility 
to speak in a language understandable to the masses, but the message was 
uniformly oriented toward socialist modernization and Soviet unity.   
Soviet authorities never denied this responsibility, but cinema became 
accountable for other issues after Stalin.  Filmmakers and studios were to 
develop their own “mark” on the industry, paving the way for greater emphasis on 
differentiation over ideological and industrial cohesion.  Industry differentiation 
functioned on several levels, at once allowing the production of “art films” for 
international film festival consumption and cultural promotion of the USSR 
abroad, and the production of popular cinema for domestic consumption and 
industry profits.  As I show in the following chapter, the language of differentiation 
also empowered republican studios to represent “their own” nationalities, and to 
make films for “their own” spectators.  While films produced at the “national” 
studios were intended for all-Union release, promotion of them was targeted 
toward spectators within the republic.  At the same time, industry and party 
authorities would use a film’s lack of success locally as a reason to refuse its all-
Union distribution.  In this way, differentiation functioned to tie films to a national 
public while potentially limiting their appeal.  Nonetheless, in its articulation of 
age, gender, class and ethno-national difference, the language of “differentiation” 
represented a new discursive phenomenon in the post-Stalin era.  While the 
Stalinist cinema of the periphery presented national difference only to, finally, 
deny it a political space, post-Stalinist cinema sought to exploit such difference.  
By suggesting that the specificity of the medium remains tied to how it structures 
consumption, I do not mean to reduce it to its “cultural use” as von Moltke 
criticizes historians of doing; rather, in seeing the development of the “national” 
film as a niche market, we have to understand audience expectations for 
particular types of images and for the studios that produced those images.  The 
next chapter explores changes in the Soviet studio system that took place in the 




and the development of “national cinema.”  Dovzhenko Studio in Kyiv adopted 
this definition of “national cinema” because it understood as one of its goals to 
speak to and for a Ukrainian audience.  In tandem with this re-conceptualization 
of the Soviet media consumer, I examine the types of “national” films that were 
intended to speak to this audience.  In many ways, we see the disintegration of 
certain facets of the folkloric system of non-Russian representation, and the re-
emergence of a politics of national identity within the Ukrainian film industry.  In 
staking a claim to a section of the “differentiated” public and its own thematic 
material, Ukrainian filmmakers and the Dovzhenko Studio leadership also 
articulated its own principle of film authorship that attempted to tie personal 
expression to national belonging.  Dovzhenko Studio’s principal task by the early 
1960s, however, lay not only in establishing the ideological basis for autonomous 
cultural production in Ukraine, but in seeking recognition from Moscow on the 




The Studio System, Genres, and Audiences in Ukraine during the early 1960s 
 
 
Reaction against the “theatricality” theory of “Ukrainian national cinema” 
was so intense in 1962 that it effectively ruined director Mykola Makarenko’s 
career.  He completed his People Don’t Know Everything (Liudi ne vse znaiut’, 
1963) about Ukrainian partisan leader Dmytro Horotsvit, after which he could not 
find work until 1970, when he co-directed Bread and Salt (Khlib i sil’), a television 
mini-series about the Revolution of 1905 in Ukraine.  Even then, the studio 
placed Makarenko’s name under the much younger and inexperienced director 
Hryhorii Kokhan in the credits.  Ivan Chabanenko’s and Makarenko’s articles 
sparked intense anger over the seemingly intentional effort of filmmakers in the 
republic to remain “provincial,” and outside of the main currents of Thaw-era 
realist discourse.  During the Central Committee’s Ideological Commission 
meetings between 1962 and 1964, filmmakers working in Ukraine considered it 
no great victory that L. F. Il’ichev and company excluded their work from political 
criticism.  Dovzhenko Studio in the early 1960s was simply below the radar of 
ideological authorities.1  During the 22nd Congress of the CPU in October 1961, 
First Secretary Pidhornyi drew a firm distinction between political correctness and 
artistic feeling when he stated that Ukrainian films possessed an “outwardly 
truthful” character, but lacked an “elaboration” of the heroes’ “inner lives.”2 
The problem, according to many voices in Kyiv, was one of recovery from 
the effects of the “cult of personality,” which, as I explored in Chapter 1, had 
                                                 
1 “Zapiska Ideologicheskogo otdela TsK KPSS o vypolnenii kinostudiei ‘Mosfil’m’ ukazanii 
iiun’skogo (1963 g.) plemuna TsK KPSS o povyshenii ideino-khudozhestvennogo urovnia 
kinofil’mov, (24 Jan. 1964),” in Ideologicheskie komissii TsK KPSS 1958-1964: Dokumenty, 
comp. E. S. Afanas’ev, V. Iu. Afiana, et al. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998), 466-7. 








                                                
supposedly reduced Ukrainian cinema to stale allegory and stereotypical notions 
of the Ukrainian folk character.  Whereas Mosfil’m had successfully established 
modern production facilities, had their pick of the best of recent VGIK graduates, 
and profited from the extensive growth of distribution networks and mechanisms 
for film criticism and promotion, Kyiv Studio found itself in essentially the same 
position as it was on the eve of the war.  From 1936 (when the Ukrainian film 
journal Kino was shut down) to 1956, the state refused to publish a single work of 
film criticism in Ukrainian or on Ukrainian cinema.  During the same year, film 
educational facilities were closed in both Odessa and Kyiv.3  Neither of these 
decisions, enacted based on a conception that such institutions were hotbeds of 
bourgeois nationalism, were reversed during the 1950s.  Even the most aping 
supporters of official policy in Kyiv confidently criticized this “legacy of the cult 
[nasledie kul’ta].”  While Kyiv Studio was re-built after the war, a sharp 
curtailment of production in the late 1940s depleted its personnel, who were 
forced to look elsewhere for employment.  Ivan Korniienko, the first of a new 
generation of Ukrainian film critics in the mid-1950s, argued that the cult 
“shackled the development of Ukrainian film art, film scholarship, and film 
criticism.”4  By 1960, however, Ukraine had made some progress, with the 
publication of the illustrated magazine Novyny kinoekrana (Screen News) and 
the establishment of academic departments for screen acting, film direction, and 
cinematography at the Kyiv Institute of Theatrical Arts (KITM). 
Nonetheless, Dovzhenko Studio still found itself at a stark disadvantage to 
central studios, especially as the mid-1950s’ emphasis on re-building the Soviet 
film industry came increasingly to mean the channeling of human and financial 
resources toward Mosfil’m, Gor’kii Studio, and Lenfil’m.  Ukrainian film critic Oleh 
Babyshkin wrote that Mosfil’m and Gor’kii had overcome the “cult of personality” 
with a successful influx of recent VGIK graduates, while “this has not fallen at the 
 
3 After 1940, only the department of film engineering remained at the Odessa Film Institute.  
TsDAVOU, f. 4754, op. 1, d. 50, l. 15. 
4 Ivan Korniienko, “Tendentsii i zavdannia,” Literaturna Ukraina, August 24, 1962: 1.  Korniienko 
repeated his criticism in “Velinnia chasu,” Radians’ka Ukraina, January 10, 1963: 3. 
 
feet of Ukrainian cinema.”5  Throughout the 1950s, the “national cinemas” of the 
Union republics remained in a decisively peripheral position in relation to the 
central studios.  During the next decade, however, several ideas for overcoming 
this divide between Moscow and the Union republics, and for building industrially 
and aesthetically modernized “national studios” emerged, particularly in Ukraine.  
At the same time, real problems remained.  The new leadership that took control 
over the Ukrainian film industry in 1962 – Sviatoslav Pavlovych Ivanov as head of 
Ukrainian Goskino, Vasyl’ Vasyl’ovych Tsvirkunov as managing director of 
Dovzhenko Studio, and Vasyl’ Sydorovych Zemliak as head of the Screenplay-
Editorial Board (SRK) – remained divided (both among and within themselves) 
on the issues of native cadre development, language policy, and the thematic 
and aesthetic foci of Ukrainian national cinema.  The new leadership, however, 
shared a desire to participate in the cultural Thaw, and with the politics of 
nationality.  Soviet cinema’s growing commercialization also forced them to 
contend with questions of Ukrainian cinema’s profitability.  As I explored in the 
previous chapter, many aspects of Stalinist practice and modes of representation 
remained in place, and maintained broad support among members of the studio 
collective, although for different reasons than Chabanenko and Makarenko 
expressed. 
 This chapter begins chronicling Dovzhenko Studio’s move from a small 
and insignificant provincial studio in the late 1950s and early 1960s to one of the 
principal institutions of non-Russian cinema in the Soviet Union.  Republican 
studios had a difficult time making films on par with those produced at central 
studios, largely because the Soviet film industry did not attribute much 
importance to them, either as profit-making enterprises or as politically and 
artistically necessary.  I argue that a post-Stalinist claim to nationalities policy fit 
into Thaw-era notions of authentic experience, and the articulation of organic 
knowledge of national space.  The combination of demands for industry re-
structuring and cadre deployment along “national” lines set the stage for 
                                                 





transforming the ways that studios and individual filmmakers conceptualized 
national representation and the consumption of “national” films. 
 
The Industrial Demands of “National Cinemas” 
 
According to industry authorities at the republican and studio level, the 
first problem of developing viable “national cinemas” was an administrative 
problem: how to address the sharply unequal distribution of capital between 
Moscow and the republican studios.  While Central Asian, Caucasus, and Baltic 
studios had more modest goals, Ukrainian authorities continually demanded 
throughout the late-1950s and early-1960s a share of industry production equal 
to that of the central studios.  In 1963, Mosfil’m planned to make 25 films, and in 
turn Levchuk set Dovzhenko Studio’s goal at 20-25 during his speech at the First 
Congress of the SKU the same year.6  Unless it was willing to slash budgets for 
their productions even further, however, Goskino would continue to set studio 
production goals at 10-15 feature films per year in Kyiv (see Figure 5.2).  When 
the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU in October 1952 resolved to increase film 
production – and thus put an end to malokartin’e – republican studios understood 
this to be an all-Union affair, a project for extensive infrastructure development, 
both in Moscow, and in the republics.  Moreover, with the elimination of the 
centralized Ministry of Cinematography, which occurred two weeks after Stalin’s 
death in March 1953,7 industry power shifted to the Ministries of Culture in each 
of the Union republics.  With this partial devolution to republican Ministries, 
authorities within the separate Administrations for Feature Film Production had 
considerable more power over the creation of production and thematic plans.  
After 1953, production increased most notably in Kyiv, Odessa, Moscow, 
Leningrad, and Tbilisi, although, because budgets were still determined within 
                                                 
6 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 227, l. 24. 
7 Liudmila Pustynskaia, “Kinematograf ottepeli v sotsian’no-politicheskom i kul’turnom 
kotekstakh,” in Vitalii Troianovskii, ed., Kinematograf ottepeli: kniga vtoraia (Moscow: Materik, 
2002), 384.  The Ministry of Cinematography was only one of 26 ministries eliminated in the 
immediate aftermath of Stalin’s death.  Ronald G. Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the 





the All-Union Ministry of Culture, Mosfil’m and Gor’kii benefited 
disproportionately. 
Moreover, despite the devolution to republican organizations, the central 
branch in Moscow still required its approval for screenplays prior to production 
and for all-Union distribution.  A January 1962 order from the Ministry of Culture 
in Moscow, for example, complained that republican studios had been illegally 
approving screenplays for production before central organs had given them 
permission to do so.8  In many respects, authorities within the central Ministry of 
Culture still conducted business directly with individual studios, without the input 
of republican-level organizations.  As Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone argues, 
while devolution re-established the idea of power-sharing between Moscow and 
the Union republics, the former did not invest the republics with any meaningful 
share.  Nonetheless, republican organizations employed largely personal 
connections with other local and republican level organization and party 
departments, demonstrating that there existed “considerable room for maneuver 
by skillful republic-level leaders.”9  There were practical reasons for devolving 
production authority to republican organizations.  Khrushchev himself gave 
intermittent support for plans to devolve economic decision-making to republican 
ministries and local enterprises.  Notions of khozraschet during the 1950s urged 
greater self-reliance and financial responsibility in industrial production more 
broadly.  Under the influence of economist Evsei Liberman’s theories during the 
1960s, khozraschet took on the additional meaning of devolution of authority to 
local enterprises, on the reasoning that individuals closer to the site of production 
would have personal knowledge of how to make their enterprises more efficient.  
Moreover, “economic methods” could be employed to “stimulate” workers and 
management toward increased productivity.10   
                                                 
8 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1520, l. 82. 
9 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR,” Problems of 
Communism 23, no. 3 (May-June 1974), 12-13. 
10 See, Abraham Katz, The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger,  
1972), 30-31, 58.  See also my discussion of how khozraschet functioned in the film industry 
during the 1960s: Joshua First, “From Spectator to ‘Differentiated’ Consumer: Film Audience 
Research in the Era of Developed Socialism (1965-80),” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and 





Such talk of devolution of authority to republican organizations, studios 
and filmmakers themselves informed the planning and implementation of the 
February 1962 Plenum of the Union of Cinematographers (SK).11  Apart from its 
organizational goals, one of the initial intentions for the Plenum was a full 
discussion of plans for developing republican studios.  First Secretary Pyr’ev 
gave voice to some of these concerns in his opening speech, mentioning the 
necessity to provide assistance toward this end and in the development of 
professional “national cadres.”12  He spoke of “new forms of interrelations and 
mutual aid,” and in Kyiv later that year, he rejected the notion of importing 
directors from central studios to work in the republics.  “You have a lot of your 
own people,” he emphasized, “so why [should we] come [to you]?”13  Although 
workers in Ukraine still had serious problems in attracting their “own people,” 
Pyr’ev’s statements were understood as a policy of native cadre development at 
republican studios.   
While rejecting the import of Moscow cadres to republican studio, Pyr’ev 
listed joint productions with republican studios as the priority in aiding their 
development.  SK representatives from the republics, however, viewed such 
“assistance” as counter to the construction of independent republican studios, 
and interpreted Pyr’ev’s insistence on joint productions as a condescending jab 
at their unequal share of financial resources and creative cadres.  Pyr’ev argued 
that joint productions would give meaning to “our multinational cinema.”14  While 
                                                 
11 The Union of Soviet Cinematographers was still a new organization in 1961.  In June 1957, 
Ivan Pyr’ev headed the Organizational Bureau of a Union of Workers in Cinematography, with the 
goal of establishing a union for filmmakers along the lines of what the Writers’ Union had become 
by the 1950s.  The former director of Mosfil’m aimed to create an organization, in which 
filmmakers themselves would have real power to affect industry decisions, and to establish a 
standardized system of privilege in line with other members of the creative intelligentsia.  The 
establishment of the Bureau in 1957 also created parallel organizations in most of the Union 
Republics.  The February Plenum established a Union of Workers in Cinematography, and the 
First Congress in November 1965 established the Union of Cinematographers (SK). 
12 For the early Bolsheviks, the term “cadre” referred to the vanguard or leading members of the 
organizational committees.  In this context, however, “cadre” simply refers to the basic framework 
of creative personnel, ie., directors, screenwriters, cinematographers, and sometimes art 
directors (khudozhniki) and film critics.  
13 TsDAMLMU, 655, op. 1, d. 199, l. 204. 
14 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 1, d. 151, l. 63.  Editor-in-Chief of Sovetskii ekran Dmitrii Pisarevskii 
responded to Pyr’ev’s comments about aiding the development of “national studios” stating that 





“multinationality” indicated recognition of difference, it was one that could be 
reconciled in the process of exchange rather than through an equal distribution of 
capital.  The decisions of the February Plenum followed from the First 
Secretary’s opening speech, stating that the Union would work toward more joint 
productions, “in an effort to unite the creative powers of multinational Soviet 
cinema, and [render] real help to the republican studios and an exchange of 
creative experience.”15  While joint productions might in fact bring much-needed 
money and other technological resources for later use at republican studios, 
these productions frequently employed cadres exclusively from the central 
studios.  In this respect, such projects tended to contradict Pyr’ev’s stated 
intentions of “exchange.”  Even Mosfil’m-Dovzhenko Studio co-production, The 
Enchanted Desna (Zacharovannaia Desna, 1964), directed by Iuliia Solntseva 
and based on Dovzhenko’s short story about his childhood in Chernihivshchyna, 
became an exclusively Mosfil’m production in terms of the credit assigned to the 
films, and even in terms of the resources allocated to their production.16  They 
were co-productions in name only, made to appease the studio’s sentimental 
attachment to their patron saint.  When Goskino official Nikolai Dymshyts came 
to Kyiv for the January 1964 Plenum of the SKU to advise them on joint 
productions with other republican studios, playwright and Premier of the 
Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Korniichuk asked him why he only mentioned co-
productions with other republican studios, and not with Foreign studios.17  
Korniichuk mentioned that domestic co-productions were only further 
provincializing for republican studios because it demonstrated that only Moscow 
studios were able to conduct their own “foreign policy.”18  Now that Ukraine had 
                                                 
15 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 180, l. 46. 
16 In fact, when Volodymyr Denysenko approached Solntseva about making Dovzhenko’s A 
Dream about My Son (Mechta o moem syne) at Dovzhenko Studio, she refused to give up her 
rights to the novella.  See their correspondence, TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1560. 
17 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 287, l. 286. 
18 Between 1956 and 1964, Mosfil’m or Gor’kii Studio had collaborated with India on Journey 
Beyond Three Seas (Khozhdenie za tri moria, V. Pronin and K. A. Abbas, 1957), with France on 
The Last Inch (Poslednii diuim, T. Vul’fovich and N. Kurikhin, 1958) and Normandy – Neman 
(Normandiia – Neman, J. Dréville, 1960), with Bulgaria on The Night Before (Nakanune, V. 
Petrov, 1959), with Czechoslovakia on May Stars (Maiskie zvezdy, S. Rostotskii, 1959), with 





its own UN seat, why could it not participate in the global community of 
filmmakers alongside other nations?   
Delegates at both the February 1962 and January 1964 Plenums engaged 
with other problems of center/periphery relations, with the unequal distribution of 
capital occupying much of the discussion.  Typical of speeches from republican 
delegates at the Moscow Plenum, Armenian director Stepan Kevorkov spoke 
about the “much more difficult work” that republican studios had in comparison to 
central studios.  He complained that the “national” studios routinely received less 
money for productions, due to the industry’s rating system.19  Under this policy, 
studios were rated on a scale of one to five, with level one studios like Mosfil’m, 
Lenfil’m, and Gor’kii receiving the most generous funding, thanks in large part to 
Pyr’ev’s own role in resurrecting Mosfil’m.  Armenfil’m, along with most of the 
republican feature film studios, were rated as “threes,” while Dovzhenko Studio 
and Gruzia-fil’m maintained a middle ground with level “two” ratings.  In a Catch 
22, films produced at republican studios were generally of inferior technical 
quality due to funding limitations, thus justifying the continued practice of 
underfunding productions.  According to a November 14, 1964 Council of 
Ministers prikaz, the payment of studio management, in addition to creative and 
technical personnel, was based on the studio’s rating, which in turn was 
determined by the number of full-length films released each year by the studio.  
Along with this quantitative determinant, the first group included those feature 
film studios that “have a particularly important meaning for the development of 
Soviet feature filmmaking.”20  Kevorkov iterated that this inequality, based as it 
was on a subjective notion of “importance,” should be at the basis of any 
discussion of the “development of national cinemas.”21   
Even the quantitative aspect to this assignment of “pay categories” 
contained a degree of inequality, as the question of “importance” also constituted 
                                                                                                                                                 
Beasts (Liudi i zveri, S. Gerasimov, 1962), and with Italy on They Went East (Oni shli na vostok, 
G. de Santis and D. Vasil’ev, 1964).  See, Sergei Zemlianukhin and Miroslava Segida, eds., 
Domashniaia sinematika: otechestvennoe kino, 1918-1996 (Moscow: Dubl’-D, 1996). 
19 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 1, d. 154, l. 7. 
20 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1852, ll. 21-22. 





the method of determining the very means of production, and thus, the level of 
production.  In the mid-1950s, many republican studios, including Kyiv Studio, 
Gruzia-fil’m, and Armenfil’m among others, were slotted for significant expansion, 
also in answer to the demands at the Nineteenth and Twentieth Party 
Congresses for increased overall production.  While the industry still worked 
toward increasing production, by the early 1960s the idealism of the previous 
decade had faded with a concern that spectatorship for domestic productions 
had reached a peak.22  Further production increases would occur almost 
exclusively at the most profitable studios, Mosfil’m, Lenfil’m, Gor’kii, and, to a 
lesser extent, Odessa.  Meanwhile, the reconstruction projects begun in the 
1950s at republican studios, under the banner of “developing national cinemas,” 
remained uncompleted into the 1970s.23  Thus, republican studios faltered, both 
under the system of centralization, and under the new conditions of the industry’s 
profit-mindedness.   
Apart from the studios themselves, authorities in the Ministry of Culture 
(and later in Goskino) also assigned films a “pay category” from one to five, 
which determined the level of pay the cast and crew received above their modest 
salaries.24  Authorities determined these categories in the early 1960s mainly 
through subjective means – whether a film was politically and / or artistically 
“significant.”  Later assessments tended to include box office results, but this was 
only on a quasi-official basis until Filipp Ermash took control of Goskino in 1972.  
Studios and republican-level organizations could only recommend ratings that 
would then go to Moscow for approval, which effectively established a third layer 
                                                 
22 Goskino Chairman Aleksei Romanov, for example, told his Georgian counterpart V. Siradze in 
1967 that expansion plans for republican studios in 1958 assumed an all-Union production of 250 
films annually.  These plans never materialized due to a lack of audience demand.  Thus, 
Romanov wrote, Gruziia-fil’m also saw a reduction in its production plan.  He stated that the only 
way to increase production further was to reduce the average film budgets, or increase the level 
of profitability from film distribution.  RGALI, f. 2944, op. 1, d. 429, ll. 76-77. 
23 See Armenfil’m director S.T. Gasparian’s complaint to Romanov in 1963: RGALI, f. 2944, op. 1, 
d. 102, ll. 1-2; Uzbek film director Usubaliev’s concerns about the reconstruction of Uzbek-fil’m at 
a 1967 Union Plenum: RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 70, ll. 19-20; and Dovzhenko Studio director 
Vasyl’ Tsvirkunov’s similar complaint to chairman Filip Ermash in 1972 that the first stage of 
reconstruction, begun in 1958, had still not been completed: TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2523, ll. 
14-16. 
24 An August 10, 1962 Ministry of Culture prikaz set a maximum salary of 200 rubles per month 





of bureaucracy between the film and distribution.  While Mosfil’m productions 
required approval in Moscow alone, Kyiv productions required approval in 
Moscow and in Kyiv.25  Thus, in many cases, the devolution of authority to 
republican-level organizations served only the careerist ambitions of those quasi-
authorities placed in these organizations.   
Inequalities between center and periphery were as much a creative and 
administrative problem as they constituted a concern about quality of life.  During 
a January 1962 meeting in Kyiv to discuss the program for the February Plenum, 
directors Sigismund Navrotskii and Oleksii Shvachko complained of low pay for 
workers in the Ukrainian industry, especially in comparison to those working in 
Moscow.26  At the First Congress of the SKU the following January, film critic and 
Chairman of Feature Filmmaking in the Ministry of Culture, Vladimir Baskakov, 
told the assembled Ukrainian delegates that they needed to think less about 
money and more about their jobs, a statement that did not garner much applause 
in such an atmosphere of tension between the central industry organizations and 
republican studios.27  Thus, Pyr’ev did not intend his condescending call for 
assistance to republican studios as antagonistic, especially in comparison to 
industry officials who wished to see reductions in benefits to workers at such 
studios, and others who perceived that republican studios were simply a drain on 
state finances and served no one’s interest.28 
In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union began a second round of film industry 
reconstruction, which attempted to address some of these inequalities.  First, 
industry authorities determined that the Ministries of Culture had become 
overextended with managing a completely overhauled and expanding domestic 
film industry.  The decisions of the February Plenum highlighted the drafting of “a 
proposal on an organizational reconstruction of feature filmmaking.”29  This 
proposal resulted in the establishment of the State Committee on 
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Cinematography under the Council of Ministers (Goskino) in early 1963, which    
divorced both the Administration of Cinematography and the Administration of 
Infrastructure and Distribution (UKK) from the control of the Ministries of 
Culture.30  The Council of Ministers appointed journalist and former deputy 
chairman of the Central Committee’s Department of Propaganda and Agitation 
Aleksei Romanov to head the new Goskino.  As someone who was politically 
orthodox but wanted to see the industry function smoothly, Romanov shared 
concern for the inequalities in salaries and bonuses identified by many 
filmmakers in the republics.  In September 1963, he wrote to the chairman of the 
State Committee on Labor and Salaries A. P. Volkov and the Soviet Minister of 
Finances V. F. Garbuzov, asking them to amend the pay scale for workers in the 
Ukrainian film industry, which was set ten percent lower than the rate for workers 
in the RSFSR.  In defense of this change, Romanov mentioned that Ukraine was 
“one of the most important Union republics,” and that the Ministry needed to raise 
salaries so that its film industry could compete with central institutions.31  The 
Soviet salary reform that went into effect on May 1, 1965 officially mandated the 
standardization of labor compensation throughout the entire country, which 
essentially solved this most overt form of inequality among workers in the film 
industry, but maintained unofficial practices that favored central studios, such as 
the distribution of bonuses based on pay scales (see above).32 
Ideas began circulating in the early 1960s, initially within the Union of 
Cinematographers, to amend the protocols for calculating and distributing 
bonuses, the most popular of which was a plan for profit sharing.  Under a 1961 
project entitled, “Conditions and Measures for the Further Development of Soviet 
Cinematography,” the SK Presidium suggested that “a part of a [film’s] profit go 
toward the incentive of good work at studios and for the introduction of new 
technology.”33  In April 1962, Ukrainian filmmakers Sigismund Navrotskii and 
Oleksandr Pankrat’ev submitted their own “Measures for the Further 
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Development of Soviet Cinematography” on behalf of the SKU, in which they 
derided the current inefficient system by which studios sold their films “as 
products” to the organs of distribution in order to pay off loans to Gosbank.  They 
stated that such practices did not insure that studios were “interested [in the] 
results of advancing a film in distribution, or with its success with spectators.”  
The authors proposed a new system of financing, whereby studios themselves 
distributed films through the organs of distribution.  This would produce real 
results for making studios care about a film’s profitability, and would correlate 
overall profits with the amount the studio would receive for its budget and future 
investment.  In addition, such a reform would allow republican studios to target 
local audiences more directly.  Finally, Navrotskii and Pankrat’ev suggested a 
general increase in the honorarium paid to screenwriters (which stood at 4000-
8000 rubles in 1962 currency) to 10,000-15,000 rubles, along with an increase in 
material benefits, which the authors called “labor incentive (material’noe 
stimulirovanie).”34  Deputy Minister of Culture in Ukraine Svitlana Kyrylova 
followed suit in a proposal to her counterpart in Moscow N. N. Danilov, “On 
Measures for the Further Improvement of the Organization of Production of 
Feature Films,” in which she suggested “establish[ing] honorariums [i.e., 
bonuses] in relation to the amount of box office returns calculated from the sale 
of tickets at theaters, instead of the production award” currently in use.35  
Following Navrotskii’s and Pankrat’ev’s proposal, the plan that Dovzhenko Studio 
presented also criticized the “unneeded tutelage to Gosbank,” making reference 
to the then-current system of crediting and debiting studio accounts, and 
advocated “an ordinary commercial system of credit,” which took into accord 
concerns with local and enterprise-centered control over capital development, 
marketing, profits and labor compensation.  This latter system, the Dovzhenko 
Studio plan asserted, would eliminate the “subjectivism” inherent in decision-
making.  The plan made direct reference to profit sharing with members of the 
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studio collective for films that achieved an above average attendance, thus 
further ensuring a profitable product.36   
The idealism contained in these proposals is notable in their engagement 
with Thaw-era concerns about public opinion.37  The proposal for a system of 
profit sharing assumed that the subjectivities of audience desire were necessarily 
of greater value than the so-called objective standards determined by industry 
assessments, which were in fact quite arbitrary and based on prejudices against 
republican studios.  By claiming that republican studios and the filmmakers who 
worked at them were better qualified than central organs to assess what 
audiences would or would not like, the proposals asserted a principle of both 
professional knowledge and local experience.  In the form of the proposals, 
republican studios asserted a greater claim to speak to “their own” spectators 
more so than could central organizations.  While none of these proposals 
became official Goskino policy, they defined the discourse of the early 1960s, 
and determined the types of claims that republican studios and industry 
organizations made to market the particularity of “national” films. 
 
Selling Ukraine as a Comedic Space 
 
 At the same time, organs of distribution in Ukraine were increasingly 
weary of promoting “their own” pictures.  During a republic-wide meeting of rural 
projectionists in Kyiv on April 4-6, 1962, one participant stated that he hated 
showing Ukrainian films in the republic because the audience would leave the 
theater before the end.  To this statement, he received several affirmative 
responses from his colleagues in the audience.38  This projectionist’s complaint 
pointed to the long-standing reputation of Dovzhenko Studio.  More seriously for 
Ukrainian filmmakers and authorities in charge of republican film production, 
however, such criticism indicated that Dovzhenko Studio’s “product” could not be 
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correlated to a “national” audience.  Valentyn Fomenko wrote in Pravda Ukrainy 
that theater managers needed to black out the name of Dovzhenko Studio on film 
posters to avoid showing a film that no one would see.39  A Donbass coal miner 
told the assembled delegates at the First Congress of the SKU that Kyiv 
productions were the chaff that they threw out at the end of the day.  After 
reading the press, he said, it seemed “there [were] few nice opinions about 
Ukrainian films.”40  In a July 24, 1960 article printed in Radians’ka kul’tura (Soviet 
Culture), critic Valentyn Rybak-Akymov reported that during the screenings for a 
Festival of Ukrainian Literature and Art (Dekady Ukrainskoi literatury i iskusstva) 
in Moscow, only 20 people showed up at the theater.  He complained that the 
same screenplays with the same situations and the same characters appeared 
repeatedly.41  Ukrainian writer Oleksandr Mykhalovych said during a 1963 SKU 
meeting that Dovzhenko Studio was a “disgrace,” at which “millions of 
spectators” laughed.42 
While the central press in particular lambasted Dovzhenko Studio’s work, 
continually making the claim that its productions were not popular with Soviet 
audiences, a number of films did attract sizable crowds in the early 1960s, such 
as Volodymyr Denysenko’s Soldatka, which sold 24 million tickets in 1960.  Other 
box office performers included Makarenko’s Where Human Blood is Not Found 
(Krov liuds’ka – ne vodytsia, 1961), which sold over 21 million.  Moreover, Sergei 
Paradzhanov’s Ukrainian Rhapsody (Ukrains’ka rapsodiia, 1961) sold 20 million, 
and Viktor Ivchenko’s Ivanna (1961) sold over 30 million.43  With the average 
domestic production attracting 13 million spectators, these films were significant 
box office successes.  Moreover, each of them dealt with Ukrainian subject 
matter.  Due to the standards in place within the industry, however, they were not 
deemed “important” by the central industry organizations, and the people who 
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made them were given little credit.  Thus, we should approach criticism of 
Dovzhenko Studio with caution, especially when we consider that the studio 
found itself with far fewer “leaders in distribution” in its heyday in the later 1960s 
and early 1970s.  Another likely possibility was that film critics working at 
newspapers were promoting their own tastes in the selection of negative letters 
to the editors.  This appears to be the case in many circumstances, but the vast 
majority of letters sent to the studio (which were unpublished) also expressed 
similar negative opinions about the films.  Nonetheless, we should also consider 
that perhaps only a fraction of the letters were kept, and that the bound volumes 
of such letters reflected the concerns of those who selected them for safe-
keeping in the archives of literature and art in Moscow (RGALI) and Kyiv 
(TsDAMLMU).44  Nearly all letters from the early 1960s dealt with films that were 
at least mildly successful, but aesthetically unsophisticated genre productions – 
or examples of “Ukrainian theatricality” – which did not carry cultural value, and 
were in fact condemned for their rejection of “contemporary” methods and 
aesthetic concerns. 
Comedy constituted one of the major genres at Dovzhenko Studio in the 
early 1960s.45  It is here that stereotypes of Ukrainian peasant life constituted a 
type of national kitsch, and, while the genre was a money-maker for Ukrainian 
cinema, it was also a reason for the poor reputation of Ukrainian cinema in the 
first place.  Nonetheless, Soviet comedies were among the films most 
remembered today, and were screened constantly on television and in theaters.  
Figure 2.1 shows that comedy appeared in the Dovzhenko Studio repertoire 
almost twice as frequently as in Soviet cinema as a whole during the period  
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1958-62.  While these films tended to be the most popular in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, they were also the most maligned.   
In her 1966 monograph The Film Comedy: Conflict, Character, Genre, 
Svitlana Zinych wrote that, despite the powerful presence of comedy and satire in 
Ukrainian folklore, Ukrainian films had not developed the genre past its 
theatricalized clichés of embroidered vests, baggy trousers and silly old men.  “In 
the majority of our movies,” she wrote, “the everyday details are only hollow 
bodies (pasyvne tlo), a choice of accessories, which in no way helps to reveal the 
Ukrainian national character.”  In essence, Ukrainian comedies did not 
demonstrate the psychological complexity in their representations of national 
subject matter.  Zinych argued that the character of the old man (did) in 
particular, “who initially represented the national wisdom of the Ukrainian people 
in the works of Dovzhenko and Savchenko,” now presented an offensive 
stereotype that only intended to make the public laugh.  Her complaints were 
even sharper for those comedies that “remained nationally indifferent,” where the 
“sphere of the national is confined to the Ukrainian names of the heroes.”46  Like 
many critics working within the framework of the goals for national studios after 
Stalin, Zinych resisted a narrowly folkloric definition of national character, while 
                                                 





remaining committed to the overarching principle of national representation 
above and beyond newer, Thaw-era concerns with individuals’ character.  Two 
Ukrainian comedies from 1963 – Oleksii Mishurin’s The Gas Station Queen 
(Koroleva benzakolonki) and Artur Voitets’kyi’s Path-Shmath (Stezhki-dorozhki) – 
particularly irked Zinych for these reasons, of excess on the one hand, and 
ignorance on the other. 
 Mishurin’s The Gas Station Queen was, beyond question, the most 
successful Ukrainian comedy of the early 1960s.  Selling more than 35 million 
tickets in the year of its release, the film continued to play in Kyiv theaters 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.47  Mishurin’s film is a “pobutovyi” comedy – or, 
comedy of everyday life – about a young woman Liudmyla (played by the rising 
star of Iurii Chuliukin’s The Girls [Devchata, Mosfil’m, 1961], Nadia 
Rumiantseva), who wants to become a soloist in the Kyiv-based traveling 
ensemble, “Ballet on the Ice.”  After failing the trials, she decides to seek 
employment in the tourist industry in Yalta.  Liudmyla roller-skates from Kyiv to 
the Crimean coast, but only finds work at a truck stop on the outskirts of town as 
a gas station attendant.  In her own move from spontaneity to consciousness, 
Liudmyla goes from being unhappy with the cards fate has dealt her, to a 
realization of her task in raising the cultural level of the abrasive characters that 
pass through her station.  Thus, Mishurin’s plot was situated between Stalinist 
and Thaw-era concerns with its reconciliation of the dichotomy between 
individual happiness and the needs of the collective.  At the same time, the 
characters she meets on the way include a rude truck driver whose persistent 
shout of the Ukrainian “UVAHA! [attention!]” signals his demand for quick service, 
an unkempt rural film projectionist, whose mobile projection facility constantly 
screens out-of-date films, and the Ukrainian folk costume-wearing manager of 
the station, who needs to learn the value of Liudmyla’s creativity.  In the end, she 
helps each of them overcome their own particular qualities of backwardness.  
Moreover, she refuses to take a position of authority in the obkom Department of 
                                                 






Education, resolving that her job as a gas station attendant allows her more 
opportunity to continue her mission. 
Despite the box office success of Gas Station Queen, S. P. Ivanov 
commented during a SKU Plenum in 1965 that it was typical for Ukrainian films in 
that the film crew threw together a bunch of stereotypes with some “petty plot,” 
which told us nothing about contemporary life in the republic.  Screenwriter Petro 
Lubens’kyi recalls the rabid criticism of the film when he and Mishurin took it to 
the Ministry of Culture in Moscow for approval.48  Despite this, authorities saw 
the possibility for profit and approved the film for release.  Critics continued to 
pan the film in the republican and central press.  And indeed, the film harbors 
many of the problems that Zinych would identify in the her 1966 monograph: the
gaudy folk costumes, the characters’ naïve relationship to modernity, 
superstitious religious beliefs, and the Ukrainian language itself relegated
and impertinent speech.  The film’s narratively motivated dialogue, on the other 
hand, occurs in Russian, and Liudmyla’s role functions as a sort of Russification, 
as the frequent patrons of the station gradually lose their “Ukrainianisms” by the 
end of the film.  This shift even becomes self-referential, as Taras the 
projectionist begins the film with a small kinoperedvizhka (mobile projection 
facility) labeled with the Ukrainian letters “КІНО,” and graduates to a vehicle t
plays wide-screen films, which is labeled in Russian, “КИНО” (Figure 2.2). 
film’s teleology is somewhat surprising, given that the 1962 thematic plan called 
for a fuller description of Liudmyla’s past, including her move from Polt
(represented in early Gogol’ and other literary spaces as the Ukrainian heartland) 
to Kyiv to pursue her dreams.  The studio – and Lubens’kyi, according to his rich 
description of his inspiration
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Figure 2.2. Taras, the unkempt Ukrainian projectionist in Mishurin’s Gas Station 
Queen (1963)  
 
humor and satire,” and Liudmyla’s own language was initially supposed to be 
Ukrainian.  Like many attempts to make Ukrainian-language films in the early  
1960s, however, a Ukrainian Gas Station Queen was not feasible because few 
actors knew how to speak “correctly.”  Moreover, the inclusion of Russian actress 
Rumiantseva in the leading role provided a means to escape from Dovzhenko 
Studio’s negative reputation in the early 1960s.  From these circumstances, we 
might read the theme of Russification in the plot as a movement away from 
lowbrow surzhyk to a literate tongue.  Initially, the studio intended Mishurin to 
shoot the film in Ukrainian, but as no popular actors were available who spoke it, 
they chose Russian to accomplish this purpose instead.  As Borys Buriak stated, 
in quoting Oleksandr Dovzhenko in 1964 (whose truth-speech was as evident as 
Lenin’s in 1960s Ukraine): “It is better to speak in perfect Russian than in poor 
Ukrainian.”50 
Recent VGIK graduate Artur Voitets’kyi’s coming of age kolkhoz comedy 
Path-Shmath appeared the same year.  After Mechyslava Maievs’ka quit the 
production owing to disagreements with lead actor Ihor’ Borysov, Voitets’kyi 
transformed the production from a similar kind of Ukrainian “bytovoi” film as Gas 
                                                 





Station Queen to a much subtler situation comedy, which omitted any mention or 
identification – linguistic or otherwise – of Ukraine.  While sharing the narrative 
scheme of Mishurin’s film, with its focus on a creative but self-serving individual 
who must make an occupational sacrifice, Voitets’kyi’s film validates the Thaw-
era theme of personal satisfaction, even at the expense of the functioning of the 
kolkhoz.  After graduating from his course in accounting, Roman receives a post 
on the kolkhoz where his uncle is the chairman.  Although happy about his 
nephew’s arrival at first, his uncle soon recognizes that the joyfulness is 
somewhat premature.  Roman explains that he has no real interest in accounting, 
and that he was sent to receive such an education on official orders.  He dreams, 
instead, of becoming a mechanical engineer.  The chairman is not receptive to 
his fickle nephew and forces him to stay at the kolkhoz, despite Roman’s 
incompetence at his new job.  Eventually the young man begins to value his life 
on the kolkhoz, especially after he falls in love with Oksana.  At this point, 
however, his uncle chooses him to act as liaison to the Ministry of Agriculture in 
matters related to the development of corn.  Eventually retired accountant 
Kalistrat Kalistratych – who had befriended Roman early during his stay on the 
farm – convinces the chairman to allow his nephew to stay due to his skills in 
mathematics.  The film ends as Roman feels the desire to leave once again, this 
time to pursue a graduate degree in his field.   
Screenwriter Mykola Zarudnyi severely criticized the film for its lack of 
“Ukrainian atmosphere.”  Screenplay editor S. Fomina complained that, while 
Mikhail Belikov’s camera work was done nicely, there were no “Ukrainian 
landscapes” in the film.51  To many at the studio, Zarudnyi’s screenplay had 
fallen too much under the influence of its replacement director, Artur Voitets’kyi, a 
VGIK returnee whom the studio collective considered nationally unaware.52  At 
the same time, Voitets’kyi’s intention was to present a more sophisticated 
comedy that did not essentialize “Ukrainianisms” in the manner of such films as 
The Gas Station Queen.  As Fomina suggested, the landscape is reduced to a 
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generic rural background that does not suggest either particularity or any 
essential quality.  It exists, in fact, as a counterpoint to the mobile hero.  
Voitets’kyi transformed Zarudnyi’s conflict between place and individual to one 
between personal satisfaction and official responsibilities.  Moreover, in 
Zarudnyi’s screenplay, Roman wanted to be a tractor driver rather than an 
accountant, very different from his desire in the film to be in the lucrative and 
urban profession of engineering.  In the process of Voitets’kyi’s transformation 
and modernization of Zarudnyi’s screenplay, the rural landscape suggests 
nothing apart from its association with the occupation that the state has imposed 
upon the hero, a type of generically determined backwater.  Of course, the hero 
learns to value the simple people that inhabit such a place, but neither the plot 
nor the image facilitates identification between hero and place.  Zinych criticized 
the film for ruining Zarudnyi’s ethnographically informed screenplay with a non-
nationally informed narrative and hero.  The studio and Ukrainian Goskino 
recommended a category four rating for the film, essentially limiting the film in 
distribution to second-run suburban theaters and rural kinoperedvizhniki in the 
republic.53  In the places that Path-Shmath screened, however, it was wildly 
successful, and Tsvirkunov successfully appealed the rating on that basis in 
November 1964.54 
While bytovoi comedies like Gas Station Queen were indeed the most 
profitable genre within Dovzhenko Studio’s repertoire in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, Ukrainian filmmakers considered the form to be a primitive holdover from 
the “cult of personality” in its dated and condescending representation of 
Ukrainians.  Ukrainian film critic Mykola Berezhnyi warned Dovzhenko Studio 
filmmakers in January 1964, “When you give them [the audience] films like this to 
laugh at, they are laughing at the land itself.”55  Thus, market success within the 
genre carried a degree of guilt for the studio, even though reform proposals 
emerging from the SKU and Ukrainian Goskino advocated a profit-sharing 
principle, whereby the industry would correlate pay categories (and thus 
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bonuses) to box office success.  At the same time, as we saw with Ukrainian 
Goskino’s and the studio’s reception of Voitets’kyi’s Path-Shmath, filmmakers 
and industry authorities in the republic were unwilling to sacrifice the particular 
mode of national representation – grounded in the production of a Ukrainian 
ethnoscape – that made Dovzhenko Studio a unique cultural institution.  Thus, 
Kyiv filmmakers at the beginning of the 1960s felt three simultaneously 
interlocking types of pressure: to make films that rejected Stalinist clichés and 
engaged with Thaw-era concerns; to make films that sold tickets; and to remain 
committed to the production of a specifically Ukrainian culture.  As the new 
administration soon realized, however, they could hardly accomplish any of these 
tasks with the current group of creative personnel at Dovzhenko Studio, pulled 
either from pre-war assistant directors and cinematographers, or more likely, 
from the Ukrainian theater.  
 
Narratives of Return 
 
As Path-Shmath moved from pre-production to production and reception, 
we see a project at the confluence of old and new concerns at the studio – 
between a Stalinist mode of folkloric representation and Thaw-era concerns 
about the primacy of individual personality.  Voitets’kyi’s film positioned the 
conflict between personal satisfaction and obligation to the state as grounded in 
a spatial politics, one which informed many other films from the early 1960s.  
During this time, kolkhozy were having trouble convincing young people to stay, 
and it was especially difficult to compel them to return after receiving advanced 
degrees in cities.  Moreover, the “virgin lands” campaign initiated in the mid-
1950s was now running out of steam, and educated young people no longer 
wished to spend their lives so far away from Soviet cultural and political 
centers.56  The “return narrative” constituted a veritable cycle in literature and 
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cinema throughout the post-Stalin era.  From the returning soldier in the 1950s to 
the worker returning from the Virgin Lands in the 1960s, to the returning émigré 
in the 1970s, this narrative cycle dealt with problems of re-incorporation into the 
social fabric of everyday life in the Soviet Union.  At least in many of the 
Ukrainian films in this cycle, they also presented an ambivalent dichotomy 
between an attachment to the local (family, landscape, and ethnic or regional 
identification) and responsibility to country and humanity more broadly.  
Dovzhenko Studio itself was engaged in a spatial politics in its attempt to attract 
Ukrainian VGIK students to return.  The new leadership of the studio and 
Ukrainian Goskino positioned the return to Ukraine for students born and raised 
in the republic as a national obligation, while indicating that a decision to stay in 
Moscow might be grounded in personal satisfaction, material comfort, and 
greater sensitivity to new ideas.   
Although Voitets’kyi attained employment at Dovzhenko Studio, principally 
because of his place of birth in the republic, his VGIK education subjected him to 
contemporary cultural politics in the capital.  Voitets’kyi, as one of the filmmaker 
returnees to Ukraine, while interested in the same aesthetic problems of his 
VGIK colleagues who ended up at Mosfil’m and other studios around the USSR, 
was expected to make films in the “spirit of Dovzhenko,” with all the baggage that 
this contained in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  The studio realized that it had 
to find a middle ground to satisfy both the needs of an artistically “modernized” 
studio engaged with Thaw-era concerns, and its more traditional national 
representational goals.  The biggest obstacle to the former goal in particular was 
contained in the problem of attracting creative personnel to the studio.  Navrotskii 
stated during the June 1962 SKU Plenum that the “problem of cadres” was the 
“Rome, to which all roads led.”57  He identified the problem of Ukrainian students 
leaving the republic for a VGIK education in Moscow, only to then refuse 
employment in Kyiv after graduation.  When they returned to Ukraine, Navrotskii 
                                                                                                                                                 
went underused by the early 1960s, as the ideological weight of the project waned.  See, Martin 
McCauley, Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Debate on the Virgin 
Lands, 1953-1964 (London: Macmillan, 1976).  





complained, they stayed long enough for one or two projects, and then went back 
to their new families and larger apartments in Moscow.   
Consequently, Kyiv Studio in 1960 was left with the same “basic 
framework” of creative personnel they had a decade earlier.58  After the war, Kyiv 
brought its personnel, from either outside the republic or from the theater.  
Among the pre-war filmmakers, only five remained there after the war.  Writer 
Oleksandr Levada became the Ukrainian Deputy to the Minister of 
Cinematography in 1950, and chose to invite directors in the theater to work at 
Kyiv studio, reasoning that general experience was preferable to the relative 
inexperience of a recent VGIK graduate.  The same year, Savchenko returned to 
Ukraine to make his final picture, Taras Shevchenko, bringing his VGIK students 
Aleksandr Alov, Marlen Khutsiev, Vladimir Naumov, and Sergei Paradzhanov 
with him as assistants.  His senior students Alov and Naumov completed the film, 
with Paradzhanov remaining as assistant director, after Savchenko died of a 
heart attack unexpectedly.  The three of them all stayed at Kyiv Studio after 
graduation, while Khutsiev went to Odessa.  Nonetheless, after the success of 
Alov and Naumov on The Restless Youth (Trivozhnaia molodost’, 1954) and 
Pavel Korchagin (1956), they left Ukraine for employment at Mosfil’m.  
Paradzhanov stayed, largely because he did not garner similar recognition with 
his rather unnoted Ukrainian comedies.  Other directors from the 1950s 
continued to be temporary workers, coming to Kyiv to shoot one or two films 
before returning to projects that were more lucrative in Moscow.59  By 1960, 
there was considerable discussion in the press for why Dovzhenko Studio had 
not yet replaced these rising stars, who had left for greener pastures to the 
northe
ck of 
                                                
ast.    
While Navrotskii was correct in identifying the greater financial and 
material benefits to working in Moscow, he ignored Kyiv Studio’s complicity in 
warding off young directors.  Natal’ia Kolesnikova, writing for Komsomol’skaia 
Pravda in December 1961, blamed the studio’s problems on a blatant la
 
58 Vasyl’ Illiashenko, Istoriia ukrains’koho kinomystetstva (Kyiv: Vik, 2004), 225. 





interest in cultivating “creative youth,” having already given such future 
visionaries as Alov, Naumov and Sergei Bondarchuk nothing but grief while they 
worked in Kyiv.60  In late January, Dovzhenko Studio’s Komsomol aktiv 
answered Kolesnikova’s criticism in the newspaper.  The response 
acknowledged the correctness of the newspaper’s previous criticism, and their 
explanation for the studio’s “lag” became a virulent attack against the studio’s 
management and its bureaucratic excess, which prevented young people from 
expressing anything innovative.  The activists mentioned that during the past 
eight years, the studio went through four directors.  Obviously, they argued, this 
was not a period, in which a comfortable creative atmosphere prevailed.  They 
wrote that the studio collective would not even recognize the current director – 
Volody
work:  
nts, or on the set; he doesn’t 
ome to meetings or parties, and ignores any invitation.  At a recent 
ers 
e 
k.  When asked by the 
author
depart
ff of creative cadres 
 even an excess – and we will not accept – not now, and not in the near 
future – any specialists from VGIK, and we will not allow any studio 
workers desiring to study at VGIK to be sent there.61 
                                                
myr Pavlovych Nebera – by his face, because he never showed up for 
 
He doesn’t show up in the [creative] departme
c
profsoiuz conference, studio workers asked the administration to show 
them the new director, or at least his portrait! 
 
The second problem they listed was the continued reliance on the same writ
to supply the studio with screenplays.  The studio needed to look beyond 
Oleksandr Korniichuk and Oles’ Honchar, they argued, and investigate and 
cultivate the talents of younger Ukrainian writers.  They implied that the sam
was true among directors.  Projects continued to float to Viktor Ivchenko and 
Tymofii Levchuk, while others remained without wor
s about incorporating young talent into the studio staff, the head of the 
ment of cadres supposedly answered them:  
The directorate considers that the studio has a full sta
–
 
60 N. Kolesnikova, “Po doroge na ekran,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, Dec. 12, 1961, 4.  Pyr’ev even 
referenced the complaint in Komsomol’skaia Pravda during his speech during the Fourth Plenum 
in February 1962.  RGALI, f. 2936, op. 1, d. 151, ll. 140-41; see also, V. Fomenko, “Ne nabliudat’, 
a voevat’,” Pravda Ukrainy, January 5, 1963: 3. 
61 V. Repiakh, et al., “Molodye za ekranom: Komsomol’tsy otvechaiut na kritiku gazety. A chto 






The Presidium of the Ukrainian Union also resolved to respond to these 
criticisms on February 14, directly after Pyr’ev’s statement at the February 
Plenum indicated that he had read the inflammatory January letter.62  On the 
22nd, Levada wrote to the editorial staff of Komsomol’skaia pravda in a highly 
defensive tone concerning the aktiv’s response.  While not taking issue with
letter’s characterization of the leadership, Levada claimed that many of the













Instead, Levada spent most of his letter defending the writers and directors 
identified in the earlier article – Honchar, Korniichuk, Levchuk, and Ivchenko – 
from the “unbridled attack” in the Komsomol’tsy’s letter.  Thus, his messag
not that the studio had solved its “problem of cadres.”  Rather, the studio 
Komsomol had not only disrespected the elders of the Ukrainian culture industry,
but in so doing, also failed to display proper knowledge of the national literature 
and thus to misunderstand the gravity of Ukrainian cinema’s particular 
K mol’skaia pravda, however, neglected to print Levada’s letter.  
 Perhaps more shocking was the appearance of the Komsomol’tsy’s letter 
in the first place.  After all, their critique could have been valid at any poin
the past five years.  Paradzhanov leveled much the same critique as the 
Komsomol’tsy in a 1957 “open letter” to then studio director Davyd Kop
Ukrainian and Soviet Ministries of Culture, Levchuk, and the editors of 
Sovetskaia kul’tura.  Paradzhanov condemned the studio for refusing to a
new cadres the opportunity to work, while continually favoring Muscovite 
directors or pre-war Ukrainian cadres like Levchuk and Ivchenko.  He sta
the conditions at Dovzhenko Studio directly violated the Twentieth Party 
Congress in its decision to further increase film production.  In emulation of 
Thaw-era discourse about the correlatives of talent and sincerity, Paradzhanov 
claimed that the studio had lost all of its talented cadres due to a “lack of tru
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people.”64  Moreover, Paradzhanov registered indifference to the “national 
theme,” associating it with a tired Stalinist folkloric, in which he himself had 
worked with such films as The Top Guy (Pershyi khlopets’, 1959) and Ukrainian
Rhapsody.  While such films were popular, they did not contribute positively to 
the studio’s reputation, in the same way as author-driven productions such as 
Kalatozov’s T
 









                                                
in Moscow. 
 Critic Kostiantyn Teplyts’kyi reported on the March 1962 Plenum in 
Radians’ka kul’tura, suggesting much the same in his assertion that a key reason
for Dovzhenko Studio’s backwardness was in its lack of respect toward young
cadres, which limited their creative potential to a seemingly endless cycle of 
assistant positions on film crews.  He argued that the studio needed to give 
young people the chance to express themselves honestly and independently.  In 
this respect, he offered more serious criticism, writing, “There is not that ess
creative atmosphere at the studio, [there is] no activity, no cooperation, no 
precision, no courageousness, and moreover, no innovation.”65  In May 1962, the
SKU Presidium sent a letter to the Central Committee of the CPU in response to 
their criticism and the results of the March Plenum.  They focused their attention 
principally on the “problem of cadres,” suggesting that times were changing.  The
Union’s general statement mentioned that Ukrainian cinema was lagging behin
“the Russian masters.”  They quoted film director Mykola Mashchenko at the 
Plenum, who stated that youth at the studio were in a far more uncomfortable 
position in Kyiv than they would be in Moscow, where they “meet with sensitive 
treatment.”  Mashchenko stated that none of the great films from Mosfil’m could
have been made in Kyiv due to the “provincialist” and “localist” attitudes of th
leadership.  Here, too, the focus was on catching up to the center, over and 
above reproducing the same comedies and melodramas that touched upon 
 
64 Sergei Paradzhanov, “’…chtoby ne molchat’, berus’ za pero’: Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski s 
nedrugami i druz’iami,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 12 (1990): 32-34. 
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Ukrainian themes that characterized production in the late-1950s and early-
1960s. 
 In suggesting that creative sterility resulted from the “problem of cadres,”
studio authorities referenced a more general issue that arose in the mid-1950s 
with the decision to increase cinema production.  Studios discovered that they 
not only needed material resources, they also required human resources t
the 150 films per year that the Central Committee demanded.  VGIK in the 1950s 
was not equipped to train enough personnel for an industry of this scale.  
Republican studios needed to pull directors and actors from the theater to fill th
lack of creative personnel, which became an inefficient and bureaucratically 
troublesome practice by the 1960s.  The central studios – Mosfil’m and Gor’kii 
Studio – collaborated on the establishment of a film actors’ theater in Central 
Moscow, in order to avoid the necessity to employ theatrical personnel.  Another
means of solving the “problem of cadres” came with the establishment of t
Higher Courses on Directing and Screenwriting at Mosfil’m, intended as a more 
practice-oriented approach to film education than VGIK, and would admit 
predominantly post-graduate students working in other fields.  As a result, young










e in the late 1950s was part of a general re-orientation of 
ng 
s 
                                                
66  In ma
ways, this influx of young filmmakers paralleled the structural transformations o
Western European film industries in the late-1950s and early-1960s, which in 
part established the groundwork for such film movements as the French New 
Wave and Young German Cinema.  In both the Soviet Union, and in France, 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the film industry was composed of skil
tradesmen.  The chang
cinema that privileged the role of the director-intellectual, or auteur, over the 
skilled professional.67 
 While Mosfil’m and a few other studios benefited from this influx of you
talent, Dovzhenko Studio – and even to a larger degree, other republican studio
 
66 Sergei Gerasimov discusses this issue of recruitment in “Razmyshlenie o molodykh,” Iskusstvo 
kino, no. 2 (1960). 
67 Authorities in the film industry generally rejected any association with the French New Wave, 
because it suggested a generational divide.  See, Pyr’ev’s comments at the February 1962 





– suffered a definitive lack of educated personnel.  The most pressing iss
concerned the financial burden of maintaining a studio with increased output. 
During the preparatory meeting for the January Plenum in Kyiv in 1962, 
Navrotskii complained of the continued lack of economic feasibility for native 
cadres.  He presented his colleagues with numerous examples of recent VGIK 
graduates, having arrived in Kyiv for work, who had to live in student dormitories 
because of a lack of housing.  Paradzhanov himself, who had made four feature
films (and two other documentaries) at Kyiv Studio before Shadows of Forgotte
Ancestors in 1964, still resided in communal housing until the completion 
most famous film.  He came to the studio during the final days of malokartin’e, 
however, when any position in the industry constituted a success.  In the 
atmosphere of the Thaw, with most studios expanding production, there were 
other options for Ukrainian VGIK graduates, and most sent to Kyiv in 1960-61 












68  In May 1962, the Union Presidium 
reported to the Central Committee of the CPU that a delegation sent to VGIK 
discovered that none of the Ukrainian students studying there wished to return to 
Kyiv due to the “unfriendly manner” at the studio.69  During the March 1962 SKU 
Plenum, director Leopol’d Bezkodarnyi was clearly resentful as he related that he 
did not want to work at Dovzhenko Studio, but because of the plan for developing
native cadres he, as a Ukrainian, was ordered there.70  By 1962, the dual 
practice of importing Moscow directors to Kyiv and Ukrainian theater directors t
cinema no longer appeared as a viable response to the “problem of cad
With the exponential expansion of the industry, along with the creative advances 
of the Thaw, these options were both logistically untenable an
anted.  The most viable option in 1962 for solving the “problem of cadres” 
was to create a space to which Ukrainians wanted to return. 
The decisive step in promoting “native cadres” came from the appoin
of former partisan leader and literary critic Vasyl’ Tsvirkunov to the position of 
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Dovzhenko Studio managing director in April 1962.71  Ukrainian Minister of 
Culture Rostislav Babiichuk removed P. Nebera as studio head ostensibly for his 
failure to take steps to establish and maintain a local base of native c
decision, however, originated from people in the center.  During the May Plenum 
of the SKU, Pyr’ev arrived in Kyiv seemingly with the sole motive of 
“encouraging” the Ministry to remove the inexperienced and disliked Nebera from 
his position.
adres.  The 
chanisms, work toward solving the “problem of cadres,” and to move 









VGIK, where he convinced several Ukrainian graduates of their national 
obligations to return to work in Ukraine, with the additional promise that 
                                                
72  Tsvirkunov assumed the directorship with the promise to improve 
planning me
dio toward the aesthetic principles and box-office successes of the cen
studios.73   
At the same time, Tsvirkunov was well connected to Ukrainian literary
culture of the early 1960s, was conversant with, and in many cases, supportiv
of, demands to revive Ukrainian language and culture.  He also possessed 
impeccable “national” and CP credentials: Tsvirkunov was born to a peasant 
family in 1917 in the village of Novoukraina in Zaporiz’ka oblast’ in Southeast 
Ukraine.  He graduated from the Voroshilovs’kyi Pedagogical Institute in pres
day Luhans’k in 1938 with a degree in Ukrainian Literature, and taught in a rural 
middle school in Luhans’ka oblast’ before the war started in June 1941.  He
joined the Party in early 1942 and became the head of the Political Section of a 
Partisan Brigade on the Vokhovskii Front in Central Ukraine.  In 1953, the 
Luhans’k party committee nominated him as chairman, but he entered gra
school two years later at the Central Committee’s Academy of Social Scienc
Moscow, graduating in 1959 with a job as art and literature editor for the 
Russian-language CPU journal of Marxist theory Kommunist Ukrainy, later 
becoming senior editor for Radians’ka Ukraina.  After consolidating his po
Dovzhenko Studio after the SKU First Congress in January 1963, he trav
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Dovzhenko Studio would be a space where youth “experimentation” would be 
met with sympathy.74 
Mykola Mashchenko, the youngest and last of Dovzhenko Studio’s 
“teatral’shchyky,” made Stories from the Red House (Novely krasnoho domu) in 
1963 as an allegory of return, which read the studio’s “problem of cadres” into a 
kolkhoz drama about the conflict between an authoritarian chairman and a bright 
young agronomist.  Written by SRK head Vasyl’ Zemliak, and produced on the 
cusp of Tsvirkunov’s trip to VGIK, the film’s allegorical message of recovering 
from the “cult of personality” seemed especially appropriate.  Mashchenko’s film 
tells the story of a Ukrainian village after World War II.  The conflict between 
Chairman Stokolos and agronomist Maksym is set up as one between a Stalin-
era careerist and an honest specialist.  Through flashback, we learn that the hero 
was a partisan in the war, and occupied an old Red House on the kolkhoz as the 
fascists retreated.  More recently, the red house provided the setting for 
Maksym’s love affair with Dusia.  Due to his conflict with Stokolos, however, he 
leaves to work at a brick factory in Moscow, where he writes numerous letters to 
Dusia but never receives a response.  He imagines she has forgotten about him 
and married someone else.  After hearing of Stokolos’s death, however, Maksym 
returns to the kolkhoz where he meets Dusia once again, and discovers that he 
is the father of her child.  He notices the changes that have occurred after the 
death of Stokolos and his cult of personality, and stays at the kolkhoz to work the 
rest of his life in peace.   
While Zemliak’s publication of the short story, upon which the film was 
based, in the December 1962 issue of the literary journal Vitchyzna was greeted 
with celebration, changes in the way the “cult” would be treated in literature and 
film had occurred in March the following year.75  The screenplay and subsequent 
film were subjected to numerous critiques for two reasons: first, for the film’s 
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sharp teleology, which represented the post-Stokolos era on the kholkoz as 
completely different from what came before it; and second, because Maksym is 
not portrayed as a deserter for leaving the kolkhoz due to his personal conflict 
with the chairman.76  Officials in Ukrainian Goskino and the new studio 
leadership were, of course, well aware of the film’s allegorical message and its 
teleological treatment of the personality cult from Zemliak’s short story; yet, they 
remained supportive of the film, largely because its allegory encapsulated the 
spatial politics of Dovzhenko Studio’s “problem of cadres.”  Tsvirkunov, S. P. 
Ivanov and Zemliak acknowledged that the studio’s prior leadership had driven 
many capable filmmakers away from Kyiv, but suggested that Ukrainian VGIK 
graduates had an obligation to return to the republic.  Due to ideological 
problems with central Goskino, Mashchenko’s film, completed by summer 1963, 
was not released until May 1965, which made its theme particularly dated.77  
Chukhrai had made Clear Skies in 1961, and many members of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU had determined that this film had settled the question of 
the cult.78 
Nonetheless, Mashchenko’s Stories from the Red House managed to do 
what the new studio leadership demanded: to incorporate Thaw-era concerns 
into a framework of national representation.  Moreover, its allegory promoted the 
obligation for Ukrainian filmmakers to return.  The problem remained, however, 
as to whether these young VGIK returnees were knowledgeable of or willing to 
approach a national representational mode in their work at Dovzhenko Studio.  
Artur Voitets’kyi, for example, would continually resist working in such a mode, 
opting to adapt Gor’kii and Chekhov instead of Honchar and Korniichuk.79  Other 
returnees like Iurii Illienko and Leonid Osyka came to accept the Ukrainian theme 
as fundamental to their work, but first went through a process of personal 
“Ukrainianization.”  Since the development of “native cadres” became the 
                                                 
76 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1681, ll. 58-59. 
77 Na ekranakh Kyeva, May 9, 1965. 
78 One of the “Decisions” of the February SK Plenum in 1962 mentioned that Soviet cinema had 
finally overcome all traces of the personality cult.  TsDAMLUM, f. 655, op. 1, d. 180, l. 45. 
79 During a 1972 SKU Presidium meeting, Voitets’kyi came under heavy criticism once again for 
his lack of national awareness, and for his preference for Chekhov over Ukrainian writers.  See, 





principle upon which the studio had decided to solve its problem, the reliance on 
Ukrainian VGIK graduates could supply only a fraction of its needs, especially as 
such returnees came to Kyiv in the early 1960s as unknowledgeable and, as 
dissident Ivan Dziuba would argue, “de-nationalized” Ukrainians, unprepared to 
engage with the post-Stalinist nationality politics of the older generation.  
 
“Ukrainianizing” Creative Cadres, Writing and Embodying an Image of the 
Nation  
 
In privileging “native cadres” in the creative professions, we see a refocus 
of existing energy that went beyond attempts to catch up to the central studios.  
Herein, the studio leadership was addressing difficult questions about local 
cultural knowledge, and suggested that some filmmakers had a greater ability to 
embody particular concerns of national importance.  Although Sigismund 
Navrotskii’s and Oleksandr Pankrat’ev’s “Measure for the Further Development 
of Soviet Cinematography” did not generate fundamental changes that were not 
already forthcoming, perhaps the most important question that emerged out of 
their “measures” concerned the problem of educating native cadres within the 
republic.  After all, VGIK graduates presented their own problems for the studio, 
even if the studio leadership was now firmly committed to accepting them.  At the 
same time, educating cadres in Kyiv presented even greater logistical problems, 
above the need for qualified young director-auteurs.   
Many film critics and filmmakers in the republic believed instead that the 
key to building Ukrainian national cinema was the development of professional 
screenwriters and actors.  Several directors readily admitting that the top 
Ukrainian writers of the war generation – Oles’ Honchar, Mykhailo Stel’makh, 
Ivan Le – did not translate well to the screen.80  Valentyn Rybak-Akymov wrote in 
a July 1960 editorial that the only way to solve the problem was to educate “our 
own national cadres of film dramatists.”  During a meeting of studio directors 
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during the previous month, several participants advocated the re-establishment 
of the Kyiv Film Institute with departments in screenwriting, acting, directing and 
cinematography.  At the proposed institute, teachers would prepare young writers 
for the specifics of the screenwriting genre.81  At the February Plenum in 
Moscow, Navrotskii complained directly of Pyr’ev’s assumption that more and 
better connections with established writers would solve the screenplay problem.  
Instead, he argued for a deliberate strategy to develop professional cadres of 
screenwriters who would be tied by a labor contract to a particular studio.82  As 
he stated in a March 1962 newspaper editorial, professional “screenwriters 
[should] write screenplays,” and not writers untrained to do so.83   
While the institute remained an unrealized dream for workers in the 
Ukrainian film industry, 1961 saw the establishment of a film school at the 
Karpenko-Karyi Theatrical Institute in Kyiv (KITM),84 with undergraduate 
programs in film directing, acting for the cinema, and cinematography (but 
without a screenwriting course).  Viktor Ivchenko served as the first dean of the 
school, and the head of the Department of Screen Acting.  By the 1970s, several 
prominent Ukrainian filmmakers and screen actors received their education 
there, but in 1961 Ivchenko’s film school at KITM carried all the baggage of 
Dovzhenko Studio itself: that it was provincial, and thus inferior to a VGIK 
education.  If the studio employed only personnel trained at home, some argued, 
it could never recover its poor reputation among industry authorities and 
spectators.  Levchuk and the SKU Presidium attempted to support both methods, 
at least until KITM developed its curriculum further. 
In many ways, the “actor problem” was similar to, but also more intense 
than other aspects of the “problem of cadres,” simply due to the nature of the 
profession.  In desiring to move away from the discouraged practice of employing 
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theatrical actors for the screen, the studio leadership did not have many “native” 
professional screen actors to take their place, and frequently had to fill roles with 
Moscow actors.  Moreover, the screen actors that did have a contractual 
agreement with Dovzhenko Studio were frequently unknown to a broader 
audience, and their employment in major roles would not help the film at the box 
office.  On the rare instance that a Kyiv screen actor became known, he or she 
would likely find their talents wasted by staying in Ukraine.  To give the most 
prominent example of this, Sergei Bondarchuk played the title roles in 
Dovzhenko’s final film Michurin (1948), Savchenko’s Taras Shevchenko (1951) 
and Levchuk’s Ivan Franko (1955), before moving to Mosfil’m to direct and star in 
his celebrated Fate of a Man (Sud’ba cheloveka, 1959) and War and Peace 
(1965-1968).  Despite official discouragement of Ukrainian actors leaving Kyiv for 
Moscow in a August 1962 Ministry of Culture order, popular Ukrainian actors 
found little holding themselves back from a better career in Moscow.85  Thus, due 
to distribution concerns, most Ukrainian directors continued to favor theatrical 
actors or those from Moscow over “native” screen actors, the latter of which were 
employed for minor roles in the majority of cases.86  This practice incurred the 
continual enmity of Kyiv-based screen actors, and they developed the reputation 
for depression, alcoholism, and a lack of skill.  B. Mykolaienko wrote in October 
1962 that staff actors at Dovzhenko Studio “remain in the condition of step-
children or illegitimate children.”87  Head of the Actors’ Section in the SKU, 
Sil’viia Sergeichikova, confirmed this state during her speech at the First 
Congress in 1963, telling her colleagues of the depraved condition of Ukraine’s 
“poor stock of acting material, which lives without perspective, and without any 
concern about it.”88 
                                                
During the February Plenum in Moscow, Navrotskii addressed the “actors’ 
problem” in a language that central authorities might have better understood: 
Kyiv needed a Film Actors’ Theater because Ukrainian actors would work for less 
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money than their Muscovite colleagues.89  This at first seems to contradict his 
statement in the “Measures for the Further Development of Soviet 
Cinematography” that Ukrainian cadres should be paid the same as those in 
Moscow, but Navrotskii’s interest in this earlier document was on increasing the 
prestige of Kyiv directors and screenwriters.  The actors’ problem, by 
comparison, was predominantly one of fiscal responsibility and administrative 
efficiency.  In other words, it simply cost too much time and money to move 
actors from Moscow to Kyiv and back continually.  In his unceasing efforts to 
solve the “problem of cadres” in the early 1960s, we get no indication that 
Navrotskii’s concerns were “nationally” motivated.  A Polish Old Bolshevik who 
emigrated after the formation of the Polish Republic, he first worked in Leningrad 
at Belgoskino and Lenfil’m, then came to Kyiv Studio directly after the war to help 
rebuild the studio.  His ideas about the studio’s “independence [samodeial’nist’]” 
from Moscow had little to do with questions of national representation, and 
instead Navrotskii worked toward building a stable base of personnel and 
developing technological infrastructure.  For the same reason, he argued against 
such nation-building projects as the construction of a History of Ukrainian 
Cinema museum, a separate Ukrainian cinema archive, and a new Kyiv Film 
Institute on the basis that they would merely become financial burdens for the 
studio and SKU.  Moreover, they were politically unnecessary, according to 
Navrotskii, and in fact carried an element “nationalist narrow-mindedness.”90   
Pavlo Nechesa, the head of the actors’ studio established in December 
1962, had very different conceptions for the necessity to promote Ukrainian 
actors over those from Moscow.  Nechesa had been the first managing director 
of Kyiv Studio, appointed to the position in 1929, and came out of retirement to 
take control of the actors’ studio in 1962.  Like Ivchenko, Nechesa became a 
strong advocate for Ukrainian actors.  Their orientation and intentions were 
different from those of Navrotskii’s, as they were clearly interested in the 
particular qualities that Ukrainian actors had to offer.  Chief among these 
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qualities was the ability to speak Ukrainian.  Nechesa’s reasons were clear: 
“Ukrainian national cinema” demanded films in the vernacular.  His enemies in 
this project were not only individuals like Navrotskii, who had never learned the 
language and placed no importance on Soviet nationalities policy, but also the 
Ukrainian organs of distribution.  During the SKU First Congress in January 
1963, Nechesa claimed that the head of Ukrainian UKK, L. Ia. Zahorodniuk, once 
stated that only “banderists [i.e., followers of OUN leader Stepan Bandera]” 
wanted films in Ukrainian.  The rest of the Ukrainian people preferred Russian-
language films.  Nechesa countered, “Distribution continues to ignore the 
national form of cinema art,” and that they “incorrectly understand policy on the 
nationalities question.”91  Nechesa was committed not only to promoting 
Ukrainian actors, but also to make sure that they knew the language of the 
republic, frequently demanding of actors who did not speak “correctly” to take 
night courses on the Ukrainian language.92  S. P. Ivanov gave tacit support for 
Nechesa’s platform later in the year when he stated during a studio meeting: 
“When the actors are not Ukrainian, and the language is not Ukrainian, and even 
the author of the screenplay is not Ukrainian, to speak about the national form of 
Ukrainian cinematography remains only a speech (rozmova), and we can’t 
reconcile [ourselves] with this.”93 
The goal that everyone involved in developing native cadres shared, 
however, was to establish a permanent screen actors’ theater in Kyiv, like existed 
in Moscow.  The problem, as Oleh Babyshkin wrote in Literaturna Ukraina, was 
that directors were “perfectly satisfied with the famous names in acting, who 
come to Kyiv or Odessa on tour and perform the same roles they have done ten 
times over.”94  A November 1962 memorandum from the SK in Moscow sent to 
the Presidium of the SKU stated that the film industry must solve the actors’ 
problem:  
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This is a general question for all studios, but it is especially important for 
national cinemas.  The Ministry of Culture, together with the Union and the 
participation of the leaderships of the national republics will find a way out 
of this situation.95  
 
In December, Levchuk wrote to First Secretary Pidhornyi that the solution to the 
problem of cadres was necessary for the development of “our cinematography.”  
He complained of the poor living conditions in which workers found themselves 
upon arriving in Kyiv.   
Levchuk wrote that, although the condition of Ukrainian cinema since the 
days of the cult of personality had improved immensely, it was time to improve 
the conditions of national cinema in Ukraine with the improvement – both 
materially and creatively – of working conditions at the studios.96  In his 
evaluation of Ukrainian cinema on the eve of the SKU First Congress, Babyshkin 
identified the chief aesthetic problems in Ukrainian cinema as a preponderance 
of “sociological schemas” and the “dominance of stereotypes,” especially in 
relation to the representation of the Ukrainian kolkhoznik.97  In his use of “correct 
representation,” he called for more complexity in images of peasants on the 
screen.  Moreover, in condemnation of the Stalinist folkloric, he wrote of the “lack 
of national form” or a “forgery of the national form that appears in the external 
attributes, which directors endow their characters based on the recipes of old, 
‘little-Russian,’ vagrant, hopak-dancing, horilka-swilling musicians.”98  During the 
March Plenum of the SKU, Levchuk began his speech, stating that all of 
Dovzhenko Studio’s productions of the following year were  
in the language of backward clichés about a tedious and bland people, 
and not less about their tedious and bland passions…  Instead of the 
diverse and living kolkhoznik… a half-witted old man looks at us from our 
screen with drunken eyes.  He resembles our kolkhoznik like a piece of 
driftwood [resembles] a tree… 
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Developing native cadres was a means to satisfy these concerns with 
authenticity, while infusing new talent into the studio that was not exclusively 
reliant on the good will of central studios.  Like Nechesa, Babyshkin cited the 
chief problem in hiring non-Ukrainian actors as their lack of knowledge of the 
republican language.  Along with him, however, Nechesa’s and Ivchenko’s 
concern for employing Ukrainian actors in many ways echoed debates about 
language politics in 1960s Ukraine more generally.  As Babyshkin and many 
others complained, 1962 saw only one film produced entirely in Ukrainian (Ivan 
Kavaleridze’s Poviia).  Although the concern for producing films in Ukrainian had 
emerged as early as the mid-1950s,99 little was accomplished in this area until a 
decade later.  A January 8, 1962 Studio meeting on the actors’ problem 
determined the necessity for more training in Ukrainian language, organized 
through the dubbing section of the studio, along with the establishment of a large 
actors’ theater with 150-200 individuals to meet the demands of all three 
Ukrainian feature-film studios (Dovzhenko Studio, in addition to Odessa and 
Yalta).100  Later in the decade, screenwriter Evhen Zahdans’kyi gave a common 
complaint that he could not find actors who knew Ukrainian, even though this, he 
felt, was the only proper method of national representation, “to show the true 
Ukrainian character and people.”101 
While Levchuk could not compel Pidhornyi to act on the “problem of 
cadres,” S. P. Ivanov reported in October 1963 that the new First Secretary Petro 
Shelest was concerned about such a state of affairs.102  Later in the year, Ivanov 
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wrote to the studio leadership on the lack of Ukrainian-language films, and 
henceforth demanded express permission from Ukrainian Goskino to complete a 
film in Russian.103  The studio director responded during a studio meeting in 
October 1964, in which he promised to solve the problem, in part through 
encouraging directors to employ Ukrainian actors who knew the language 
adequately.104 
In late 1963, Volodymyr Denysenko began working on A Dream (Son), a 
film revolutionary in its ability to answer so many of early 1960s concerns at 
Dovzhenko Studio.  Denysenko was also a native returnee, who first studied 
theatrical directing at KITM in the late 1940s, during which he was accused of a 
nationalist conspiracy and sent to Kolyma.  After the amnesty of 1953, he applied 
to VGIK, and studied under Dovzhenko, but returned to Kyiv the following year to 
complete his KITM studies.  In 1962, he collaborated with Ukrainian poet Dmytro 
Pavlychko on a screenplay about the young Taras Shevchenko, and began 
shooting the Ukrainian-language film with a cast of Ivchenko’s KITM acting 
students, including Ivan Mykolaichuk in the leading role.  A Dream was both 
nationally aware and conversant with Thaw-era stylistic concerns. 
 
Locating the National Self between the Folkloric and the Thaw: Volodymyr 
Denysenko’s A Dream 
 
Whereas Savchenko’s 1951 Taras Shevchenko follows the Ukrainian 
national poet’s adult years, which he spent as an Imperial conscript and in 
Central Asian exile, A Dream deals with a period of the poet and painter’s life that 
he spent in serfdom.  While employing the poem of the same title contained in 
Shevchenko’s major poetic work, Kobzar’, as its source material, A Dream was 
generically a historical biography.  Yet, unlike Savchenko’s film, which closely 
follows the trajectory of a folkloric representation of a leader’s vita and his 
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connection to his native land, Denysenko’s film is more in line with the “portrait of 
the artist.”  As Evgenii Margolit argues, the new historical-biographical film after 
Stalin represented a definitive break from the earlier genre, first of all in its choice 
of hero: The “hero-artist is in a certain sense the antithesis of the leader 
figure.”105  Denysenko’s A Dream prefigures such films as Tarkovskii’s Andrei 
Rublev (1966) in its representation of the self-sufficient hero-artist.  Denysenko’s 
first major work was intended to explicate the events that led to Shevchenko 
writing the title poem.  The narrative, however, refused to rely on a strict 
chronology of events in Shevchenko’s life; instead, a number of associations and 
metaphors are maintained throughout the film.  The manner of the production is 
sharply distinguished from Savchenko’s earlier film on Shevchenko due to the 
poetic and non-realist style, with its emphasis on “tonality [koloryt]” (or imagery) 
rather than characters and events.  Here the metaphor of the dream works 
throughout the film, and informs all of the events that are displayed.   
A Dream begins in the Petropavlovskaia Krepost’ as an older 
Shevchenko, bald with his recognizable drooping mustache, is led up a staircase 
by two guards.  After an interrogation, Lieutenant General Dubel’t charges the 
poet with spreading revolutionary propaganda through his political associations 
and through his literary and artistic work.  The interrogation takes place entirely in 
Ukrainian.  There is no attempt to maintain the linguistic authenticity of the 
interaction, which would have obviously been in Russian.  The very fact that he is 
speaking about the right to use Ukrainian as fundamental to the relation between 
Russian colonizers and the Ukrainian colonized further detracts from the realism 
of the scene.  This detraction from realism is not from some sort of poetic 
expression, but from an attempt to present a pure linguistic form, one that is all-
Ukrainian based on the space of production and the Ukrainian material upon 
which the film is based.  As Dubel’t reads Shevchenko’s sentence, a voice-over 
of the title poem is interjected into the foreground.  The rest of the story occurs in 
                                                 
105 Evgenii Margolit, “Istoriko-biograficheskii fil’m v sovetskom kino,” in Noveishiaia istoriia 
otechestvennogo kino, vol. 6, ed., L. Arkus (St. Petersburg: Seans, 2004): Accessed online, 
http://russiancinema.ru/template.php?dept_id=15&e_dept_id=6&text_element_id=61, 17 





flashbacks, and sometimes flashbacks within flashbacks.  Shevchenko is a boy, 
abused by the village priest, but soon discovers his interest in painting.  He visits 
a local artist, who convinces him to approach his master, Count Engel’gardt.  The 
latter promises to make him a court artist, but the young Shevchenko instead 
becomes his houseboy.  They travel to Riga together, and then to St. Petersburg.  
There, Engel’gardt discovers that he can make money from Taras’s talents, and 
sends him to study at the Petersburg Institute of the Arts.  There, Shevchenko 
meets the Russian painter Karl Briulov and poet and tutor to Aleksandr II, Vasilii 
Zhukovskii, who arrange to buy his freedom. 
For perhaps the first time in Soviet cinema, flashbacks continually interrupt 
the narrative, but not to provide back-story in the manner of Mashchenko’s 
Stories from the Red House.  Here, flashbacks function as moments of self-
consciously “subjective narration,” to use Maureen Turim’s phrase, which 
constitute a definitive break in the narration.  As such, these flashbacks function 
as “psychoanalytic confessions” read into historical time.106  Instead of a folkloric-
materialist progression of time, whereby the narrative of Ukrainian-Russian unity 
is read into the natural fabric of history, and where such a historical end-point 
determined the basis of a mature national consciousness, the flashbacks in A 
Dream call into question such a notion of historical time.  History itself becomes 
highly subjective as it is read through Taras Shevchenko’s own memories.  In 
such modernist use of flashback, Susan Hayward writes, “Time is carved up and 
layered.”  It “naturalizes the past,” and makes it seem as if the past and present 
are one and the same through structuring the past into the narrative logic of the 
film.  Hayward also identifies its nationalistic implications: By personalizing 
history, and making it a part of the individual psyche, it becomes a “moral lesson 
to be learnt [and] it can lead to patriotic identification.”107  In this way, flashbacks 
serve to connect the subjective and personal with political and social history of 
the nation. 
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Turim and Hayward’s identification of how flashback work in modernist 
cinema rings true in Denysenko’s film, as the hero’s memories trigger the 
movement through time.  The young Taras is constantly imagining himself in two 
places at once, in the actual space of Riga or Petersburg, and in the mythological 
space of the Ukrainian village.  He simultaneously inhabits both the ideological 
space of an idealized pastoral and a modern political consciousness of class and 
national oppression.  While viewing himself within the cultural context of the 
Imperial metropole, he seeks identification with his Ukrainian childhood.  This is 
understated within the narrative itself, and works solely on a visual level.  At the 
same time, A Dream follows many Soviet conventions for historical films, such as 
the operatic rendering of folk songs, rather than the naturalistic rendering of them 
in later works of “Ukrainian poetic cinema.”   
Critics in the republic warmly received the film, as they saw in 
Denysenko’s film a “highly artistic” use of “native cadres” and a representation of 
Ukraine that resisted common stereotypes.  Even the image of Shevchenko in A 
Dream was updated from a dour-looking middle-aged man with a droopy 
mustache and wool Cossack hat to the finely-dress and wide-eyed youth that 
Mykolaichuk played.  During an initial screening of the film, one member of the 
Dovzhenko Studio Artistic Council stated that A Dream visually articulated the 
meaning of “line four” in his passport.108  Nonetheless, the film did little for 
Dovzhenko Studio’s reputation, despite a number of positive reviews.  Its 
significance was entirely local, despite its visual sophistication along with its 
ability to translate Thaw-era discourses about authorship and personal 
expression to the republican screen.  Poet Dmytro Pavlychko, cinematographer 
Mykola Chornyi, and actor Ivan Mykolaichuk each received distinction from the 
Verkhovna Rada for their work on the film, and Denysenko won the title “Honored 
Artist of Ukraine” for his direction.   
Perhaps we may attribute the indifference non-Ukrainians displayed for A 
Dream to a general apathy of audiences toward nationalities projects, associated 
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as they were with the formulaic tone of the Soviet press in recognizing such 
anniversary events.109  The Shevchenko Sesquicentennial, celebrated 
throughout the Soviet Union during the Spring and Summer of 1964, bore the 
mark of an official gala, but one whose object was little known outside of Ukraine 
apart from information conveyed during the major anniversary years.110  A Dream 
did little to “inform” audiences about the life of Shevchenko because, in its 
simultaneous engagement with the historical-biographical genre while appearing 
chronologically fragmented, audiences unfamiliar with the hero probably left the 
theater no more knowledgeable as to who he was, apart from the “great figure of 
national importance to the Ukrainian people,” of which the Soviet press had 
already informed them. 
The Shevchenko Sesquicentennial picked up where the 1939 
quasquicentennial left off, the latter of which employed the 1937 Pushkin death 
centennial as a model.  Like the latter, it included a major re-naming of cultural 
spaces in Shevchenko’s honor and a number of large statues dedicated to him in 
major cities in the Soviet Union.  The 1964 gala continued with the dedication of 
more statues in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and L’viv, and the re-naming of the town of Aqtau, 
Kazakhstan (the region that Shevchenko spent a portion of his exile in the late-
1840s and 1850s) in the poet’s honor.111  In March 1964, First Secretary of the 
Union of Ukrainian Writers Oles’ Honchar delivered a major speech about 
“Shevchenko and the Contemporary” in Moscow’s Great Theater (Velikii teatr), 
which set the dominant tone for the sesquicentennial (Figure 2.3).  He opened 
the speech with the words:  
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The Taras Shevchenko Anniversary has become a celebration of our 
brotherhood, a hallowed celebration of multi-national socialist culture.  [...] 
It is precisely this [Leninist] Friendship [of Peoples] that has brought us all 
together as one with a feeling of honor and love toward the genius son of 
the Ukrainian people, toward the great poet-revolutionary.112 
 
Honchar listed Shevchenko among other “national” poets in the Friendship of 
Peoples canon, figures ranging from the ninth to the nineteenth century – the 
Georgian Shota Rustaveli, Persian-Tajik Abdullah Rudaki, Persian-Azeri Nezami, 
Armenian Sayat-Nova, Latvian Janis Rainis, Lithuanian Kristijonas Donelaitis, 
Turkmen Magtymguly Fyragy, and Uzbek Ali-Shir Nava'I – which, “alongside 
Pushkin, Dostoevskii, Tolstoi, Chekhov and Gor’kii represent our native artistic 
culture before the world, and become ornaments of a universal culture.”  Thus, 
Honchar reduced Shevchenko’s personal significance to a mobile and a-
historical mythology of “all-Union cultural history.”   
Yet, there was a fundamental difference between the memorialization of 
such “national” figures and that of Pushkin, et al.: As Katerina Clark argues, the 
Pushkin celebration of 1937 was essentially a popularization of a common ritual 
among the Russian intelligentsia, whereas the celebration of non-Russian 
cultural figures sought to reclaim them from pre-revolutionary nationalists with the 
assertion that the formation of the Soviet Union had resolved the nationalist 
concerns of what those figures signified.  In so doing, these canonical non-
Russian figures became generic images of anti-imperialism, and early harbingers 
of a Russian-friendly “internationalism.”  For example, in the Kievskaia Metro 
Station in Moscow, built in 1953, one of the mosaics pictures an imagined 
meeting between Taras Shevchenko and Nikolai Chernyshevskii, Aleksandr 
Herzen, and Vissarion Belinskii.  Thus, fundamental to the Stalin-era image of 
the Ukrainian poet was an individual who unproblematically existed in both 
Ukrainian and Russian intellectual and revolutionary traditions, and who was 
equally important to both cultures.   
At the same time, Shevchenko continued to function as a nationalist 
symbol in Ukraine, one who stood for Ukrainian independence from Bolshevik 
                                                 





Russia during the demonized reign of nationalist Symon Petliura in 1920.  
Dovzhenko presented the latter image of the poet in his second film, Arsenal 
(1929), which associated the cult of Shevchenko with decisively counter-
revolutionary elements during the Civil War (Figure 2.4). 
In Stalinism’s domestication of Taras Shevchenko in 1939, however, the 
state ceased promoting an image of nationalist appropriation of Shevchenko’s 
image, at the same time as such actual appropriation would have been grounds 
for immediate repression.  What emerged of the Shevchenko image in the realm 
of popular culture constituted a significant element of Ukrainian national kitsch.  
An image published in Novyny kinoekrana displays a Taras Shevchenko icon 
surrounded by rushnyky, and presiding over a garishly decorated room with 
embroidered wall hangings, ceramic objects, bucolic landscapes and a woman in 
full national costume inspecting a female headpiece (See Figure 2.5).  What, in 
the 1920s would have been identified as “nationalist culture” was now located 
within the safe, domestic space of the Stalinist folkloric. 
Despite Honchar’s predictable speech on the continued significance of the 
poet, and the continued predominance of such domesticated Ukrainian national 
imagery, the inclusion of Denysenko’s A Dream as a component of the 1964 
anniversary served to complicate Shevchenko’s image in the republic, which 
paved the way for his use by young intellectuals and dissidents.  Ivan Dziuba 
recalled hearing someone state in the movie theater after watching A Dream: 
“Have you seen how the Banderists come in gangs to this movie?...”113 indicating 
that such a complicated and modernist treatment of the poet, and one who 
continually affirmed his Ukrainian identity in opposition to Imperial Russia, was 
already implicated in nationalist discourse.  During and after the 
sesquicentennial, there were periodic unofficial gatherings of Kyiv young people 
and intellectuals at the 1939 statue of the poet in Shevchenko Park (across the 
street from Shevchenko University).  After one such gathering in May 1966, Iurii 
Kondufor, the CPU Department of Science and Culture chief, reported to Petro  
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Figure 2.3. Oles’ Honchar speaking at the Great Theater in Moscow on March 
11, 1964 for the Shevchenko Sesquicentennial.  Source: Literaturna Ukraina, 
March 11, 1964: 2. 
 
   
Figure 2.4. Orthodox priests and Ukrainian nationalists worship icons of Taras 







Shelest that Kyiv intellectuals had asserted that they were trying “re-claim the 
great Kobzar’ from Russia.”  Kondufor demanded that security organs pay 
attention to such “anti-social” gatherings.114  Just as future dissidents Ivan 
Svitlychnyi and Dziuba had articulated their dissent upon Soviet cultural 
infrastructure, Denysenko presented an image of Shevchenko that resisted 
characterization within a folkloric teleology, which was nonetheless produced 
upon the representational material and within the production context of a Stalinist 
mode.   
 
Disposing of “Those Notorious Attributes”: Toward an Ethnographic 
Politics of Representation 
  
While no one at Dovzhenko Studio, within the SKU or Ukrainian Goskino, 
admitted as much, the “problem of cadres” appeared to be solved by 1965, and 
people stopped talking about it.  The studio hired several young Ukrainian 
directors – most of them VGIK graduates rather than from the theater or Moscow 
imports – while Vasyl’ Tsvirkunov also helped establish actors’ and screenwriters’ 
studios in Kyiv, all of which brought Ukrainian cinema out of the immediate 
personnel crisis of the early part of the decade.  Moreover, budgets for 
Dovzhenko Studio productions began to increase noticeably along with central 
Goskino’s acknowledgement that Ukrainian cinema had improved.  Whereas only 
two films had been awarded with a pay category of one or two in 1963, four had 
received the first pay group and six more the second in 1965.115  Of course, 
Ukrainian film production remained on a smaller scale than the SKU desired, but 
with the immediate administrative crisis resolved, studio politics shifted from the 
various concerns over personnel and catching up to the central studios to more 
directly confront issues of artistic representation.   
As I have shown in this chapter, and will continue to demonstrate, both of these 
areas of concern were part of the same continuum.  The nationalities of the 
directors, screenwriters, actors and other members of film crews in Ukraine were 
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Figure 2.5. Shevchenko (top center) as patron saint of Ukrainian national kitsch.  





considered determining factors in how films themselves were positioned within 
the politics of national representation at the studio.  Members of the studio 
collective banked their reputations on their abilities to participate in the cultural 
Thaw, which not only implied engagement with such discursive abstractions as 
“sincerity” and “authenticity,” but through this, an effort to transform the popular 
image of Ukraine and Ukrainians more generally.  Ukrainian screenwriter Mykola 
Zahrebel’nyi acknowledged Denysenko’s A Dream as the “first film at Dovzhenko 
Studio, which I’m not ashamed to say that this is a film from Dovzhenko Studio, 
where our people are shown (pokazanyi).”  In this sense, “shown” implied more 
than mere presence, as the writer then counterposed A Dream to “those 
notorious attributes,” which continued to plague Ukrainian cinema: “There’s the 
Zaporozhians, there’s the Haidamaky, there’s the Dnipro.”  He called for a 
rejection of the domesticated image of Ukrainians in Soviet cinema: “To show” 
them, as he stated, “not to simply pose them, not to simply display them in the 
background.”116  As Zahrebel’nyi indicated, films produced at Dovzhenko Studio 
during the early 1960s visited the canonical sites of national importance, and 
looked in on the canonical people that inhabited these spaces.  Films such as 
The Gas Station Queen presented spectators with particular spaces in the 
republic, but did so within an all too familiar mode of national branding, which 
appeared out of touch with Thaw-era concerns with “authenticity.”   
Rather than commercial success, or rather, in addition to commercial 
success, filmmakers and the new leadership at Dovzhenko Studio sought 
recognition from Moscow for Ukrainian cinema as a legitimate art, one which did 
not require self-parody.  In rejecting “those notorious attributes,” Ukrainian 
cinema asserted a new claim to national originality, but one in dialogue with 
Thaw-era concerns with “sincerity” and “authenticity.”  Ukrainian cinema was 
engaged in seeking recognition during the early 1960s.  In this way, Ukrainian 
cinema’s reputation was intimately tied to a broader image of Ukraine and 
Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.  If Ukraine continued to be an image of rural 
backwardness, Ukrainian cinema too would have such a reputation, largely 
                                                 








because it was considered responsible for producing such meaning.  While the 
figure of Taras Shevchenko was associated in popular culture with Ukrainian 
kitsch, Denysenko attempted to update the image of the national poet to signify 
not only national awareness, but also youth, a contemporary sensibility and 
intelligence.  While members of the studio collective and the Ukrainian 
intelligentsia generally approved of Denysenko’s picture, it failed to garner much 
recognition for Ukrainian cinema more broadly within the Soviet Union.  It did not 
dispel “those notorious attributes,” largely because A Dream remained tied to the 
generic system of non-Russian cultural production under Stalin, despite 
significant stylistic and narrative innovations contained therein. 
In the following chapter, I examine Sergei Paradzhanov’s Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors, the first film that brought fame to Ukrainian cinema since 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko’s Earth (Zemlia, 1930).  The elements of its fame had as 
much to do with the eccentricities of the director and his personal style as it did 
with the unusual material upon which the film was constructed.  Paradzhanov’s 
film and the drama that surrounded its production marked a new means of 
national representation in the cinema, based not on the familiar sites of Ukrainian 
folk spectacle present in such films as Tractor Drivers, Gas Station Queen, and 
even A Dream, but on the principle of ethnic self-discovery, necessitating a 
journey to unfamiliar territory and thus a different means to render national space 
itself.  Shadows worked with a conception of, and relationship between, space 
and its inhabitants that was specific to its particular site of exploration, rather than 




Sergei Paradzhanov’s Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors (1965)  
and the Carpathian Journey 
 
 
 In the July 1965 issue of the Ukrainian illustrated monthly, Ranok 
(Morning), readers might have seen a poem by Hanna Shaburiak extolling the 
beauty of Hutsúl’shchyna, the “Land of the Hutsuls.”   
Певна зовсім і просто не вірю, 
Що в житті щось знайду рідніше, 
Ніж гуцульська земля барвиста, 
Мов орнамент космацьких крашанок, 
Намистинка земного намиста, - 
України великої паросток. 
 
I am quite sure and I simply don’t believe 
That I will find something more my own in life, 
Than the colorful Hutsul land. 
They say the ornamental designs of Kosmach, 
Like a tunic of earthly beads, -  
Is the germ of great Ukraine.1 
 
The poem at once takes possession of “Hutsul land” by calling it “my own,” while 
the term “colorful” pointed toward its domestication within a folkloric mode.  
Shaburiak, moreover, assumed her readers’ familiarity with the material culture of 
the region in her reference to the “ornamental designs of Kosmach,” the latter a 
village with several health spas, camping resorts and a folk arts (kraevedcheskii) 
museum nearby.  The next line, “Like a tunic of earthly beads,” connects these 
multiple meanings for the tourist observer, associating Hutsul-made objects with 
the landscape itself, interweaving nature and culture.  The final line – the kicker – 
places a particular nationalistic value on Hutsul’shchyna: this is the primordial
                                                 
1 Hanna Shaburiak, “Sonata Hutsul’shchyny,” Ranok, no. 7 (July 1965), 13. 
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space, which gave rise to the modern nation.  As Christopher Ely concedes in his 
treatment of landscape in nineteenth-century Russia, the presence and draw of 
tourism constitutes one of the first stages for defining a natural space as 
nationally significant.2 
The Hutsuls are, trans-historically and metonymically, the pre-modern “us” 
in the present.  Yet, in claiming Hutsul’shchyna as one’s own – perhaps because 
of this possession claim – Ukrainians would have had to admit the exceptionality 
of such a space.  While they probably had never met one of these iconic sheep-
herding mountaineers called “Hutsuls,” living predominantly in the sparsely 
populated Chernivets and Ivano-Frankivsk provinces, readers were inevitably 
familiar with Hutsul’shchyna as a site of national importance to the republic.  
Magazines like Ranok, and other newspapers and travel guidebooks recently 
had been promoting the new “Hutsul’shchyna” camping lodge near Kosmach, 
where Ukrainian tourists could enjoy hiking in the Carpathians, relaxing in health 
spas, and watching real Hutsuls make their favorite kind of sheep’s milk cheese, 
brynza,3 on the nearby kolkhoz “Radians’ka Verkhovyna.”  Hutsul’shchyna, and 
the Hutsul herself, straddled several contiguous sites of meaning production, at 
once a “colorful” oddity on display for poets and tourists alike and as a scene of 
national belonging for various generations of Ukrainian artists and intellectuals.   
Soviet Ukrainian cinema too approached Hutsul’shchyna in the aftermath 
of “reunification” in 1939, with many filmmakers, including Oleksandr Dovzhenko, 
sent west to propagandize the coming of Soviet power.  Films like Abram Room’s 
Wind from the East (Veter Vostoka, 1939) and Tymofii Levchuk’s A Star over the 
Carpathians (Zoria nad Karpatami, 1949) represented the beauty of the 
landscape and the folk wisdom of the highlanders, but clearly foregrounded the 
political and cultural tasks of overcoming backwardness as a precondition for 
actual incorporation into Soviet Ukraine.  As the above titles suggest, the agents 
of history were not the Carpathian highlanders, but the modernizing state.  By 
comparison, a cinematic discourse of ethnographic authenticity relocated 
 
2 Christopher Ely, This Meager Nature: Landscape and National Identity in Imperial Russia 
(DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000), 5. 
3 Brynza is kind of like feta cheese.   
Hutsul’shchyna during the 1960s as an implicit counterpoint to the modernizing 
state.  In stressing “authenticity,” 1960s-era engagement with the Carpathians 
denied the applicability of the modernization narrative.  This chapter deals with 
how “authenticity” functioned within Sergei Paradzhanov’s Shadows of Forgotten 
Ancestors, easily the most hyped Ukrainian film during the long 1960s.  The 
discourse of authenticity in and about Shadows functioned both to question 
Stalin-era aesthetic principles, a common element of the cultural Thaw, while 
establishing a new means of non-Russian representation. 
Long before Paradzhanov’s film appeared on the big screen in November 
1965, Dovzhenko Studio began promoting it within the republic as a cultural 
object of national importance.  A press release from early 1964 stated, “Hutsuls 
[themselves] were making this film,” which produced an “astonishing” effect of 
“authenticity” on the production.  It went on to stress the leading actor’s personal 
connection to Hutsul’shchyna: “Ivan Mykolaichuk was born in those very same 
Carpathian lands[…] He does not perform, but lives in this image [emphasis 
mine].”4  Whereas Shaburiak’s “Sonata of Hutsul’shchyna” demonstrated how 
objects of a folkloric material culture become nationally possessed, the press 
release showed how the human image itself embodied such a site of national 
importance.  In both the poem and film, humans become not mere inhabitants of 
the land, but in fact part of the land.   
In conflating land and people, both representations fit into a new 
ethnographic mode of representing the non-Russian in Soviet visual culture.  The 
poem and the film, moreover, addressed a reader/spectator who was positioned 
as a participant/observer, called on to decode the nationalistic value of their 
visual qualities.  As I detailed in Chapter 1, the ethnographic mode defines the 
modernist use of folklore and material culture that characterized the work of 
Paradzhanov and his followers in Ukraine.5  Like the folkloric, the ethnographic 
                                                 
4 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1581, l. 20-21. 
5 This use of “ethnographic” is not to be confused with George S. N. Luckyj’s use of 
“ethnographic” in Literary Politics in Soviet Ukraine, where he argues that symbolists like 
Kotsiubyns’kyi were interested in getting away from prior “ethnographic” literary representations 
of Ukrainians.  I would identify Luckyj’s use of “ethnographic” more in line with how I use 
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mode identifies a particular relationship between visual style and how non-
Russians are written into film narration.  The folkloric mode, associated with 
Stalinist cinema, introduced the spectacle of “national color” within a classic 
organization of filmic space and narration, whereby the narrative teleology 
indicated that, while non-Russian subjects were primordially located in particular 
spaces, the “national” hero nonetheless stands above them.  The ethnographic 
mode highlighted visual style and circular narration, and the human subject exists 
within the landscape, unable to stand apart from it.  Whereas earlier Ukrainian 
films that dealt with national subject matter imagined porous national boundaries 
– either through the return narrative or within the political union of Ukraine and 
Russia – Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors suggests an entirely enclosed and a-
historical space, penetrated only by the filmmakers and, indirectly, the spectator.  
Paradzhanov’s film certainly contained a cohesive narrative structure, but its 
intended ethnic texture is conveyed, not through narrative, or not through 
narrative alone, but through its observational camera-work, at times even 
documentary-like, which alternately serves to alienate and attract the spectator.  
This attraction/alienation principle that the camera establishes parallels 
Shaburiak’s construction of ethnoscape through a possession/difference 
dialectic.  To make sense of the poem’s and the film’s nationalistic value, the 
reader/spectator had to first possess such difference within oneself, and 
convergently, understand Hutsul’shchyna as the “germ of great Ukraine.” 
In earlier chapters, I used the term “folkloric,” in contrast to “ethnographic,” 
to refer to Stalinist cinema’s mobilization of folklore to justify a contemporary 
political program of patriotic unity.  The folkloric mode sought to represent a 
simultaneous modernization and historicization of particular non-Russian national 
traditions.  In Chapter 1, I examined Ihor Savchenko’s 1941 historical-
biographical film, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi, to show how plot and iconography 
became uniform in the Stalinist cinema of the periphery, even as they continually 
brought attention to particularistic concerns of individual nations within the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                                 
“folkloric” in this dissertation.  See, George S. N. Luckyj, Literary Politics in Soviet Ukraine, 1917-
1934, rev. ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 30.  
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Union.  In this chapter, I address how and why this shift from the folkloric to the 
ethnographic took place in representations of the Ukrainian Carpathians.  As I 
argued in Chapter 2, this emphasis on representing difference over unity, and 
style over narrative, fit into larger cultural processes related to Thaw-era 
aesthetic problems, indigenization policies at republican studios, and political 
imperatives that favored limited devolution of authority.  This chapter looks 
closely at the cinematic results of those processes, in one of the most unusual 
films released in the Soviet Union during the 1960s. 
 To contextualize the importance of Paradzhanov’s journey to the 
Carpathians in making Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, I also examine a 
dominant image of the Carpathians in Ukraine from the early twentieth century 
until the 1960s, which was located in folksy representations of Hutsul song and 
dance, and as a site for exotic tourism.  Paradoxically, this system of 
representation intended to produce an authenticated site of ethno-national self-
knowledge, which could be extended throughout the republic.  Paradzhanov’s 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors functioned on many levels – at once affirming a 
domesticated and generically driven notion of the folkloric for Ukrainian Trans-
Carpathia, while remaining a highly experimental film appearing at the end of the 
cultural Thaw.  By winning a number of awards at international film festivals – 
most notably in Mar del Plata, Argentina, Rome, New York, and Sydney – 
Shadows became the first film that Western critics would identify as “Ukrainian” 
rather than generally “Soviet” or “Russian.”6  Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors 
signified the completion of the Carpathian journey, wherein Ukrainians could 
perform the Hutsul as themselves.  
As Dovzhenko Studio’s press release determined, the guiding principle of 
media hype was the film’s supposed ethnographic authenticity, located in the 
actuality and spontaneity of Hutsul performance on screen.  In the promotion of 
                                                 
6 During his coverage of the 1966 New York International Film Festival, the famous New York 
Times critic Bosley Crowther commented on the film: “The late show at the festival last evening 
was an unusual Ukrainian film, “Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors,” which was made in 1964 to 
celebrate the 100th birthday anniversary of the Ukrainian novelist, Michalo Kotsiubinsky, from one 
of whose books this film was made.”  Bosley Crowther, “Film Festival: ‘The Hunt’,” The New York 
Times, Sept 20, 1966, 39. 
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Paradzhanov’s film, the language of authenticity took on a signification that, while 
building upon Thaw-era concerns with representational honesty, pointed toward 
a mode that transcended mere realist articulations.  In this way, the language of 
promotion for Shadows approached a type of jargon, in the sense that 
“authenticity” took on, as Theodor Adorno suggested in The Jargon of 
Authenticity, a quality of “mystification.”  With such “magical” properties contained 
within the concept of “authenticity,” its idealized content appears to exist simply in 
mobilizing its discourse.  “Authenticity,” thus, conflates reflection on a 
philosophical problem with the actual objects of that reflection,7 in this case those 
objects which provided the film with its ethnic “texture.”  In positioning Hutsuls 
and Hutsul’shchyna as authenticated objects, they are meant to transcend both 
their contemporary and historical existence.   
Important here, however, is the specificity of the claim to authenticity – 
that is, the historical context in which it arose – in addition to the formal practices 
that were intended to render cinematic objects authentically.  Even when the 
press attempted to subvert the studio’s claim to a transcendent ethnographic 
authenticity, it approached the film according to its own visual and conceptual 
logic, rather than vis á vis the film’s ideology or realist verisimilitude.  Whereas 
these latter concerns were related principally to the aesthetic principles at work 
within the film, the problem of authenticity touched on the very processes of 
production, which were also on display and constituted a key source of 
Paradzhanov’s film’s final meaning.  One satirical drawing, which appeared in the 
November 19, 1964 issue of Radians’ka kul’tura, depicted the director, flanked by 
his cinematographer Iurii Illienko and set designer Hryhorii Iakutovych, (Figure 
3.1).  All three are engulfed in an enormous keptar’,8 with their “ordinary” clothes 
underneath.  We see Paradzhanov and Illienko in contemporary clothing – the 
director seemingly in a three-piece suit, and Illienko in a more casual shirt with 
rolled-up sleeves – while Iakutovych is outfitted in a second embroidered shirt, 
                                                 
7 Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, tr., Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), xiii. 
8 A keptar’ is the characteristic highlander wool and sheepskin vest, worn throughout the 
Carpathians.  The word comes from the Romanian word, cheptar, for “vest.” 
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along with the characteristic feathered hat of a Carpathian highlander.  Even as 
Illienko holds a camera to identify his profession, the visual metaphor of the 
shadows behind them indicates that the lights – and ostensibly the camera too – 
had been turned on them.  While in the film, and in Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi’s 
novella from which it was adapted, the “shadows” ostensibly are cast by the lost 
culture of the Hutsuls, who now lurk only in the distant and secluded corners of 
time and space, the cartoonist associated these shadows with the celebrity 
status of the film’s production almost a year before any common reader of the 
newspaper had actually seen it on the screen.  The cartoonist made the 
filmmakers into actors within a second drama about the production of the film, in 
which the spectator too is invited to participate in the film’s discourse of 
authenticity.9   
The problem of authenticity in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors 
demonstrates how the film became a matter of popular interest, associating 
questions of cinematic authorship with film style and popular reception.  The 
artist forces us to consider whether the man in the embroidered shirt under the 
embroidered vest is in fact more ethnically “authentic” than the Georgian-born 
and Russian-speaking Armenian director or the Russian-born and Russian-
speaking Ukrainian cinematographer.  Or, is authenticity necessarily exclusive to 
such representational regimes?  The above images satirically play with the notion 
of the “authentic self,” visually associating it with a matrëshka-like being.  In 
positioning such a self-consciously strange film in relation to notions of “the 
authentic,” moreover, its authors, studio representatives, as well as the press 
implied a conceptual distance from the Stalinist folkloric with the assertion that 
Ukraine might still be unfamiliar territory.  The principle of authenticity, thus, 
determined the production context as well as the film’s aesthetic means.  
                                                 
9 M. Malovs’kyi, “Avtoram fil’mu ‘Tini zabutykh predkiv’ S. Paradzhanovu, Iu. Il’ienku, Iu. 




Figure 3.1. Caricature in Radians’ka kul’tura, Nov 19, 1964: “To the Authors of 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors”
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*   *   * 
As a student of Ihor Savchenko until his untimely death in 1950, 
Paradzhanov first came to Ukraine while working as an assistant director on his 
teacher’s The Third Blow (Tretii udar) and Taras Shevchenko in 1948-1950.  He 
returned to Moscow to complete his studies under Dovzhenko, who helped him 
get a permanent position at Kyiv Studio in 1952.  There, he made his first film, 
Andriesh (1952), a fairytale-like creation that expanded upon his thesis project, A 
Moldavian Fairytale, from a year earlier.  A non-event in Soviet cinema at the 
time, in hindsight Andriesh looks vaguely familiar, and introduces several themes 
that preoccupied the director in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors and later films: 
the animacy of nature, material culture and an interest in non-Russian folklore.   
Many of the film director’s biographers attribute this interest in the ethnic 
exotic to Paradzhanov’s cosmopolitan upbringing.10  He was born to a Russified 
middle-class Armenian family in Tbilisi in 1924, a period during which many 
Armenians were leaving Georgia for Armenia, due to problems of ethnic conflict 
that emerged during Menshevik control of the city (1917-1918).  The Parajanians, 
who remained successful businesspeople during the period of NEP, opted to 
stay.11  Sergei first attended a technical school for rail workers during the war, 
having avoided military service after failing the health exam.  A year later, he 
decided on a career in singing, graduating from the Tbilisi Opera Academy in 
1945.  After another change in career plans, he ended up in Moscow at VGIK 
studying film directing.  After completing work on Savchenko’s two films, 
Paradzhanov returned to Moscow, where he met Nigyar Kerimova, a Tatar sales 
clerk at GUM, whom he soon married.  Nigyar’s family disapproved of her 
marriage to an Armenian and her brothers killed her shortly thereafter.  
Paradzhanov returned to Kyiv to serve as assistant director on Vladimir Braun’s 
Maksimka (1952), where he met and married Svitlana Sherbatiuk, the daughter 
of the Ukrainian ambassador to Canada.  Ivan Dziuba recently recalled the first 
                                                 
10 See, Karen Kalentar, Ocherki o Paradzhanove (Erevan: Hitutiun, 1998), 8-10; Vasilii Katanian, 
Prikosnovenie k idolam (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), 210. 
11 Kalentar, 8. 
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time he heard the name, “Paradzhanov:”  The future Ukrainian dissident was 
attending a performance of the Kyiv Philharmonic in 1959, and caught sight of 
Svitlana, whom he defined as the most beautiful woman at the concert.  He 
asked his friend who she was, to which the reply was, “Don’t bother, some 
Armenian has already abducted [zaharbav] her,” alluding to a common 
stereotype of the Caucasus kidnapper.12   
Paradzhanov was equally derogatory in his first recollection of the people 
he met in Ukraine.  During a December 1964 meeting in Moscow to honor 
Paradzhanov’s success on the film, he decried the “provincialism [khutorianstvo] 
and little-Russian mentality [malorossiishchina]” that prevailed at the studio, 
alluding the safe and static folkloric imagery that characterized Ukrainian cinema 
particularly during the 1950s.13  And yet, apart from Andriesh, the films that he 
made before Shadows were largely part of this system of Stalinist folklorics: 
From the kolkhoz comedy The Top Guy, a musical, Ukrainian Rhapsody, and a 
social drama about resistance to a religious cult in the Donbass called Flower on 
the Stone (Kvitka na kamne, 1962), there was little indication of what 
Paradzhanov had to offer Ukrainian cinema.  He intentionally detached himself 
from studio politics, and, consequently, we have few documents, other than the 
letter I cited in Chapter 2, that reveal much about his early career in Ukraine.   
We receive some sense of the director’s future concerns at a meeting of 
Dovzhenko Studio’s Directorial Board in June 1962 regarding Flower on the 
Stone, during which Paradzhanov complained of his failure to reveal the 
“authentic Donbass atmosphere.”  He blamed this shortcoming on the 
screenwriter’s refusal to allow the actors to speak in “contemporary Ukrainian.”14  
These concerns with linguistic authenticity, which would take center stage in the 
production of his next film, might seem strange coming from such a determined 
monoglot, but for Paradzhanov, performance of ethnicity was of key importance 
in his aesthetic outlook.  In essence, Paradzhanov was more concerned with the 
                                                 
12 Larysa Briukhovets’ka, “Ivan Dziuba: Paradzhanov bil’shyi za legendu pro Paradzhanova,” 
interview with Ivan Dziuba, Kino Teatr, no. 4 (2003), accessed online: 
http://www.ktm.ukma.kiev.ua/show_content.php?id=129: March 24, 2005. 
13 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 1, d. 528, l. 41. 
14 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, delo 1536, l. 40. 
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sound of Donbass surzhyk15 than with what the characters were saying.  In this 
respect, he had little interest in Ukrainian language politics of the early 1960s, 
with its emphasis on promoting a standardized, literary Ukrainian in the cinema.  
Vadym Sobko, the screenwriter that Paradzhanov blamed for the lack of linguistic 
authenticity in Flower on the Stone, for example, stated during the SKU First 
Congress, “If we continue to speak such surzhyk in films, we will beat ourselves 
with our own most important weapon.”16   
In Denysenko’s A Dream, moreover, one complaint about the film was 
Mykolaichuk’s vaguely Western Ukrainian inflected speech.  Tymofii Levchuk 
suggested that another actor – one who spoke standard Ukrainian – overdub 
Mykolaichuk’s lines due to the gravity of Shevchenko’s representation.17  Thus, 
many at the studio, especially among the older generation who used Ukrainian in 
their daily lives, viewed the respectability of a literary language as an escape 
from folkloric representations, with its frequent mobilizations of surzhyk or 
Ukrainian-accented Russian as components of aural spectacle in Ukrainian 
cinema.  Shevchenko, Ukraine’s first modern cultural figure, could not in good 
conscience speak in the “language of backward clichés.”18  Paradzhanov, in 
highlighting the “authentic,” however, viewed national difference as an aesthetic, 
rather than political, problem.  Difference had to be discovered, experienced and 
revealed, and in this project, the outsider’s lack of knowledge might contribute 
more than those who commanded cultural authority, associated as they were 
with a compromised position vis á vis a discredited Stalinist aesthetic.  In other 
words, even if Ukrainian characters stopped speaking Russian, neither 
authenticity nor realism would necessarily be the result.  In fact, the Ukrainian 
speech of historical figures like painter Karl Briullov or poet and tutor of Tsar 
Alexander II, Vasilii Zhukovskii, in A Dream seemed anything but authentic, and 
rather highlighted the explicitly political project at the root of Denysenko’s work. 
                                                 
15 Surzhyk is a Russian/Ukrainian pidgin language spoken in the rural areas of Eastern Ukraine.  
Typically, a Russian lexicon is used with a distinct Ukrainian pronunciation and morphology.     
16 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 227, l. 70. 
17 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1750, l. 7. 
18 These are also Levchuk’s words, from the March 1962 SKU Plenum. TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, 
d. 199, l. 14. 
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Despite his penchant for linguistic spectacle and rejection of mainstream 
language politics in Ukraine, Paradzhanov in no way offered a return the Stalinist 
folkloric.  In fact, Paradzhanov wrote extensively about his early “failures” in 
“Eternal Motion,” his first and only work of film theory, published in Iskusstvo kino 
four years later as he was coasting on the success and fame garnered from 
Shadows.  Therein, he emphasized his journey to discover the “authentic” 
Ukraine while collecting materials for production: 
When I began work on the film The Top Guy, I exposed myself to the 
Ukrainian village for the first time.  And I was exposed to the staggering 
beauty of its texture, and its poetry.  And I tried to express its charm on the 
screen.  But from the blows of the plot – and this, in essence, was an 
unimportant humoresque – the entire task was shattered.  Not with what 
proved to be landscapes, stone-like peasant women, storks, tractors, and 
straw wreaths.  The material on which the films Flower on the Stone and A 
Notion were made is deeply memorable to me.  The folk thread, sewing, 
the imprint.  Ancient songs of Ukraine.  I wanted to convey the world of 
these songs in all their protogenic charm.  I wanted to convey the folk 
“vision” without museum make-up; to return all of this staggering 
embroidery, reliefs, and tiles to their creative source, to merge them into a 
united spiritual act.19 
  
Here, Paradzhanov tells us that his inspiration came from travel and observation.  
He positioned himself as an amateur ethnographer in his active discovery of 
Ukraine’s “protogenic charm.”  Paradzhanov definitively tried to distance himself 
from a Stalinist folkloric, represented by the “landscapes, stone-like peasant 
women, storks, tractors, and straw wreaths,” and later with “museum make-up.”  
In the articulation of his aesthetic principles, Paradzhanov demanded his ethnic 
subject carry elements of folkloric color, but asserted that authenticity warranted 
such exotic human images.  Moreover, landscapes could not exist independent 
of culture, as generic spaces in nature.  Paradzhanov believed that space not 
only determined human culture, but that humans were part of the landscape 
itself.  As “Eternal Motion” argued, his journeys eventually took him to the 
Carpathians, where he discovered the ideal and transcendent space for a more 
expressive national representation, a space both familiar from his earlier travels 
                                                 
19 Sergei Paradzhanov, “Vechnoe dvizhenie,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 1 (Jan 1961), 61. 
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and yet “savage,” strange, and unfamiliar.20  In encountering the Ukrainian 
periphery, Paradzhanov had discovered a space seemingly untouched by Soviet 
modernity, and it was such a space that invited an extensive and inclusive 
discussion in the republic on the authenticity of the “Ukrainian national 
character.” 
 
A Brief History of Carpathophilia 
 
In 1962, Paradzhanov and his cast and crew began their ascent into the 
mountains that would come to signify so much in the years that followed, and 
which would transform the thematic focus of Ukrainian cinema for the next 15 
years.  The national spectacle of the Ukrainian Carpathians represented in 
Paradzhanov’s film, however, has a much longer history, first emerging in Polish 
literature with Józef Korzeniowski’s 1840 romantic play “The Carpathian 
Highlanders,”21 then as the subject of L’viv ethnographer Volodymyr 
Shukhevych’s four-volume work, Hutsul’shchyna (1899-1909), and later 
alongside Ukrainian modernism with the work of artists Ivan Trush (1869-1941) 
and Olena Kul’chyts’ka (1877-1967) and writers Ivan Franko (1856-1916), 
Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi (1864-1913), Ol’ha Kobylians’ka (1863-1942), and Vasyl’ 
Stefanyk (1871-1936).22   
                                                 
20 During a meeting with Moscow filmmakers in December 1964, Paradzhanov said, “This occurs 
between Uzhhorod and Chernivtsi – in the center of Europe – such savagery [varvarstvo]!”  
RGALI, f. 2936, op. 1, d. 528, l. 43. 
21 Józef Korzeniowski the romantic-era playwright is not to be confused with Józef Korzeniowski 
the British novelist known to the world as Joseph Conrad.  
22 Patrice Dabrowski argues that Korzeniowski’s play was essentially an allegory for Poland’s own 
liberation struggle against the Russian and Hapsburg Empires.  Later, British and French 
travelers and collectors of folklore would find a particular interest in Hutsul material culture, and 
during the 1880 ethnographic exhibit in Galicia, many Western Europeans came to see the 
beautiful objects on display.  Dabrowski, however, is primarily concerned with the importance of 
the Carpathians and the Hutsuls for Polish national identity at the end of the nineteenth century.  
She tells of a previously terra incognito becoming a Polish tourist destination after a series of 
ethnographic studies of the region.  Doctor and amateur ethnographer Tytus Chałubiński, who 
journeyed to the Carpathians in the 1870s, saw the highlander as “a superior Polish peasant, one 
who came to be seen as preserving the old Polish ways.”  This “discovery,” according to 
Dabrowski, revealed a new layer to imagining the Polish nation, a populist layer that was not 
centered on the essential “nobility” of Poles (387).  But, in the process of making the region a 
tourist attraction, members of the Polish Tatra Society also saw the region as a cash cow, in 
desperate need of economic development and general modernization, which also would serve 
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Although this chapter seeks to understand the modern – and specifically 
post-war – representations of the inhabitants of the Southwestern Ukrainian 
Carpathians, we should not fail to recognize that the Hutsuls in fact did (and 
do23) exist as a self-identifying group in this region at least since the fourte
century.  The network of Hutsul villages spreads out along the Prut and 
Cheremosh Rivers in Southern Ivano-Frankivs’k oblast’ and East into Chernivets’ 
oblast’.  Hutsul communities also exist in northern Romania and the 
Northwestern tip of Moldova.  Most Hutsuls speak a dialect of Ukrainian, with 
several loan words from Romanian and Hungarian.  Until collectivization in the 
late 1940s, Hutsuls engaged in timber production, in addition to cow and sheep 
herding.  Contemporary Hutsul’shchyna constituted a part of the Polish 
Commonwealth until the First Partition of 1772, when it went to the Hapsburgs.  
After World War I, most of the region returned to the inter-war Polish Republic, 
with the exception of Southern Bukovyna, which Romania absorbed in 1920.  
The Soviet Union occupied the region in 1940 (after the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Treaty).  After the formation of general Ion Antonescu’s fascist state in 1941, 
Hitler validated Romania’s historic claim to the entire region.  Only after his fall in 
1944 did the Soviet Union re-occupy Hutsul’shchyna and proclaimed it an 
organic component of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.   
enth 
                                                                                                                                                
All of the aforementioned artists and writers grew up and worked in 
Hapsburg and – after World War I – Polish and Romanian Ukraine, most of them 
 
the needs of the locals, who were then living in abject poverty (388).  The Poles who organized 
the 1880 ethnographic exhibit had two purposes: One, they sought to bring attention to this 
backward part of the empire, and two, to make the emperor realize that the Hutsuls were in fact 
Polish, rather than “Ruthenian,” which was a competing identity in the region during this time 
(400).  See, Patrice Dabrowski, “’Discovering’ the Galician Borderlands: The Case of the Eastern 
Carpathians,” Slavic Review 64, no. 2 (2005): 380-402. 
23 In the Carpathian region of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast and the Sub-Carpathian region of 
Zakarpats’kyi oblast in contemporary Ukraine, Hustuls are legally defined as a “subethnos” of the 
Ukrainian “nation.”  Recent attempts by regional authorities to define Hutsuls as part of a Rusyn 
“national minority” have met with protests by self-identified Hutsuls, who fear that they would 
relinquish their claim to Ukrainian nationality.  While the federal government of Ukraine does not 
recognize nationality as a legal category in the same way as the Soviet Union did or 
contemporary Russia does, nationality continues to play a role in the collection of census data.  
See, “Na Zakarpatti Rakhivs’ka raionna rada rada [sic] zvernulasia z protestom do Prezydenta ta 
Henprokuratura proty rishennia oblasnoi rady pro vyznannia natsional’nosti ‘rusyn’,” UA-
Reporter.com: Novosti Uzhgoroda i Zakarpat’ia, March 23, 2007: accessed online: http://ua-
reporter.com/novosti/20556/, May 2, 2008. 
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expressing a mild form of cultural nationalism that nonetheless accepted “foreign” 
control.  With the introduction of anti-Ukrainian legislation in Poland and 
particularly in fascist Romania, the surviving individuals expressed support of 
limited Soviet control over the region.  The exception is Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi, 
born on the other side of the mountains in Vinnytsia to a bureaucratic family in 
the Russian civil service.24  As a young seminary student in the border town of 
Kamianets’-Podil’s’kyi,25 he joined the more radically nationalist Shevchenko 
Brotherhood.  As an adult, he moved to the North-Eastern Ukrainian city of 
Chernihiv, where he spent his most productive period, and joined the more 
moderate educational organization “Prosvita (Enlightenment)” in 1906.  It was not 
until 1910 that he first traveled to the Carpathians, after becoming interested in 
mountains while on vacation on Capri, the latter a popular destination for 
European intellectuals and artists.  Hutsul’shchyna was quickly emerging as an 
Eastern version of the Italian island for the Polish and Ukrainian intelligentsias.  
While in the Carpathians, he wrote to his friend Maksim Gor’kii: “If only you knew 
what a captivating, almost fairly-tale corner of the world this is, with its dark-green 
mountains and eternally whispering mountain springs.”  He drew further attention 
to the “costumes and customs” of the “nomadic Hutsuls,” and wondered whether 
he had been “transported to some new and unknown world.”26  After his 
publication of Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors in late 1911, he returned to the 
Carpathians to gather material for a larger epic volume about the Hutsuls, but fell 
ill with a heart condition, and, after returning to Chernihiv, died on April 12, 1912.  
Kotsiubyns’kyi defined his work in the Carpathians as clearly ethnographic in 
intention.  Especially after the Revolution of 1905, the writer gradually shifted his 
style from a populist and realist aesthetic along the lines of Gor’kii (evident in the 
                                                 
24 Much of his work, however, was published in L’viv rather than Kyiv, due the comparative ease 
to publish in Western Ukraine, away from Russian imperial censorship.  See, Bohdan Rubchak, 
“The Music of Satan and the Bedeviled World: An Essay on Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky,” in Mikhailo 
Kotsiubynsky, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, (Littleton, CO: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 
Studies by Ukrainian Academic Press, 1981), 87. 
25 Kamianets’-Podil’s’kyi was on the border of the Russian and Hapsburg Empires after the First 
Partition, and later on the border of Poland and the Soviet Union in the inter-war period.   
26 Letter to M. Gor’kii, August 9, 1910, in Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi, Tvory v semy tomakh, vol. 7 
(Kyiv: Dnipro, 1975), 69.  
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first half of Fata Morgana, the entirety of which was written between 1903 and 
1911), to more of an impressionist orientation in such works as Intermezzo 
(1907) and Shadows. 
The popular romantic image of the Carpathian inhabitants temporarily 
dissolved after World War II, when security organs were combing the mountains 
for the remnants of the UPA movement.  With the Tenth Anniversary of the “re-
unification” of Ukraine in 1949, however, Western Ukraine was redeemed with a 
message of the victory of socialism over the poverty, ignorance, and “bourgeois 
nationalism” that authorities in Moscow and Kyiv claimed had prevailed in Polish 
and Romanian-controlled Ukraine.  During the early 1960s, Ukrainian filmmakers 
carried the torch of Carpathophilia from the folkloric to an ethnographic 
orientation.  In this later formation, the Carpathians provided not only an 
ideological component of Ukraine’s “re-unification” but more importantly, it 
became an exotic space of self-knowledge for Kyiv artists and intellectuals.  This 
shift emerged alongside both a growing Ukrainian dissident movement along with 
the proliferation of mountain imagery in Soviet popular culture. 
  
“Oh Verkhovyna, You are Ours, Oh Precious, Little World”:27 Representing 
the Carpathians through the Carpathian Tourist 
 
The imagery of the Carpathians in Ukraine emerged in tandem with a 
broader visual discourse in the Soviet Union on mountains, enlisted primarily 
toward promoting the growing potential for tourism in the Caucasus and Crimea.  
As Anne Gorsuch and Diane Koenker argue, “For eastern Europeans inside 
multinational empires, tourism became one mechanism to help to define self and 
other, and it contributed to reifying nation-building projects.”28  By the 1960s time 
for leisure activity both expanded and became more individual in orientation.  The 
                                                 
27 This was the title of a feature article on Hutsul song and dance in Radians’ka kul’tura, July 28, 
1960: “Verkhovyno, svitku ty nash,” p. 2. 
28 Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker, “Introduction,” in Gorsuch and Koenker, eds., Turizm: 
The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006): 2.  They go to argue, “In the Soviet Union… tourism was supposed to 
help individuals to internalize the nation; and through this process the nation, in turn, would 
become like the human body – united and functioning as a whole” (10). 
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1960s represented a period in the Soviet Union, like in the United States and 
Western Europe, when greater numbers of people could afford time and money 
for personal leisure.  This growing orientation toward “privatization” of public life, 
as Vladimir Shlapentokh once referred to the post-Khrushchevian malaise in 
Soviet society, made tourism a means for personal enjoyment, while the 
obligatory visit to such nationalistic icons as war monuments were merely 
tolerated.29  At the time, Boris Grushin saw the Soviet Union developing into a 
“mobile society,” both in terms of the movement of labor and in terms of the 
pursuit of leisure and knowledge of other places.30 
Yet, tourism to the mountains was not about leisure alone; rather, the 
specific quality of the landscape was to appeal to pop-philosophical notions of 
transcendence.  After completing his first film, Vertical (Vertikal’, 1967), a story 
about mountain climbers in the Caucasus who narrowly escape death from an 
avalanche, the young Vladimir Vysotskii told reporters in Sportivnaia zhizn’ Rossii 
(Russian Sports Life): “It seems to me that, of all types of sports, mountain-
climbing tends to have more of a moral effect on the individual.”31  In Vertical, 
however, the rustic ethnics that inhabit the mountains exist on the periphery of 
the primary conflict between man and landscape.  The inhabitants of 
Hutsul’shchyna were not only part of the tourist spectacle, but also read into the 
transcendent quality of the landscape.   
As Paradzhanov’s film finally hit theaters in fall 1965, Ranok published a 
photo montage that complimented Shadows, which showed a group of men and 
women dressed in traditional highlander costumes preparing a horse for tilling 
the fields alongside a group of backpackers leaving a large tourist center (Figure 
3.2).  Although tourism to such places as the Caucasus and the Black Sea coast 
were significantly more popular during the 1960s, there were a number of such 
                                                 
29 For an analysis of how ordinary Soviet citizens after Khrushchev viewed nationalistic public 
spectacle, see, Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
30 The term “mobile society” comes from Hermann Bausinger, Folk Culture in a World of 
Technology, tr., Elke Dettmer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990): 39.  Boris Grushin, 
Svobodnoe vremia (Moscow, 1967). 
31 N. P. Cherepanova, “Luchshe gor mogut byt´ tol´ko gory,” Sportivnaia zhizn´ Rossii, no. 5 
(1968), 23. 
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organized trips to the Carpathians.  A 1977 tourist guidebook featured 12 
different organized and self-guided tours through the Carpathians.  Four of the 
tours included a stay at the “Hutsul’shchyna” resort (pictured in Ranok), which 
opened in 1965 together with the “Hutsul’shchyna” restaurant, and another 
included a 14-day tour of the Hutsul region based out of the “Hutsul Valleys” 
resort.  Thus, while Caucasus tours were far more extensive and prevalent in the 
tourist literature, the Carpathian tours were unique in the Soviet Union in that the 
organization of tourism centered on experiencing the region’s inhabitants, rather 
than solely on nature activities and relaxation.32  To help facilitate the journey to 
the mountains, Karpaty publishers was established in 1964 in the Trans-
Carpathian city of Uzhhorod.  They initially specialized in tourist guidebooks and 
picture books, which, while generally published in Ukrainian and Russian-
language editions, were clearly intended for a Republican – rather than all-Union 
– audience.33  The promotion of the Carpathians as a space of “traditional” 
Ukrainian folk values occurred alongside the promotion of the tourist journey to 
this space.  Viewing this “panorama” of the Carpathians in Ranok, the highland 
farmers and backpackers become part of the same ideological construction.  The 
happily-laboring villagers acquire more than an element of “to-be-looked-at-ness” 
because the tourists are positioned as active participants in the Carpathian 
drama, and to no less degree do they acquire the same visual quality in their 
performance as tourists/spectators.   
Along with the spectacle of traditional life in the Carpathians came the 
responsibility to protect it.  Later in 1965, Ranok published an article on nature 
preservation in the Carpathians, together with a series of photographs of 
mountain vistas.  Pavlo Skochok, a member of the republican council of the State 
Committee for Nature Preservation, argued,
                                                 
32 N.A. Ivashkina, ed., Turistskie marshruty (Moscow: Profizdat, 1977), 82-84.  The differences 
between organized tourism in the Carpathians and that in the Caucasus may also include the 
differences in the physical structure of each mountain ranges.  While the Caucasus had a number 
of steep peeks and rock faces conducive to the sport of mountain climbing, the rounded features 
of the Carpathians were more conducive to hiking and exploration. 
33 This limited distribution for Carpathian guidebooks is indicated by the fairly small number of 
copies printed.  For example, one of the largest print-runs for 1965 was a photo album entitled 









The Carpathians are our national pride.  Their beauty has long warmed 
the heart with the memories of all who have been caressed by their 
attractiveness, and songs about Carpathian mountain valleys are sung 
from Moldavia to Finland.34 
 
While Skochok initially articulated the specifically “national” importance of the 
space, the reader soon learns that this assertion is self-consciously associated 
with the outsider’s experience in the Carpathians, rather than anything inherent 
to the space itself.  Similarly, the tourist, as a type of spectator, is given the role 
of producing meaning.  But such an outsider teeters on the boundaries of 
inclusion into this vulnerable Carpathian pastoral after acquiring such knowledge 
about preservation.  Skochok, in his role as an ideological guide, told readers 
and potential tourists that a visit to the Carpathians should indeed produce a 
feeling of communal – indeed, national – responsibility.   
Underlying these representations of tourism was a conception of the 
Carpathians as a sign pointing not only toward the quintessential rural pastoral, 
but also toward a division between such an invented authenticity and the cultural 
and social processes that went into giving it meaning as a “national” construct; 
that division between “you” and “ours,” which required cultural suturing.  For 
Western Ukrainian intellectuals, the idea of the Carpathians developed into a 
distinctive regional identity in the early twentieth century, which only later 
produced nationalistic feelings in tandem with the political upheavals of East-
Central Europe in the inter-war period.  With the increasing popularity of tourism, 
Kyivans and other Eastern Ukrainians were also invited to visit the mountains, 
and to associate it with their own national space, as the “germ of great Ukraine,” 
waiting to be discovered and personally possessed. 
 
                                                 
34 Pavlo Skochok, “Homin Karpat,” Ranok, no. 10 (1965), 7. 
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The Carpathians as a Generically Defined Site of Historical Knowledge 
 
 One of the dimensions of “national pride” that Skochok referenced was the 
historic national importance of the region for Ukraine and the Soviet Union.  
Viktor Ivanov’s Oleksa Dovbush (1959), perhaps the first in a new cycle of films 
about the Carpathians, attempted to establish this importance, but did so within a 
conventional generic and stylistic framework that I have previously defined as the 
“folkloric mode.”  As a popular historical epic, the film located a primordial 
struggle between Ukrainians and Poles among the Carpathian Hutsuls.  
Dovbush, the legendary 18th century bandit-turned-rebel leader of the 
highlanders, defends the Hutsuls against the arbitrary will of the Polish 
szlachta.35  After taking a blood obligation to an old opryshok36 to avenge his 
comrades’ deaths at the hand of Pan37 Jablonski, Dovbush leaves his life of petty 
crime to gather a group of Hutsul rebels.  Upon first meeting the pan, Dovbush 
easily subdues him in a sword fight, but spares his life after a promise to return 
the peasants’ livestock.  Jablonski initially follows through with his promise, but 
later kills Dovbush’s parents in revenge.  He eventually tracks down the pan, 
killing him, but in Dovbush’s flight from the castle, his fiancé, Marichka, is 
captured.  Dovbush’s men, in turn, capture Jablonski’s widow, and offer the 
Poles an exchange.  After another series of double-crossings, Dovbush breaks 
into the tower to free his love, only to (literally) be stabbed in the back by his 
friend Shtefan.  The latter had made a pact with a Polish priest, who promised to 
marry the latter to his long-time crush, Marichka.  After leaving victorious, 
                                                 
35 The szlachta (or, shliakhta) is the Polish and Ukrainian term for the Polish nobility. 
36 The opryshky were peasant rebels operating in Galicia, Zakarpattia and Bukovyna, who fought 
an intermittent guerrilla war against Polish, Austrian and Romanian landowners over the entire 
period of Western Ukrainian serfdom (sixteenth-early nineteenth centuries).  Dovbush led the 
opryshok movement from the late 1730 to the early 1740s.  See, V. V. Hrabovets’kyi’s work on 
the opryshok movement in the Carpathians: Vladimir Grabovetskii, Oleksa Dovbush: legendarnyi 
geroi ukrainskogo naroda (Moscow, Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskaia literatura, 1959), a popular 
history coordinated with Ivanov’s film, and V. V. Hrabovets’kyi, Antyfeodal'na borot'ba 
karpats'koho oprýshkivstva :XVI-XIX ct. (L’viv: L’viv University Press, 1966), a more rigorous 
scholarly monograph on the broader opryshok movement in the Carpathians.  Iakutovych 
designed the front cover of the latter. 
37 Pan/pana/pani is the Polish/Ukrainian title for a member of the nobility, equivalent to the 
English “sir.” 
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Marichka and Dovbush’s men lead their dying leader to the mountains, where he 
disappears with Marichka over the horizon.   
Typical of the socialist realist “master plot,” the titular hero moves from the 
spontaneity of local banditry to the social consciousness and responsibility of a 
revolutionary leader.  Moreover, the film answers the demand in Ukrainian 
cinema to locate a historic – and, indeed, familial-like – connection between the 
East and West.  Although “Russians” are absent in the film, the presence of the 
Cossack Mykhailov in Dovbush’s group as a representative “from Ukraine” 
narratively associates the two liberation struggles of the haidamaky38 and the 
opryshky, and writes the impetus for “unification” into the 18th century.  In the 
screenplay, the narrator makes the film’s nationalistic argument explicit, 
associating highland and highlander together, as the credits roll in front of a 
montage of forested mountain vistas:  
The Carpathian Mountains, like deep wrinkles in the ancient face of the 
land.  From time immemorial, children of the one mother Ukraine lived 
here until the Polish, Austrian, Hungarian, and Wallachian lords seized 
this land, tore it to pieces, and divided it among themselves.  How much 
suffering did our brother-heroes experience in captivity, but they did not 
give in, and were not annihilated.  Anger was excavated from the hearts of 
the people, like those springs from mountain cliffs, and came down like a 
merciless sword on the heads of the oppressors.  Two hundred years ago, 
this anger had a human name.  They called him Oleksa Dovbush…39 
 
The screened Russian-language version differs from this Ukrainian text in the 
shooting script.  Instead of identifying the oppressor nations, or a pre-modern 
Ukrainian nation, the narrator informs us that the Carpathian lands constituted a 
significant part of the Kievan Rus’ state from the 9th to the 13th centuries, thus 
tying together the fates of Ukraine and Russia more directly.40  Most importantly 
                                                 
38 The haidamaky were Cossacks and peasant rebels in Right-Bank Ukraine (lands West of the 
Dnipro and East of the Carpathians), who fought Polish landowners during the 1830s-60s.  See, 
Oleksandr Lola, Haidamats’kyi rukh na Ukraini 20-60rr. XVIIIst. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1965). 
39 See the Ukrainian-language shooting script: TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 2, d. 1536. 
40 As Jaroslaw Pelenski writes, the Soviet theory of the “Kievan inheritance” “allots equal rights to 
[…] the three East Slavic nations […] but which in fact is much closer to the traditional Russian 
theory and its forceful advocacy of Russian national interests than it is to the Ukrainian [theory].”  
“The Contest for the ‘Kievan Inheritance’ in Russian-Ukrainian Relations: The Origins and Early 
Ramifications,” in Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter (Edmonton: Canadian 
Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), 4. 
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for rendering the film as socialist realism, this agent of Ukraine’s anger is an 
iconic “positive hero,” at once extraordinary in his combat abilities and flawlessly 
virtuous in his moral outlook.  At the same time, such a leader demands absolute 
allegiance and courage on the part of his followers.  While recruiting his 
opryshky, he forces them to walk across a narrow plank over two bare cliff faces.  
The first person – an old man, seemingly drunk – falls to his death, which 
inspires little remorse from the calm and collected Dovbush.  The camera 
constantly hovers on Dovbush’s face in close-up, his eyes revealing compassion 
and beauty, while his thick mustache emphasizes his paternal sternness and 
absolute commitment to the revolutionary cause (Figure 3.3).41   
Nonetheless, there are several possibilities for seeing Oleksa Dovbush as 
generically interested in other problems.  The love triangle involving Shtefan, 
Marichka, and Dovbush demonstrates how the Carpathian cycle functioned 
within the realm of political melodrama.  After all, the political drama is quickly 
subordinated to this personal drama, which lies outside questions about class 
and nation that the film purportedly addresses.  Also generically significant is 
Oleksa Dovbush’s dialogue with the conventions and iconography of the Western 
in its representation of a frontier society with tenuous connections to a political 
center.  Like the Western, the physical and cultural space of the film is located in 
the borderlands of two states, in this case Poland and Russia.  Yet both of these 
spaces have shifted in context.  Instead of Enlightenment-era St. Petersburg and 
Warsaw, East-Bank “Ukraine” stands in for Russia and Pan Jablonski’s remote 
outpost of aristocratic decadence and violence stands in for Poland.  This 
Western-like iconography of vigilante on horseback, high cliff faces, immoral 
gentlemen, and the damsel in distress would have been familiar to Soviet 
audiences in the 1950s owing to the large numbers of Hollywood films that the 
Red Army confiscated from Nazi film archives in Berlin in 1944, which  
                                                 
41 In Soviet cinema, the Hutsul is canonically represented with a mustache, but it usually takes 
the form of Ivanko’s thin strip of hair in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors. 
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Figure 3.3. Oleksa Dovbush: The Stalinesque Hutsul 
 
subsequently screened in the Soviet Union over the next decade.42  Thus, we 
might see Ivanov’s film as an attempt to emulate the epic Western of the 1930s-
40s, while sufficiently adapting it to the ethno-historical context of the Russian 
Imperial and Polish “frontier.”   
While over 23 million people saw Oleksa Dovbush in 1959, critics were 
dismissive of its “traditional dramaturgy,” perhaps pointing toward its Stalinist 
folkloric mode of narration.  Nina Ignat’eva wrote in the January 1961 issue of 
Iskusstvo kino that while “a striving for poetic elevation… is in general associated 
with works of Ukrainian cinema, this sometimes emerges as ‘sugary’ and falsely 
‘touching little pictures [kartynky].’”  This is precisely what happened with 
Ivanov’s film, she argued, with its sappy love story and endless shots of cliff 
faces and men on horseback chasing each other.  The plot, Ignat’eva wrote, was 
“traditional” in the “stupidest meaning of the word.”43  Nonetheless, what the critic 
found appealing about the film was the “colorfulness of Hutsul byt44 and the 
originality of Carpathian nature.”  Here we find the critic more willing to accept the 
film’s ethnographic texture, while the director’s intention seems to be closer to 
the folkloric message of trans-historicity and a narrative of unity through diversity.  
                                                 
42 See Kristin Roth-Ey’s discussion of Soviet “trophy films” in her dissertation, “Mass Media and 
the Remaking of Soviet Culture, 1950s-1960s,” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2003): 107-
117. 
43 Nina Ignat’eva, “V puti,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 1 (January 1961): 90-94. 
44 Byt is untranslatable, but comes closest to meaning “everyday life.” 
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Critics, however, noticed the film’s representation of the Hutsul’s exotic world, 
transposing it in the process to the chaos of Carpathian nature.  Here, despite 
the fairly democratic historical teleology (Eastern and Western Ukrainians uniting, 
without the help of the Russian state, to eliminate Polish aristocratic injustice) of 
a chapter leading toward Ukrainian unification, critics largely picked up on the 
film’s ability (or lack thereof) to represent these human objects accurately and 
authentically.  As Ignat’eva suggests, it is the filmmaker’s gaze – like the tourist 
above – which catalogs and defines such authenticities. 
 Paradzhanov also weighed in on the debate about Oleksa Dovbush, but 
from the distance of seven years.  In “Eternal Motion,” the director caustically 
wrote,  
They [the film crew] came to the Carpathians cinematically educated [my 
emphasis].  More importantly, they drew it with exotic and decorative 
motifs, but we did not recognize any Hutsuls in the film.  We did not see 
their gait, did not hear their charming speech, and the movement of 
thought.”45 
   
Paradzhanov counterposed his conception of ethnographic authenticity with 
filmmakers’ specialized knowledge of cinematic technique and generic 
conventions.  While Soviet film scholarship traditionally focused on the 
development of plot and character psychology to define the essence of socialist 
realism, the 1960s brought with it a shift in realist discourse to accommodate 
what it loosely referred to as “poetics.”  As Ignat’eva and Paradzhanov implied, 
although disagreeing on the specific qualities of a particular film, they would 
judge a film’s realism not only according to narrative convention, but also 
according to the visual quality of the human subject.  Paradzhanov wrote in his 
article that aesthetic “power is [located] in the authentic object,”46 and here it 
seems he could alternately be speaking about the keptar’ or the Hutsul himself.  
As he did with his own film Flowers on the Stone, Paradzhanov took 
particular offense to the “inauthentic” language of Oleksa Dovbush.  Like the 
Donbass miner, Hutsuls should not speak either perfect Russian or Ukrainian, 
                                                 
45 Sergei Paradzhanov, “Vechnoe dvizhenie,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 1 (January 1966): 63-64. 
46 Ibid., 66. 
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despite the problem of comprehension that dialect presented.47  Paradzhanov’s 
claim to authenticity in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors was associated with a 
process of de-familiarizing the ethnic texture of the film, and with a rejection of 
direct translation.  In this way, he imagined the ethnographic concept of “national 
color” as a particular form of untranslatability in his film.  Whereas Oleksa 
Dovbush employs the sounds of the trembita, floiar, and drymba48 – the 
traditional instruments of the Hutsuls – it does so exclusively with the 
accompaniment of a symphonic score more characteristic of classical narrative 
cinema.  While Ivanov’s film occasionally uses dialectal terms and phrases, 
especially to characterize Uniate priests and older Hutsuls, the bulk of the 
dialogue is spoken in flawless literary Russian.  Paradzhanov would later break 
with both of these normalizing conventions in his attempts at de-familiarizing the 
soundtrack in Shadows.  The elements of soundtrack include untranslated voices 
and non-verbal music, which function to immerse the spectator in the ethnoscape 
of Hutsul’shchyna, rather than perform a mediating role with the cinematic 
conventions of musical composition and dubbed-over with literary voices.  As 
Paradzhanov certainly believed after reading Kotsiubyns’kyi’s novella in 1961, 
this interest in de-familiarizing the aural dimensions of ethnic texture also 
informed the writer’s use of language. 
 
Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi and the “Painterly Text” 
 
When production on Shadows began, the studio intended that the 
adaptation of Kotsiubyns’kyi’s 1912 novella would contribute to the celebration 
planned for the writer’s centenary in 1964.  Initially, Dovzhenko Studio asked 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 63-64. 
48 The trembita is long, valve-less horn used in funeral dirges and to signal the end of the working 
day for shepherds in Hutsul’shchyna.  The floiar is a wooden piccolo-like instrument, usually 
associated with Hutsul shepherds, who played the instrument while tending the pasture.  The 
drymba (or, Jew’s Harp) is a tiny pear-shaped woodwind with a reed (or, tongue) dissecting the 
middle.  One plays the instrument by placing it in the mouth, and blowing on the reed while 
“strumming” it back and forth.  Its characteristic sound is associated with marriages, funerals, and 
liturgical holidays in Hutsul’shchyna.  See, Volodymyr Shukhevych, Hutsul’shchyna, vol. 5, book 3 
(L’viv: Naukove Tovarystvo imeny Shevchenka, 1902): 70-77. 
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Paradzhanov and writer Ivan Chendei to adapt a minor Kotsiubyns’kyi short story 
called “The City [Mist],” but upon the request of the writer’s daughter Iryna, the 
studio agreed to work on Shadows instead.  The latter concerned the tragic love 
between two Hutsuls, Ivánko and Maríchka, the children of the rival families 
Paliichuk and Hutentiuk, in a village near Chornahora, the Black Mountain.49  
The first half of the story loosely follows a Romeo and Juliet narrative.  The two 
lovers meet during a quarrel between their fathers after a parish fair, during 
which Paliichuk falls dead from an axe wound.  The two children continue to 
meet each other in secret until they are teenagers, Ivanko promising that he will 
marry her despite the familial conflict.  Due to the poverty that Paliichuk’s death 
brought to the family, Ivanko must hire himself out as a shepherd in a high 
mountain valley.  The young lovers part, with Marichka pregnant, vowing to meet 
again at the end of the grazing season.  While in the mountain pasture, Ivanko
begins to have visions of the girl, and believes that nymphs are playing tricks on








                                                
50), and a number of others die in a blizzard.  At the end of the sum
when the livestock are returned to their owners in the lowland villages, Ivanko 
descends the mountain to discover that Marichka had been caught in a flood 
while fording the Cheremosh River.  Villagers tell him that she had drifted over a 
waterfall and died on the rocks below.  After discovering the body, Ivanko falls
into a deep depression and disappears to the Hungarian side of the mountains 
for six years.  He eventually returns to his village, marries the wealthy Palanha, 
and becomes a stable farmer.  At first, he is satisfied with his new life, but soon 
grows tired of the constant troubles with his neighbors, which include a witch o
one side and a sorcerer on the other.  The more his thoughts turn to Marichka
the less he is enamored with his shallow and materialistic wife.  On Saint Iurii’s 
Day (May 6, the first day of Spring in Ukraine), Palanha leaves early to perform 
 
49 V. Luhovs’kyi, Nevidomyi maestro: S. Paradzhanov, Tini zabutykh predkiv: Rozkadrovky (Kyiv: 
Kino-Teatr, 1998), 29. 
50 “The Great One” 
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the holiday rituals outside in the nude,51 where she encounters Iura the sorce




                                                
52  While initially angry at her neighbor’s voyeurism, but d
part to Ivanko’s persistent depression, she comes to accept him as her love
encountering him during a violent storm.  While drinking at a tavern, Ivanko 
meets the sorcerer, whom Palanha is fondling.  Ivanko challenges Palanha’s new 
love and the latter beats him to the ground, but spares his life.  Ivanko has 
another vision of Marichka in a highland forest, which ends with the arrival of a 
forest spirit who challenges him to a haiduk competition.53  The nymph imitating 
Marichka returns, luring Ivanko off a cliff to his death.  The story ends with 
Ivanko’s funeral, Palanha’s well-articulated wails fading into revelry as “they 
forgot about [Ivanko’s] body.”54   
The plot of the novella is structured around Ivanko’s three journeys into 
the mountains.  The first time is as a child, when he hears the aridnyk55 play the 
flute.  His second journey concerns his time spent as a shepherd, where he first 
encounters the Marichka nymph, and the third time occurs after Iura beats 
Ivanko, during which the Marichka nymph lures him to his death.  The plot 
revolves around a dichotomy between the highlands and the lowlands, each with 
their own dangers and advantages for Ivanko.  The highlands represent the land 
of demons and creativity, while the lowlands represent depravity and comfort.  
While Ivanko’s relationship with Marichka represents the realm of pure 
existence/art, his marriage to Palanha describes the banality of everyday life.  
Typical of literary impressionism, Kotsiubyns’kyi blurs the boundaries between 
objective and subjective narration.  The reader is never confident whether the 
 
51 Bohdan Rubchak writes in the notes to the English translation that Saint Iurii’s Day is 
associated with the Spring Festival of the pagan god Iarylo, when villagers typically engaged in 
“orgiastic” displays meant to protect the livestock from witches and other evil spirits.  See, “Notes 
on the text,” in Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, tr. Marco Carynnyk 
(Littleton, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1981), 69-70. 
52 Until Vasilii Pichul’s Little Vera (Malekaia Vera, 1988), Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors was 
the only Soviet film to feature female nudity.   
53 The haiduk is a dance, which men perform, involving hopping from side to side with their legs in 
a sitting pose.  The winner of the competition is the individual who maintains the posture and 
continues to dance the longest. 
54 This description is based on the 1967 text, Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi, Tini zabutykh predkiv 
(Kyiv: Dnipro, 1967). 
55 Aridnyk is another Hutsul term for the devil. 
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supernatural elements of the story are really occurring, or if Kotsiubyns’kyi is 
offering us an interpretation of events already filtered through Hutsul mythology: 
His text is littered with references to “sad mountains,” “sleeping walls,” “breathing 
fire,” and the Cheremosh “relating its dreams.”  Through such metaphoric 
excess, inanimate objects and natural processes are imbued with 
anthropomorphic agency.  The Hutsuls interact and communicate with these 
objects and “dark forces” as they would with other human beings.56  These visual 
queues point toward Kotsiubyns’kyi’s explicit interest in creating a “painterly” text.  
He consistently referred to his “exotic” stories about Hutsuls, Tatars, and 
peasants from Moldavia and Capri as “sketches” and “pictures (obrazky),” 
demonstrating his concern with modernist literature’s intertextual relationship to 
the visual arts.  As Rubchak explains, Kotsiubyns’kyi considered his careful and 
subtle use of “color” to be as essential as its use in painting.57  Thus, “color” is 
not only an ethnographic trope, as in Shaburiak’s poem, but also an important 
textual component, which serves as the iconographic bridge from the object of 
nature to the human subject and its material culture. 
Paradzhanov brought these painterly concerns with color to the cinema in 
his adaptation of Kotsiubyns’kyi’s novella.  In the writer’s language, “color” is 
embedded in his excessive use of metaphor, which frequently functions 
intertextually by reference to visual forms: “The entire world was like a fairy 
tale,”58 he writes at the beginning of the novella, more likely an allusion to the 
contemporaneous Symbolist renderings of fairy tales than to the oral or written 
texts themselves.   
As Paradzhanov would be in his adaptation, so was Kotsiubyns’kyi 
concerned with the verbal and aural ethnoscape of the Carpathians.  The 
language of the narration furthermore conveys the confusion of narrative voice.  
When the writer traveled to the Carpathians for his fieldwork, he experienced a 
                                                 
56 Rubchak further explains that the aridnyk in the story is given agency as a Pan-like figure.  
Kotsiubyns’kyi divests Ivanko’s “pact with the devil” of its moral exigencies.  “The Vanisher 
[aridnyk] becomes Kotsiubyns’kyi’s ambiguous agent of salvation against the background of a 
specifically Hutsul Christianity, bedeviled in its own way.”  The role of the aridnyk, he argues, is 
essentially “dual natured,” reflecting Greek concerns about the nature of Pan.  Rubchak, 107. 
57 Ibid., 90. 
58 Kotsiubyns’kyi, 9. 
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very different form of Ukrainian than the one he grew up with, and wanted to 
convey these differences with the hybridized language that he employed in the 
text.  For example, Kotsiubyns’kyi used the term “bovhar” instead of the standard 
Ukrainian “pastukh” for cowherd, and “buryshka” for “kartoplia,” meaning potato.  
The end of the story included a glossary of terms to help the Eastern Ukrainian 
reader understand the text, but the refusal to translate these terms within the text 
itself was a significant authorial decision, which sought to convey the ethnoscape 
of the narrative.  In this way, Kotsiubyns’kyi’s language functioned on the level of 
“color,” in that it sought to convey a spectacle essentially beyond the direct 
capabilities of a literary text.  The glossary, then, represented a form of subtitling 
meant to transmit information without disrupting the text’s intended ethnographic 
authenticity, and attempted to demonstrate the essential untranslatability of 
certain terms in his attempt to render sound through written words. 
Not surprisingly, such an impressionistic text, initially published in 
Hapsburg L’viv in 1912 to avoid Russian imperial censorship of Ukrainian-
language literature, also fell outside of the commonly acknowledged Soviet 
canon of Kotsiubyns’kyi’s work.  A 1929 Kyiv edition of the story, however, 
attempted to highlight a realist Shadows by including a series of illustrations 
drawn by Olena Kul’chyts’ka (Figure 3.4).  Her images functioned to normalize 
the strangeness of Hutsúl’shchyna and its culture.  The illustration of Ivanko 
beginning his ascent into the mountains presents a clear and almost cliché 
narrative line, while the appeal of the three figures is their “realistic” psychological 
interaction rather than their exotic or mythological traits.  This juxtaposition of 
realist illustrations with the writer’s impressionistic language further affected the 
novella’s generically hybridized quality.  Stalinist era criticism of Shadows, in the 
little that there was, exclusively emphasized Kotsiubyns’kyi’s “sociological” 
concerns.  For example, P. Zlatoustov wrote during the same year as the 
publication of the Kul’chyts’ka-illustrated version that the writer was largely 
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interested in the “demoralization” of poverty, which expressed itself in the Hutsul 
culture of vendettas, superstitions, and “savage customs.”59   
Although Zlatousov’s interpretation remained dominant into the 1960s, 
and critics of Paradzhanov would draw on him and his protégés to disparage the 
film’s lack of verisimilitude to Kotsiubyns’kyi’s original, a critical divergence also 
emerged in the years leading up to the writer’s centenary.  Along with Petro 
Kolesnyk’s standard interpretation in “Kotsiubyns’kyi against Modernism,” we find 
Olena Kravets’s monograph, M.M. Kotsiubyn’skyi on the Everyday Life of the 
People (both 1963), which advanced the writer’s work as an example of fictional  
ethnography, which was moreover a defense of the development of national 
culture, literature, and art in Ukraine.60  The promotion of Kotsiubyns’kyi as a 
nationalistic icon was certainly different from the proto-socialist realist author and 
intimate friend of Gor’kii that Stalin-era scholars had identified.61  In this 
reevaluation of Kotsiubyns’kyi, Paradzhanov was given a greater degree of 
artistic freedom to interpret this most eccentric work of literature. 
 
Paradzhanov’s Shadows and the Authentication of the Carpathian 
Ethnoscape 
 
In adapting a work of such importance to the history of Ukrainian national 
literature, Paradzhanov was initially uninterested in hiring Ukrainian actors for the 
leading roles.  Illienko convinced him to hire his wife, Sovremennik62 actress  
                                                 
59 P. Zlatoustov, “Idealizatsiia chy zhakhlyva diisnist’,” Chervonyi shliakh, no. 4 (1929): 165; 
quoted in Rubchak, 104. 
60 Petro Kolesnyk, “Kotsiubyns’kyi proty Modernizmu,” Vitchyzna, no. 4 (1963); Olena Kravets’, 
M.M. Kotsiubyns’kyi pro narodnyi pobut (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1963); quoted in Volodymyr 
Zinych, “Interes do etnohrafii,” review of Kravets’, Literaturna Ukraina, September 15, 1964: 3. 
61 It should be said, however, that Kotsiubyns’kyi’s earlier work was more in the realist vein, and 
made them easily acceptable adaptations for Ukrainian filmmakers throughout the Stalin era, and 
into the 1950s.  Borys Tiahno first adapted Fata-Morgana in 1931 at Ukrainfil’m in Odessa, 
followed by Oleksii Shvachko’s The Bloody Blossom (Kravavyi rassvet), V. Karasev’s Pe-koptor, 
and S. Komar’s Horses are Not To Blame (Koni ne vinovaty), all in 1956.  The latter two were 
written by Kyiv studio director Davyd Kopytsia.  In 1958, famed Soviet director Mark Donskoi 
adapted At a High Price (Dorohoiu tsinoiu), which became one of the first respected films 
released by Kyiv Studio after Savchenko’s Taras Shevchenko in 1951.  Donskoi’s film was still in 
the Stalinist allegorical fairly-tale genre, but its use of color and Mykola Topchi’s interesting 
camera work made the film closer in style to Paradzhanov’s loose mode adaptation in 1965.  





Figure 3.4. Olena Kul’chyts’ka’s illustrations for Kotsiubyns’kyi’s Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors (1929 Soviet edition). Source: Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi, Tini 
zabutykh predkiv (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1929) 
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Larisa Kadochnikova, as Marichka.  For the role of Ivanko, Paradzhanov found 
MKhAT actor Gennadii Iukhtin perfect for the job.63  Thus, we find the director 
particularly uninvolved in the cultural politics of Dovzhenko Studio at the time, 
wishing instead to appeal to the leading actor’s fame over the ability to speak 
Ukrainian.  As assistant director Volodymyr Luhovs’kyi recalls, Ukrainian Goskino 
was at first supportive of Iukhtin for his ability to bring in audiences, which might 
be impossible with an unknown Ukrainian actor.  Clearly, Goskino hoped for 
another blockbuster along the lines of Oleksa Dovbush.   
When KITM film dean Viktor Ivchenko asked Paradzhanov to consider his 
acting student Ivan Mykolaichuk for the role of Ivanko, the director was less than 
excited.  Due to Ivchenko’s status in the industry, however, Paradzhanov was 
essentially forced to send a telegram to the Carpathian village of Chortoryia 
where Ivan lived, requesting that the acting student come to Kyiv for a script 
reading.  The director had no intention, however, to cast Mykolaichuk in the role, 
and refused to even watch him read for the part.  During his audition, Luhovs’kyi 
recalls that if the cinematographer had not been there, he would have mistaken 
the performer for an actual Hutsul.64  Thus, Mykolaichuk’s very origins attached a 
large degree of linguistic authenticity to the role that he would perform.  While 
Paradzhanov and Illienko continued to insist upon Iukhtin, the Dovzhenko Studio 
Artistic Council viewed Mykolaichuk’s reading and voted overwhelmingly for him, 
thus placing the importance of resolving the “problem of cadres” over that of 
marketing possibilities.65   
After finalizing the details of production, Paradzhanov, the cast and crew 
traveled to the village of Verkhovyna (before 1963: Zhab’e), the population center 
of the Ukrainian side of Hutsul’shchyna, and the contemporary site of the kolkhoz 
“Radians’ka Verkhovyna,” where they began work on the film.  Ukrainian graphic 
artist Hryhorii Iakutovych (pictured in Figure 3.1) was hired as a set designer and 
                                                 
63 Luhovs’kyi, 41, 43. 
64 Ibid., 47. 
65 Ibid.  During my presentation of a section of this chapter at the 2007 ASN Convention, 
Columbia University professor Iurii Shevchuk took issue with my positioning this as an issue of 
marketing concerns.  He argued instead that the choice of central actors over republican actors 
was a deliberate policy aimed specifically toward Russification as an end in itself.  I see no basis 
for this argument or any evidence for it in the literature or in archival documents. 
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guide through the Carpathians.66  Iakutovych, a respected young graphic artist 
and specialist in Carpathian Studies, was illustrating a 1967 edition of 
Kotsiubyns’kyi’s novella.  His images were strikingly different from Kul’chyts’ka’s 
1929 drawings, the former reflecting new interest in the avant-garde during the 
Thaw.  The expressions of the figures are crudely drawn, and space itself is 
flattened and de-contextualized (Figure 3.5).  Human figures fade into the 
background.  The randomly-placed symbols in this visual environment lack both 
the depth of natural space and psychological investigation of Kul’chyts’ka’s 
earlier illustrations.   
Paradzhanov also hired Uzhhorod painter Fedir Manailo (1911-1978) as 
an “artistic consultant” on the film, to whom screenwriter Ivan Chendei introduced 
the director earlier in 1963.67  While Manailo worked in a number of styles and 
genres during his long career – from socialist realism to romantic mountain vistas 
– his images of Hutsuls from the 1930s, which interested Paradzhanov, were 
strictly in a neo-primitivist vein (Figure 3.6).  Texture, color, and pattern are the 
important formal elements in both the Hutsul woman with a water jug and the 
highlander youth carrying the lamb.  Faces are crudely rendered, and do not 
                                                 
66 See, Georgii Iakutovich, “Khudozhnik ot boga,” in Kora Tsereteli, ed., Zhizn’ – igra: Kollazh na 
fone avtoportreta (Nizhnii-Novgorod: DEKOM, 2005): 83-84.  Iakutovych was one of two up-and-
coming graphic artists in 1960s Ukraine, who focused on Carpathian themes.  The other was the 
L’viv-based Hungarian Mariona Ilku.  Ilku’s work from the early and mid-1960s was more realist in 
its rendering of space than Iakutovych.  See his images in Iurii Belichko and Andrii V”iunyk, eds., 
Ukrains’ke narodne vesillia (Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1969.): plates 59 and 81. 
67 Fedir Manailo had been largely ignored during the Stalinist and Khrushchev periods due to his 
relationship to Ukrainian Monumentalism, a version of neo-primitivism popular during the inter-
war period in Polish Ukraine.  Manailo was born in 1911 in the village of Ivanivtsy in the region of 
the Hapsburg Empire that later composed the Czechoslovakian province of “Trans-Carpathian 
Rus’” (sometimes referred to as “Carpathian Ruthenia”) after World War I.  Manailo studied 
painting in Prague in the early 1930s, graduating in 1934.  He returned to the provincial capital of 
Uzhhorod the following year, where four years later, local leaders declared an independent 
“Carpathian Rus’.”  Germany occupied the region during 1941-1944, after which the Soviet Union 
incorporated it into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as Zakarpats’ka oblast (or, “Trans-
Carpathian Province”).  Many Uzhhorod artists emigrated, first to Prague, and after 1948, largely 
to France, Germany, Canada, and other sites of the Ukrainian Diaspora.  Manailo, a dedicated 
communist since his days in Prague, decided to work with the Stalinist regime, agreeing to 
change his style to match Soviet realist conventions.  His political past was fairly sketchy, 
however, and hardly any of his newer, politically-correct, work was ever shown.  Consequently, 
Manailo faded into relative obscurity by the mid-1950s.  In the 1960s, however, critics and gallery 
directors took a new interest in his work.  There was a large exhibit at the Museum of Ukrainian 
Art in L’viv in the summer of 1962, and Ihor Verba reviewed the exhibit in the main Ukrainian 
literary journal, Vitchyzna, in June.  Uzhhorod writer Ivan Chendei frequently employed Manailo 




Figure 3.5. One of Hryhorii Iakutovych’s illustrations for Kotsiubyns’kyi’s 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors (1967 Soviet edition) 
 
reveal the subject, as they are subsumed under the objects and symbols of 
everyday life and material culture.  We also notice the characteristic flattening of 
space of neo-primitivism in Manailo’s images, which heightened their collage-like 
feel.  In Paradzhanov’s decision to include these artists within the film crew, he 
associated himself with a revived appreciation for Ukrainian modernists, whose 
interest in the Carpathians implicitly connected them with the independence and 
autonomist movements from the turn of the century through the 1920s.   
Yet, claims about the film’s authenticity were grounded in a notion of 
ethnographic realism, which valued the particular visual quality of the human 
subject and its organic relationship to the natural world over representations 
grounded in generic or modal conventions.  Paradzhanov’s decision to film 
almost exclusively on location in Hutsul’shchyna represented the convergence of 
Ukrainian modernism with the unique Thaw-era realist discourse.  For the 
director, Hutsul’shchyna was both a space mediated through such modernist 
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representations and a real space of ethnographic knowledge.  In promotional 
material about the film, press releases constantly emphasized that the film crew 
spent extensive time in the Verkhovyna region, investigating the sounds and 
colors emanating from the “strange” land of the Hutsuls.  It furthermore stressed 
that Paradzhanov was shooting the film not far from the leading actor’s native 
village.  As the cast and crew completed filming in late summer of 1964, features 
on the production of the film gradually appeared in the republican press, 
particularly on the actor himself.  Mykolaichuk appeared on the cover of the June 
issue of Novyny kinoekrana, shaven, in the likeness of the young Taras 
Shevchenko, but dressed in a contemporary suit complete with a necktie 
embroidered with a common Verkhovyna pattern (Figure 3.7).  The cover image 
highlighted both his handsome face, in addition to his ethnic and regional 
connections.  Mykolaichuk’s style was narodnyi chic, an authenticated ethnic 
subject, who was seamlessly compatible with modern urban Soviet society.  The 
image also served to blur the lines between his personal performance as the 
“romantic Hutsul,” and his role in the film as the tragic Hutsul, Ivanko.  Iurii 
Bohdashevs’kyi’s article in the issue emphasized the specificity of his upbringing, 
mentioning by name uncle Petro and aunt Varka.  They were shooting the film 
“not far from the village where the boy was born.”  Mykolaichuk’s activity while on 
location for Shadows blurred the line between his role and his performative self.  
Bohdashevs’kyi explained, 
Ivan met with the Hutsuls, listened to their songs, their leisurely stories.  
People liked this affable boy, and called him “our Ivan”…  And in fact, he 
was “their own.”  His house [khata], where he grew up among a 
rambunctious crowd of brothers and sisters, was not far away.68 
 
Two months later, as the film was in post-production, the magazine featured an 
interview with Paradzhanov, who also affirmed the crew’s “intimate” familiarity 
with the exotica of Hutsul material and spiritual culture.  Critic Oleksii 
Miroshnychenko’s accompanying article brought out the authentic character of 
Mykolaichuk, whom we can look in the eye, and see his resemblance to the 
Ivanko that Kotsiubyns’kyi had himself found in the Carpathians.   
                                                 





Figure 3.6. Fedir Manailo’s images of Hutsul’shchyna, c. 1930s.  Source: V. P. 




Miroshnychenko reported that, while shooting an episode that occurs during the 
singing of koliadky (Ukrainian Christmas Carols), Ivan’s performance so affected 
Paradzhanov that the director was scared to halt the action after Illienko 
completed the shot, for fear that the crew would disturb the event itself.  At 
another point, Mykolaichuk purportedly invited the crew to his home in Chortoryi 
so they could experience “genuine Hutsul customs.”69  In December, as both of 
Mykolaichuk’s films were receiving lots of press, L. Korobchak featured an article 
solely on the actor, quoting Mykolaichuk about his role in Shadows: “Paliichuk is  
my zemliak [fellow countryman].  He is close to me, and I can sense him.”  The 
author continued:  
The 23-year old actor found himself in the fairly-tale Carpathian region – 
dear to his soul – both legs on Hutsul land with the cries of the shepherds, 
sounds of the trembita and little girls singing.  Mykolaichuk worked with 
delight, the characters came out easily and freely, and [he] improvised 
well.70   
 
In describing Mykolaichuk’s authentic character, however, critics objectified him 
not as an ideal Ukrainian, but as a feature of the Carpathian ethnoscape.  Poet 
Ivan Drach reviewed the film for Literaturna Ukraina, writing that the actor 
“naturally” perceived the world “as a Hutsul” from the time he was born.  He 
concluded by asking the spectator to “rush to sip from [the film’s] pure Carpathian 
spring.”71   
Mykolaichuk was a willing participant in this everyday performance as both 
a Hutsul and as a Soviet citizen conscious and proud of his Ukrainian nationality.  
When applying for membership for the SKU in March 1966, the actor answered 
each of the questions on the Russian-language application in Ukrainian.  He 
listed his social position as “peasant [selianyn]” (rather than “civil servant 
[sluzhashchii],” which was more common for a film industry worker) and crossed  
                                                 
69 Paradzhanov and Oleksii Miroshnychenko, “Tini zabutykh predkiv” Novyny kinoekrana, no. 8 
(1964), 4-5.  
70 L. Korobchak, “Podviinyi debiut: Aktors’ki syluety,” Radians’ka kul’tura, December 3, 1964: 4. 
71 Ivan Drach, “Sviato z pryvodu ekranizatsii Tinei zabutykh predkiv” Literaturna Ukraina, 
September 15, 1964: 4. 
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Figure 3.7. Ivan Mykolaichuk on the cover of Novyny kinoekrana, no. 6 (June 
1964) 
 
out the Russian letter “г.” (for “god”), writing in a Ukrainian “р.” (for “rik”) in the 
line for date of birth.72  When reporting in Mystetstvo (Art) magazine on his trip to 
Argentina for the Mar-del-Plata film festival, Mykolaichuk indicated that he, as a 
Ukrainian from the Western oblasts, rather than the film itself, was the attraction 
for the many émigrés in the audience.  He reported that he brought his audience 
copies of the Kobzar’ and a birch branch as “women and men” cried in memory 
of their native land.73  Mykolaichuk promoted himself as the embodying image of 
the Carpathian land, which, metonymically, stood for Ukraine as a whole. 
Essentially, the actor was able to perform the cultural work of moving the 
unfamiliar periphery of the Carpathians to the center of Ukrainian identity.  In his 
description of the Mar-del-Plata event, he worked to assimilate the image of 
                                                 
72 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 1685, ll. 2-3.  “God” and “rik” are the Russian and Ukrainian 
(respectively) words for “year.” 
73 Ivan Mykolaichuk, “Daleka podorozh,” Mystetstvo, no. 4 (1965); pub. in Mariia Ievhen’evna 
Mykolaichuk, ed., Bilyi ptakh z chornoiu oznakoiu: Ivan Mykolaichuk: spohady, interv”iu, stsenarii 
(Kyiv: Mystetstvo, 1991), 213-215. 
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Shevchenko – existing dually within the “Friendship of Peoples” mythology and 
Ukrainian nationalist pedagogy – with that of the Hutsul, the ethnographic oddity. 
*   *   * 
With the first screening at Dovzhenko Studio, the film brought credibility to 
Paradzhanov as the film’s author, but also contributed to an evaluation of what it 
meant to be Ukrainian among the many members of the Kyiv intelligentsia invited 
to the event.  Director Iurii Lysenko made it most clear that authenticity itself was 
grounded in a particular regime of representation when he told the studio Artistic 
Council that this was a film that taught him a lot about his own people that he had 
not previously known.74  The question of self-knowledge thus became something 
outside the realm of truth, and only contained within styles of performance.  
Critics and filmmakers openly distinguished between a folkloric mode that relied 
on a conformist mode of melodramatic or comedic performance, and a modernist 
abnegation of space and psychology, which simultaneously functioned to de-
familiarize and authenticate the Carpathians as essentially and ethno-nationally 
Ukrainian. 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors was a text that could be, and was, used 
in both modes.  Before Paradzhanov and Chendei began writing the screenplay, 
the story had been adapted for a ballet in L’viv and the production was touring 
the republic in 1960.  This ballet version, however, bore no similarity to 
Paradzhanov’s film, as its emphasis was strictly on the melodramatic elements of 
the plot, and employed classical symphonic music to accompany Hutsul 
choreography in what was determined to be a light and colorful Hutsul “love 
story.”75  In this way, the ballet brought to the forefront the ways in which 
classical style came to be associated with realism in its ability to normalize or 
make familiar cultures that were articulated as alien.  But in “leveling” figures like 
Oleksa Dovbush and a ballet performance of Kotsiubyns’kyi’s novella with 
Aleksandr Nevskii or, say, the Nutcracker, Ukrainian intellectuals did not 
                                                 
74 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1750, l. 109. 
75 Liubomyr Hoseiko, Istoriia ukrains’koho kinematohrafa, tr. Stanislav Dovhaniuk and Hoseiko 
(Kyiv: Kino-kolo, 2005), 184. 
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necessarily believe that these contributed to a proper recognition of national 
culture, even if it made such a culture more legible to both “self” and “other.”    
 We should not, however, fail to see that Paradzhanov’s adaptation, which 
stressed de-familiarization over legibility, was itself, and for those very reasons, a 
form of ethnographic spectacle.  In James Clifford’s examination of the 
connections between French Surrealists and ethnographers during the 1920s, he 
identifies a representational mode – referring to it with the Russian Formalist 
term, “ostranenie [de-familiarization]” – by which the exotic and the familiar exist 
side-by-side.76  In the combination of Paradzhanov’s self-promoted journey to the 
Carpathians to film “actual Hutsuls,” and his collage-like imagery of 
Hutsul’shchyna, the film too occupied a space between amateur ethnography 
and surrealism.  The “Hutsuls” were both possessed in the sense that the film 
crew captured them on camera for popular consumption, and fundamentally 
strange in their non-standard Ukrainian speech and folk culture.  Hutsul folk 
culture was both on display and transformed into a collage of color, which at 
times emulates impressionistic painting (Figure 3.8).  Thus, with its emphasis on 
visual and aural texture, the authenticated Hutsul ethnoscape transcends notions 
of Thaw-era realism entirely.  Yet, much of the claim to authenticity remained 
located within a discursive play between text and context, inside and outside – 
between the Carpathian native, represented on screen through Mykolaichuk and 
other “real” peasants, and the recorder/viewer, represented dually by the 
filmmaker who journeys to Hutsul’shchyna and the “virtual tourist” who views the 
native in an artificially re-constructed, a-historical Carpathian ethnoscape.77 
 
                                                 
76 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and 
Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 117ff. 
77 Francine Hirsch employs the term “virtual tourist” for the spectator of ethnographic information 
that Soviet authorities intended for museum exhibitions.  See, Hirsch, “Getting to Know the 
‘Peoples of the USSR’: Ethnographic Exhibits as Soviet Virtual Tourism, 1923-1934,” Slavic 








A Ukrainian Bergfilm? The Carpathian Journey and National Identity 
 
Dovzhenko Studio’s press release stressed that “Hutsuls are making this 
film: giving consultation, playing [the roles] of ordinary residents of the most 
distant valleys.”  The studio promotional material implied that the filmmakers 
themselves had penetrated such a “distant” region, heretofore unknown to 
modern audiences.  These Hutsuls were in fact “playing” themselves, similar to 
Mykolaichuk, but without the lasting appeal of the actor’s hybridized image in the 
press.  Mykolaichuk was above all an approachable Hutsul – an individual who 
had journeyed from the unknown (Hutsul’shchyna) to the known (Kyiv) – while 
the Hutsul extra was still an ethnographic found object that Paradzhanov had 
discovered for the spectator.   
The central press first took notice of Shadows after Paradzhanov 
screened it before a general meeting of the Union of Cinematographers on 
December 24, 1964.  In providing a “Russian context” for the screening, 
participants in the discussion afterward were considerably more apt to discuss its 
importance to Ukrainian culture.  Evgenii Pomeshchikov, screenwriter on Pyr’ev’s 
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Tractor Drivers, spoke first, informing those present that his identity as a 
Ukrainian qualified him to evaluate and translate the film.  He told the others,  
This is a simple people who preserve to this day what is dear and national.  
From this perspective, it’s amazing to me how these two ‘Cubans’ [i.e., 
Paradzhanov and Illienko] made this film.78  Paradzhanov is not Ukrainian, 
but having resided in this Verkhovyna, he was so deeply penetrated with 
its spirit, with its powerful national tradition, that I can’t find another word 
for this picture [other] than authenticity, and this authenticity is 
extraordinarily decorative [emphasis mine].79   
 
Thus, Pomeshchikov indicated the importance of clothing and other objects of byt 
in articulating this notion of authenticity, the revelation of which required a special 
kind of journey to Hutsul’shchyna.  L. Varshavskii, writing for Kazakhstanskaia 
Pravda, also emphasized the “clothing and embroidery” that represented the 
film’s “national color.”80  Drach mentioned the film’s “dekorativnost’” when he 
reviewed it a second time for Literaturnaia Rossiia (Literary Russia) in February 
1965.  There, he marveled at the “zgardy [beaded necklaces] and cheresy 
[belts]” found in the film. “All of them are accessories of the everyday life of the 
Hutsul and Ukrainian highlander… All of this is part of the wealth of the 
Carpathians,” and thus of Ukraine itself.81  In her review of the film for Sovetskaia 
kul’tura in August, Elena Bauman assured readers that the film would present the 
kind of ethnographic material endemic to the “ethnographic museum” despite its 
essential “dekorativnost’.”82  
 In the most famous article on the film, Ivan Dziuba, like Pomeshchikov, 
emphasized the necessity of the Carpathian journey for understanding the 
significance of the region for Ukrainian national identities.  He wrote,  
                                                 
78 The word here is in fact “kubintsy,” and I am not sure why Pomeshchikov used it to take the 
place of “ethnic other” in general. 
79 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 1, d. 528, l. 3-4, 8, 10, 25, 41, 43-44, 46. 
80 L. Varshavskii, “Pravda narodnykh kharakterov,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, June 8, 1965. 
81 Ivan Drach, “Spasibo!” Literaturnaia Rossiia, February 26, 1965: 17. 
82 Elena Bauman, “Nad kem plachut trembity…” Sovetskaia kul’tura, August 14, 1965: 3. 
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Those who have been in the Carpathians know that the real life of the 
Hutsul from birth to death – as it was from time immemorial – is 
aesthetically conceptualized and arranged with traditional rituals, customs, 
and beliefs.  His entire byt is art, the art of the word, the knife, and the 
brush.83 
 
In emphasizing this journey, at once about “spiritual” transcendence, tourist 
consumerism, and national identity, Dziuba helps us discover a link between the 
1960s Carpathian film and the themes found in the Weimar-era Bergfilm.  I find 
this link significant, not for the association of the German genre with a 
supposedly “fascist aesthetic,” but for alpine imagery’s fundamentally modernist 
claim to transcendence of worldly concerns – the market, politics, etc.84  As 
Kotsiubyns’kyi himself established in his novella, the highlands were a space of 
direct communion with artistic inspiration, whereas the lowlands were associated 
with the mundane cycle of production and reproduction.  Yet, both the Bergfilm 
and Paradzhanov’s film assumes a market for objects associated with this 
transcendent space. 
 As Eric Rentschler argues, the Bergfilm finds its meaning in the collision of 
an authentic Gemeinschaft with the mapping and defining powers of the rational 
                                                 
83 Ivan Dziuba, “Den’ poiska,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 5 (1965), 82. 
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Susan sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” in Under the Sign of Saturn (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 1980), 86-87, 91.  As I state above, these dichotomies were present within highly 
divergent political traditions during the 1920-30s, and, as we see with Paradzhanov’s film, such 
concerns carried over to the post-Stalin era.  In no way, however, can we accuse Paradzhanov 
himself of reproducing a “fascist aesthetic;” after all, the Hutsuls are far from idealized physical 
specimens in the film.  While Paradzhanov’s penchant for transforming humans into objects may 
be problematic on an aesthetic level, it carries none of the connotations of power relations that 
Sontag identified within fascist art.  Sontag admits, however, that “all totalitarian countries” 
embody features of the “fascist aesthetic” (92).  The problem then becomes what value the term 
itself serves, except to erase fundamental differences in aesthetic and political outlooks. 
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individual employing the tools of modern technology.85  He points out that Leni 
Riefenstahl’s emblematic The Blue Light (Das blaue Licht, 1932) functions to 
“transform exterior landscapes into emotional spaces.”86  Riefenstahl’s film 
concerns a young woman, Junta, who has been cast out of her native village for 
being a witch.  She resides in a mountain cave that emits a blue light during the 
full moon, which lures young men from the village to seek out its source, only to 
die in the climb to get there.  One day, a landscape painter from the city comes to 
the village, where he hears of Junta.  After meeting her, he falls in love with her 
natural beauty, despite their inability to communicate verbally (She speaks Italian 
and he German).  One full moon night, he follows her, in secret, to the source of 
the blue light, where he finds her among the crystals that produce the aura.  The 
painter rushes to tell the villagers of the treasures that exist in their midst, and 
they proceed to steal them when Junta is away.  After realizing what has 
happened, she falls to her death in grief.   
 Rentschler reads the painter as a common tourist, as such bringing 
modernity to the isolated mountain village through his discovery of the crystals.  
Moreover, the film is mediated through the painter’s views of the exotic space, 
while self-reflexively pointing to the painter as hero, with whom it sets up the 
spectator to identify.  While The Blue Light presents the journey from the modern 
city to the mountains within a diegetic origin (the painter), with Shadows, the 
production drama implicates the merging of modernity and “traditional” cultures to 
define the space of “authenticity.”  Paradzhanov told readers in his article 
“Eternal Motion” that he “fell in love” with the exotic space of Hutsul’shchyna, 
regardless of the fact that he could not understand the language of its 
inhabitants.87  In this closed community, the tourist painter enters this authentic 
space in the second drama of the film, that of its production and reception.   
 To shoot the scene of Ivanko as a shepherd in a remote mountain valley, 
Paradzhanov’s crew orchestrated the construction of a modern road from the 
                                                 
85 Eric Rentschler, “A Legend for Modern Times: The Blue Light (1932),” in The Ministry of 
Illusion: Nazi Cinema and Its Afterlife (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996): 26-51. 
86 Ibid., 32. 
87 Paradzhanov, “Vechnoe dvizhenie,” 63-64.  
 170
town of Verkhovyna.88  Thus, while the film presents a closed community, 
seemingly without any relationship to the outside world, its very authenticity is 
defined through the introduction of modern and technologically determined 
notions of visuality.  The studio and press continually celebrated the crew’s 
desire to film on location, within the pristine alpine nature, and among the actual 
Hutsuls.  In this way, Shadows also becomes, in Rentschler’s words, a timeless 
“village tale offered up to visitors.”89  Dziuba, above, in addition to Paradzhanov 
in his many statements about the film, made it clear that the journey to view and 
then to artistically define the Carpathians was an essential aspect of 
authenticating the space itself.90 
 The particular space that Paradzhanov “offered up to visitors,” however, 
was not (simply) the familiar bucolic landscape that Riefenstahl presented in The 
Blue Light.  The Soviet filmmaker lacked interest in re-creating the iconic 
mountain vista, or with the kind of static close-ups that Riefenstahl featured in the 
earlier film, as he associated them with a tired Stalinist folkloric mode.91  In fact, 
most of Shadows is conducted in medium shots, which avoids both psychological 
exploration of the heroes and villains, while also giving the feeling of 
disorientation due to the absence of clear establishing shots.  The rare long shot 
in Paradzhanov’s film eliminates the element of horizon that characterizes the 
mountain vista, and effectively flattens the landscape to a pallet of colors and 
textures (Figure 3.9).  Rather than a strategy of inter-cutting to show 
simultaneous action in different spaces – a hallmark of classical film narrative 
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style – a mobile camera explores space, follows the course of a single action, or 
remains completely static with a long lens, rendering certain scenes into an 
exotic tapestry of human activity.  These latter scenes of stasis are highly 
theatrical, frequently with Hutsuls performing folk dances and songs directly for 
the camera (Figure 3.10), while the mobile camera suggests recent 
developments in documentary techniques rising out of hand-held camera 
technology. 
 Shadows does not, however, provoke the sort of “contemplation” – nor 
does it invite a rational understanding – of nature and the exotic cultures that 
inhabit it, a principle which lied at the basis of The Blue Light and even 
Kotsiubyns’kyi’s novella.  As Johannes von Moltke argues with regard to 
Riefenstahl’s film, and similar to my own thoughts about Kotsiubyns’kyi’s source, 
these works were stylistic hybrids.  They at once offer an ethnographic spectacle, 
in addition to providing rational commentary, either in the form of supplementary 
illustration, or in the form of the tourist painter, who attempts to make sense of 
exotic space, but in the process destroys it.92  In Paradzhanov’s Shadows, 
through the processes of visual and aural de-familiarization, nature is subsumed 
within an artistic, musical, and literary metaphor.  The camera does not 
“transform superstition into knowledge;” rather, nature becomes an independent 
“intelligence” unwilling to reveal its mysteries.93  “The narrative trajectory” is not, 
as Rentschler and von Moltke suggest in the case of the Bergfilm, 
“modernization.”  Here, we have a fuller attempt at narrative, visual, and aural 
spectacle.  The film does not narratively invite identification, nor is the spectator 
positioned to gain rational knowledge about the Carpathians.  The “mystery” of 
the Hutsuls is not revealed in the narrative.  They are essentially unknowable 
beneath the realm of their own demonology and the colorful objects that they 
appear as.    
 It is style or form, therefore, along with how the industry, the filmmakers 
and critics positioned the film, which “invites” the outsider and offers him or her  
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Figure 3.10. Market spectacle in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors 
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knowledge.  Iurii Illienko’s camerawork also implicates this second drama of 
production in his curious use of point-of-view (POV) shots.  In the opening scene 
of Oleksa’s death, for example, we view the tree’s perspective as it comes 
crashing down on the young man’s body, suggesting the continued theme of 
nature’s agency on the lives of the Hutsuls.  In the scene that follows, a jerky 
camera surveys a procession of women playing a small stringed instrument as a 
man’s voice chants a funeral dirge.  The POV-style shot does not, however, 
reveal a diagetic origin, as Ivanko himself steps into the shot, excluding him as 
the most obvious subject of the gaze on this procession.  The most shocking 
instance of the movement from such an “authorial” POV shot to a subjective POV 
shot is during the fight between Paliichuk and Hutentiuk, all conducted in one 
shot.  Initially, the camera follows Hutentiuk and his wife to the right, and then 
moves left to reveal Paliichuk and his wife, the former with axe in hand.  The 
camera follows him to the right, toward Hutentiuk, as he raises his axe.  The 
camera shifts right, and tilts slightly to frame Hutentiuk diagonally in the bottom 
right of the frame, raising his own axe.  At this moment, we notice that the 
camera has become Paliichuk’s line of sight as the axe comes down over the 
lens and blood fills the screen (Figure 3.11). 
 Later, the camera is static before a line of Hutsul dancers facing it, 
suggesting the presence of an off-screen audience (Figure 3.12).  In this vein, 
Paradzhanov’s statement about not wishing to stop shooting the koliadky scene 
(quoted above) is particularly instructive.  The camera as the “author,” by drawing 
attention to itself, imparts itself into the narrative, which was compounded when 
spectators were subjected to so much spin over the making of the film.  The film, 
through its visual style, and acting style, prohibits identification with any of the 
characters.  But the presence of such a subjective and self-reflexive camera, 
together with what I have labeled the production drama, makes it available for 
identification with the filmmakers.  If the idea and the process of the journey to 
the Carpathians, then, is essentially transformative for the creators of the film, 
and validated by such respectable literary critics like Dziuba, the very experience 






Figure 3.11. Subjective death in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors 
 
 
Figure 3.12. An implied audience for Hutsul folk spectacle in Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors 
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journey connects two modern sites of Ukrainian self-consciousness – L’viv and 
Kyiv – with the Carpathians, and metaphorically “opens” or “reveals” what was 
lost to their modern intellectual sensibilities.  
 
“…a flurry of hysterically modernist techniques…” 
 
 Earlier in this chapter, I examined the ways in which the Carpathian exotic 
was both textually canonized and naturalized in Ukrainian art and literature, with 
the promotion of “traditional” Carpathian song and dance, and more recently in 
images of tourism, and in films like Ivanov’s Oleksa Dovbush.  As I argued, 
Paradzhanov did not break from the convention of a folksy and anti-modern 
representation of the Hutsuls; in fact, the film intensified the sense of the Hutsuls’ 
isolation from the geo-political and historical space that surrounded them.  Thus, 
we might also wonder, along with film critic Robert Payne, “What makes 
[Paradzhanov’s film] more than exotic people in pretty costumes?”94  Yet when 
viewing Shadows, especially for the first time, the spectator is overcome by a 
sense of its strangeness.  From the opening scene of the tree falling on Ivanko’s 
brother Oleksa, the spectator begins to understand what Kristin Thompson and 
David Bordwell meant in referring to the film’s style as a “flurry of hysterically 
modernist techniques.” 95  In this statement, Thompson and Bordwell do not 
associate the film with other Thaw-era productions from the Soviet Union.96  
Instead, the authors of Film History: An Introduction positioned Paradzhanov’s 
film as an example of 1960s international art cinema, which Bordwell in particular 
believed had its own peculiar formal and narrative logic, in addition to its own 
audience.   
 Our sense of the strangeness in Shadows is located, not in the expository 
components of the film, but in the frequent breaks in classical film style (by which 
I mean to include both Hollywood and socialist realism).  Like Dovzhenko’s Earth, 
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the surface of Paradzahnov’s film reveals an overly simplistic story – classical, in 
its allusion to Romeo and Juliet – but one which is subordinated to method 
(siuzhet) and aspects of stylistic excess.97  The camera’s proclivity for erratic 
movement and subjective positioning is the most obvious sign of such “modernist 
technique,” but the foregrounding of symbols from Hutsul mythology, with which 
the film assumes the spectator’s familiarity, and a de-contextualized elaboration 
of the aural and material culture of a civilization clearly distant from the features 
of modern life, also contributes to a cinematic experience of de-familiarization.  I 
employ this term in a slightly different way than did Shklovskii or Brecht because, 
even in pop-cultural discourse, the Hutsuls are anything but normative citizens.  
They appear as strange.  But they also have a history of appearing in a particular 
generic mode, which Paradzhanov intentionally disrupts.  Thus, de-familiarization 
is possible due to a process begun in the later nineteenth century of the literary 
incorporation of Hutsul’shchyna.  Moreover, as I argue in Chapter 1, the very 
project of Stalinist folkloric representation was to make non-Russians knowable 
within a particular mode of domesticating the Soviet periphery.  Paradzhanov’s 
project was to transform these knowable curiosities back into strange beings. 
 As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, however, Paradzhanov 
goal was of a dual nature: He aimed at not only de-familiarization but also 
assimilation or possession of Hutsul’shchyna into oneself through the process of 
the journey, either real or transposed through the filmic medium.  The recurring 
POV-like shot from the beginning of the film is neither first person nor third 
person narration.  It is, in fact, a hybrid of the two forms.  But in producing such a 
hybrid of subjective/objective narration, Paradzhanov has substituted the world of 
the Hutsul with his own aesthetic principles and interests in the exotic.  Illienko 
contributed to this substitution in his technique of, as Pier Paolo Pasolini put it, 
“making the camera felt.”98  As Pasolini defined the style of poetic cinema, there 
is no identification with the protagonist; rather, there is identification with the 
filmmakers and their worldview expressed through a formalistic manipulation of 
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images.  The immediacy of Paradzhanov’s and Illienko’s images establishes their 
very presence. 
 As Regina Bendix reminds us, “Textualized expressive culture such as 
songs and tales can, with the aid of the rhetoric of authenticity, be transformed 
from an experience of individual transcendence to a symbol of the inevitability of 
national unity.”99  Such is what happened to Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors.  
The spectator is made to be aware, not only of the camera, but also of a 
“meaning,” which originates from an “author;” an author who demands to be 
unhindered in his or her “quest.”  Three separate “authors” emerged from 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, two of whom were identified in M. Malovs’kyi’s 
image, with the addition of Mykolaichuk.100  Interestingly, the screenplay’s 
original author, Ivan Chendei, fell aside in this new discussion of authorship 
during the mid-1960s.  Each of these new authors stood in for a particular kind of 
claim to authenticity: Paradzhanov was the outsider who traveled to the 
Carpathians to gain genuine knowledge of the Hutsuls; Illienko, whose camera 
the spectator “senses” (we see the camera move in step with his, and even 
perceive its shadow at times101) in almost every scene, moves fluidly from 
objective to subjective narration, without so much as a cut; and Mykolaichuk, 
whose presence as a “local” could be generalized beyond the confines of the 
Carpathians through his representation, both behind and in front of the screen.  
 
Ukrainian National Identity, in “Color” 
 
 During his opening speech at an SKU Plenum on March 1, 1965, Levchuk 
introduced Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors as a “turning point” in Ukrainian 
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cinema, and explicitly tied it to a national phenomenon.  He included in the 
speech that despite their horrible oppression at the hands of the capitalists, “A 
fragment of our [emphasis mine] Ukrainian people – the Hutsuls – were able to 
keep their native language, their colorful folklore, their manners and customs, 
and their songs!”102  A Marxist might well ask of the First Secretary why he 
appeared to be celebrating feudalism as a form of resistance to capitalism.  
Clearly, Levchuk was uninterested in presenting a proper historical materialist 
interpretation of the Hutsuls, as he had done earlier with A Star over the 
Carpathians.  Instead, he mentioned Paradzhanov’s attention to an “actual” 
representation of everyday life.  Its ethnographic details provide the film with its 
“national form,” and Paradzhanov “revealed the depths of the life processes of 
the Ukrainian people” in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, the difficulty of which 
had not been “mastered” until then.  Earlier he even stated that the ethnographic 
elements found at the basis of Shadows “will be one of our prerequisites for the 
molding of our product.”103  Almost a decade later, Levchuk revisited his 1949 
film about the Carpathians, this time highlighting the exotic nature of the 
mountain inhabitants, rather than an emergent socialist society.  What 
“bewildered” him, he wrote, was the “fairy-tale” landscape itself.104  In 
foregrounding authenticity over realism, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors had 
established a new context for discussing non-Russian cinema.  Instead of literary 
concerns with film narrative, Paradzhanov demonstrated that national meaning 
might be located exclusively within a film’s imagery and soundtrack.  The visual 
and aural qualities in Shadows marked off a site of Ukrainian difference, a site 
located outside of a rights-based agenda focused on the language question. 
Levchuk wrote in January 1965 that A Dream and Shadows ”contain a 
bright national form, and with their contents reach into the sediment of life…  The 
conclusion involuntarily arises that the enrichment of national form in our art is a 
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guarantee of creative success.”105  Nationality was, for the moment, a question of 
artistic representation.  After its release on screens in October and November, 
Levchuk introduced the film during a Union Plenum as “a revelation of the 
national originality of culture, everyday life, and the customs of our people,” by 
which he meant “our” Ukrainian people.106  Paradzhanov had revealed an 
undiscovered country in Hutsul’shchyna, but Levchuk along with other promoters 
of the film, transposed its meaning to the whole of Ukraine.  In so doing, Ukraine 
itself became the undiscovered country, newly and authentically revealed 
through Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors.   
Ukrainian cinema had established a certain imagery of authenticity, 
located not only within Hutsul’shchyna, but also within the authenticating 
potential of the individual artist, which could later be either rejected or capitalized 
upon.  Despite such statements on the “authenticity” of national representation 
and the embodiment of the national spirit that the film seemed to invite 
everywhere that people saw the film, there was also a vicious campaign 
launched against the film.  Perhaps out of jealousy, or perhaps out of a genuine 
dislike for Paradzhanov and his film, some at the studio found it ideologically 
fruitful to call attention to the film’s lack of a Carpathian audience, thus essentially 
using the filmmakers’ and critics’ own language of authenticity against it.107 
The following two chapters take up the theme of “national authorship” as 
the establishment of a new type or “genre” of cinema production – “Ukrainian 
poetic cinema” – which asserted a specifically Ukrainian claim to Thaw-era 
aesthetic problems, while intersecting with nationalist politics, on the one hand, 
and with audiences, on the other.   
 
105 Tymofii Levchuk, “Rik tvorchykh shukan’,” Novyny kinoekrana, no. 1 (January 1965), 1.  
106 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 313, ll. 22-23. 
107 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 400, l. 152. 
Chapter 4 
Ukrainian Nationalism and Film Authorship in the 1960s 
 
 When Sergei Paradzhanov first journeyed to Hutsul’shchyna in 1963, no 
one expected much to result.  The April 1962 thematic plan for the studio had the 
director slotted to make Iurka, the One-Kid Team (Iurka, besstannaia komanda), 
another kolkhoz comedy along the lines of his previous work in The Top Guy 
(Pershyi khlopets’) and Ukrainian Rhapsody (Ukrains’ka rapsodiia).1  Flower on 
the Stone had been released with a category three rating, thus maintaining 
Paradzhanov’s mediocre reputation, and Tymofii Levchuk listed the latter film as 
one of the “dull” productions of the previous year during the First Congress of the 
SKU in January 1963.2  Nonetheless, he was a reliable director who volunteered 
to take on projects that no one else wanted.3  Instead of Iurka, the studio put him 
in charge of the Kotsiubyns’kyi Centennial, an event significantly overshadowed 
by the Shevchenko Sesquicentennial.  From this perspective, the success of 
Shadows after his return to Kyiv in 1964 seemed all the more significant.  Upon 
their initial viewing of the film, the studio, SKU, and Paradzhanov himself, 
immediately recognized that it was the most significant Ukrainian film since 
Dovzhenko’s time.4  Moreover, they viewed the director as an altogether different 
kind of individual from what he had been to them before going to Hutsul’shchyna, 
                                                 
1 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1539, l. 50. 
2 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1620, l. 14; f. 655, op. 1, d. 227, l. 63. 
3 During a meeting of the Directors’ Board to discuss Flower on the Stone in June 1962, Viktor 
Ivanov commented, “I would give him [Paradzhanov] a medal for bravery for The Real Guy [sic].  
No one approached it at that time.  No one wanted to make Ukrainian Rhapsody either.  That was 
a difficult screenplay.  He alone took on this project.  You were the only person who came to the 
rescue on this picture and now it’s easy for us to joke and complain.  I can also shoot some 
arrows, but that’s not the point here.”  TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1536, l. 22. 
4 For example, Dovzhenko Studio film director Sulafim Tsybul’nyk’s reaction to the incomplete 
footage in 1964 was that Shadows “will be the first, after Dovzhenko, to bring the studio 
international glory.”  See, Nikolai Blokhin, Izgnanie Paradzhanova (Stavropol’, 2002), 66. 
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one who was not merely “talented,” but set apart from the studio collective, and 
possessing genius.   
Perhaps more pertinent to cinema in the 1960s, however, Paradzhanov 
had become a Soviet variation on what the French journal Cahiers du cinéma 
had called an “auteur.”  In 1954, François Truffaut wrote “A Certain Tendency of 
the French Cinema,” which became one of the first articulations of “La Politique 
des Auteurs.”  Therein, Truffaut counterposed two kinds of film directors – those 
that simply “set up the scenario (metteur-en-scène),” and the “auteur,” the 
director-author.  Truffaut called on filmmakers to reject their beholdenness to 
screenwriters with their penchant for “psychological realism” and, as film authors 
in their own right, to invent their own visual and narrative style.  The French critic 
and later filmmaker associated cinematic meaning with the “mark” of such a 
director-author, and less so to the qualities that were already present in a literary 
screenplay.5  As John Hess has pointed out, the “aestheticist” concerns of auteur 
criticism were aimed also at divorcing cinema from its politically and socially 
progressive foundations in post-war France.6  While such a context is difficult to 
transpose to the post-war Soviet Union, we might note that the Thaw-era “cult of 
the little guy” was grounded in a similar notion of the artist’s “personal 
expression” above the political demands of the party and state.7  As I 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, moreover, Paradzhanov’s aestheticist 
concerns with Ukrainian authenticity stood at variance with mainstream language 
politics in the republic.   
While we have little knowledge of the readership for Cahiers du cinéma in 
the Soviet Union during the 1950s, Oleksandr Dovzhenko gave an apparent 
response to “A Certain Tendency” the following year in Iskusstvo kino.  In also 
addressing the static quality of Soviet literary adaptations, the only living member 
of Soviet cinema’s 1920s avant-garde called on directors to use a visual 
 
5 François Truffaut, “A Certain Tendency of the French Cinema,” in Bill Nichols, ed., Movies and 
Methods: An Anthology, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 232-33. 
6 John Hess, “La Politique des Auteurs (Part One): World View as Aesthetics,” Jump Cut: A 
Review of Contemporary Media, no. 1 (May-June 1974): Accessed online: 
http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/onlinessays/JC01folder/auturism1.html: May 13, 2008. 
7 See my discussion of the “cult of the little guy” in chapter 1. 
vocabulary that was not beholden to literary modes of narration.  Thus, the 
screenplay should be left to the interpretive powers of the director.8  In its notion 
of the individual artist as the producer of cultural meaning, a Thaw-era auteur 
theory developed in the Soviet Union, which rejected the Stalinist “cinema of 
leaders” in favor of a cinema of great directors.  While Pomerantsev and other 
early apologists of the cultural Thaw were careful to position their ideals of 
personal expression and “sincerity” not in opposition to “politics,” per se, the 
intellectual culture of the 1960s introduced a greater focus on the transcendent 
value of art.  As Ann Komaromi has recently postulated in “The Unofficial Field of 
Late Soviet Culture,” the dissident movement emerged during this time in part as 
the defense of this principle of the politically transcendent space of art.9  
Especially after the “mass meeting” on Moscow’s Pushkin Square on Soviet 
Constitution Day, December 5, 1965, authorities were particularly concerned with 
the political power that individuals could wield in defense of this “apolitical” 
principle.10 
As an emergent Soviet auteur after making Shadows of Forgotten 
Ancestors, Sergei Paradzhanov both alarmed and intrigued authorities in the film 
industry and within the party.  In the aftermath of Shadows, many of the young 
returnees to Kyiv Studio became committed Paradzhanovites in their aesthetic 
outlook and interest in a Ukrainian ethnoscape.  Moreover, studio authorities 
participated in the construction of a Ukrainian auteur, seeing in Paradzhanov and 
his followers the possibility to disrupt ingrained modes of national representation 
and to “return to Dovzhenko,” the original Ukrainian auteur.  Nonetheless, the 
cultivation of “personal expression” at the root of both auteur theory and Thaw-
era cultural expression constantly intersected with the emergent Ukrainian 
nationalist movement, precisely because the intellectuals who comprised the 
latter were interested in many of the same problems that emerged during the 
                                                 
8 Aleksandr Dovzhenko, “Pisatel’ i kino v svete trebovanii sovremennosti,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 2 
(Feb 1955), 7-14. 
9 Ann Komaromi, "The Unofficial Field of Late Soviet Culture," Slavic Review 66, no. 4 (Winter 
2007), 605-29. 
10 The Pushkin Square meeting on December 5 was intended to protest the closed trial of writers 
Andrei Siniavskii and Iurii Daniel’.  
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cultural Thaw as the filmmakers themselves.  During the 1960s, Ukrainian 
nationalism in Kyiv took on new dimensions that were more in dialog with the 
“Thaw generation” than with the independence movements of the earlier part of 
the century.  Thaw-era Ukrainian nationalism, moreover, constituted a dissident 
message geared toward a particular audience, in many ways, the same audience 
that Paradzhanov’s followers intended for their supposedly apolitical films.  Ivan 
Dziuba and other Ukrainian dissidents constantly divided the nation into 
intellectuals and the “de-nationalized” masses, indicating clear allegiance with 
the former, while the latter represented the hopeless cause of Ukrainian 
autonomy rooted in any kind of mass movement.  Similarly, Paradzhanov stated 
in December 1971 before an audience of “creative youth” in Mink that the mass 
“audience should apologize” to him for not understanding his films.11  We must 
assume that he was not referring to his present supporters who came to listen.  
Thus, a Ukrainian politique des auteur not only emerged as a socio-aesthetic 
phenomenon, as a successful means to “differentiate” Dovzhenko Studio’s 
product from that of other studios, but principally within the realm of film industry 
and audience politics.   
The intersections between audience politics and dissident politics became 
public on September 4, 1965, during the official premier of Shadows of Forgotten 
Ancestors.  Expectations were high for the crowd that gathered at the “Ukraina” 
theater in central Kyiv that Saturday evening, the majority of whom had procured 
tickets through connections to people who worked on the film or at Dovzhenko 
Studio.12  Others demanded entry, and when the box office closed, rushed the 
doors.  “Ukraina” director Fedir Brainchenko alerted the militsiia to the problem, 
but allowed Paradzhanov to introduce the film, in a hope that such a public ritual 
would help calm the situation.  Instead, the latter launched into an embellished 
monologue concerning the conflict with industry authorities over dubbing the film 
into Russian.  The confident Paradzhanov asserted that “blacks, the French, and 
                                                 
11 James Steffen, “Sergei Parajanov’s Speech in Minsk before the Creative and Scientific youth of 
Byelorussia on 1 December 1971,” Armenian Review 47, nos. 3-4, 48, nos. 1-2 (2001-2002), 17. 
12 Interview with Svetlana Vasil’evna Petrovskaia, Kyiv, 9 June 2006.  Petrovskaia claimed that 
she and her husband, literary critic Miron Petrovskii, received tickets from Ivan Dziuba, who 
probably received them from poet and screenwriter Ivan Drach.   
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Argentines” understood it, but “the organs [of distribution] aren’t allowing the film 
to be released, on the grounds that our people won’t understand it.”13  The 
director’s concern did not include linguistic comprehension – as I stated in the 
previous chapter, Paradzhanov himself would have struggled to understand the 
“authentic” Hutsuls who participated in the film’s production – but with 
maintaining the aesthetic integrity of his work of art.  Similarly, Paradzhanov 
suggested that Goskino’s insistence on a Russian dub was based on the 
contrary principle of pragmatic comprehension and on the equally mundane 
problem of violating industry policy.14 
In directing this statement to his intended audience, Paradzhanov elicited 
sympathy for a principle of personal expression, which was divorced from the 
specific qualities of the on-screen speech.  Linguistic comprehension, in 
Paradzhanov’s view, would actually disrupt a broader comprehension of the 
author’s intentions.  While the emergent Ukrainian dissident movement viewed 
the promotion of a literary Ukrainian language as the foundation of resisting 
“Russification” and “de-nationalization,”15 these participants in radical 
kul’turnytstvo16 viewed the occasion of Paradzhanov’s premier as the perfect 
opportunity to draw attention to the government’s reaction against their cause. 
Brainchenko initially watched in silence as his intentions to maintain order 
during the premier were thwarted further.  After Paradzhanov’s contentious 
“introduction,” literary critics Dziuba and Mykhailyna Kotsiubyns’ka – the latter a 
grand-niece of Mykhailo Kotsiubyns’kyi – approached the stage to present the 
film director and costume designer with flowers.  Dziuba immediately seized the 
                                                 
13 Letter from F. Brainchenko to S. P. Ivanov, personal archive of Sviatoslav Pavlovich Ivanov; 
published in Poetychne kino: zaboronena shkola, Larysa Briukhovets’ka, ed. (Kyiv: ArtEk, 2001), 
286. 
14 According to the February 1965 Goskino prikaz on labor and finances, all literary and film 
material had to be translated into Russian and sent to Moscow before final approval.  
TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op, 1, d. 1852, l. 166-68. 
15 For use of these terms, see esp. Ivan Dziuba, Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the 
Soviet Nationalities Problem, ed., M. Davies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968). 151-56. 
16 The Ukrainian word, “kul’turnytstvo,” has no English or Russian equivalent in the present 
meaning, but I translate it as a form a cultural nationalism, a movement that promoted a rebirth of 
native language, culture, and/or religion, but was not in essence exclusionary, nor did it 
necessarily disapprove of Soviet power in Ukraine.  In its traditional definition, kul’turnytstvo is 
equivalent to the Russian “kul’turnichestvo,” which means simply “cultural education.”   
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microphone from Paradzhanov to proclaim that the “reaction of 1937” had 
returned.17  As the secretary of the theater Partkom scrambled for the PA system 
to drown out Dziuba’s speech, the latter quickly informed the audience of arrests 
during the previous two weeks of 19 Ukrainian intellectuals accused of a 
“nationalist conspiracy.”18  Dziuba shouted above the loud music coming from 
the PA system and sirens from the approaching militsiia vehicles: “Whoever
opposed to tyranny, stand up!”  As the militsiia entered the theater, Brainchenko 
grabbed the microphone from Dziuba’s hand.  The projectionist started the film 
as chaos erupted between the security organs and the ticketless spectators.  The 
event marked a watershed in Ukrainian cultural politics, in that Dziuba’s act 
transformed an official gathering into what amounted to a street riot.  Dziuba and 
Kotsiubyns’ka had brought post-Stalin “literary politics” into a public space.   
 is 
                                                
Like many of the filmmakers, writers and intellectuals associated with 
Ukrainian dissident politics during the 1960s and 1970s, Dziuba was born into an 
Eastern Ukrainian peasant family, educated in Russian-language institutions, and 
came to consciousness as a Ukrainian through a diversity of intellectual pursuits 
that encompassed interest in literature, history and law.  Until late 1962, he was a 
senior editor for the main SPU journal, Vitchyzna (Homeland), and was 
responsible for publishing non-conformist writers like Ivan Drach, Dmytro 
Pavlychko, Lina Kostenko and Oleksandr Syzonenko.  When Dziuba resolved to 
act on September 4, he was in the midst of writing his major political tract, 
Internationalism or Russification?  Therein, he complained of a “de-
nationalization” of the Ukrainian people, owing to Soviet population resettlement 
policies and a conscious effort in Moscow to “provincialize” Ukrainian culture, 
which had the effect of “pushing Ukrainian language into the background.”19  
Each of these problems emerged from a “violation in Leninist nationalities policy,” 
according to Dziuba.20  In essence, the purpose of the book, according to the 
 
17 TsDAVOU, f. 4754, op. 1, d. 50, l. 65-66. 
18 Poetychne kino, 269. 
19 Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem, tr. 
M. Davies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 14. 
20 Ibid., 15. 
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author, is in justification of the principle of criticizing the uneven implementation 
of a continually affirmed Soviet policy. 
As recent work on Soviet dissidence suggests, the defense of the principle 
of “socialist legality” constantly butted heads with the messianic principle of the 
intelligentsia’s role in Russian/Soviet society.21  In affirming both a natural and 
legal connection between cultural production and nationality, Dziuba was trying 
to reconcile this division, while maintaining a properly “Leninist” position.  His 
ideas about “de-nationalization” are particularly instructive for why Shadows was 
relevant to his position in Internationalism or Russification?  After all, Dziuba 
remembers telling Ivan Drach, “This is an anti-Soviet film,” but that he should 
keep that fact secret.22  Specifically, Dziuba pointed out in his tract that films from 
Ukrainian studios were dubbed into Russian, even in Ukraine, thus promoting the 
second-class status of the vernacular.23  In refusing a Russian dub for Shadows, 
Paradzhanov thus resisted this process (at least, from Dziuba’s perspective) of 
“killing” the Ukrainian people.24  The film pointed toward a more general 
significance for Ukrainian kul’turnytstvo, as Dziuba’s very concept of “de-
nationalization” when applied to individuals and social groups made explicit the 
cultural labor involved in maintaining a meaningful category of national identity.  If 
Ukrainians could lose a sense of themselves as “Ukrainians” in Siberia, Karelia, 
Slovakia, Canada, Ukraine, etc., Dziuba showed that instruction in Ukrainian 
language, history, literature and film was absolutely necessary, indeed a civil 
right, wherever Ukrainians lived.  Thus, the journey toward ethnic self-knowledge 
implicit in Shadows was also a principle upon which Dziuba attached hope for a 
newly nationalized Ukrainian people. 
                                                 
21 See, for example, recent articles in Slavic Review: Ann Komaromi, "The Unofficial Field of Late 
Soviet Culture," Slavic Review 66, no. 4 (Winter 2007), 605-29; Benjamin Nathans, "The 
Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol'pin and the Idea of Rights under 'Developed Socialism'," 
Slavic Review 66, no. 4 (Winter 2007), 630-63. 
22 Larysa Briukhovets’ka, “Ivan Dziuba: Paradzhanov bil’shyi za legendu pro Paradzhanova,” 
interview with Ivan Dziuba, Kino Teatr, no. 4 (2003), accessed online: 
http://www.ktm.ukma.kiev.ua/show_content.php?id=129: March 24, 2005 
23 Dziuba, 125. 
24 Dziuba quoted the Ukrainian academic, K. D. Ushyns’kyi, with the words, “When a language 
has died on the lips of a people, the people is also dead,” p. 154. 
 188
Yet, what kind of public was it that went to see Shadows that night, to 
which Dziuba addressed his call to stand up against “tyranny”?  The literary critic 
had several choices for a venue that evening, including Denysenko’s A Dream, 
playing at the Leningrad an hour earlier, and the premier of the long-anticipated 
military comedy, Keys from Heaven (Kliuchi vid neba), directed by the ever-
popular Viktor Ivanov (Oleksa Dovbush), which was playing at the Sputnyk at the 
same time.25  These latter two films also dealt with local topics, and were 
presented in Ukrainian.  As I argued in Chapters two and three, however, 
Denysenko and Ivanov were working within tried and true genres of representing 
the nation, despite the innovations of the former production.  The audience at 
Ukraina that evening was a particular kind of elite audience, one that expected to 
see an unusual film.  Many of them had already seen Shadows during free, 
private screenings at the October House of Culture.26  Dziuba believed that 
particular texts invited pre-determined readings; perhaps we might say 
generically determined readings.  In broaching his political cause of defending 
accused Ukrainian nationalists, he needed a space, in which a particular kind of 
reception was already activated, while also desiring the centrality of Ukraina’s 
physical location, and the significance of the movie theater’s name.   
Thus, we find in Dziuba’s choice of protest venue a peculiar desire for 
both visibility and exclusivity, in addition to an interest in the specific problems 
that Paradzhanov’s film raised.  Several newspapers had featured Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors in promotional materials related to the annual “Cinema 
Days” event in Kyiv that would take place on that first weekend in September.  Of 
the supposedly 340,000 people who attended at least one screening during the 
three-day extravaganza, it would seem logical that some of them would want to 
see the most talked-about Ukrainian film of the year.27  Upon learning that the 
screening was already sold out, many of them might have become angry at the 
system of privilege for members of the intelligentsia, whose connections entitled 
                                                 
25 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 317, l. 6. 
26 A September 3, 1965 prikaz from central Goskino ordered its Ukrainian branch to halt further 
private screenings of Shadows in anticipation of its public screening.  TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, 
d. 1852, l. 179. 
27 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 306, l. 107. 
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them to see such a film.  Central Goskino considered the possibility that 
spectators in Kyiv would become rowdy, warning its Ukrainian branch on Friday 
to enlist responsible members of the Profsoiuz organizations, the Komsomol 
aktiv and pensioners to catch ticketless spectators as they entered theaters 
during “Cinema Days.”28  While Ukrainian Goskino had already initiated a 
campaign against ticketless spectators in the republic, efforts were oriented 
toward rural film points, where up to half of film audiences were getting in free in 
some oblasts.29  In these cases, blame was placed on rural projectionists who 
either failed to collect the entrance fees or were accused of embezzling the 
funds.30  The situation was different during the Shadows premier: People were 
barred at the door, some successfully entering through the fire escape, others 
simply pushing their way in.  Rather than constituting a problem of state finances, 
an official “creative meeting with spectators” had been violated, which was only 
then compounded by Dziuba’s protest action.  The militsiia’s confrontation was 
not with the ticketed guests at “Ukraina” theater, some of whom stood up after 
Dziuba’s rallying cry, nor even with Paradzhanov, Kotsiubyns’ka or Dziuba 
himself, each of whom suffered longer-term consequences as a result.  
Brainchenko had called the militsiia, rather, to disperse a violation of public order, 
which the ticketless spectators represented.31 
 On the following Thursday, the SKU Presidium met to discuss the 
“unfortunate events” of September 4.  Paradzhanov denied responsibility for 
Dziuba’s speech, stating, “I am a Soviet person and in essence I do not agree 
with Dziuba.”  He complained of the “poor organization” of the premier, also 
alluding to the chaos of the ticketless spectators’ presence who diluted the pool 
of intellectuals.  Volodymyr Denysenko also affirmed that the problem lay not in 
Paradzhanov “demagogic” speech, but in the “hooligan behavior” at the 
premier.32  Yet, it was no coincidence that the “Ukraina event” exploded at the 
                                                 
28 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1852, l. 178. 
29 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, 2059, l. 65. 
30 TsDAVOU, f. 4623, op. 1, d. 497, l. 27. 
31 Brainchenko reported to S. P. Ivanov that Dziuba once again tried to rally the spectators after 
the screening suggesting that he remained untouched by the militsiia.  See, Poetychne kino, 269. 
32 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 309, l. 244-45. 
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Shadows premier, within the confluence of a film intended for a particular kind of 
audience – the Ukrainian intelligentsia – with a festival intended for a mass 
audience.  Dziuba’s message of persecuted intellectuals, moreover, was clearly 
intended to garner sympathy from Paradzhanov’s own exclusive audience. 
The audience politics surrounding Paradzhanov’s film was indeed 
complex, and not only for the events that occurred during its premier.  The 
intended “elite” audience for Shadows was, in fact, confirmed by top authorities in 
the film industry, who were concerned to treat Paradzhanov and his crew with 
due respect lest they incur the enmity of other filmmakers (the enmity of “the 
spectator” was not yet a category of concern regarding the film).  In the summer 
of 1963, with such an ordinary film already behind schedule, central Goskino 
imposed economic sanctions on Paradzhanov and his crew.  With the 
increasingly celebratory atmosphere over the film’s significance from the Kyiv 
and Moscow intelligentsias by late 1964, Goskino chairman Aleksei Romanov 
resolved to heed his Ukrainian counterpart’s warning, “The reduction of 
c[omrades] Paradzhanov’s, Iu. Illienko’s, and [production manager] N[onna] 
Iur’eva’s pay will arouse a wide and very undesirable reaction among 
filmmakers.”  Romanov reversed sanctions on January 19, 1965.33  The 
Ukrainian Union of Cinematographers admitted Paradzhanov as a full voting 
member on April 30.34  Moreover, with the receipt of his honorarium for co-writing 
the screenplay to the amount of 1200 rubles and bonuses that made 
Paradzhanov 6000 rubles wealthier, the director of Shadows was able to move 
out of the dormitory that he had resided for the past decade to a large apartment 
in the prestigious neighborhood on Ploshcha Peremohy (Victory Square).35  
Within the course of a year, Paradzhanov had gone from being a “reliable,” but 
mediocre, director to the studio’s greatest genius, respected in Kyiv for 
transforming Ukrainian cinema, and in Moscow for being one of the Thaw-era’s 
emerging auteurs.  Yet, this occurred before a single non-elite spectator had 
seen the film.  
                                                 
33 TsDAVOU, f. 4754, op. 1, d. 50, l. 45; RGALI, f. 2944, op. 4, d. 280, l. 30. 
34 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 738. 
35 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1581, l. 59; f. 670, op. 3, d. 166, l. 7. 
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After the premier at “Ukraina,” organs of distribution pulled the film once 
again, for fear of similar incidents and perhaps unsure of Paradzhanov’s future 
political status.  In the politically charged atmosphere of 1965-66, with the recent 
arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals (not to mention the Siniavskii / Daniel’ trial) 
compounding tensions between the creative unions and the CPU, and among 
various interests within each of these organs of power, Paradzhanov and his 
followers at the studio skirted two issues: that of individual genius and personal 
expression, on the one hand, and correct national representation, on the other.  
By the end of 1966, the Central Committee of the CPU had labeled three films, 
which appeared to exist within a correct mode of socialist realist and national 
representation, “politically dangerous.”  Such a designation, however, 
fundamentally existed within a new imagined relationship between an auteur and 
particular kinds of audiences.  As Thaw-era cultural politics intersected with 
issues of national representation in Ukraine, questions emerged about not only 
who was qualified to represent the republic, but also who was qualified to 
consume such an image.  This chapter investigates the politics of Ukrainian 
authorship and the “danger” that emerged in Paradzhanov’s subsequent film, 
Kyiv Frescoes (Kyivs’ki fresky), his cinematographer Iurii Illienko’s directorial 
debut A Well for the Thirsty (Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh), and his young protégé 
Vasyl’ Illiashenko’s Coordinate Your Watches (Perevir’te svoi hodynnyky), which 
also became the articulated foundations of a “new school [novoe napravlenie]” in 
Soviet cinema, “Ukrainian poetic cinema.” 
 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors and Reception Politics 
 
For two weeks after its premier, there was no mention of Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors in the press.  Finally, on September 17th, Evhen Kyryliuk, 
the most important Shevchenko scholar in Ukraine, wrote an article in Literaturna 
Ukraina proclaiming Shadows to be a definitive work of socialist realism.  While 
admitting its complexity, he argued for the film’s inclusion under a newer 
conception of socialist realism that emerged with the end of the cult of 
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personality.  Indeed, as Thomas Lahusen has noted, socialist realism contained 
little of its “educational foundation” in post-Stalinist articulations of its “method.”  
Especially after the Twentieth Party Congress, Soviet literary critics were given 
freer reign to define this “historically open system of the truthful representation of 
life.”36  Kyryliuk concluded that Paradzhanov and Ivan Chendei had “correctly 
read Kotsiubyns’kyi’s story,” and had removed the “crude sociological schemes” 
(i.e., Zlatousov’s strict socialist realist reading of Kotsiubyns’kyi) that pervaded 
interpretation of Kotsiubyns’kyi during the period of the cult.37  The following 
Monday, “Ukraina” tested the waters with another evening screening of the film.  
It passed without further problems, and nightly screenings occurred at the 
“Ukraina” from September 27 to October 17.38  Thereafter, Shadows expanded 
beyond central Kyiv theaters, even showing regularly at several factory clubs39 
until late November.40  While the film did not even see an average degree of box 
office success for Soviet cinema, selling under 11 million tickets throughout the 
USSR, it garnered enough interest to maintain its presence at theaters in major 
Soviet cities throughout the Fall of 1965.  And, while organs of distribution were 
weary of the film, Josephine Woll’s claim that “Shadows barely ran in commercial 
theaters” is far from true.41  Nonetheless, we cannot consider Kyiv’s pattern of 
distribution representative of Ukraine as a whole, and certainly not of the Soviet 
Union as a whole.  Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors was a festival film, 
functioning internationally and domestically to demonstrate the vitality of 
Ukrainian high culture.   
As the film was leaving Kyiv theaters in November, the SKU gathered in 
Plenum, where Levchuk once again praised the film for its “revelation of the 
national originality of culture, everyday life, language, and customs of our 
                                                 
36 Thomas Lahusen, “Socialist Realism in Search of its Shores: Some Historical Remarks on the 
‘Historically Open Aesthetic System of the Truthful Representation of Life,” in Lahusen and 
Evgeny Dobrenko, eds., Socialist Realism without Shores (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1997), 9. 
37 Evhen Kyryliuk, “Pravda, opovyta romantykoiu,” Literaturna Ukraina, 17 September 1965: 3. 
38 Na ekranakh Kieva, 25 September, 2 October, 9 October, 16 October 1965. 
39 As a general rule, factory clubs functioned as second-run movie houses in the Soviet Union, 
where workers could watch popular films for approximately half the price of regular showings. 
40 Na ekranakh Kyeva 
41 Josephine Woll, Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 186. 
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people.”42  Nonetheless, S. P. Ivanov’s statement that “spectators judged the film 
harshly” probably had more resonance in the hall that day.  Indeed, one engineer 
from Dnipropetrovsk wrote a long and derisive letter to the Russian-language 
daily Pravda Ukrainy complaining of the film’s incomprehensible “Ukrainian 
atmosphere.”  Addressing the (unpublished) letter directly to Dovzhenko Studio, 
he wrote:  
I am an ordinary movie watcher, [just] one of the consumers of your 
product [odin iz potrebitelei vashei produktsii], and if you wish to know 
what happened to me during a screening of Shadows of Distant [sic] 
Ancestors, take a bowl of good Ukrainian borshch, put a half kilo of honey 
in it and try to eat it within a half an hour… That will tell you about the 
condition of my brain during the next day…43 
 
While it was not unusual for people writing to journals or newspapers about films 
to identify themselves as non-professionals or “ordinary [riadovoi],” this writer’s 
further delineation of that identity with “consumer” of a “product” indicates how 
Soviet audience politics was changing in the 1960s.  In his analogy to borshch 
and honey, moreover, the writer alluded to the Stalinist folkloric mode of 
representing non-Russians, but in Paradzhanov’s schema, it is mere intellectual 
citation, which, rather than amusing (pace Pyr’ev), becomes nerve-racking for 
spectators.  The engineer from Dnipropetrovsk continued, asking, “For what 
reason do you try to mess with the spectator’s psychological condition? […]  The 
spectator never forgets that he sits in the theater, in a comfortable chair […] and 
that he is the spectator.”  Such a notion of spectatorship was definitively at odds 
with what scholars have identified as the model for media consumption in the 
Soviet Union.  In The Making of the State Reader, Evgenii Dobrenko argues that 
the role of Soviet authority in the realm of culture was to facilitate a proper 
relationship between text and reader, to create or “mould” a new kind of 
reader/spectator in the process.  In this respect, the Soviet spectator was not 
simply a “consumer” or “recipient” of culture, but the “object of reshaping.”44  In 
                                                 
42 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 313, l. 22. 
43 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1829, l. 1. 
44 Evgenii Dobrenko, The Making of the State Reader: Social and Aesthetic  
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approaching the authorities, the engineer, however, made it clear that he did not 
want indoctrination, political or otherwise, during his leisure time; rather, he felt 
invested to speak as a spectator wanting nothing more than comfort and 
entertainment from an engaging plot.  In using the vocabulary of the Soviet 
“mass spectator,” moreover, he further transformed it from the “object of 
reshaping” to the subject of leisure and irony: 
For the first time in my life, I saw how spectators, not by themselves, but in 
rows, got up and left[…]  Someone stated aloud their grandfather’s 
aphorism, “Cross yourself at such a strange sight.”45  In general, the 
audience revealed the most rare unanimity. 
 
At the same time, the engineer was versed in other aspects of Marxist-Leninist 
dialectics to critique the studio on the basis of its own stated goals: first, to 
represent the Ukrainian ethnoscape; and second, to “develop along the traditions 
of Aleksandr Dovzhenko.”  He went on:  
In my view, you develop only the form of Dovzhenko’s art, that is to say, 
the most external level, and attach to this the progress of the highest 
technical know-how.  But Dovzhenko’s art reached such heights [of 
expression] due to the fire of patriotic feelings, and a civic pathos, that is, 
due to the content. 
 
Thus, the engineer ended his critique of Shadows condemning its emptiness, its 
very inability to affect the spectator, to transcend the material world.  “Feelings” 
and “pathos” were the stuff of “content,” while “technique” was located in the 
formal dimensions of the film.  This is not necessarily a “contradiction,” as he 
meant to reject the author’s role in the film by de-emphasizing being (the 
filmmaker’s journey to Hutsul’shchyna) and doing (the filmmaker’s talent or 
authorship) to return to the practical and objective question of what the film 
accomplished.  Here, the answer was simple: The unaffected spectator left the 
theater, unsatisfied.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Contexts of the Reception of Soviet Literature, tr., Jesse M. Savage (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), vii, 2. 
45 The phrase he used was “На яке дыво дывысь, а на це – перехрэстись.”  In writing Ukrainian 
words, the engineer employed the Russian characters, “ы” and “э,” to emulate Ukrainian sounds, 
instead of the correct letters, “и” and “е.”  The standardization of literary Ukrainian, away from the 
former letters, took place during Ukrainianization, and hence contained a connotation of Ukrainian 
“nationalism” to some Russian-speakers in the republic. 
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 In fact, few would deny the filmmakers’ talents, or the film’s political 
importance for Ukrainian “national cinema,” but in speaking for the Ukrainian 
subject-spectator, opponents of Paradzhanov were able to question the film’s 
legacy.  When the SKU met to discuss nominating Shadows for the Shevchenko 
Prize (the highest CPU award for literature and art) on January 5, 1966, various 
members danced around the film, largely because it seemed from their vantage 
point that only foreigners and intellectuals appreciated it.  While certainly a bad 
sign, many at the meeting stated that this did not necessarily exclude the film 
from the Prize, due to the incredible talent of the director and cinematographer.  
Iurii Kondufor, the chair of the CPU Department of Culture, who had to ratify all 
nominations, stated very clearly, however, “No one is nominating this film for the 
Shevchenko Prize.  Argentina celebrated [otmetila] this film, but that in no way 
means that we should get behind it.”46  Later in the meeting, Oleksandr 
Korniichuk made the case even clearer why the film would not be nominated 
despite the support of the entire SKU:  
For the Argentines who watched Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, it was 
important how the cinematographer made the trees spin around[…] but we 
Ukrainians, when we evaluate such a defaced image of the Ukrainian 
people, it’s not pleasant for us.  There is some kind of wild tendencies 
there.  This is not the Ukrainian people.  This film has nothing in common 
with Kotsiubyns’kyi.47 
 
In making this claim, Korniichuk in fact affirmed that the film was intended for a 
specifically Ukrainian audience, but it failed because Shadows instead appealed 
to an international “festival’nyi zritel’.”   
 During a March 1967 Union Plenum, screenwriter and deputy chairman of 
Ukrainian Goskino, Oleksandr Levada, pointed out “the peculiar disproportion 
between the film’s form and content.”  Rather than accuse Shadows of all-out 
formalism, which would have necessitated its condemnation, Levada casually 
noted its lack of a popular audience, with Carpathian spectators in particular 
                                                 
46 Quoted in Blokhin, 68. 
47 Quoted in Ibid., 69. 
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writing “letters of outpourings of displeasure concerning the film.”48  In further de-
emphasizing the production drama, Levada was able to dissect the filmmakers’ 
organic connection with the Carpathian highlanders, and thus complicate the 
film’s claim to authenticity.  Levada brought the film down from the mountain of 
personal expression to “actual” Hutsuls living in “the present [suchasnist’].”  The 
June 1967 issue of Novyny kinoekrana echoed Levada’s concerns, publishing a 
letter from a self-identified Hutsul, Bohdan Chufus.  He wrote,  
Our Carpathians are magical, winding with green forests, filled with the 
roar of the Prut and the Cheremosh.  It has given birth to not only one 
hero: The legendary Oleksa Dovbush fought here, [and] partisans under 
the command of Sydir Kovpak fought for freedom, peace and happiness in 
the forests and villages.  What magical people we have!  No artist – 
[either] painter, composer, or poet – has captured the beauty of the 
Carpathians, the grandeur of the Hutsul’s soul!  And you don’t see any 
films about our country.  Dovzhenko Studio gave us Shadows of Forgotten 
Ancestors – a genuine poem about the life of the Hutsuls, about a pure 
and great love.  But this event was in the past!  We would like to see 
contemporary Hutsuls, who approach the glory of communism with their 
labor.  We are waiting, dear filmmakers, for films about the contemporary 
Carpathians from you.49 
 
In this overdetermined letter, the writer did not deny that particular landscapes 
produce certain types of people, and affirmed the primordial quality of ethnicity; 
nor did Chufus deny the talent of Paradzhanov’s film by drawing attention to 
issues of “formalism” or “abstractionism;” rather, the problem became its very 
distance from actuality.  Chufus still maintained, “You don’t see any films about 
our country,” suggesting that Paradzhanov’s subject was located elsewhere.  
Chufus’s concerns were not for the auteur, but in the film’s very relevance to the 
Carpathian spectator.  Kotsiubyns’kyi’s title, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors in 
fact invited this critique.  The engineer from Dnipropetrovsk, moreover, affirmed 
the subject’s very “distance” with his intentional mistitling.  As I explore in the 
remainder of the chapter, however, Paradzhanov’s and other Ukrainian 
filmmakers’ engagement with the “contemporary theme” proved all the more 
                                                 
48 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 400, l. 152. 
49 Bohdan Chufus, “Lyst do kinomyttsiv,” Novyzny kinoekrana, no. 6 (June 1967), 4. 
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problematic, particularly within the context of the official emergence of the “cult” 
of the Great Patriotic War during 1965. 
 
Ukrainian National Representation and the Politics of Paradzhanov’s 
Genius 
 
As the campaign against Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors emerged in 
1966-67, Paradzhanov experienced another political defeat with his aborted 
production, Kyiv Frescoes.  The latter film proved to be the beginning of the 
director’s undoing, ending with his arrest a decade later.  While he promoted 
Frescoes as a Victory Day film – an homage to Kyiv, the “Hero City”50 – the film 
bore no similarity to parallel works released during this important anniversary 
year.  After 1965, Brezhnev would establish what Nina Tumarkin calls the “cult of 
World War II,” with the naming of new “hero-cities,” the construction of the eternal 
flame on the side of the Kremlin wall, and a number of large monuments on the 
sites of major battles and Nazi atrocities.51  While such sites were simultaneously 
evocative of Soviet heroism and suffering, Paradzhanov’s film seemed to exist 
completely outside of such a narrative. 
In the actor’s trial that Paradzhanov shot with VGIK returnee Oleksandr 
Antypenko in 1965, which essentially killed the production, we see a series of 
four self-contained thematic explorations, introduced and concluded with images 
from the Pechers’ki Region of Southern Kyiv, where both the Caves Monastery 
and Ukraine’s major war memorial are located.  Within the frescoes themselves, 
we see the origins of Paradzhanov as a blicoleur artist, one who would eventually 
produce art from the trash found in his prison cell.  Whereas the director was 
constrained by the Ukrainian literary canon with Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors 
in what he intended as a total exploration of the Hutsul ethnoscape, he used Kyiv 
Frescoes for a fuller investigation of the aesthetic possibilities of combining his 
                                                 
50 Kyiv, along with Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol’, and Stalingrad became Hero-Cities 
(Goroda-heroi) by decree of the Supreme Soviet on May 8, 1965.  Nonetheless, Moscow and 
Kyiv were newer designations, as the other cities had held the semi-official titles of Hero-cities 
since May 1, 1945.  
51 Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in 
Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 143-44. 
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disparate interests in objects and things.  His justification for the apparently 
random assortment of objects and thematic material contained in the Frescoes 
trial insisted that these elements composed the very living material of a city, both 
nationally and historically Ukrainian and multinationally modern.  Yet, in rejecting 
the very specific dimensions of each of these two ideological sites, 
Paradzhanov’s film appeared as an essentially fractured representation of a 
particular space of cultural importance.  Moreover, in its self-reflexive 
juxtaposition of mass culture and high art, Frescoes not only appeared to 
celebrate Kyiv’s existence between history and the contemporary, but also 
affirmed a supposedly bourgeois understanding of an undifferentiated culture of 
consumption. 
The first “fresco” is emblematic of the entire short: Three soldiers pose in 
an empty room save for three paintings Cossack hetmany52 behind them.  The 
mise-en-scène of the shot, as with the trial in general, is artless.  There is even 
lighting, the camera sits at a 90 degree angle to the rear wall.  The scene is 
silent, except for the ambient sound of the three soldiers who walk in.  Each of 
them sits in a wooden chair, and removes their boots.  One of the soldiers wears 
a cowboy hat, and has a handlebar mustache.  After removing the hat, he poses 
with a Cossack bulava.53  While posing, water flows across the uneven 
hardwood floor, and the soldiers begin mopping.  The second part of the trial 
occurs in the same barren room, the center of which now contains a lifeless 
soldier lying on a bed, with a woman and child attending to his body.  A museum-
like picture frame hangs in the foreground of the shot, composing the three in the 
background.  We hear sounds of priests chanting.   
                                                
The second half of the trial continues in the same Soviet interior, but 
becomes more fragmented, mixing filmic citations from Eisenstein and 
Dovzhenko with Orthodox ritual, jazz, a wedding, classical mythology, children’s 
games and Renaissance art.  In an apparent collage of Western and Eastern 
European art objects, Paradzhanov juxtaposes items from the Kyiv Museum of 
 
52 “Hetman “is the Ukrainian Cossack title for the political and military leader of the group.  It is 
equivalent to the Russian, “ataman.” 
53 The bulava is a ceremonial mace that symbolizes the hetman’s power. 
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Western and Eastern Art – vases, busts, Velázquez’s Infanta Margarita – with 
objects from an Orthodox mass – incense, bells and garments.  We cut to a 
contemporary couple in bridal costume.  Their movements are slow, deliberate, 
and highly theatrical, reminiscent of Dovzhenko’s battle scene between the Rus’ 
and Scythians in Zvenyhora.  Finally, in a reference to Potemkin, a baby carriage 
rolls across the screen, empty, except for a black shawl that the bride pulls out.  
We cut to an open book (one of Paradzhanov’s persistent images) with a needle 
on top of it, and then to a boy, composed, like the dead soldier, behind a swaying 
picture frame as he throws paper airplanes at the camera (Figure 4.1).  We cut to 
a series of people holding Orthodox icons as a boy dressed in Angel’s wings 
cranks an antique gramophone.  A black couple dances to jazz.  A nude female 
stands motionless in the frame, with birch logs separating her standing body from 
a man lying on the floor.  The trial ends with a montage of churches from the 
Caves Monastery complex, seemingly presented as an afterthought, reminding 
the spectator of the film’s intentions to present an “image of Kyiv.”   
After I viewed the short film at the Oleksandr Dovzhenko National Film 
Center in Kyiv, the archivist explained that Kyiv Frescoes was “only a trial 
[proba],” not intended to function as a complete film.  Indeed, when reading the 
screenplay, we realize that the story does contain a hero, identified only by 
“person [chelovek].”  “Person” is a filmmaker living in an apartment building 
overlooking Ploshcha Peremohy, who has recently been divorced from his wife 
and is searching throughout Kyiv for the subject of his next film.  Such 
autobiographical material would characterize each of Paradzhanov’s subsequent 
films, wherein the director situates the “portrait of the artist” within a particular 
ethnic tapestry – Armenia for Sayat-Nova, Georgia for The Legend of Surami 
Fortress (Legenda Suramskoi fortretsy, 1984), and Azerbaijan for Ashik-Kerib 
(1988).  Nonetheless, the “trial” that existed in the film archive functioned as a 
foretelling excerpt of what Kyiv Frescoes would have looked like, had 





Figure 4.1. Random randomness in Paradzhanov’s Kyiv Frescoes (1965) 
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represented verbatim in the shooting script.54  Moreover, Paradzhanov edited the 
“trial” as a short film for public screenings, after it became obvious that Goskino 
would not permit the completion of the film.55  The purpose of a “trial” was to test 
various actors’ abilities to play a given role.  Here, we see only parodies of 
acting, only self-reflection about the function of the images.  In his next film, 
Sayat-Nova, made at Armenfil’m in 1968, we see the realization of 
Paradzhanov’s aesthetic of self-reflexivity and bricolage.  Humans dressed in 
period costume appear on a plain set with beautiful objects, artlessly presenting 
the audience with a representation of symbolic motifs related to the title 
character.  When presenting the latter film to a group of “creative and scientific 
youth” in Minsk on December 1, 1971, Paradzhanov indicated this new aesthetic 
principle: “Sayat-Nova was filmed from a single spot[…] not adjusting light, color, 
not adjusting the optics, from a single spot[…] The picture is terribly static[…] and 
for this it is very dear to me.”56  With Kyiv Frescoes, Paradzhanov had returned 
full circle to the Stalinist literary infatuation with “things and objects,” but within a 
completely surrealist mode.  His images were increasingly divorced from the 
specifics of cinema (depth, movement, montage), and approach an aesthetic of 
modernist metatheater with its own self-reflexive “theatricality.”57  Reading Kyiv 
Frescoes through this later project, we perceive that, rather than a trial, the short 
                                                 
54 See Paradzhanov’s shooting script, TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 2, d. 2280. 
55 According to James Steffen, the Kyiv Frescoes trial screened at Kyiv Dom kino as part of a 
retrospective on Paradzhanov’s work between December 3, 1965 and January 14, 1966.  James 
Steffen, “A Cardiogram of the Time: Sergei Parajanov and the Politics of Nationality and 
Aesthetics in the Soviet Union,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Emory University, 2005), 199. 
56 “Sergei Paradzhanov’s Speech in Minsk before the Creative and Scientific Youth of Byelorussia 
on 1 December 1971,” tr. Nora Seligman Favorov and P. Elana Pick, Armenian Review 47, nos. 
3-4, 48, nos. 1-2 (2001-2002), 18. 
57 Alan Ackerman and Martin Puchner argue that one of the means by which modernist theater 
attempted to reject “theatricality” was in an insistence on theater’s artifice, and an embellishment 
in self-reflexivity.  Modernist theater called attention to the presence of the audience, frequently 
addressing spectators directly.  Alan Ackerman and Martin Puchner, “Introduction: Modernism 
and Anti-Theatricality,” in Against Theatre: Creative Destructions on the Modernist Stage 
(Basingstroke UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 4.  In Paradzhanov’s mobilization of theatrical 
elements in his later films, he meant to cite Ukrainian “theatricality” of the 1950s, drawing 
attention to its artifice, while opening acknowledging its spectacular allure.  In this way, Sayat-
Nova was not simply anti-theatricality in the ways that Ackerman and Puchner identify, but a post-
theatricality that was not only aware of its effect, but also admiring of its form. See also in this 
volume, Elinor Fuchs, “Clown Shows: Anti-Theatricalist Theatricalism in Four Twentieth-Century 
Plays,” in Ackerman and Puchner, 39-57. 
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film Paradzhanov presented to the studio, Ukrainian Goskino and a select public 
at Kyiv Dom kino in December and January 1965-66 was the expression of a 
director who now felt entirely comfortable moving outside of the realm of Soviet 
aesthetic and narrative conventions.  The short’s bookends of war memorials and 
churches are all that returns us to a Soviet cinematic commonplace.  The 
question that emerges from this highly experimental and, indeed, personal, 
project is how Kyiv Frescoes made it as far as it did, despite reservations about it 
at all levels of the Soviet film industry. 
Throughout the project, Paradzhanov maintained that the film was 
intended to represent Kyiv during and after the war; that he was lending his 
genius to “contemporary” concerns: the memorialization of the war.  When it 
became evident to everyone that this was not Paradzhanov’s intention with the 
film, Goskino in particular questioned the film.  Deputy Chairman of Goskino, 
Vladimir Baskakov, wrote to S. P. Ivanov in August 1965: 
We can’t forget that the film’s action takes place in Kyiv, a city that 
experienced a heavy siege [osada], encirclement, and occupation, which 
became an arena for an intense battle, and in 1943, the Soviet Army’s 
victory.  All of this is missing in the screenplay.58 
 
Baskakov noted that there was “no Kyiv” in the screenplay.  In September, 
Ivanov issued a statement that the shooting script could not “be considered a 
completed and valuable basis for a future film about Kyivans and Kyiv.”59  In 
Paradzhanov’s highly personal and abstract conceptions of the city, Goskino 
found his project divorced, not only from the ideological basis of the Victory Day 
celebrations, but also from the studio’s identity within the framework of “national 
cinemas” in the USSR.  
 At the same time, the director’s identity as an auteur, who helped forge 
Dovzhenko Studio’s movement away from the Stalinist folkloric and toward a new 
mode and space of national representation, provided him with a free hand in 
developing the project apart from the complicated bureaucratic system of double 
and triple levels of approval for each stage in the production process.  When 
                                                 
58 TsDAMLMU, f. 1127, op. 1, d. 172, l. 82. 
59 TsDAVOU, f. 4754, op. 1, d. 47, l. 179. 
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Paradzhanov submitted his screenplay to the studio in April, for example, the 
Screenplay Editorial Board urged the director to “consider the general 
conception” of the future film, but issued a broader statement to industry officials 
to resist any “rude interventions or rigid counsel.”60  Shadows cinematographer 
Iurii Illienko called the screenplay “pure auteur [avtorskoe] cinema”: 
Such a screenplay has appeared because it was the physiological 
necessity of the author to express [it].  Therefore, the screenplay cannot 
be bad.  It can’t be a failure.  If it was my will, I’d get a group together and 
shoot a screenplay [literaturnaia stsenariia], even without a shooting script 
[rezhiserskaia stsenariia].61 
 
Paradzhanov continually asserted his intellectual independence, becoming 
increasingly irate with any suspicion as to his intentions.  To advance his 
unorthodox method, he called for the establishment of an “experimental 
studio[…] in the quest for the new.”62  Clearly, Paradzhanov’s idea for an 
“experimental studio” was based on Grigorii Chukhrai’s Experimental Studio at 
Mosfil’m, established during the previous year.  Whereas Chukhrai’s 
“experiment” aimed to correlate production and profit, Paradzhanov demanded 
Kyiv Studio follow with an “experimental studio” invested with “taking risks.”63  
Paradzhanov’s idea was similar to Chukhrai’s, however, in that both sought a 
method of filmmaking “vne kolektiva (outside of the collective),” believing that an 
“experimental studio” could function as an alternative space of cultural 
production.   
There were certainly precedents for “vne kolektiva” cultural production 
emerging in the late 1950s and early 1960s, such as the Kyiv “Klub tvorchoi 
molodi (Club of Creative Youth),” which existed under the tutelage of the 
Ukrainian Komsomol.  As Heorhii Kas'ianov points out, the KTM was an 
opportunity for the Komsomol to monitor non-SPU activity among young people, 
while still offering the youth an opportunity to engage in experimentation that 
                                                 
60 TsDAMLMU, f. 1127, op. 1, d. 172, l. 4. 
61 Ibid., l. 15.  
62 Ibid., l. 16. 
63 The “Experimental Studio” was to be one of the testing grounds for Libermanesque economic 
reforms, along with Khrushchev’s garment factories and the many other “experimental” 
enterprises, mostly in light industry, that sprung up in the mid-1960s.    
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would be frowned upon within the official sphere.  A "Second Ukrainian Theater" 
was organized under the KTM, where there were not only performances by 
students studying at the conservatory and KITM, but also a Kyiv Jazz group, 
history lectures, and poetry readings.64  We should not, however, restrict our 
understanding of “vne kolektiva” to youth organizations and a nascent dissident 
ideology, as Kas’ianov suggests in his book on the Ukrainian “resistance 
movement [rukh oporu].”  Sigismund Navrotskii, who actively fought for resolving 
the “problem of cadres” in Ukrainian cinema, became an active opponent of 
“youth experimentation” and perhaps the most recognizable Neo-Stalinist at 
Dovzhenko Studio during the later 1960s.  For example, Navrotskii called “six 
years in prison” for Ivan Dziuba’s speech at the Shadows premier a “liberal 
measure.”65  Nonetheless, he too fancied himself an auteur, continually calling 
for the elimination of “a whole series of instructions, which take root in our 
everyday lives and do not give us the possibility to live and work freely and 
creatively.”66  In speaking against Vasyl’ Tsvirkunov’s regimentation of thematic
plans during a Union meeting, Navrotskii complained that when the studio “pins a




t years:  
                                                
67  Speaking during 
Plenum of the SKU in 1962, Navrotskii attempted to explain why he had become 
more of a “critic” than filmmaker in recen
No creative worker… has any desire to work according to a plan [rabotat’ 
po planu]; they have their own personal creative plan; they want to do 
such things closer to themselves [lit.: “in their biography”].  They don’t 
want to be embarrassed in front of [other] people.  I am deeply convinced 
that it is necessary to do [things] exactly in this way.  But there is also 
another working principle: the principle of working on whatever earns 
[money].  This doesn’t suit me.68 
 
He advocated that the studio provide the opportunity for a select group of 
talented directors to work “ne po planu” and “vne kolektiva,” with only the “Party 
 
64 Heorhii Kas'ianov, Nezhodni: ukrains'ka intelihentsiia v rusi oporu 1960-80-kh rokiv (Kyiv: 
Lybid', 1995), 19. 
65 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 345, l. 23. 
66 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 198, l. 15. 
67 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 228, l. 7. 
68 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 199, l. 67. 
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Program” to guide them.69  Yet Navrotskii’s “personal” conception for a film, an 
“exploration of the international character of the October Revolution,” was in no 
way similar to that of Paradzhanov’s symbolist conception contained in Kyiv 
Frescoes, even if we accept that the latter film was in fact “about Kyiv.”  The 
studio never gave Navrotskii the opportunity to make his film about the October 
Revolution, and he instead began working on an unlikely topic for this Polish old 
Bolshevik.  Across the Blue Sea (Po sinnemu moriu) was to be a film about the 
“internationalist” dimensions of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in their struggle 
against the “Turkish Beys.”70  Navrotskii resisted making the film, but his lack of 
work was costing him and his family needed income.  In 1964, he took on a 
project about a group whose history, he believed, “should have been 
repressed.”71  
 In this resistance to Ukrainian “national themes,” however, we see a 
similarity that these two highly dissimilar filmmakers shared: Both Navrotskii and 
Paradzhanov were uneasy with making films exclusively for an agenda that 
privileged “national” representation at the expense of personal expression.  After 
reading the shooting script in July, studio opinion on Kyiv Frescoes had shifted to 
some degree, although the leadership remained committed to promoting the film, 
largely because of the auteur behind it.  The manner of critique is instructive for 
what the studio expected from Paradzhanov after his success with Shadows.  
Most speakers complained that they “didn’t see Kyiv” in the script.  Pavlychko, for 
example, was concerned with the “cosmopolitanism” of the imagery, of its lack of 
a “Kyivan, a purely Ukrainian image.”72  Vasyl’ Zemliak stressed that, like all 
directors at the studio, “Paradzhanov has to think with Dovzhenko’s 
categories.”73  The message was clear: Paradzhanov’s personal expression was 
to be encouraged, but he had to work within the framework of Ukrainian national 
cinema in his choice of thematics and mode of representation, a mode for which 
                                                 
69 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 268, l. 155. 
70 The film was halted in production during 1964, for unknown reasons.  See the shooting script: 
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he himself had established the precedent with Shadows.  In its decision to pass 
the shooting script on to Goskino, the studio opted to emphasize “personal 
expression” over “national” representation, however, asking Moscow to pass the 
script into production on the basis that such a “risky experiment” was “possible 
and justified only because of the interesting and original mark of the artist who 
stands behind it.”74   
 When Goskino saw the results of Paradzhanov’s “mark,” and those results 
did not correspond either to the tolerated formal edginess and method of seeing 
nationality, contained in Shadows, interest in the filmmaker’s character 
transformed into character assassination.  In the midst of this conflict surrounding 
Kyiv Frescoes, the SKU Presidium met to discuss Paradzhanov’s “conduct.”  
Ukrainian film critic Viacheslav Kudin noted that the director had  
dug himself into a political, moral, and civil hole [during the production of 
Kyiv Frescoes].  We have only to listen to how he conducts conversations 
among students, how he used foul language around women.  If we don’t 
pay attention to all this, the issue with comrade Paradzhanov can acquire 
a serious character.75 
 
As an auteur, whose work now dealt, to a greater degree, with his own interests 
and personality, Paradzhanov’s public conduct was subject to the same scrutiny 
as his political beliefs.  During the Kyiv Frescoes fiasco, Zemliak characterized 
Paradzhanov as “one of those artists who easily hypnotizes those around him,” 
and was concerned that the director was developing an “entourage [otochennia]” 
of young people at the studio.76   
To contextualize Paradzhanov’s arrest and imprisonment eight years later, 
we have to take into account how the director’s personal character and aesthetic 
sensibilities were part of a continuum.  “Ukrainian poetic cinema,” the self-
conscious movement that emerged at Dovzhenko Studio from Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors, was not simply a new aesthetic platform of national 
representation; rather, it was a means of defining “national cinema” in relation to 
an individual auteur.  Due to the international importance in the 1960s of auteur 
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cinema in France, Italy and Germany, along with the conscious designs of film 
critics and filmmakers themselves, the “Auteur Theory” came to dominate 
discussion of the very meaning of “national cinema” in Europe and North 
America.  In fact, auteurs like Jean-Luc Godard in France, Rainer Werner 
Fassbinder in West Germany and Federico Fellini in Italy came to embody their 
nations to an educated, international public during the 1960s and 1970s.77  The 
presence of an auteur like Paradzhanov at Dovzhenko Studio was the principle 
means through which its management sought to escape from the Stalinist 
folkloric, without compromising the goal of national representation, and to mark 
off national cinema from central genre production.  Yet, in Paradzhanov’s 
increasing refusal to participate in this collective project, with his largely 
superficial mobilization of the local in Kyiv Frescoes, his conduct, which befitted a 
“cosmopolitan,” grew ever more problematic to the CPU, Goskino and studio 
authorities. 
While I do not intend to address his arrest and imprisonment in this 
dissertation, I find it instructive to mention that the director was charged publicly 
with indecent conduct, in particular with spreading syphilis to those same young 
men who admired him a little too much after making Shadows of Forgotten 
Ancestors.  Paradzhanov’s arrest was announced in the Ukrainian-language 
daily, Vechirnii Kyiv, under the heading, “In the Name of the Law,” alongside 
other arrests for drunkenness and various violations of public order.  The article, 
penned by the First Deputy to the Head Prosecutor in Kyiv, stated that the film 
director “led an immoral type of life, ruined his family, converted his apartment 
into a den [rus. pryton] of depravity, and resorted to sexual corruption[…]”78  
Thus, Paradzhanov’s private space was implicated as a particular component of 
his “vne kolektiva” lifestyle.  In Paradzhanov’s case, as well as that of Navrotskii, 
“vne kolektiva” implied a separation from the confines of the studio, the latter an 
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official space invested solidly in a collective enterprise of Ukrainian national 
representation. 
 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko and “Ukrainian Poetic Cinema”  
 
As Zemliak implied during a discussion of Kyiv Frescoes (see above), the 
director of Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors had tarnished his reputation as the 
bearer of “Dovzhenko’s categories.”  The original Ukrainian auteur, as Soviet film 
historian Nikolai Lebedev suggested in his Outline on the History of Cinema in 
the USSR, Oleksandr Dovzhenko came to embody the discursive intentions of 
the studio that later bore his name.79  Ukrainian film critic Borys Buriak wrote 
that, before Dovzhenko, there was no “Ukrainian national cinema,” only directors 
who came to work in Ukraine.80  One of the frequent critiques of the studio in the 
early 1960s was that Kyiv had failed to live up to its namesake’s standa
Screenwriter Mykola Zarudnyi, for example, stated during the March 1962 SKU 
Plenum that he felt “Oleksandr Petrovych’s displeasure” upon entering the studio 
grounds where a bust of the filmmaker stood.
rds.  
                                                
81  Thus, at the beginning of the 
decade, national embodiment was grounded particularly within Dovzhenko’s 
individual character, perhaps to an equal degree as it was within his work.   
Critics and filmmakers celebrated Oleksandr Dovzhenko, not only for his 
choice of Ukrainian subject matter, but primarily for his unique style.  In 
distinction, Ukrainian cinema boosterism of the early 1960s viewed Dovzhenko’s 
style within a continuum of personal expression and national representation.  
While Paradzhanov promoted himself as the hand-picked successor to 
Dovzhenko in his Iskusstvo kino article, “Eternal Motion,” he did not believe that 
“poetic cinema” could be contained by “narrowly national” concerns.  Kyiv could 
be represented in a different manner than could have happened previously, not 
because of what Kyiv was or had become, but due to changes in the world of 
 
79 See my discussion of Lebedev and Dovzhenko in Chapter 1. 
80 Boris Buriak, “Internatsional’noe – ne beznatsional’noe,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 2  
(February 1964), 30. 
81 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 199, l. 76. 
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artistic representation, which touched Ukraine, the Soviet Union and Western 
Europe in similar ways.  He told his colleagues,  
Seven year ago, when I worked with [Petro] Lubenskii [screenwriter on 
The Top Guy], I couldn’t do what I wanted to.  I didn’t know how.  I was 
less literate.  Today, when there’s Fellini, Illienko, there’s Father of a 
Soldier, when there are five-six great poets in Ukraine[…]  I understand 
how to start to make new films at the studio, when Osyka and Illienko 
have appeared at the studio.  We have a great big responsibility.82 
 
While Paradzhanov routinely made use of the term “poetic cinema” to define his 
work alongside that of Iurii Illienko and Leonid Osyka, the attachment of the word 
“Ukrainian” was less essential for him.  He was as much interested in the term as 
it applied to other auteurs like Fellini, poet-filmmaker Pier Paolo Pasolini, and 
Andrei Tarkovskii as he was the self-conscious student of the “poet of cinema” 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko.  Yet the Soviet and Ukrainian context for “poetic cinema” 
was fundamentally entangled in the life and legacy of Dovzhenko, not only 
because Dovzhenko Studio continually drudged up his name for emulation but 
also as legitimating “poetic cinema’s” aesthetic and “political” agenda within the 
particular space of Ukraine. 
 When celebration of Paradzhanov’s “authentic” image of Hutsul’shchyna 
shifted to complaints about his film’s lack of a mass audience, ostensibly 
because it was difficult to understand, it was not solely about accusations of 
“formalism” and audience politics, just as audience politics was not solely about 
audience desire.  After all, the average Soviet film in the mid-1960s was a box 
office failure.  For the moment, this remained a problem for the organs of 
distribution, and did not constitute an explicitly political problem.  By contrast, 
those who initiated the reaction against Shadows beginning in early 1966 played 
the audience card to distance mainstream production at Dovzhenko Studio from 
what was soon labeled “Ukrainian poetic cinema.”  During 1965 and 1966, the 
most contentious two films made at Dovzhenko Studio were in production, which, 
combined with the Ukrainian intelligentsia’s response to the arrests of August-
September 1965 over the course of the following year, established a certain 
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polarized atmosphere at the studio.  Nonetheless, Illienko’s and Illiashenko’s 
films went into production of the basis of promoting personal expression and a 
Ukrainian national theme, two principles that emerged from the marriage of Thaw 
principles and a reinvenstment in the “national character” of republican film 
production, both of which existed on the margins of official policy in Moscow and 
Kyiv.   
Illienko’s directorial debut, A Well for the Thirsty (Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh, 
1966, released 1988), was shelved by the end of 1966, while production was 
halted on Illiashenko’s Coordinate your Watches (Pereverte svoi hodynyky, 
1966) around the same time.  While diverse in style, both directors considered 
their work to be the heirs of Dovzhenko’s Zvenyhora, on the one hand, and 
Paradzhanov’s Shadows on the other.  Paradzhanov, for his part, actively used 
his prestige to promote their work, calling on the studio to establish a conscious 
policy for cultivating “poetic cinema.”83  During this short period of two years, the 
idea of “poetic cinema” took on an all-important dimension of how filmmakers at 
the studio defined their work.  Illiashenko, for example, pleaded his case for such 
a difficult film with the words: “It’s necessary to consider that each game has its 
rules, which you can’t but consider.  This also has its rules, and it’s necessary to 
judge it accordingly.”84  As Leonid Osyka was completing work on his remake of 
Illiashenko’s film, Love Awaits Those Who Return (Khto povernetsia – doliubyt’) 
in 1966, he answered complaints that his film was mere imitation of Paradzhanov 
with, “This is in agreement with the genre of poetic cinema.”85 
 While no one had yet stated that “poetic cinema” was a “genre,” Osyka’s 
statement would have made perfect sense to his friends and critics at Dovzhenko 
Studio.  Denysenko proclaimed in 1964 that one could divide the production of 
the studio into two varieties: those that were merely “imitative” of film production 
in Moscow, and those that contained a “cinema poetics [kinopoetika],” which 
appealed to “Dovzhenko’s traditions.”86  On a literal level, the films that 
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Denysenko referenced, and those that later came to be identified with “poetic 
cinema” were themselves written by poets.  Denysenko’s A Dream was written 
by Dmytro Pavlychko, and Shadows screenwriter, Ivan Chendei, was a poet and 
collector of Carpathian folklore.  Ivan Drach and Lina Kostenko, the authors of 
Illienko’s and Illiashenko’s films, were the two most prominent representatives of 
the young generation of Ukrainian poets during the 1960s.  Kostenko was, 
moreover, the wife of Vasyl’ Tsvirkunov.  Thus, poets and filmmakers came 
together at Kyiv studio like nowhere else in the Soviet Union.  While poetry 
received renewed attention during the Thaw, with such celebrity poets as Evgenii 
Evtushenko, Andrei Voznesenskii and Bella Akhmadulina emerging during this 
time, they remained noticeably absent from the film industry.87 
 A second factor that we see in Denysenko’s statement was “poetic 
cinema’s” claim to Dovzhenko’s legacy.  Both Denysenko and Paradzhanov 
studied under the aging filmmaker at VGIK during his final years.  As the 
Dovzhenko Septuagennial drew near in 1964, everyone at the studio had some 
claim to the filmmaker’s legacy, whether that was a direct pedagogical 
relationship, a chance encounter, or simply an aesthetic affinity.  In this latter 
claim, filmmakers opened the discussion about “poetic cinema” as a particularly 
Ukrainian phenomenon, but which initially participated in one of the most official 
commemorations of the mid-1960s.  In the years leading up to the anniversary 
year, Dovzhenko’s role in Ukrainian cinema took on mythological proportions.  
He became the foremost pre-war Ukrainian filmmaker, the embittered victim of 
the “personality cult,” a writer who carried on the Ukrainian traditions of 
Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, a member of Soviet cinema’s Holy Trinity 
alongside Sergei Eisenstein and Vsevolod Pudovkin, and the “inventor,” 
according to Pavlychko, of an aesthetic movement known as “poetic cinema.”88  
While “poetic cinema” functioned more broadly in Soviet critical debates about 
the re-examination of modernism and the early twentieth century avant-garde, its 
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association with Dovzhenko imparted a clear nationalistic value to the term in 
Ukraine. 
In Chapter 1, I examined how Dovzhenko’s early work was conversant 
with Ukrainian modernism.  At the same time, his later work came increasingly to 
be identified with an outmoded Stalinist aesthetic for Thaw-era critics.  By the 
early 1960s, Dovzhenko’s position in Soviet and Ukrainian culture had been 
redeemed entirely, and critics praised his work like never before.  The director’s 
Civil War epic, Shchors (1939), about Ukrainian Bolshevik leader Mykola 
Shchors who died fighting Symon Petliura’s nationalist army in 1919, held 
particular weight in 1960s discussions of Dovzhenko’s contribution to “poetic 
cinema.”  Film critic Semën Ginzberg stated that Shchors was the only film of its 
time that completely escaped from the “cult of personality.”89  Although Stalin 
himself commissioned Dovzhenko to make the film, suggesting to him that it 
should be the “Ukrainian Chapaev,” the result bore little similarity to the Vasil’ev 
Brothers’ 1934 blockbuster.  With its mix of the Eisensteinian monumentalism of 
Aleksandr Nevskii and Ivan Groznyi and the Stalinist folkloric of Savchenko’s 
historical films, Shchors comes to exemplify Katerina Clark’s notion of socialist 
realism’s “modal schizophrenia,” with “its proclivity for making sudden, 
unmotivated transitions from realistic discourse to the mythic or utopian.”90  The 
most powerful figure in the film was not the leader figure, as in Savchenko’s and 
Eisenstein’s epics, but a fictional character, an old Ukrainian peasant named 
Vasyl’ Bozhenko who joins the red partisans, and imparts a degree of “folk 
wisdom” to Shchors’s strategy.  While such characters were ubiquitous in the 
historical-biographical genre, nowhere do they dominate the narrative and 
imagery to such an extent as in Dovzhenko’s film.   
In the critical language of the 1960s, Shchors was the film in which 
Dovzhenko most successfully combined socialist realism with his own brand of 
“cinema poetry.”  It was in this realm of the “poetic” – the space that Bozhenko 
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inhabited in the film – that the folkloric elements were contained.  To state the 
case simplistically, Dovzhenko’s “poetics” referred to his use of extra-narrative 
elements of spectacle, what Kristin Thompson referred to as “excess” in 
Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, Part 2.91  In critics’ referral to Dovzhenko as the 
“poet of cinema,”92 however, they privileged these elements of folkloric excess, 
which suggested a fundamental difference in his aesthetic outlook from others 
who employed folkloric representations during Stalinism.  Dovzhenko’s distinction 
as the “poet of cinema” implied that the containment of the folkloric – its 
domestication, as I refer in Chapter 1 – was not certain in his work.  According to 
several critics, Dovzhenko’s films were “plotless [bezfabul’nyi],” and his use of 
the folkloric image threatened to inhibit the structure of the narrative, and thus 
skirted the boundaries of formalism.  Yet, according to a 1964 conference 
dedicated to strengthening “Dovzhenko studies [dovzhenkovedenie]” in film 
criticism, it was this very “plotlessness” that made the director so necessary for 
early Soviet cinema.93  Clearly, Nekrasov’s counterpositioning of the Thaw-era 
problematic of “sincere” realism and Dovzhenko’s Stalinist aesthetic was no 
longer relevant to Soviet critics by the mid-1960s (see, Chapter one). 
At Dovzhenko Studio, where “speaking in the language of Dovzhenko” 
was stated studio policy in the 1960s, a “soft” claim to the filmmaker’s legacy 
meant a continued commitment to representing a local and national space, and 
that Dovzhenko Studio in particular had an exclusive claim to Ukrainian 
thematics.  To make a “hard” claim to Dovzhenko suggested that the only 
possible representation of Ukrainians was within the “genre” of “poetic cinema,” 
that is, in implementation of a modernist and counter-realist “poetics.”  As I 
suggested at the outset of this chapter, the difference between “soft” and “hard” 
claims to Dovzhenko’s legacy were also contained in an understanding of film 
style as, in the former case, a collective mode of representation attached to the 
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studio’s “mark” or “branding,” and, in the latter case, determined by personal 
expression and attached to the “mark” of individual authorship.  Several remarks 
made during studio and SKU gatherings in the mid-1960s indicated the 
emergence of a polarized atmosphere among Ukrainian filmmakers on the issue 
of “poetic cinema.”  Film director Oleksandr Muratov, in discussing the “two 
tendencies in Ukrainian cinema” at a Union Plenum in late-1965, complained that 
“some comrades” believed that only “expressive” films can represent the 
Ukrainian ethnoscape, while films about “real life” are somehow not national.94  
Oleksandr Syzonenko made a similarly polarizing remark from the other side 
during the March 1962 SKU Plenum.  The screenwriter and editor at Dovzhenko 
Studio recalled the “violent struggle in the thirties” between the “poets of cinema,” 
which he associated with Dovzhenko, Eisenstein and Pudovkin, and the “realists 
or prosaists,” who rallied behind film director Sergei Iutkevich.  Syzonenko 
continued, “Eisenstein is no more, Pudovkin is no more, and Dovzhenko is no 
more, but Iutkevich remained, and it has not been the best side of our cinema 
that has remained.”95   
It is easy to read into Muratov’s and Syzenenko’s remarks the existence of 
such a divide between “poetic” and “realist” conceptions of Ukrainian cinema at 
the time, but it was in fact an “old” divide, as Ivan Pyr’ev noted in response at the 
Plenum, and one which initially had very little to do with Ukraine.  While the 
origins of “poetic cinema” lie in French avant-garde film criticism during the early 
1920s, the concept first appeared in the Soviet Union through the Russian 
Formalists, specifically Iurii Tynianov and Viktor Shklovskii.96  In the formalist 
tract on cinema, Film Poetics (Poetika kino, 1927), Shklovskii identified the two 
“genres” of cinema as poetry and prose, asserting, “Plotless cinema is ‘verse’ 
cinema.”97  In comparing the “formal and technical” with the “semantic,” 
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Shklovskii privileged the visual over the narrative elements of a film.  Although 
such ideas were rejected by the mid-1930s, with “formalism” functioning as a 
pejorative for “elite” art, and in distinction to socialist realism, Shklovskii 
continued to be a significant writer and teacher into the 1970s, even guiding Ivan 
Drach’s thesis work at the Screenwriting Institute (Vyshii stsenarnyi kurs) at 
Mosfil’m.98 
While Dovzhenko famously said, “I belong to the poetic camp,” his own 
influences were not as clearly “formalist” as that of Eisenstein’s and of other 
members of Proletkult and the constructivists.  In re-fashioning the meaning of 
the “poetic” for a later Thaw vocabulary, Efim Dobin’s The Poetics of Film Art 
(Poetika kinoiskusstva) is instructive for understanding Dovzhenko’s place in this 
new debate.  Beginning with the premises that “style dictates meaning,” and that 
“image-meaning” is an important perspective for critical analysis, Dobin 
attempted a historical examination into the question of “poetics,” focusing in 
particular on the “dovzhenkoist [dovzhenkovkii]” image, which he claimed was a 
problem of mise-en-scene rather than montage or narrative (thus excluding early 
Eisenstein and Pudovkin).99  In revisiting the poetic / prosaic conflict of the 20s 
and 30s, Dobin called “narrative” and “metaphor” “two different paths, two 
different principles in correlation, in combination, in reciprocal association of the 
general and the particular [edinichnyi] in an artistic cinematic image.”100  
 While successful in the mid-1920s, Dobin argued that the “poetic school” 
declined in the later part of the decade due to the complete dissociation of the 
metaphor from the narrative, as occurred in Eisenstein’s October in particular.  
Demonstrating a familiarity with both the Formalists, and the French avant-garde, 
Dobin wrote, “The avant-gardists’ attempts to create a ‘pure,’ poetic, plotless 
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cinema cannot but end in failure.  It was a utopian and groundless task.”101  The 
French avant-garde filmmaker Jean Epstein, whose theories had the most lasting 
effect on the Formalists, “attempted to develop a certain mystical, pantheistic 
conception of poetic cinema, in [their] aspiration toward philosophical depth.”102  
Dobin complained along similar lines regarding October, arguing that Eisenstein 
increased the role of metaphor to the extent that the people [narod] themselves 
became nothing more than their metaphorical significance.103  Thus, Eisenstein’s 
fetish of the metaphor in his work from 1927 to 1936 had dual significance: First, 
his stylistic excess “marked off the metaphor from the second originary element 
of art [i.e., the “narrative-psychological”],” and second, the “masses” in 
Eisenstein’s October embody transcendental meaning – elements of a 
spiritualized natural landscape – rather than human subjects.  There were no 
personages, much less heroes – only metaphoric conception.104  While 
disavowing such abstractionism, Dobin refused to subscribe to Sergei Iutkevich’s 
notion that “poetic cinema” was only an “elite” form of intellectual 
“connoisseurism,” distant from the masses.105  Dobin, thus, opened the space for 
a new theory of “poetic cinema,” removed from both the debates between 
Eisenstein and Iutkevich, which helped articulate socialist realism, and from the 
now-false dichotomy that Nekrasov proposed in light of the Twentieth Party 
Congress.  Dobin suggested instead that an emphasis on visual style and 
metaphor did not necessarily disrupt a film’s realism.   
Not until the posthumous re-appraisal of Dovzhenko’s role in Soviet cinema 
would his identity as the “poet of cinema” re-emerge.  Instead of the mouthpiece 
of the “cult” that Nekrasov suggested in “Words, Great and Simple,” Dovzhenko 
was now the embittered victim of Stalinism, who nonetheless managed to resist 
its influence on his work, even the work most directly associated with Stalin.  
Dobin examined Shchors to explore Dovzhenko’s mature poetics, a space where 
                                                 
101 Ibid., 57-59. 
102 Ibid., 30-31. 
103 Efim Dobin, “Sud’ba metafora v kino,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 2 (Feb 1964), 17. 
104 Eisenstein, of course, responded with Aleksandr Nevskii, which combined his interest in 
montage with a heroic narrative. 
105 Quoted in Dobin, “Poeticheskoe i prozaicheskoe v kino,” 91. 
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the filmmaker’s modernist disposition was tempered by tribute to a heroic, party-
minded leader and his folksy, peasant sidekick.  In discussing this particular film, 
however, Dobin was able to isolate and praise Dovzhenko’s anti-realist aesthetic 
contained in the scene of Bozhenko’s funeral, affirming the importance of 
Dovzhenko’s personal authorship in the scene’s very “constructedness 
[sostroennost’]”106 and stylization: “It is completely obvious that A. Dovzhenko did 
not attempt at accuracy, not even at resemblance...  All the scene’s components 
are in complete harmony with its high, ceremonial, poetic construction.”107  Dobin 
made a further point about Dovzhenko’s construction of the landscape: He 
showed that Ukrainian nature itself dictated such a construction: 
The blossoming sunflowers across the entire screen is a favorite image of 
his native Ukrainian nature…  Nature in Dovzhenko’s [work] is never a 
passive space of action.  The landscape is itself metaphorical.  It 
peculiarly “accompanies” the transparent theme of the majority of 
Dovzhenko’s films – the theme of the liberation of his native Ukraine from 
forces hostile to it.  In the landscape elements of Dovzhenko’s films is the 
image of his native land, its eternal creative force.  In this way, it is 
poetic.108   
 
Two primordial elements stand out in Dobin’s praise of Dovzhenko’s Shchors, 
both of which are irrelevant to the heroic story, and in many cases serve as 
counterpoints to the narrative: the peasant Bozhenko, drawn from Dovzhenko’s 
autobiography (resembling his grandfather and uncle, according to the director), 
and the quality of the landscape.  The funeral scene (Figure 4.2) connects both 
elements in a trans-historical moment as young soldiers carry the peasant’s body 
over a suddenly peaceful Ukrainian steppe.  The funeral is “poetic” not only due 
to questions of form – the use of visual metaphor, in particular – but more 
frequently encapsulates the particular content that is capable of embodying such 
formal properties.   
 
                                                 
106 See, Chapter 1.  Pomerantsev blamed Stalinist literature for its “sostroennost’.”   
107 Dobin, Poetika, 109-10. 
108 Ibid., 113-14. 
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Figure 4.2. Vasyl’ Bozhenko’s funeral in Shchors (1939) 
 
 With his affirmative Ukrainian ethnoscape, which refused to domesticate 
national color, placing it instead at the center of political action, along with his 
films’ anti-realist qualities, Dovzhenko easily played into concerns about the 
“traditions” of Ukrainian cinema, while his modernism lent credence to an 
auteurist agenda at Dovzhenko Studio during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Iurii Illienko’s A Well for the Thirsty and “Ukrainian Poetic Cinema” in the 
1960s 
 
It’s so real, sometimes it feels stylized. 
Iurii Illienko, speaking about A Well for the Thirsty, January 1966109 
 
Before his career as a cinematographer, Iurii Illienko had been to Ukraine 
only to visit relatives.  His parents were among the “de-nationalized Ukrainians,” 
engineers who had moved to Moscow after the war.  During his VGIK years, 
Illienko worked with his instructor Iakov Segel’ on Farewell, My Dove (Proshaite, 
holuby, 1960) and Artur Voitets’kyi on My Son is Somewhere (Des’ ie syn, 1962), 
both at the Yalta Film Studio, before Tsvirkunov recruited him to Kyiv.  The young 
cinematographer was unfamiliar with Ukrainian literature and knew the Ukrainian 
language poorly at best.  Yet, his work would come to be known as the foremost 
example of “Ukrainian poetic cinema,”110 a term that evoked both the principle of 
                                                 
109 Ye. Semenova, “Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh,” Na ekranakh Kyeva, 15 January 1966, 2.  
110 See, for example, Heorhii Kas’ianov, Nezhodni: Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia v rusi oporu 1960-70-
kh rokiv (Kyiv: Lybid’, 1995). 
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national authorship and a specifically Ukrainian artistic patrimony, read through 
Oleksandr Dovzhenko.  
Although taking place in contemporary Ukraine, A Well for the Thirsty 
makes frequent reference to the Great Patriotic War, both in the hero’s memory 
and in the implicit consequences toward which the film points.  Like Kyiv 
Frescoes, Illienko’s debut was to fit within the framework of remembering the 
Ukrainian experience of the war for the 20th Anniversary of Victory Day in 1965.  
Evidence of this orientation is contained in the publication of Ivan Drach’s literary 
screenplay in the October 1964 issue of Dnipro, the Ukrainian-language 
Komsomol literary journal.  The featured story of the issue is prefaced with a 
photomontage of Kyiv’s liberation in November 1943, with images of tanks rolling 
down Khreshchatyk, Khrushchev speaking to the liberated residents, a fallen 
Nazi plane on a field with a tractor sowing wheat, and a silhouette of the Bohdan 
Khmel’nyts’kyi statue on Sofiia Square.111  When commenting on the film’s 
significance to a Moscow audience in January 1966, Syzonenko noted that, once 
you see this film, you will understand how difficult it was for the Ukrainian people 
to advance to victory during the war.112  In this way, he attempted to establish the 
relevance of the film, both for the domestic spectator (he admitted that Shadows 
of Forgotten Ancestors functioned mostly within the realm of “foreign 
distribution”), and for the political demands of the anniversary year.  A Well for 
the Thirsty was to be a film on an “actual theme,” which spoke to and about the 
“Ukrainian people” in their victory over fascism.113   
Today, Illienko’s film remains a signpost of Ukrainian national cinema, 
alongside Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors.  As with Paradzhanov’s film, the 
context of the political reception of A Well for the Thirsty has determined how 
Ukrainians remember the film today.  In discussing the film with Svetlana 
Vasil’evna, the wife of Kyiv literary critic Miron Petrovskii, she assured me that 
she had seen the film in the 60s during a personal screening with Drach and 
Dziuba.  Much of the contemporary response to the film seeks to place it within a 
                                                 
111 K. Lishko, “Dniv tykh chuiemo vidhomin…” Dnipro, no. 10 (October 1964), 4-5. 
112 RGALI, f. 2944, op. 5, d. 136, l. 70-71. 
113 Ibid., l. 158. 
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Ukrainian literary canon of resistance to tsarist / Bolshevik power.  Ukrainian film 
critic Vadym Skurativs’kyi stated that the essential conception behind A Well, 
along with Shadows, and other examples of “Ukrainian poetic cinema," was the 
destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry, which began in the late 18th century with 
the coming of serfdom and concluded with the Holodomor of 1932-33.114  
Interesting here is that Skurativs’kyi viewed these symbolic and highly folkloric 
films as social documents, or rather responses to the long-term processes and 
results of Ukrainian social history.  At no point did he mention the cultural or 
aesthetic significance of the film, and resisted answering my questions about 
such topics.  Rather, his concerns were the contexts of political and social 
history, along with a sort of behind-the-scenes look at the cast and crew, many of 
whom with which he was at least familiar, if not long-term friends. 
 A Well for the Thirsty is about an old man named Levko Serdiuk, who lives 
alone with his memories in a dying village in Cherkas oblast’.  One day, he 
decides to die.  The old man finds wood to build a coffin, and invites his sons and 
their families back to their native village to witness his death, or rather, to witness 
him lying in his homemade coffin until he becomes uncomfortable and gets out.  
His family has dinner together, and the film ends with his daughter-in-law going 
into labor as she picks apples.  CPU Ideological Secretary Andrii Skaba stated 
that A Well for the Thirsty “is against us from beginning to end[…]  It’s insulting to 
the Ukrainian people[…] and [to] the Ukrainian landscape.”115  Thus, the 
affirmation of a Ukrainian ethnoscape was both demanded and demanded 
correct representation.  The violation of such a system did not constitute a 
problem of center-periphery relations, or a violation of socialist realist principles, 
but an “insult” to the Ukrainian ethnoscape. 
Drach began writing his “dangerous” screenplay in 1962, for his 
graduation project at the Screenplay Institute.  While only 26 years old at the 
time, the poet was well-published in the early 1960s, a party member and the 
darling of the Ukrainian literary establishment.  In his introduction to Drach’s first 
                                                 
114 Conversation with Vadym Shurativs’kyi, June 2006. 
115 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 345, l. 54; d. 355, l. 166. 
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book, also published in 1962, Ukrainian poetry historian, Leonid Novychenko, 
wrote, “There are comrades ready to see in him the essential ‘mode’ of 
contemporary young poetry.”116  That year, Voprosy literatury (Questions on 
Literature) interviewed him as one of the most representative of young Soviet 
poets, alongside Voznesenskii and Evtushenko.  Like Paradzhanov, Drach 
claimed influence from a diversity of Russian, Ukrainian, Western European and 
American writers and filmmakers, mentioning in the interview Tolstoi, 
Dostoevskii, Federico García Lorca, Hemmingway, “the early [Pavlo] Tychyna,” 
Maksym Ryl’s’kyi, Dovzhenko and Fellini.117 
Drach published his first major work, “Shevchenko’s Death (Smert’ 
Shevchenka),” in the March issue of Vitchyzna, while Dziuba was still the literary 
editor.  In his poem, Drach forwarded two ideas regarding the poet’s 
memorialization: First, Shevchenko was one of the few figures that Eastern and 
Western Ukrainians shared equally, even before “re-unification” in 1944; and 
second, the poet himself served as a harbinger of individual artistic style, which 
eclipsed his political significance as a “revolutionary democrat.”  Drach wrote, 
The artist does not have well-trodden norms. 
He himself is the norm, he himself in his own style… 
In this hundred-year and hundred-colored storm 
I throw myself into the troubled sorrow-waves.118 
Here, Drach was as much interested in the legacy of the poet for a new Ukraine 
that encompassed both east and west, as well as the Diaspora in the Russian 
Far East and on the Canadian plains (with his reference, “From Winnipeg to 
Vladivostok”), as he was in re-capturing a politics of personal expression, which, 
with its emphasis on “sorrow” and “loss,” denied the affirmative politics of the 
Stalinist folkloric.  With Drach’s direct influence at Dovzhenko Studio, these two 
sentimental elements continually worked together with a formal interest in 
body/space metaphor to establish what would be called “Ukrainian poetic 
cinema.” 
                                                 
116 Leonid Novychenko, “Ivan Drach – novobranets’ poezii,” Literaturna Ukraina, September 18, 
1962, 2.  This article was also published as the introduction to Drach’s Soniashnyk: poezii (Kyiv: 
Derzhavne vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury, 1962), 3-19. 
117 “Molodye – o sebe” Voprosy literatury, no. 9 (September 1962), 130-31. 
118 Ivan Drach, “Smert’ Shevchenka,” Vitchyzna, no. 3 (1962), 3. 
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“Shevchenko’s Death” was included in his collection, Sunflower,119 where 
he brought both of these concerns to bear.  The centerpiece of the collection is a 
poem entitled, “Spraha (Thirst),” published first in the May 1962 issue of Dnipro, 
which appeared at the time as a poetic response to Khrushchev’s critique of the 
cult of personality, with its predictable sentiment of a “thirst” for authentic life and 
a return to humanistic values.  In imagined conversation with Walt Whitman and 
Aphrodite in his college dorm room, Drach wrote: 
I have sorrow – wild, insatiable, 
Nothing can calm it, forever unquenchable. 
This is the thirst of compassion [liudianist’] and beauty and opportunity, 
I am filled with this.  It burns me daily 
A passionate thirst is human happiness, 
Humanity’s anxiety is my anxiety.”120 
Novychenko noted that Drach came to being, like “his generation,” under the 
conditions of the Twentieth Party Congress.  While the literary historian 
interpreted this passage within the context of the general cultural Thaw, we might 
relate it to A Well for the Thirsty (Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh) in its allusion to the 
unused well of the village that emerges after the war, signaling its spiritual death.  
Drach moves from an aesthetic of hope in humanity’s ability to quench their thirst 
to an ironic statement about the “well for the thirsty,” which has dried up and is no 
longer potable.  
Novychenko defined Drach’s style as “associative,” seeing in it parallels to 
“Dovzhenko’s film language.”  While acceptable to a certain extent, Novychenko 
called on Drach to reign in certain aspects of his excess, especially when it 
created distance between the poet and reader:  
                                                 
119 The sunflower is an important crop for Ukraine, both agriculturally and, consequently, 
symbolically.  In Ukrainian cinema, for example, one of the most memorable images is in 
Dovzhenko’s Earth (Zemlia, 1930) of a peasant woman framed from below with a sunflower next 
to her.  While Drach’s intention is to use the symbol for the republic itself, it is instructive that the 
sunflower is essentially meaningless to Western Ukraine, where it was never grown. 
120 Ivan Drach, “Spraha,” Dnipro, no. 5 (1962), 53.  This verse in Soniashnyk is slightly different, 
with the first two lines reading, “There is sorrow in the world – wild, insatiable / There everyday, 
forever unquenchable,” p. 67. 
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It is true that the poet has a right to expect a reader who actively “works 
together” with his thoughts, but this does not at all justify the appearance 
in certain of Drach’s verses of images that demand special puzzle-solving 
skills [spetsial’ne rozhaduvannia].  In the end, poetry is not a rebus 
[puzzle].121 
 
Drach’s response to such mild criticism would allude to theories of audience 
differentiation, that the reader for whom the poems were intended – a highly 
educated, Ukrainian-speaking public – would understand his complex “imagery.”  
Nonetheless, with the Ideological Commission reports of 1962-1963, Drach 
discovered that there was a slippery slope from his appeal to a small subset of 
the mass audience and accusations of “formalism.”  In April 1963, First Secretary 
Pidhornyi singled out Drach, along with Dziuba, for criticism during a meeting 
with ideological workers in the CPU, stating that their work was fodder for 
“Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist counter-revolutionaries abroad.”122  Andrii Skaba 
moreover accused Drach in the May issue of Kommunist Ukrainy of having “an 
unjustifiably complicated descriptive system,” which he blamed on “the disease of 
his age [bolezn’ vozrasta].”123  Despite such high-level criticism, literary journals 
Dnipro and Vitchyzna, along with Dovzhenko Studio, continued to support their 
work actively. 
Drach had finished his screenplay by 1964, and the head of the 
Screenplay Institute asked Tsvirkunov to consider it for production at Dovzhenko 
Studio, on the basis that it dealt with Ukrainian thematics.124  In following the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Culture’s 1962 directive to employ Ukrainian writers to help 
“reveal Ukrainian literature, art, and culture,” Tsvirkunov had hired Drach into the 
Screenplay Studio (Stsenarnoe masterstvo).  While providing Drach with a 
regular salary, in addition to the standard honorarium for all work accepted for 
production, the masterstvo demanded that he write exclusively for Dovzhenko 
Studio (members of the screenplay studio had no ability to “sell” their work to 
                                                 
121 Novychenko, “Ivan Drach,” 3. 
122 Radians’ka Ukraina, 10 April 1963; quoted in Heorhii Kas'ianov, Nezhodni: ukrains'ka 
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123 A. Skaba, “Kommunisticheskoe vospitanie trudiashchikhsia – vazhneishaia zadacha partiinykh 
organizatsii,” Kommunist Ukrainy, no. 5 (May 1963), 29-30.  
124 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1781, l. 74. 
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other Soviet film studios), providing his employer with one viable screenplay 
every 18 months.  To maintain his full salary, Drach additionally submitted at 
least six reviews of other screenplays and served as the principle editor on 
another screenplay each year.125  Thus, despite the Fordist style of cultural 
production that Tsvirkunov was attempting to institute at Dovzhenko Studio in the 
early 1960s in an attempt to solve the “problem of cadres,” the masterstvo also 
functioned as a haven and regular employment for non-conformist poets like 
Drach, Pavlychko, Kostenko and Vinhranovs’kyi.   
Drach began the literary screenplay for A Well for the Thirsty, subtitled “A 
Contemporary Parable,” with an epigraph from the final lines of Plato’s Phaedo, 
during which Socrates takes the hemlock and dies.  Drach intended to present a 
similar mythology of the noble death that he did in his poem, “Shevchenko’s 
Death.”  In the performance and reproduction of the death ritual, death was to 
affirm the positive quality of life itself.  We soon learn, however, that Drach’s 
screenplay functioned as morbid parody of such a ritual, envisioning an old and 
lonely widower, whose many sons have either died during the war or left him to 
pursue a “contemporary” lifestyle in the city.  The old man, Levko, decides to 
build his own coffin and lay in it until death comes, inviting his family back to their 
native village to observe the indefinite spectacle.126  Despite the bleak theme of 
loneliness and death, Drach injected several moments of light-hearted comedy, 
which appealed to the Stalinist folkloric: Levko discovers the kolkhoz director’s 
electric razor, which Levko attempts to use, unsuccessfully, on his own grizzled 
face.  Later in the screenplay, Levko’s daughter-in-law Solomonia presents him 
with a radio to communicate with his youngest son, an airplane test pilot.  The old 
man, who is more comfortable talking to his pet goat, is unable to speak to a 
machine, managing only an awkward cough.  Other elements of comedy include 
the old man’s prolonged quest for official approval to acquire wood for his coffin, 
                                                 
125 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1540, l. 3; d. 1745, ll. 1-6. 
126 Ivan Drach, “Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh,” Dnipro, no. 10 (October 1964), 7-42.  The epigraph 
from Plato’s Phaeto appeared in a later draft, which was submitted in Russian to central Goskino. 
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the latter of which alluding to the comedy of Soviet bureaucracy found in 
Aleksandrov’s Volga Volga (1938) among many other early Stalinist films.127  
When the studio reviewed Drach’s screenplay for production, many 
immediately identified the work’s rural setting and iconic old man as tied into a 
traditional Ukrainian folkloric mode.  Yet they saw in A Well for the Thirsty 
particular promise for its allusions to Dovzhenko’s style and literary content.  In 
particular, the figure of Levko recalled Dovzhenko’s work through the latter’s 
fictionalized accounts of his own grandfather, Semen Petrovych.  During a 
discussion of the screenplay, Drach’s colleagues conflated this resemblance with 
the idea of maintaining Dovzhenko’s “traditions.”128  Zemliak commented that the 
film would affirm the studio’s return to Dovzhenko.  He told the board, “In recent 
years we have moved away from that knowledge, which Dovzhenko left 
behind.”129  Screenplay editor, M. A. Kyrychenko, argued more adamantly for the 
maintenance of “Dovzhenko’s traditions” in this screenplay:  “If we’re about 
Dovzhenko’s traditions, then this screenplay[…] is a model for how we should 
follow those traditions.”130  Levchuk, along with Syzonenko, commented on the 
film’s shooting script that Levko reminded him “very deeply of Semen 
Dovzhenko,” fictionalized in the filmmaker’s short story The Enchanted Desna 
(Zacharovannaia Desna).131  Denysenko extracted from this that Levko 
represented the “entire Ukrainian people.”132  Thus, the studio linked writerly 
knowledge specifically to the film’s national significance, seen in its association 
with the fictionalized space of Dovzhenko’s childhood.  Significantly, the 
screenplay’s definitively bleak representation of the Ukrainian ethnoscape was 
not at issue: After all, Dovzhenko’s work too focused on death and rural poverty. 
The SRK identified two problems with the screenplay: first within the 
folkloric quality of some of the scenes with Levko.  Novelist Iakiv Bash was 
positive about the Dovzhenko associations, but cautioned against Levko’s 
                                                 
127 The Russian version of the screenplay is contained in the file, RGALI, f. 2944, op. 1, d. 497. 
128 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1780, l. 10. 
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association with a “khutorians’kyi” type:  Non-Ukrainians “will call him funny, an 
eccentric, and so on.”133  The second complaint registered confusion about the 
complex “symbolism” and predominance of metaphor contained in the work.  In a 
sense, Drach’s colleagues found fault with both the familiar stereotypes and the 
de-familiarized ethnoscape that the young poet imagined.  Drach answered both 
complaints with the implication that he had written the film for a culturally 
knowledgeable Ukrainian spectator in mind.  In calling the work a “film parable,” 
he identified both the “simplicity” and “locality” of the “genre.”  He went on: 
That is why when they say that it is absolutely necessary to motivate the 
horse [a persistent image in the screenplay], it seems to me that for 
Ukrainian artists, for the world-view of a Ukrainian, the horse is [already] 
so motivated in Dovzhenko, in Gogol’ that you know what it is[…]  
Whoever knows this will not shrug their shoulders at this horse.134 
 
This claim is interesting in light of Novychenko’s accusation that Drach engaged 
in writing convoluted puzzles.  Whereas Drach made the claim for ethnic 
knowledge, Illienko made the auteurist claim for ethnic discovery, in his search 
for an authenticated Ukrainian ethnoscape. 
Illienko was probably ignorant of the specific quality of the “dovzhenkoist” 
elements in the screenplay, especially since they were drawn from Dovzhenko’s 
post-cinematic literary career, which enjoyed little success outside of Ukraine.  
With being fresh off the heals of shooting Shadows on location in the 
Carpathians, he was keen to discover more authenticities in the Ukrainian village 
that would become the setting of A Well for the Thirsty.  Sounding like 
Paradzhanov from a year and a half earlier, he told the Studio SRK in April:  
Only when we find ourselves in the village, when we find this milieu, and 
the residents of this village will be speaking in their language, when we 
come upon the architecture, the background of the Ukrainian village, the 
authentic costumes, when the real thing emerges, when we avoid the 
make-up in this respect, as we understand it now.  Only then can the 
screenplay be surrounded by the flesh, which makes it possible to make 
the film that we have conceived. 
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We traveled two thousand kilometers around the villages of Ukraine.  We 
especially picked up old men, and offered them a seat in the car and 
conversed.  We met with analogous situations, of old men, who were in 
deplorable conditions [underlining in the original document].  But it’s 
interesting that not one of them complained, they held onto their dignity in 
speaking about their troubles, and regarded them with a light humor.  
Levko is written in this way, and not bombastically.  Such a method is not 
eclectic; it is the method of researching character, and I think that in no 
way can it hinder the screenplay[…]135 
 
Illienko presented himself as an amateur ethnographer, who was, in the process, 
coming to know himself through a type of folkloric of real life.  He knew the 
stereotypes, to which the experienced writer, Iakiv Bash, referred, but denied this 
quality of “color” its lack of authenticity.  When writing about the film upon its 
release in 1987, Illienko continued to tell the story of his journey through Ukraine 
to national consciousness.  
I searched for a long time. […] And there, in the very heart of Ukraine, 
between Cherkassy and Chigirin [Ukr. Chyhyryn], where the Tiamin River 
flows into the Dnipro, I found the perfect spot [blagodatnye mesta] – hills, 
black earth, such a swirl of earthly paradise.  And, moreover, in the valley, 
I saw sand, real sand, dunes even (barkhany, diuny).  And there stood a 
village, houses [khaty] with thatch roofs, and on the roofs – windmills.  A 
Ukrainian village – standing on sand.  How unnatural!  I felt something in 
myself like a flash of lightening, like a prophesy – suddenly the essence of 
the film was revealed.  The landscape turned out to be the key, the 
prototype, the methodology even.136 
 
Whereas Paradzhanov was interested in questions of the beauty of the human 
object in nature, Illienko, in his interest in discovery and official ethnography, was 
interested in discovering a scientific basis for the authentic Ukrainian.  In this 
case, Illienko returned to a space near his own birthplace in Cherkasy Oblast.137  
Illienko begins to suggest that the village is not the pastoral idyll, nor does it 
possess a fairy-tale like quality of tragedy, as Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors 
contained.  A discovery of the primordial ethnic self demanded the labor of travel, 
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and a struggle with the unnatural and uncanny contained within Illienko’s own 
native ethnoscape.   
The director, however, made an interesting connection to Shadows, 
stating that his debut was about “the same people and the same culture.”138  
Illienko here indicated that the basis for exoticizing the Ukrainian people was the 
Hutsul.  In generalizing the Hutsul to all Ukraine, however, all-Ukraine becomes 
Hutsul’shchyna, simultaneously self and other.  Illienko commented on 
Miliutenko, “You can’t tell him apart from the peasants from the surrounding 
villages.  And the issue is not in typazhna tochnist’,139 but in the deep truth of 
[his] character.”  Miliutenko too commented, “I feel a deep kinship of Levko’s 
family with my own.  There is a lot in common.”140  Thus, we read a similar 
treatment of Illienko’s film as we did with Ukrainian coverage of Shadows, in its 
emphasis on associating the actor with the role as a function of “character,” and 
the role itself with a more general notion of Ukrainian “character.”  
Illienko’s interest in ethnography was not unusual considering the 
discipline’s connections to Ukrainian poetry and folklore, along with its 
associations with Dovzhenko’s concerns.  The aging poet Maksym Ryl’s’kyi (son 
of nineteenth-century Ukrainian ethnographer Tadei Rozeslavovych Ryl’s’kyi) 
founded the first Soviet Ukrainian ethnographic journal in 1957, Narodna 
tvorchist’ ta etnohrafiia (Folk Art and Ethnography), which published articles on 
home construction, language use, family life and pre-Revolutionary folk songs in 
Ukraine, and increasingly printed photographs of actual Ukrainian peasants 
working with objects.  This was in distinction to the traditional concerns of Soviet 
folkloristics in its focus on the transposition of folkloric concerns onto the 
revolutionary canon (i.e., songs about Lenin, rushnyky with portraits of 
Kaganovych, etc.), and images of humanless objects.  During the 1960s, 
Ukrainian ethnographers were interested in the connection between ethnicity, 
                                                 
138 “Interv”iu daie Iurii Il’ienko,” Na ekranakh Kyeva, 9 October 1965: 1. 
139 “Exact type” 
140 Ye. Semenova, 2. 
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material culture and landscape, concerns which filmmakers like Illienko 
assimilated in the absence of Drach’s personal claim to ethnic knowledge.141 
A Well for the Thirsty passed into production on April 20, 1965, with the 
prediction that it would “undoubtedly become a significant event in Ukrainian 
cinema.”142  It was decided to shoot the film in the place that Illienko claimed to 
have discovered while traveling through the republic, in the village of Trushivtsi in 
Cherkass Oblast’, located at the very geographic center of the Ukrainian SSR.  
As the credits inform us, Illienko continued Dovzhenko’s and Paradzhanov’s 
formula for authenticity, and employed peasants from the Chyhyryn district as 
extras, functioning more generally within the massovki, but also as ethnic 
decoration. 
In making the film, Illienko reduced the bytopisatel’nost’ and humor of the 
present-day narrative to a minimum, even eliminating a number of dominant 
relationships between Levko and his neighbors and family to the point where 
spectators unfamiliar with the published screenplay would miss significant 
portions of the symbolic world on display.  Instead, Illienko focused almost 
exclusively on the fuzzy boundaries between present-day reality, memory and 
the spatial politics of war memorialization (the placement and ceremony of the 
war memorial, for example).  The stark tonality of the film stock continually 
emphasizes the dream-like quality – caught between memory and the 
contemporary – of the world that Levko inhabits.  The sky and water appear 
black, while the trees possess an infrared glow.  Skurativs’kyi claims that Illienko 
used expired film stock from the Ukrainian factory in Shostka to achieve this look, 
a product which was not known to be of the highest quality (See, Figure 4.3).   
Despite the utter lack of color – and, indeed, of any degree of tonal range 
– and the further reduction of the narrative space of the film, several features of A 
Well for the Thirsty closely resemble Shadows. Iurii Davydov’s cinematography 
highlights the same combination of presentational and observational styles,  
                                                 
141 Of course, these older concerns continued to dominate the journal.  My point here is simply 
that we see a privileging of newer concerns, which were the ones that we see emulated in “poetic 
cinema’s” representation of the Ukrainian ethnoscape. 
142 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1781, l. 30, 61. 
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Figure 4.3. Dream-Image in A Well for the Thirsty (Illienko, 1965): Levko 
(Miliutenko) and his wife (Kadochnikova) at the well. 
 
alternating between artless tableaux framing in the interior shots of Levko’s 
house, assimilating his body and the wall of memories behind him into one 
flattened image, and the highly mobile camera that moves along a line of humans 
against an expressive landscape.  In this latter respect, we see a similar effort to 
survey rural human life as Illienko presented in the Hutsul market scene at the 
beginning of Shadows (Figure 3.10).  In A Well for the Thirsty, however, the 
landscape is de-familiarized to the point of total abstraction.  The spectator 
receives little information about the spatial connections between the well, Levko’s 
home, the apple orchard, the mill, and the cemetery, all of which constitute the 
film’s ethnic texture.  Illienko places all of these locations upon the same barren 
dreamscape, simultaneously existing in memory and in the present.  Alongside 
this dreamscape, however, exist the generic features of the “national film,” 
present in the ethnographic images of peasants constructing a house with hay 
and mud, the regionalism of Levko’s speech, elements of the kolkhoz comedy, all 
of which further renders the film uncanny.  Whereas the Carpathian landscape of 
Shadows had been a definitively unfamiliar landscape for most Eastern 
Ukrainians, apart from the generic antecedents of Ukrainian modernism on the 
one hand and the rare film like Ivanov’s Oleksa Dovbush on the other, the 
Central and Southern Ukrainian steppe of A Well for the Thirsty constituted a 
landscape already familiar from Gogol’, Shevchenko and Repin, and more 
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recently in the work of Dovzhenko, Py’rev and Savchenko.  Thus, Illienko’s work 
to discover and render the unfamiliar within such a known landscape became a 
more difficult task, eventually necessitating the cast and crew’s journey to the 
Uzbek desert to complete the film (where the aging actor Dmytro Miliutenko died 
from the strain of shooting the film). 
Only toward the final 20 minutes does a narrative emerge in A Well for the 
Thirsty, and the film’s dream-space recedes.  As Levko lies uncomfortably in his 
coffin, waiting for death, his many sons, with their wives and children, arrive.  The 
old man grows restless with his intended “peaceful” death, clearly bored with the 
charade.  He coughs, fidgets uncomfortably, and places kopeks in his eyes 
before emerging to have dinner with his family.  As the large family sits at the 
dinner table, we hear a woman in voice-over (VO) explaining the narrative 
thread, that the old man had resolved to die, and invited his family, via telegram, 
to watch.  The film ends as the old man drags a living apple tree across the 
orchard, apples falling behind him as a smiling Solomonia (his pregnant 
daughter-in-law, also played by Kadochnikova) attempts to retrieve them.  As she 
bends to claim another apple, she enters labor, dropping all of them out of her 
dress.  The final shot is of her leaning on the ground, holding her belly, framed 
against the sky (Figure 4.4). 
Promotion of the film began in early June 1965 in the mass-circulation 
weekly, Na ekranakh Kyeva.  Ilia Shatokhin featured Dmytro Miliutenko, who 
played Levko in the film, writing that the veteran Ukrainian actor “has given 
ample proof that his old man Levko will be filled with a humanistic and life-
affirming character.”143  In August, the film crew met with spectators to promote 
the film in Chernihiv while shooting on location nearby.144  Illienko gave 
interviews in October 1965 and January 1966 about the film for Na ekranakh 
Kyeva.  In the first interview, he affirmed Shatokhin’s notion of the transmission 
of “humanistic values,” telling reporters that A Well for the Thirsty is about the 
“immortality of the great human heart.”  Yevhenia Semenova introduced a  
                                                 
143 I. Shatokhin, “Novi raboty D. Miliutenka,” Na ekranakh Kyeva, 5 June 1965, 2. 
144 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 317, l. 53. 
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Figure 4.4. Solomonia’s (Kadochnikova) death, A Well for the Thirsty (1966) 
 
second interview with Illienko and Miliutenko, affirming that the film will become a 
“deeply emotional and philosophical work about a person who beautifies 
 [prykrashaie] the earth and labor with his love toward it, [and] about the loyalty to 
his native land and responsibility for its fate.”145 
In watching the film, one realizes how completely different such 
expectations were from the actual product that Illienko would soon present to 
Goskino.  We have to understand, however, that critics and journalists knew the 
plot; that the film was about an old man who desires to die.  In this motif, 
however, they viewed the image of death in the screenplay according to 
Dovzhenko (po-dovzhenkovskomu), as a beautiful process of renewal.  While the 
framing of the final shot, frozen as a still image, against the sky with a blissfully 
falling Solomonia, appears to construct such an image of transcendent death, it 
is impossible on a narrative level to assimilate such a death with the old man’s 
intentions.  Because A Well for the Thirsty fit into a definitive genre, the “national 
film” or “poetic cinema,” the violation of convention necessitated a response that 
spoke to such formal and narrative violations.  Instead of the homage to 
Dovzhenko, as other filmmakers and critics envisioned from the screenplay, we 
get moments of visual parody of Dovzhenko, especially Earth.  The latter film 
opens with an extended scene of an old man dying with his large extended family 
                                                 
145 Ye. Semenova, “Krynytsia dlia sprahlykh,” Na ekranakh Kyeva, January 15, 1966, 2. 
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and neighbors looking on.  The scene is serene, however, and mildly humorous 
as the dying old man eats an apple while another peasant says light-heartedly, 
“Well, die already [Nu, umri].”  Bozhenko dies in Shchors in a similarly solemn yet 
celebratory manner.  Levko, on the other hand, cannot “simply” die, honored for 
the role he played in life, but is forced instead to relive painful memories (Figure 
4.5).  The final scene of the old man carrying the apple tree is his final attempt to 
re-create the scene of beautiful death found in Dovzhenko, but ends, we 
interpolate, with Solomonia dying in labor.  Instead of the transcendent death, 
Illienko’s film presents us with an image of grief in its persistent reproduction of 
loss. 
In between Illienko’s two interviews with Na ekranakh Kyeva, Dovzhenko 
Studio’s Artistic Council viewed rushes and concluded that the footage contained 
various “miscalculations” and “shortcomings” that hindered an understanding of 
the old man as “the inexhaustible source of the people’s spirit.”146  When official 
opinion had completely turned against the film by February 1966, Ukrainian 
Goskino claimed that the film had “significantly departed from the screenplay,” 
the contents of which were “deeply national.”147  As with Kyiv Frescoes, official 
reaction to the film turned from positive to negative based on the same 
continuum.  Party officials like Andrii Skaba expected a film that represented the 
Ukrainian people in an affirmative manner (like Dovzhenko).  In this respect, the 
visual flourishes were not at issue yet, nor did officials ever criticize its 
ethnographic mode of representing the Ukrainian “national character”; rather, the 
film was problematic because of its hopelessness, something that emerges 
beyond the “life-affirming” humor contained in Drach’s screenplay. 
Several individuals at the studio, however, remained in awe with Illienko’s 
accomplishments, including the initially weary Iakiv Bash, along with Denysenko, 
and Paradzhanov.  Others, such as Levchuk’s set designer Vladimir Agranov told 
his colleagues that “egoists,” who cared nothing for the spectator, made such a 
film.  Thus, he transformed the meeting from an analysis of the film based on its  
                                                 
146 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1781, l. 19. 







Figure 4.5. The old man dying in (left to right) Dovzhenko’s Earth (1930) and 
Illienko’s A Well for the Thirsty (1965) 
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production to a discussion of its hypothetical reception.  While Vasyl’ Illiashenko, 
who was dealing with his own problems on Coordinate your Watches, argued 
that the spectator’s acceptance is not the only qualification of a film’s merit, 
Navrotskii in particular tore into the film for its pretensions against the “average 
viewer.”  Tsvirkunov, however, concluded that the “film has emerged from the 
source of the national character,” and wholeheartedly accepted it, with certain 
revisions.148  On April 27th, the studio accepted the film, concluding that it had 
returned to the ideas contained in Drach’s screenplay, with “the image of 
Ukraine, its beautiful and great nature, the diversity of landscapes, the fertile 
lands and wistful forests[…] appear[ing] before us.”149  Such an affirmation, of 
course, was divorced entirely from the pervasive image of loss contained in the 
film’s unfertile landscape and morose hero. 
 At this moment, Drach was embroiled in his own controversial political 
activity.  On the day that Dovzhenko Studio passed the completed film to 
Ukrainian Goskino for approval, Secretary of the L’viv Oblast Committee of the 
CPU issued a report on “nationalist activity and actions against it” to his superiors 
in the Central Committee in Kyiv.  Among those arrested in August 1965 were 
ten individuals in L’viv oblast.  Their trial on April 15 attracted the attention of 
several Kyiv intellectuals who were friends of several of those arrested.  Drach, 
along with fellow poet / filmmakers Lina Kostenko and Mykola Vinhranovs’kyi, 
traveled to the Western Ukrainian city to protest outside the courthouse.  The 
three, also accused of distributing “ideologically vicious” unpublished works, were 
in the center of a group of 30 friends of those on trial.  According to the report, 
Drach and Kostenko showered the accused with flowers as they were led to the 
courthouse, hailing them with “Glory!  Glory to the patriots!,” while shouting at the 
militsiia and court officials, “Shame!”.150  The report went on, “In a discussion with 
the head of the Lenin neighborhood branch of the militsiia c[omrade] Saburov, 
Drach said, “You yourself are [only] scum [podonky], but here violence is being 
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done to the most forward-looking Ukrainians.”151  Drach’s supposed statement 
was unquestionably elitist in his delineation of the “scum” from the “forward-
looking.”   
Such a seemingly intimate connection between dissident politics and film 
production seemed to shake authorities in Ukrainian Goskino as they discussed 
A Well for the Thirsty on May 4.  Senior editor Protsenko proceeded cautiously, 
and suggested that they accept the film for a “limited audience,” rather than 
return it to the director for further revisions.152  S. P. Ivanov agreed, stating, “The 
film can only exist for the certain spectator.  It’s impossible to release the film on 
the screen [vypuskat’ fil’m na ekran nel’zia].”  While such a “limited” distribution 
seemed to affirm Drach’s own preference for the film’s reception, in effect it 
meant that, despite no official order to “shelve” the film, local UKK organs would 
not be encouraged to buy prints.  The studio, however, would not have a mark 
against it in this case, as the film would then constitute a distribution concern.  
Moreover, the studio might have continued to anticipate a festival success, along 
the lines of Shadows, and the SKU would have permission to screen the film at 
their private screening hall at the October House of Culture.  During the SKU 
Plenum two days later, at which Secretary Skaba made his condemnatory 
remarks, however, S. P. Ivanov opened the event with severe words.  He stated 
that the film was one of the recent failures of the studio for its “canned lyricism” 
and fixation on death, which implicitly represented Ukraine in a negative light.  A 
meeting of the SKU Presidium a week and a half later continued the argument, 
with Navrotskii promoting Illienko’s complete repression as a “bourgeois 
nationalist.”  Toward the end of the month, an anonymous letter from a self-
avowed “old Bolshevik” within the Ukrainian Writers’ Union accused Drach too of 
being a “herald of Ukrainian nationalism,” both for his appearance at the April 15 
trial and for writing an “anti-Soviet film.”  He went on, “But how much more similar 
trash will come out of the Ukrainian film studio, in which our Soviet life and our 
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Soviet people are shown as caricatures.”153  Once again, the salient critique of 
the film concerned its improper representation of the Ukrainian ethnic community, 
ostensibly due to a lack of first-hand knowledge of its “character.” 
 Meanwhile, Syzonenko had suggested yet another revision, which would 
contain more landscapes and a “more even dialogue,”154 suggesting an attempt 
to make the film conform to a Stalinist folkloric.  To complete this new series of 
revisions, Drach asked for another 30,000 rubles, a sizable sum, which S. P. 
Ivanov nonetheless grudgingly accepted.155  A week later, however, a CPU 
Politburo decision halted production.”156  In precisely what Ivanov was fearful of, 
the studio was forced to repay Gosbank the 268,000 rubles spent on the 
production.157  While the CPU shelved and condemned the film as bourgeois 
nationalist propaganda, A Well for the Thirsty nonetheless affirmed Illienko’s and 
Drach’s reputations as brilliant auteurs.  In April 1966, as Drach returned from 
L’viv, he met with Illienko to discuss the director’s idea for a new film, this one 
based on Gogol’s St. John’s Eve (Vecher na Ivana Kupala), promoted as a mix of 
“folkloric fantasy[…] with the realia of everyday life.”158  At the moment when the 
studio was abandoning A Well for the Thirsty as a “politically dangerous” project, 
they were approving Illienko’s new film, a film completely at odds with traditional 
Soviet adaptations of the “realist” Gogol’ of the St. Petersburg years.159  While 
Illienko had failed to produce an image of the contemporary Ukrainian 
ethnoscape, he returned to the relatively safe realm of classic literary adaptation.  
Whereas Paradzhanov’s “moral” failure with Kyiv Frescoes ended his directorial 
career in Kyiv, Illienko remained a core member of the studio collective after his 
political failure with A Well for the Thirsty.  The following section examines 
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another aborted film from the same year, one which the studio and Goskino 
considered a “creative” failure, thus essentially questioning its director’s role as 
an auteur.  Coordinate Your Watches, as a failed example of “poetic cinema,” in 
fact had the most lasting effect on its director’s ability to work on future projects. 
 
Vasyl’ Illiashenko: The Failed Auteur  
 
“Poetic cinema[…] easily falls into pretentiousness.” 
Andrei Tarkovskii, Iskusstvo kino, November 1962160  
 
   
By April 1966, Illiashenko had been accused of being a fraud and would 
never recover his reputation in Ukrainian cinema.  The reasons for this are not 
obvious, but indicate that the studio continued to take seriously questions of 
personal authorship.  Paradzhanov, while having failed to complete Kyiv 
Frescoes, remained an important figure at the studio, one whose words carried 
real weight in SKU and studio debates.  When discussing footage of Coordinate 
Your Watches on December 1965, Paradzhanov heralded the film as “vne 
kolektiva,” but called the director’s lack of talent “criminal.”161  Instead of citation 
of Shadows and Dovzhenko, he accused Illiashenko of pretentious plagiarism, 
along with a deployment of clichés and Ukrainian stereotypes.  To Paradzhanov, 
Coordinate Your Watches seemed to confirm Tarkovskii’s earlier warning that 
“poetic cinema[…] easily falls into pretentiousness.”162  Five years passed before 
the studio trusted him with another independent production, this time a mediocre 
industrial drama about Donbas miners entitled Steep Horizon (Krutyi horyzont, 
1971).  This film too became a total failure, from a creative, ideological, critical, 
and box office standpoint.   
In the production drama that developed around Coordinate Your Watches, 
Illiashenko continually mobilized discourses of film authorship, the cult of 
personality and generational division.  Illiashenko intended his film as a tribute to 
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three poets who died on the Ukrainian Front during World War II and were 
posthumously accepted into the Ukrainian Writers’ Union in the Spring of 
1962.163  Writer Lina Kostenko envisioned it as a “triptych from a spiritual 
odyssey,” the narrative moving freely among three separate stories, connected 
thematically.  Together, the story of the poets was to explore the multiple 
dimensions of the Ukrainian experience during the Great Patriotic War.  As a 
narrator explains at the beginning of the screenplay, “[These] poets are mirrors,” 
which reflect the “larger path.”164  The poets’ stories begin on the eve of June 21, 
1941.  Kyivan Leonid Levyts’kyi proposes to his girlfriend in a cemetery; peasant 
Volodymyr Bulaienko (played by Mykolaichuk) marries Tonia in the village church 
as her dictatorial father threatens to kill them and they ride off on horseback; and 
party poet Fedir Shvindin wakes up in a psychiatric ward after a purge hearing 
that leads him to attempt suicide.  After the German invasion, Levyts’kyi 
volunteers for the Soviet Army, and dies in battle; Bulaienko joins the Ukrainian 
partisans, and dies while serving as a decoy as his detachment attacks a 
German train; Shvindin succeeds in killing himself after the Nazi “Dr. Todt” 
performs horrible psychological experiments on him. 
While heavy in religious and national symbolism, Illiashenko’s film appears 
from the shooting script as a canonical example of war memorial and the horrors 
of the German occupation in Ukraine.  While the film was re-made by Leonid 
Osyka as Love Awaits Those Who Return, the Shvindin and Levyts’kyi stories 
were removed for political and aesthetic reasons, and the entire film concerns 
Bulaenko, the peasant-poet-partisan.  Apart from the refocus to the most 
politically acceptable of the three protagonists, Osyka’s name change is 
significant for its direct allusion to Semen Gudzenko’s poem My Generation (Moe 
pokolenie, 1945), which emphasizes grief and loss over war heroism: 
 
 Love awaits those who return? No! The heart can’t handle it, 
 and it’s not worth dying so that the living can love them. 
 There are no men in the family, no children, nobody in the house. 
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 Will such grief really ease the sobs of the living?165 
 
Osyka removes the question mark, perhaps appealing more to irony than the 
seriousness of grief.  While Gudzenko was born in Kyiv and wrote many of his 
poems about Kyiv, he was not Ukrainian and always wrote in Russian.  The 
change in titles had implications for how the film would be read as an example of 
“national cinema.”  Osyka, too, was from Kyiv, and spoke only in Russian. 
Love Awaits begins as the camera moves through the landscape along 
the Right Bank of the Dnipro in Kyiv.  As Gudzenko’s poem is heard in voice-
over, we see a long pan across Kyiv factories and churches that line the Dnipro.  
We cut to a close-up of a marble engraver in Victory Park carving in death dates 
of fallen war heroes (1944, 1943, etc.).  The camera pans across the thousands 
of graves in the cemetery, literally melding human and landscape in the context 
of death.  Documentary voice-overs of dead soldiers’ mothers recount memories 
of their sons, with the language switching between Russian, Ukrainian and 
surzhyk.  Osyka considered this merging of oral history with fiction a completely 
new invention, meant to complicate the conventions of Soviet cinema’s war 
memorialization.  Moreover, in offering actual voices, Osyka believed he was 
authentically representing the multilingual ethnoscape of the city.  While the 
director’s colleagues at the studio generally appreciated his film, even if they 
considered it unlikely to attract a popular audience, many complained of Osyka’s 
title, along with the linguistic “dissonance” that his attempts at authenticity 
evoked.  Bash, whose work frequently touched upon the experience of fighting 
on the Ukrainian front, stated that the shift between Russian and Ukrainian, 
instead of affirming the “friendship of peoples,” promoted the idea of mutual 
incomprehensibility.  He furthermore complained of the “slippage” in the Russian 
voice of the mother.166  Bash viewed Osyka’s attempt at authenticity as a 
compromise with Russian.  He should have established a total Ukrainian 
linguistic space, one which was contained in Denysenko’s A Dream.   
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As I pointed out in Chapter 2, one of the dominant themes of comedies 
such as Gas Station Queen was the acquisition of a literary language.  Here, 
Osyka maintained surzhyk as a regional particularity in his film, thus separating 
the literary space of poetry (always in either Russian or Ukrainian) in the film 
from the speech of everyday life (what Paradzhanov called “contemporary 
Ukrainian”167).  In appealing to ethnographic investigation and the personal 
experience of speech behavior, Osyka, like Paradzhanov, attempted to distance 
himself from the heated debates about linguistic policy in Ukraine taking place in 
both official and dissident circles. 
While particular scenes resemble Paradzhanov’s and Illienko’s work in 
Shadows, such as the exploratory pan over motionless peasants, which has the 
effect of locating and equating human life with a particular landscape, the look of 
the film relates more clearly to Illienko’s A Well for the Thirsty, with its expressive 
use of tonality (rather than color).  Moreover, like Illienko’s film, the narrative is 
structured loosely, with only the overriding themes of sacrifice, death and loss 
uniting the various movements of the plot.  The narrative begins as Bulaienko’s 
mother kisses him goodbye as he leaves for the front, changing her white 
headscarf to black as she watches him walk off from their thatched-roof khata to 
join his new comrades.  A still cutaway to the house reveals an image identical to 
Dovzhenko’s boyhood home that circulated in the early 1960s, suggesting the 
self-reflexive pastiche, which constituted Osyka’s knowledge of the Ukrainian 
peasant.  Osyka was imagining peasant life through the lens of a reproducable 
mythology.   
The next scene, the only one in which we see actual combat, is unusual 
for its stylistic distance from the rest of the film.  Most of it is composed of 
documentary images from the front, with only the final moments showing 
Bulaienko arguing with his commanding officer before most of the squadron is 
blown away by German artillery fire.  Bulaienko escapes the fray with another 
man, soon killed from aerial bombardment.  After a series of adventures within 
the war-torn landscape, the poet discovers and joins a partisan group.  The 
                                                 
167 See, Chapter three. 
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partisans resolve to hijack a German train, using the plain-clothes poet as a 
decoy to get the engineer to stop.  As the partisans pick off the German soldiers 
as they exit the train, Bulaienko opens one of the cars to reveal one of the crimes 
of the occupation: The Germans had been exporting Ukrainian Black Earth to the 
West for grain production (Figure 4.6).  The camera pans across thousands of 
gravestones in Victory Park once again as the film ends, implying without 
showing the poet’s approaching death, as an extension of the literal abduction of 
Ukrainian land.  
Despite Osyka’s claim that he did not intend to “imitate” Paradzhanov and 
Illienko – that instead, he was working within a particular “genre” of associational 
poetics common to the three of them – the film lacks the sense of narrative and 
formal completion evident in Shadows and even A Well for the Thirsty.  Instead, 
Osyka presents us with a series of cinematic exercises, from narrative and 
thematic concerns such as oral history and memorialization; a play with 
conventions in representations of combat and violence; experimentations with 
rendering space and landscape; and a further exploration of aural minimalism 
and juxtaposition, from the linguistic “dissonance” mentioned earlier, to the 
juxtaposition of jazz with Ukrainian folk songs and Soviet “front poetry.”  The final 
scene is the only coherent episode, perhaps getting at the essence of what 
Osyka intended with the film – an image of loss that positions land and people in 
fluid continuity.  Bulaienko is positioned within the abducted earth.  Viewed in its 
entirety, however, Love Awaits remains an essentially de-narrativized and 
formally eclectic project, in part due to Osyka’s inexperience as a filmmaker, but 
also emerging from the process of fixing Illiashenko’s “mistakes.”  What emerges 
is an ostensibly a-political, but definitively avant-garde, film, one which had no 
possibility of becoming either a popular film or one of the classics of “Ukrainian 
poetic cinema,” alongside Illienko’s A Well for the Thirsty or Osyka’s future 
project, The Stone Cross (Kaminnyi khrest, 1968). 
Vasyl’ Illiashenko first took up Kostenko’s original screenplay after 
Tsvirkunov picked the young Ukrainian VGIK student during his trip to the school 
in 1962.  Working under the venerable Sergei Gerasimov’s direction, Illiashenko  
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Figure 4.6. Poet Bulaienko discovers the stolen Black Earth in Leonid Osyka’s 
Love Awaits Those Who Return (1966) 
 
made several shorts on Ukrainian themes, including an adaptation of Lesia 
Ukrainka’s Forest Song (Lesnaia pesnia), some of Dovzhenko’s war stories from  
Ukraine in Flames (Ukraina v ogne), and a documentary about Ukrainian 
craftsman that aired on Kyiv television in 1963.168  Thus, unlike Illienko and 
Osyka, Illiashenko came to Dovzhenko Studio already nationally aware and 
conversant with Ukrainian kul’turnytstvo.   
Movement was slow on the film, with discussions and demands for 
revisions to Kostenko’s screenplay until April the following year.  Despite such 
hold-ups regarding the “cult of personality” theme in the Shvindin section, 
Goskino recognized the film as a major event at the studio, and that the 
screenplay conveyed the “inner sincerity of the Ukrainian people” during the 
Second World War.169  Inna Kokoreva, the head of Goskino’s SRK stated that 
the screenplay was “original and interesting” and that “it’s necessary to support 
the present tendency” of presenting the “national originality of the Ukraini
people.”
an 
                                                
170  After further considering the screenplay, Goskino passed it for 
directorial elaboration, with the stipulation that some of the errors were ironed out 
 
168 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1783, l. 184. 
169 Ibid., l. 4.  
170 Ibid., l. 16. 
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in the process.  Kokoreva and Tarasov concluded that the “authors bravely 
depart from the traditional frameworks of cinema narration and resolve the 
screenplay in the style of poetic cinema.”171  Thus, Illiashenko’s film emerged as 
a work that Goskino officially represented as poetic cinema, a method with its 
own generic and stylistic codes.  
 In December 1965, the Artistic Council viewed rushes, with Tsvirkunov, 
Mykola Mashchenko, Osyka and Syzonenko – the very individuals associate 
with, and supportive of, “Ukrainian poetic cinema” – expressing little faith in the 
film.  Syzonenko, in particular, complained of the “primitive khutorians’ke vision” 
at work in the film.172  Osyka, who would soon take over direction of Illiashenko’s 
film, stated that the acting was horrible (including that of Mykolaichuk!), but that 
the studio bore responsibility because they did not opt to view the rushes earlier.  
Osyka stated that he would have to shoot 80-90% of the material over, if he were 
given the project.173  In particular, the Artistic Council was shocked at the 
audacity and utter pretension of a dream sequence contained in the rushes, 
which imagined the three poets crucified on an embankment above the Dnipro.  
Zemliak, in particular, who served as a partisan commander during the war, 
viewed such a symbol of sacrifice as completely unacceptable, and that the 
image itself was “annoying.”174  Ignoring these complaints about the film, 
Illiashenko launched into an explanation of the authorial principles at work in 
Coordinate Your Watches:  
I had faith only in myself.  I had no intention to hide behind Gerasimov’s 
wide back.  I don’t even follow his school.  During my studies at VGIK I 
had my own theory: art is not a representation of life, but an allegory of 
life.175   
 
In alluding to his supposedly non-conformist school days during a meeting to 
discuss what was supposed to be a mature project, Illiashenko appeared 
hopelessly naïve and undependable.  Tsvirkunov ended the discussion, stating 
                                                 
171 TsDAMLMU, f. 1127, op. 1, d. 174, l. 42.  
172 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1783, l. 98. 
173 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1783, l. 103. 
174 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 313, l. 60. 
175 Ibid., l. 113. 
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that young director “undermined our faith in him as a person.”176  Four days later, 
on December 25, shooting ended.  Unlike Kyiv Frescoes or A Well for the Thirsty, 
the studio itself (rather than Goskino or the CPU) gave the order to halt 
production, suggesting a different conflict in play than with these other two films. 
On December 28, Gerasimov arrived from Moscow to discuss what to do 
with the film.  Much of Illiashenko’s material, he said, possessed an “artificial 
sentimentality, in the tradition of Ukrainian melodrama.”177  Paradzhanov, also 
present at the meeting, stated, “The director arranges [the film] incompetently.”178  
More damning, however, was Kostenko’s statement, “I could have expected 
something unpleasant, but not such serious artistic miscalculations[…]  It’s 
tasteless.”179  Kostenko proposed to rewrite the screenplay based on only one of 
the poets, and to shoot it all within the studio to save money.180  Osyka was 
confirmed as the director of this re-make in January.181  Nonetheless, the budget 
and timetable for completing Osyka’s film remained the same as Coordinate Your 
Watches, necessitating that the crew shoot exclusively on the studio grounds.  
Consequently, the look of Love Awaits resembles Paradzhanov’s artless mise-
en-scène in Kyiv Frescoes, with a focus on medium interior shots, and frequent 
cutaways of objects of material culture. 
Cultural politics were extremely tense in mid-to-late-1966, with the 
conviction of the L’viv Ten and other Kyiv intellectuals, along with the active 
support of several poets like Drach, Kostenko and Vinhranovs’kyi, all of whom 
were employed at Dovzhenko Studio.  The CPU Department of Science and 
Culture noted that Kostenko participated in a “nationalist” meeting at the 
Shevchenko statue in central Kyiv on May 22 with convicted nationalist Ivan 
Svitlychnyi and 150 others, and who personally argued that the Kobzar’ was an 
exclusively “Ukrainian” document.182  In October, Kostenko requested that the 
studio remove her name from Osyka’s film, stating that nothing contained in the 
                                                 
176 Ibid., ll. 118. 
177 Ibid., l. 90. 
178 Ibid., ll. 93-94. 
179 Ibid., l. 95 
180 Ibid., l. 95-96. 
181 TsDAVOU, f. 4754, op. 1, d. 77, l. 49. 
182 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 24, d. 6160, l. 104. 
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rushes resembled her original screenplay.183  It is unclear why she did this.  
Perhaps she was scared of the repercussions that would come from the film, or 
perhaps she was genuinely annoyed with Osyka’s creative license, as she was 
with Illiashenko’s. 
Osyka’s film received little acknowledgement, but received a second 
category rating from Ukrainian Goskino.184  Central Goskino did, however, 
approve the film for all-Union release on December 1, 1966.185  Press coverage 
of the film was close to nothing until this final approval, with articles not 
appearing in Ranok, Kul’tur i zhyttia, Literaturna Ukraina, and Novyzny 
kinoekrana until March 1967.  The film premiered at the suburban Kyiv “Dnipro” 
Theater on December 10, 1967, a year after Ukrainian Goskino approved it for 
release.186  The film disappeared once again until March 1968, with one week of 
extensive screenings in Kyiv and other major Soviet cities, to be followed with 
limited screenings throughout April.187  Iskusstvo kino reviewed the film in March, 
and a final mention of it appeared during the Second Congress of the SKU on 
November 14, 1968, when Goskino chairman Aleksei Romanov complained of 
the film’s poor success with Ukrainian spectators.188  
*   *   * 
Two issues, in particular, emerge from Illiashenko’s Coordinate Your 
Watches and Osyka’s re-make: First, we see a political conflict between 
ideological authorities and the studio/filmmakers on a supposed correlation 
between Stalinism and fascism.  The “cult” theme was politically dated by 1965, 
and the direct comparison that Illiashenko made between Stalinism and fascism 
in the Shvindin story was all the more problematic after Vasilii Grossman’s novel 
Life and Fate failed to pass the censors in 1962.189  A more pertinent conflict 
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emerged between the war generation at the studio (Tsvirkunov, Levchuk and 
Zemliak) and the post-war generation (Illiashenko, Osyka and Illienko) about the 
meaning of the war itself, Illiashenko’s film viewing the poets’ deaths as a 
sacrifice rather than as heroic martyrdom.  This conflict also manifested itself in a 
politics of social and cultural difference at the studio.  All three “war” films from 
1965-66 were made by non-serving directors, whereas the studio and SKU 
leaderships were composed of war heroes.  Each of these latter individuals were 
supportive of “Ukrainian poetic cinema” but took fundamental issue with the way 
in which local and national space was situated in relation to the war and its 
commemoration.  Personally invested in the war narrative, the older generation 
of Ukrainian-speakers at the studio viewed these young Russian-speaking 
returnees as having much too little geographic or historical experience to deal 
with these monumental events that their films encapsulated, despite the 
ethnographic and literary research that they undertook.  Thus, in the final dispute 
over representational knowledge, nationality was conflated with generation and 
questions of film style.  Thereafter, studio and Goskino authorities would become 
more critical of the auteurist agenda that had characterized the studio since 
1964, associated as it now was with a certain youthful dilettantism with regard to 
the nationality question.  
 
Ukraine and Modernism: Questioning an “Elite” Agenda 
 
This same generation of Soviet Ukrainian war heroes, who now occupied 
the positions of leadership within the SKU and Dovzhenko Studio, had been 
infatuated with, and to some degree influenced by, Paradzhanov’s Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors as a model of “authentic” national representation.  
Moreover, Paradzhanov’s film positioned Ukrainian cinema at the forefront of 
Ukrainian cultural politics and within a new conception of non-Russian cinema in 
the USSR.  Shadows had established a consensus in Ukraine.  Yet that 
consensus broke down, based in part on the very claims to authenticity that its 
filmmakers made, both in public forums and within the film’s formal arrangement.  
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CPU officials and spectators alike began asking why such an “authentic” image 
of the Ukrainian people need be so unusual and complex.  Were representations 
of the Ukrainian people so “difficult to master,” as Levchuk once stated, or were 
Paradzhanov and his followers interested in their own “difficult” aesthetic 
questions more so than in Ukraine?  With “Ukrainian poetic cinema” now 
implicated in dissident politics, perhaps only by association, the unfamiliar 
ethnoscape that it presented on screen to a specific public now appeared as a 
potential threat.  If Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors constituted the height of 
“authentic” representation, why did Ukrainian spectators not accept it as an 
image of themselves?  In part, the fault lay in promoting the journey narrative, 
which celebrated the auteur as the creator of national meaning, asking the 
spectator to see the film as its authors did.  Moreover, in promotional materials, 
these films asked Ukrainian spectators to assimilate the unfamiliar as part of 
one’s own national identity, rather than accept the canonical objects, events and 
meanings contained in the “Friendship of Peoples” mythology.  Many Ukrainians, 
like the engineer in Dnipropetrovsk, who watched Shadows of Forgotten 
Ancestors did not see the importance of defining Ukrainians as so fundamentally 
different.  Did this not diminish the importance of other potential identification as 
Ukrainian or with Ukraine? 
The dispute over Dovzhenko’s legacy and his artistic intentions 
encapsulates the problem here: Was Dovzhenko important for Ukraine because 
he mobilized a modernist aesthetic to reveal the essence of a unique “national 
character,” or was he important because he showed how and why the great 
events of the twentieth century – The Revolution, formation of the Soviet Union, 
industrialization, collectivization, and the Great Patriotic War – happened in 
Ukraine?  There was general consensus among Ukrainian artists and 
intellectuals during the 1960s as to the filmmaker’s specific importance for the 
republic, but these questions of artistic representation touched on the very root of 
the problem of Ukrainian difference and how, and to whom, to show it.  A 
filmmaker’s stylistic choices could be used to render a film’s subject matter as 
familiar and comprehensible or unusual and impenetrable, which, in the present 
 249
case, had implications about spatial relations between Ukraine and Russia, and 
between the everyday and the extraordinary.  As a Ukrainian modernist 
filmmaker, Dovzhenko rendered the everyday as extraordinary in his delineation 
of a unique Ukrainian “national character.”  As a Soviet and socialist realist 
filmmaker, however, he was invested in showing how Ukrainians participated in 
the revolutionary process, albeit within their own particular cultural, social and 
political context.  Both positions on the legacy of the filmmaker and his work 
rejected the earlier notion of Ukrainian difference as backwardness, but the latter 
asserted a claim to active Ukrainian participation in modern politics and social 
processes, whereas the former affirmed, through Dovzhenko’s role as an auteur, 
Ukraine’s participation in a pan-Soviet and pan-European modernism.   
During the 1960s, Dovzhenko Studio adopted an auteurist model for 
creating “national cinema,” largely because its new leadership viewed the history 
of Ukrainian cinema in terms of personality and the mark of particular directors, 
most notably that of Dovzhenko himself.  The problem with this model was that it 
only had the traditional repressive powers of the Soviet state to regulate thematic 
interest.  The studio leadership gave young filmmakers like Illienko, Osyka and 
Illiashenko the green light based on a combination of developing young talent 
and a commitment to an auteurist agenda as a means to transform the studio’s 
reputation.  The conflict that emerged from the production of Illiashenko’s and 
Osyka’s debut was between different conceptions of authorship, and their 
commitment to both modernism and the nationality question.  During their work 
on these projects, both Drach and Kostenko became involved in Ukrainian 
cultural nationalism and the interests of this movement.  Moreover, their 
screenplays reflected the narrative and ideological concerns of the nascent 
dissident movement in Ukraine.  By contrast, the directors were less interested in 
these descriptions of rural everyday life in the republic, and more so in 
developing a visual style that produced a de-familiarized Ukrainian ethnoscape 
divorced from a domesticated Stalinist folkloric and engaged with a modernist 
“dovzhenkoist” poetics.  Their lack of commitment to either a Ukrainian dissident 
agenda or to more mainstream questions about language policy placed these 
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filmmakers in a difficult position vis á vis CPU ideological authorities, but allowed 
them to continue working, provided they reconceptualize their aesthetic 
ambitions and relationship to a Ukrainian and broader public. 
Chapter 5 
 
Re-Imagining Ukrainian National Cinema in the Era of Stagnation 
 
 The SKU Plenum in May 1966 was a tense event for most of its members.  
Since the previous Plenum in November, production was halted on Coordinate 
Your Watches and Kyiv Frescoes, and now it seemed certain that Iurii Illienko’s 
film would also fail to reach distribution.  Director Mykola Mashchenko stated that 
an “unpleasant, complex and difficult atmosphere” had descended upon the 
studio in the past months, and that those individuals who opposed the VGIK 
returnees were now gloating about victory.1  S. P. Ivanov attempted at 
reconciliation, stating that the “different creative schools” emerging at Dovzhenko 
Studio had helped Ukrainian cinema overcome its dependence on primitive 
theatricality of the 1950s and early 1960s.  He denounced both “rigid dogma” 
(i.e., the CPU Resolution that Paradzhanov’s, Illienko’s and Illiashenko’s films 
were “politically dangerous”) and “haphazard experimentation” (i.e., the films 
themselves).  But his denunciation of “associationalists,” as he called them, 
made it clear that “Ukrainian poetic cinema” would not be, as Levchuk stated in 
October 1964, “one of the prerequisites for the molding of our product.”2   
In denouncing the politics of authorship at work during 1964-1966, Ivanov 
stated that the auteur was already old news in Western Europe, and made 
Ukraine look provincial by comparison.3  French New Wave directors like 
François Truffaut and Jean-Luc Godard had moved beyond “Le Politique des 
auteurs” to embrace, in the former case, a sophisticated brand of commercial 
                                                 
1 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 355, l. 212. 
2 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 1750, l. 151. 
3 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 355, l. 28-29, 41-42. 
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cinema, and in the latter, radical collective filmmaking.4  From Illiashenko’s 
pretensions in particular, it was obvious to most at the studio that Ukrainian 
national cinema could not survive solely “vne kolektiva,” especially in its 
penchant for what Ivanov called “formalist-roguish” qualities.5  In the coming 
decade, authorities sought to reign in such excess as images of Ukrainian poets 
crucified on the banks of the Dnipro, while continuing to encourage such “poetic” 
representations of “national character,” as long as a realist ideological 
pragmatism and a sympathetic ear toward spectators’ patience tempered them.  
At the same time, Dovzhenko Studio sought alternatives, both to the theatricality 
of the Stalinist folkloric, and the “ethnographic” tendencies of “poetic cinema.”  
With a view toward surviving in an increasingly profit-driven Soviet film industry, 
the Ukrainian studio had to recoup its financial losses from 1965-66 and prove to 
both Goskino and audiences that it too could compete with central studios 
without sacrificing one of its primary goals to speak to and for the Ukrainian 
people. 
Nonetheless, Ukrainian cinema, just as cultural production in the republic 
more generally, was becoming increasingly provincialized by the early 1970s, 
and only in part the result of new ways of thinking about media consumers.  
Roman Szporluk has argued that a successful campaign against the Ukrainian-
language press was initiated in 1972 with the purge of Petro Shelest and his 
supporters in the CPU Central Committee.  Under Volodymyr Shcherbyts’kyi, 
whose power base was in the same Russian-speaking, Southeastern Ukrainian 
industrial region as Brezhnev himself, the CPU would demand that the Ukrainian 
branch of Soiuzpechat’ (the state printing bureau) curtail Ukrainian-language 
circulation of periodicals and books, having accused the organization of artificially 
inflating the readership for such printed material.  Thereafter, a number of 
Ukrainian-language scholarly journals ceased publication, and the print run for 
such major periodicals as Ukraina and Vechirnii Kyiv shrunk, the latter reduced 
 
4 James Monaco, The New Wave: Truffaut, Godard, Chabrol, Rohmer, Rivette (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 39-41.  Roy Armes, “Ebb Tide, 1963-68,” in French Cinema (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 194-219. 
5 From a Ukrainian Goskino Resolution of July 20, 1966.  TsDAVOU, f. 4754, op. 1, d. 77, l. 54. 
from 344,550 copies in 1975 to 200,000 copies five years later.  The same 
process predictably occurred even stronger in Eastern Ukrainian cities like 
Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk.  While the number of titles increased during the 
1970s, circulation drastically declined.6   
In the area of Ukrainian film production, we see a similar process, with a 
greater proportion of films shot in the republican vernacular as the possibility to 
use native actors increased during this time, just as the audience for such films 
declined alongside UKK’s increasing unwillingness to sacrifice their financial 
plans for a political project, in which they remained uninvested.  Shcherbyts’kyi 
and Ideological Secretary Valentyn Malanchuk would continue to appeal to the 
Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia, but only on a rudimentary level, as Szporluk’s 
figures indicate.  In many respects, the studio’s promotion of an auteurist agenda 
declined during the same period.  With the removal of patrons like Shelest and 
Ideological Secretary Fedir Ovcharenko, the appeal to the auteur’s genius was 
no longer a politically neutral question.  More often than not, individuals like 
Paradzhanov and Ilienko carried the undesirably quality of independent influence 
in his or her self-promotional capacities as a filmmaker.   
This chapter explores the several interlocked causes for, and results of, 
the decline of a politics of national authorship as the basis for Ukrainian national 
cinema.  Whereas central studios were able to benefit from advances in film 
technology, production facilities in the republics were increasingly inferior to 
those in Moscow.  Whereas Ukrainian auteur cinema could survive on more 
limited budgets, largely because such a mode of representation marketed to 
audiences the spectacle of ethnic difference, genre films – adventure 
[prikliuchencheskie], science fiction and historical epics in particular – required 
budgets comparable to central productions.  Thus, the increasing demands to 
make films that paid were much more difficult for Kyiv Studio to accomplish.  By 
the 1970s, however, the fact that films “based on national material” did not attract 
large audiences mattered to Goskino under the new control of Filipp Ermash.  
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The decline of a Thaw-era politics of culture, which qualitatively valued “personal 
expression,” in place of a focus on the quantitative dimensions of audiences, had 
a profound effect on film directors associated with “poetic cinema” by the mid-
1970s.  Creatively, some continued to make minor compromises while attempting 
to work within the same mode of 1965, while others moved toward zakaznye 
temy7 or genre production.  While poetic cinema managed to function very briefly 
within the realm of commercial cinema, the national theme found continued 
resonance in zakaznye films, which were the only types of films that were not 
expected to generate profit.  By the late-1960s, SKU First Secretary Tymofii 
Levchuk became highly adept at negotiating the “national theme” within films that 
answered the demands of the latest party plenum.   
After Petro Shelest’s ouster in 1973, however, the lack of industry support 
gave way to a lack of political support for Ukrainian films dealing with “national 
themes,” associated as they now were with an “ethnographic,” rather than a 
“contemporary [suchasnyi]” conception of the Ukrainian people.  Such 
ethnographic imagery came to be associated with an anti-modern representation 
and thus outside of the main current of Soviet realism.  When film director Iurii 
Lysenko referred during a “Creative Conference” in 1968 at Dovzhenko Studio to 
the “national theme [as] consist[ing] of baggy trousers or something else like 
that,” he was as much discussing the films of 1965 as he was those of 1939.8  
But, in getting rid of the “morons in the pictures,” as Lysenko advocated, the 
question remained as to whether there was a method of representing a non-
ethnographic Ukraine, which would answer both nationalities policy in the ways 
that Ukrainian filmmakers understood it, and the demand for industry profits. 
Most at the studio, in fact, remained committed to a system of national 
representation, and specifically one that viewed the Carpathians as the essential 
Ukrainian ethnoscape.  During a 1972 conference, Vasyl’ Zemliak responded to 
critic Dmytro Shlapak about why the Carpathians were more important than the 
Donbas mines and the Dnipro: “Things are preserved there [in the Carpathians], 
                                                 
7 By “zakaznye temy,” or “ordered themes,” are implied those films that were placed in the annual 
thematic plans by the party itself. 
8 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2159, l. 62. 
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which are not yet destroyed, there are things there, which belong to this people.”  
Zemliak’s position remained unchanged from the debates of 1965: The 
Carpathians was a Ukrainian space that was both essentially different but also 
essentially one’s own.  The writer’s point took on a different tone, however, when 
he suggested in the same speech that Leonid Osyka and Iurii Illienko did not 
understand either the Ukrainian language or its customs, and pointed toward the 
work of fellow Zhytomyr peasant and war hero Tymofii Levchuk as the model for 
national representation.9  Essential to the SKU First Secretary’s style of 
filmmaking was its epic quality – big budget themes taken directly from party 
congresses and the latest celebratory event or anniversary.  By the late 1960s, 
however, Levchuk displayed a significant influence from poetic cinema’s content 
(if not style), choosing to locate his films about Honoré de Balzac, the 
Kotsiubyns’kyi family and partisan leader Sydir Kovpak in the Carpathians, and 
which featured local actors Ivan Mykolaichuk and Kostiantyn Stepankov among 
others.  
Levchuk and his colleagues within the SKU leadership feared a “de-
nationalization,” which would arise from greater focus on industry profits.  Kyiv 
filmmakers were skeptical that their films could compete with central productions, 
and not only due to unequal budgets.  The whole idea of box office competition 
with central production appeared to the studio leadership and the filmmakers 
alike as incompatible with the socialist mode of production, and which 
discriminated in particular against films that dealt with “national” subject matter.  
Just as Soviet critics claimed that commercial Hollywood films were “de-
nationalizing” Western European cinema,10 so too was “Russian” cinema “de-
nationalizing” the cinemas of the Union republics in their hegemonic role in 
cultural production and over audience expectations.  A May 1971 letter 
(unsigned) sent to the SKU Presidium and Ukrainian Goskino attempted to 
                                                 
9 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2536, l. 81. 
10 See, G. Bogemskii, “Kinematograf ‘obshchestva potrebleniia:’ Razmyshleniia ob ital’ianskom 
kommercheskom fil’me,” in Mify i real’nost’: Zarubezhnoe kino segodnia 3 (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 
1972), 107-137; I. Vaisfel’d wrote in 1967, “Cinema’s appeal to national aesthetic values became 
one of the obstacles on the path toward its subordination to a commercial standard.”  I. Vaisfel’d, 
“Natsional’noe – internatsional’noe.” Iskusstvo kino, no. 9 (Sept 1967), 19.  
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garner official support in opposition to a central Goskino report from two months 
prior on the “project for the transfer of film studios to a new system of planning, 
and economic and material stimulation.”  The letter argued that a new system of 
economic stimulation, along with the film industry’s reorganization “dependent on 
the economic results of distribution” would severely hurt national cinema.  The 
author’s first complaint was that distribution organs attempted to fulfill their own 
economic plans without concern for political objectives.  Consequently, UKK 
showed as many imported genre films as was possible without arousing the 
suspicions of authorities in the cultural section of the Central Committee.  Such 
bottom-line distribution planning would hurt all of Soviet cinema, the letter 
argued, but republican studios in particular.  The author admitted that films from 
the republics, “based on national material,” could not compete with Mosfil’m 
production, and certainly not with foreign cinema.  Thus, “national films” would be 
in danger of disappearing from the repertoire.  The letter continued: “It would be 
criminal to deprive the 47 million people of Ukraine of a national and socialist film 
art.”11  In this allusion to the audience, however, the report did not imply that 
these 47 million were the intended audience; or rather, it did not suggest that 
such a number only corresponded to the size of the audience.  In identifying the 
population of the republic, the letter articulated that the Ukrainian film studio 
effectively represented this constituency, whether or not they chose to see any 
films that it produced.  Moreover, the author argued that the industry’s 
reorientation toward profit and the size of the audience over the quality of the 
audience would cause a flight of cadres to the central studios.  Thus, the letter 
reasoned, such a perestroika of the industry would send Soviet cinema “down 
the bourgeois path of development,” and erode filmmakers’ “moral” responsibility 
before the spectator.12   
Such a project for “material stimulation” would undo not only the politics of 
national authorship that dominated the studio in the mid-1960s, but also the 
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infrastructural developments that Tsvirkunov and S. P. Ivanov worked hard to 
establish in the early part of the decade.  Nonetheless, such an exodus of 
personnel never occurred from Dovzhenko Studio to the central studios, largely 
because its staff had few desirable qualities for Mosfil’m or Gor’kii studios.  From 
the other direction, it became rarer for Moscow actors and directors to come to 
Kyiv for temporary work, in part because it became less lucrative to do so, but 
also due to the nepotistic quality of the studio collective, which routinely protested 
such import of temporary personnel.  In a sense, the “problem of cadres” at 
Dovzhenko Studio had been solved by the late 1960s, but only at the further cost 
to the studio’s reputation and its ability to attract audiences. 
 
The Search for a Ukrainian Blockbuster 
 
What were Dovzhenko Studio’s options (and those of other “national” 
studios) after the rejection of “poetic” experimentation from a political standpoint, 
on the one hand, and film commodity “exploitation” on the other?  Certainly, 
neither the Ukrainian film industry management, nor those involved in the 
creative end, desired a situation in which only Ukrainians constituted the 
audience for republican productions, despite efforts to gear marketing and 
promotion toward such an imagined community of film consumers.  Indeed, as 
industry officials made clear, they considered the limiting of films to republican 
distribution a punishment and insult to the work itself, not to mention a violation of 
Soviet nationalities policy.  In September 1968, for example, Tsvirkunov and 
Ukrainian Goskino SRK head Kostiantyn Kudiievs’kyi wrote to Aleksei Romanov 
with a complaint that Ukrainian-language films were more often distributed only 
within the republic.  “After all,” they stated, “the Committee doesn’t consider the 
republican screen to be a second or third tier screen in the country.”13  Language 
itself, after all, did not limit a film’s distribution to the linguistic community due to 
the extensive directives governing film translation in the Soviet Union.  At issue 
were films whose authors believed it aesthetically necessary to shoot in 
                                                 
13 RGALI, f. 2944, op. 1, d. 524, l. 126. 
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Ukrainian, for the purpose of maintaining the national subject matter’s 
authenticity.  Thus, central Goskino’s decision to limit certain Ukrainian-language 
films probably had little to do with linguistic comprehension and more to do with 
what they perceived as the difficulty of comprehending a non-Russian 
ethnoscape and “formalist” experimentation imbued with the mark of an “author.”  
To some degree, we can see how Paradzhanov, Drach, Illienko and other 
Ukrainian auteurs brought such limits upon themselves when they continually 
answered critiques about their elaborate symbolic language to the effect that 
those for whom the film was intended would understand.  Industry and party 
officials would interpret this notion of the knowledgeable audience, of course, as 
a clear sign of intellectual snobbery.  The actual decision to limit certain “national 
films” to “knowledgeable” republican audiences demanded that the studio prove 
that Ukrainians not only understood but desired to see such films.  In January 
1967, Romanov reported on a “strange situation” during a SK Plenum, whereby 
films produced at “national studios” performed more poorly in “their own” 
republics than in the USSR as a whole.14  During the Second Congress of the 
SKU in November 1968, Romanov returned to the same topic, stating that films 
like Leonid Osyka’s Love Awaits Those Who Return performed better in Moscow 
than in Kyiv, despite the “national theme” of the film.  “These Ukrainian films,” he 
stated, “not only ran poorly in Ukraine, they ran worse [there] than in the whole 
[Soviet] Union.”15  Romanov’s reasoning was instructive: “The success of a film 
in the republic [in which it was made] provides an indication for its genera
success[…]”
l 
                                                
16  The chairman’s counterclaim to the specificity of ethnic 
knowledge was that national difference did not exist on the level of patterns of 
film consumption, and he dared his Ukrainian colleagues to prove otherwise.   
“National films” had to perform on two stages: They had to be successful 
with a particular spectator (one in the republic) and a “mass” spectator (i.e., it had 
to generate profit).  The search for a Ukrainian blockbuster involved several 
 
14 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 70, l. 56-57. 
15 Romanov stated that Osyka’s debut attracted only 613,000 people (1.4% of the population) in 
the Ukrainian SSR for the four months, during which it screened.  TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 
450, l. 199-200.   
16 Ibid., 201. 
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production strategies, from attempts to market a “realist” poetic cinema, to work 
within established popular genres like war, melodrama and detektiv.  For the 
purposes of realist narration, Ukrainian filmmakers set such films within a 
particular republican landscape, but, in de-emphasizing the iconicity of 
landscape, made little attempt to produce meaning about the nature of it as an 
ethnic space.  In such attempts to draw audiences to Ukrainian films, space was 
pushed into a recognizable background.  Humans, meanwhile, act independently 
of the landscape.  They are neither beholden to it nor identified with it.  Several of 
the most popular films produced in Kyiv during the mid-1960s, however, had 
absolutely nothing to do with a “national” theme.  At the same time, such films 
could demonstrate that Dovzhenko Studio had the same production possibilities 
as central studios, and could shoot with its own cadres and budgetary 
restrictions.   
*    *    * 
After A Dream, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, and his brief work on 
Illiashenko’s Coordinate Your Watches, Ivan Mykolaichuk entered a different 
stage in his career, one seemingly at odds with what he had come to signify 
during his student years.  After graduating from KITM in the Spring of 1965, the 
actor immediately received a role on his instructor Viktor Ivchenko’s new 
production, The Viper (Gadiuka, 1965), based on the 1929 Civil War novella by 
Aleksei Tolstoi.  In Ivchenko’s film, Mykolaichuk played his first of only two 
villains during his career, this time a White officer who rapes the heroine Ol’ga 
Zotova.  The gripping action and high production values made The Viper 
Mykolaichuk’s greatest popular success.  In 1966, 34 million people saw this 
historical film about the daughter of a merchant who, after being raped, fights in 
the Red Cavalry.  After the war, she returns to her ravaged village to find her 
family murdered.  She has difficulty assimilating into a civilian life, trading her 
soldier’s rifle for a bureaucrat’s typewriter.  In the end, Ol’ga becomes the further 
victim of corrupt officials, but maintains her essential idealism and ideological 
commitment. 
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Ivchenko directed the film in a classic realist manner, which stood at odds 
with his earlier “theatrical” aesthetic in Ivanna (1959) and Forest Song (Lisova 
pisnia, 1961).17  Visually, nothing stands out in The Viper when compared to 
these earlier eccentricities, but production values were high and the acting was 
professional.  The Viper’s narrative presents a linear, but psychologically 
complex story of the daughter of a “class enemy.”  Mykolaichuk’s role as the 
White officer, however, carries no subtlety, signifying pure evil in his sole purpose 
to prey on the innocent and seemingly helpless.  In performing in his instructor’s 
film, Mykolaichuk sought a degree of job security within the safe haven of a 
“mature” filmmaker’s work.  He was not playing “himself,” the “romantic Hutsul,” 
and thus was not required to answer for the authenticity of a Russian White 
Guardist.  He told Novyny kinoekrana in January 1966, “I wanted to play the 
villain.  Work on the role of the White Guard officer Val’ka Brykin was for me 
extraordinary and at the same time interesting.”18  He did not identify with his role 
here, but merely found it “interesting.”  The Viper screened regularly in Kyiv from 
mid-March 1966 to early January 1967.  After Ivchenko won the Shevchenko 
Award for the film two months later (The Viper was chosen instead of Shadows 
of Forgotten Ancestors, despite Ivchenko’s own support for the latter), it returned 
for a week of screenings at the Druzhba Theater on Khreshchatyk, and an 
additional private screening at the Kyiv Officer’s Club.19  The Viper had the 
longest run for a Ukrainian film during the entire 1960s, and routinely came back 
to movie theaters and factory clubs in honor of various anniversary events.   
The very fact that the film had nothing to do with Ukraine allowed 
Mykolaichuk to establish himself as a genuine actor, over and above his identity 
as a “genuine Hutsul.”  Several other Ukrainian actors starred in the film, 
including Ivchenko’s student Raisa Nedashkivs’ka, in addition to other KITM 
                                                 
17 Vasyl’ Illiashenko calls Forest Song on the border of theater and cinema.  Vasyl’ Illiashenko, 
Istoriia ukrains’koho kinomystetstva (Kyiv: ArtEk, 2004), 191. 
18 Ivan Mykolaichuk, Novyny kinoekrana, no. 1 (January 1966); quoted in Larysa Briukhovets’ka, 
Ivan Mykolaichuk (Kyiv: Kino Teatr, 2004), 75. 
19 Na ekranakh Kyeva, March 14, 1966 – January 17, 1967, March 30, April 21, 1967; Novyny 
kinoekrana, no. 5 (May 1967). 
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graduates Kostiantyn Stepankov and Oleksandr Movchan.20  Despite its non-
Ukrainian thematics, Ivchenko shot the film in Hutsul’shchyna.21  With The Viper, 
we find a different attempt to create “national cinema” in Ukraine, one based on 
the studio’s independence from borrowed personnel and landscapes, and one 
which competed with central productions for spectators.  For his role in this film in 
particular, Mykolaichuk was distinguished as an Honored Artist of the Ukrainian 
SSR, and won the prestigious Mykola Ostrovs’kyi Award. 
Between 1964 and 1974, Dovzhenko Studio produced only 15 additional 
films that attracted 20 million or more spectators, and most of these productions 
related only marginally to Ukrainian themes.  As we see in Figure 5.1, war films, 
specifically combat films dealing with the Great Patriotic War, carried the most 
box office successes.  Both Tymofii Levchuk’s Two Years above the Abyss (Dva 
gody nad propast’iu) and Anton Tymonishyn’s They Knew Them Only by Face 
(Ikh znali tol’ko v litso) dealt with Soviet counter-intelligence operations during the 
Nazi occupation in Kyiv with the former, and in a generic “Russian” port city in the 
latter (probably Sevastopol’).  Tymonishyn continued his lucrative career by 
making Doctor Abst’s Experiment (Eksperiment Doktora Absta), a non-comedic 
take on the theme that Kubrick explored in Dr. Strangelove (1964) about a Nazi 
mad scientist who contributed to the United States’ acquisition of the atomic 
bomb.  Despite being a director that contributed several “leaders in distribution” 
to the Kyiv studio, CPU member and KITM graduate Tymonishyn garnered little 
respect there or within the SKU for his continual use of non-Ukrainian actors, and 
little regard for contemporary representational politics in the republic.  The single 
mention of him in industry and Union documents, apart from the standard orders 
for production, was a statement from Zemliak during a 1967 SKU Plenum:  “Here 
is a man who looks better when he is silent.  Oleksandr [sic] Tymonishyn has 
found a theme for himself.”22  Tymonishyn’s work at the studio was, thus, another 
                                                 
20 Dovzhenko Studio’s statement about the completed film praised its use of KITM graduates as a 
positive feature of its production.  RGALI, f. 2944, op. 4, d. 720, l. 105. 
21 TsDAVOU, f. 4754, op. 1, d. 44, l. 260. 
22 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 400, l. 105. 
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1964 Keys from the Sky V. Ivanov I. Stadniuk Comedy 22.3 
1966 The Viper V. Ivchenko G. Koltunov War 34 
1966 Two Years above the 
Abyss 
T. Levchuk L. Trauberg War 30.6 
1966 They Knew Them Only 
by Face 
A. Tymonishyn E. Rostovtsev War 40.7 
1967 The Gypsy E. Matveev E. Mytko Melodrama 55.6 
1968 Annychka B. Ivchenko B. Zahoryl’ko Melodrama 25.1 
1968 Doctor Abst’s 
Experiment 
A. Tymonishyn A. Nasibov War 29.4 
1968 Spies O. Shvachko E. Onopriienko War 34 
1969 Long-Distance Romance E. Matveev D. Khrabrovyts’kyi Hist-Rev 21 
1970 The Prisoners of 
Beaumont 
Iu. Lysenko Georges Juribida War 20 
1971 Inspector of Criminal 
Investigations 
S. Tsybul’nyk M. Makliars’kyi Detective 40.9 
1971 Nina O. Shvachko S. Smirnov War 21.6 
1973 Everyday Criminal 
Investigations 
S. Tsybul’nyk M. Makliars’kyi Detective 27.3 
1973 Only the Old Go to Battle L. Bykov E. Onopriienko War 44.3 
1973 The Black Captain O. Lentsius Iu. Lukin War 21.9 
1974 The White Bashlik V. Savel’ev Shynkuba Hist-Rev 20.8 
 
type of “vne kolektiva” production.  He performed a certain function for Ukrainian 
cinema in his successful ability to work within established popular genres, but at 
the expense of participation in “Ukrainian national cinema” itself, and thus at the 
expense of his reputation as an artist.  Whether or not Tymonishyn cared to 
participate is beside the point; rather, the lack of interest in him and his films 
demonstrated that the studio collective and the SKU continued to be driven by 
the development of native cadres and the promotion of national authorship.  
Whenever possible, most filmmakers attempted to integrate one or both of these 
concerns when approaching the problem of audiences.   
While Oleksii Shvachko’s Spies (Razvedchiki) located his counter-
intelligence film in a non-Ukrainian space – a stretch of the Danube in Hungary – 
he peopled it with Ukrainian intelligence officers and employed studio actors to 
                                                 
23 “Leaders in Distribution” was the Soviet term for films that sold more than 20 million tickets.  
Data is cited from Raisa Prokopenko, ed., Natsional’na kinostudiia khudozhnikh fil’miv imeni 
Oleksandra Dovzhenka: Anotovanyi kataloh fil’miv, 1928-1998 (Kyiv, 1998). 
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play the major roles, including Mykolaichuk as the hero Captain Kurganov,24 
Andrii Sova as Corporal Cherniak, Stepankov as a Hungarian partisan, and 
Leonid Bykov as Sergeant Makarenko.  The film’s plot, a common motif for 
Soviet cinema in the mid-1960s, finds Soviet intelligence officers rendering 
humanitarian aid to a village whose supply lines were cut off by the retreating 
Nazi occupiers.  Intended for the growing youth audience, Spies is full of action 
and suspense, with little of the psychological exploration of Ivchenko’s The Viper.  
Here again, however, the film provided more visibility to Mykolaichuk as a 
talented actor.  By 1969, he had demonstrated his ability to play in Ukrainian and 
Russian literary roles (Shevchenko and Val’ka), as the authentic self in 
“Ukrainian poetic cinema” productions (Ivanko), and now in a genre film as 
Kurganov.  If, in 1964-66 we saw Mykolaichuk in neckties with embroidered folk 
patterns and a Hutsul keptar’, we now saw him on the cover of Novyny 
kinoekrana as a professional actor able to transcend his ethno-national identity, 
and as a machine-gun toting adventure hero (Figure 5.2).  Released at the 
beginning of Soviet schoolchildren’s summer recess, UKK sold almost 35 million 
tickets for Spies, demonstrating the administration’s growing conversance with 
marketing films appropriately.25   
Of the “leaders in distribution” listed in Figure 5.1, however, only L. 
Bykov’s Only the Old and Sulafim Tsybul’nyk’s Inspector (Inspektor ugolovnogo 
pozyska) could be considered Soviet “blockbusters (boeviki).”  While other films 
attracted an above average number of spectators, these two films dominated 
movie theaters in 1971 and 1973, respectively, each sparking sequels later in the 
decade (Tsybul’nyk’s Everyday [Budni ugolovnogo pozyska] in 1973, and 
Bykov’s One-Two Soldiers Went [Aty-baty shli soldaty] in 1976).  While the two 
films were shot in Russian for the most part, and in no way pretended to be 
“national films,” “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” appeared in both.   
                                                 
24 Initially, the studio had chosen Ihor Sambors’kyi to direct the film, who had Moscow actor V. 
Grachev playing Kurganov.  When Shvachko took over the production in February 1968, he 
replaced the Russian with Mykolaichuk, crediting the latter with more “skill” in such a role.  See, 
TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2151, l. 81. 
25 See, Na ekranakh Ukrainy, April 21-June 9, 1969.  UKK worker V. Poltavtsev wrote about 
seasonal considerations in marketing particular genre films in his Iskusstvo kino article, 
“Prokatnaia zhizn’ fil’ma,” IK, no. 10 (Oct 1972), 115. 
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Tsybul’nyk’s well-crafted detektiv follows a group of Kyiv militsiia officers 
who are tracking down a murder suspect.  The film concludes as the detectives’ 
pursuit takes them to the Carpathians, after they discover that the suspect has 
returned to his native mountain village.  They visit his mother’s khata on an 
unpeopled mountainside, where she tells them in perfect Russian that her son 
has just left.  The detectives call in assistance from a helicopter to track his 
movements through the nooks and crannies of the Carpathians, where they 
eventually find and catch him.  Here, the Carpathians functioned not so much as 
an ethnic fountain of youth; rather, the landscape becomes a tactical prop, whose 
characteristics were determined, not by Ukrainian kul’turnytstvo, but by the 
emergent detektiv genre.  The one inhabitant we see in these mountains is an 
old peasant woman, who represents, not “national color,” but generic 
backwardness.   
Leonid Bykov, a popular actor at the Kharkiv Theater during the 1950s, 
moved to Lenfil’m in the 1960s to become famous in primarily comedic roles.  In 
1973, Bykov returned to Ukraine to direct Only the Old, the story of a 
“multinational” Soviet air squadron operating in German-occupied Ukraine, 
assigned to what they understood as a suicide mission.  Bykov plays the 
commanding officer, Lieutenant Titarenko, who, while speaking flawless Russian, 
calls his comrades “khloptsy” rather than the Russian equivalent of “rebiata 
(guys, buddies),” and, when alone with Airman Kuznechyk (played by KITM grad 
Sergei Ivanov), speaks Ukrainian.  Managing assistant director of Dovzhenko 
Studio Hlib Shandybin wrote to the new head of Ukrainian Goskino Vasyl’ 
Bol’shak in September 1973 asking that the Russian original not be dubbed into 
Ukrainian, on the basis that it would ruin the film’s multinational character and 
“ruin” the film’s “dramaturgy.”26  While similar to Paradzhanov’s argument against 
a Russian dub for Shadows, the shift from a discourse of “color” to one of 
“narrative” or “dramaturgy” represented a new stage in the representational 
politics of Soviet nationalities policy, one which sought to locate nationalities 
outside of both folkloric and ethnographic sites of exploration, while continuing to 
                                                 





Figure 5.2. Ivan Mykolaichuk in Za Radians’kyi fil’m and Novyny kinoekrana 
during 1968-69: (l-r) A caricature of the actor hitting the bull’s-eye of “cinema art” 
by E. Sheikin in the November 5, 1969 issue of ZRF; and drawn within the letter 
“П” for a review of Spies in the February 1969 issue of NK. 
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acknowledge their existence.  In this way, Only the Young represented the visual 
and aural components of line four on Soviet citizens’ passports, neither 
condescending nor exoticizing, but merely revealing contemporary reality within a 
comprehensible, yet truthful, narrative about the tragedy and heroism of those 
who fell in the Great Patriotic War.27  While denying the natural connections of 
ethnic subjects to particular landscapes found in “Ukrainian poetic cinema,” the 
film also removed the domesticated folkloric spectacle of the non-Russian found, 
for example, in the opening segment of Pyr’ev’s Tractor Drivers (see Chapter 1). 
The Viper, Spies, Inspector and Only the Young in particular, represented 
successful attempts from Ukrainian filmmakers to remain relevant after the crisis 
of 1965-1966, as Dovzhenko Studio attempted to save itself from the stigma of 
Kyiv Frescoes, A Well for the Thirsty, and Coordinate Your Watches.  At the 
same time, as S. P. Ivanov’s statement about “different creative schools” 
indicated, the studio continued to promote its auteur geniuses, and attempted to 
cash in on the respect from intellectuals that “Ukrainian poetic cinema” had 
provided the studio.   
During the late 1960s, republican Goskinos and studios believed that the 
industry was still committed to expanding production, and provided justification 
that such a plan made sense in terms of the successes of Paradzhanov and 
Illienko in Ukraine, Rezo Chkheidze and Tenghiz Abuladze in Georgia, Tolomush 
Okeev in Kirghizstan, and Vitautas Zhalakiavichus in Lithuania among other 
“national” auteurs.  An increase in production would not only allow republican 
studios to compete economically with central studios, bringing much needed 
funds to expand and modernize production facilities, but also to justify their very 
existence alongside of them, rather than subordinate to them.  At the Second 
Congress of the SKU, several speakers mentioned increasing production by 
125% to 30 full-length feature films annually.  Similar proposals appeared before 
Goskino from republican studios throughout the latter part of the decade.28  CPU 
                                                 
27 Even Vasyl’ Illiashenko writes in his recent history of Ukrainian cinema that Only the Young 
was one of the most honest films about the experience of the Second World War in the Soviet 
Union.  Illiashenko, 236. 
28 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 450, l. 123. 
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First Secretary Shelest attempted to use his weight in the party to compel the 
industry to move on this issue.  In a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU 
in early 1969, he argued that the “conservative program for the release of feature 
films… leads, on the one hand, to a rise in the cost of producing films and, on the 
other hand, to the lengthy inoccupation of creative workers.”  While rejecting the 
possibility of 30, he recommended the modest increase to 15 films per year.29  
As we see from Figure 5.3, by 1968, production on full-length feature films for 
non-television release at Dovzhenko Studio had already stabilized at around 12 
films per year.  In the 1970s, this number constituted official Goskino policy, and 
which the studio maintained until 1993.30  The industry saw no further need f
an increase in production, and viewed 12 films per year as the top level that th
market could handle.  Even at this level, only one-two films annually were 
profitable, and the industry continued to subsidize the bulk of production.
or 
e 
                                                
31 
For authorities in central Goskino, then, the question of increasing 
production provoked other questions about how many more Ukrainian-themed 
films Soviet audiences would pay money to see.  During the decade between 
1968 and 1978, authorities in Goskino promoted audience research as a way of 
understanding patterns of film consumption.  As Hollywood had done beginning 
in the late 1930s, the Soviet film industry now appealed to the language of public 
opinion polls, rather than propaganda, as the idiom through which it understood 
“the audience.”32  Within this idiom, audiences became a multitude of “taxonomic 
collectives,” to whom the industry could direct its marketing.  Sociologists 
studying film audiences determined that adventures and comedies were the  
 
29 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 31, f. 3689, ll. 60-61.  
30 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 788, l. 15;  After 1993, production fell off as Goskino completely 
dissolved.  Dovzhenko Studio was suddenly forced to find private funding for production, as well 
as alternative means of distributing their films.  See, Prokopenko.  
31 Marat Vlasov, “Kinoiskusstvo i epokha zastoia,” in Vlasov, ed., Sovetskoe kino semidesiatykh – 
pervoi poloviny vos’midesiatykh godov: uchebnoe posobie (Moscow: VGIK, 1997), 9. 
32 See, Joshua First, “From Spectator to ‘Differentiated’ Consumer: Film Audience Research in 
the Era of Developed Socialism (1965-1980)” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History 9, no. 2 (Spring 2008), 317-44.  On Hollywood audience research, see, Susan Ohmer, 
George Gallup in Hollywood (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Catherine Jurca, 











































Figure 5.3. Number of Feature Films Produced Annually at Dovzhenko Studio, 
1950-1980.  The data set excludes shorts (films less than 50 minutes long), 
filmed plays, concerts, operas and ballets, in addition to films made for television.  
Data cited from Raisa Prokopenko, ed., Natsional’na kinostudiia khudozhnikh 
fil’miv imeni Oleksandra Dovzhenka: Anotovanyi kataloh fil’miv, 1928-1998 (Kyiv, 
1998) 
 
kinds of films that most spectators enjoyed watching, and that they preferred 
foreign productions to domestic, and central productions to those from the Union 
republics.33  In August 1972, CPSU Ideological Secretary Ermash replaced 
Romanov as Chairman of central Goskino, and came to power with a definitive 
policy of further reducing production budgets for studios that did not generate 
profits.34  One representative of central Goskino told the SKU in 1976 that 
Ukrainian filmmakers had to find their “special group of film spectators,” or risk 
becoming irrelevant to Soviet cinema.  He mentioned that the chairman wanted 
                                                 
33 See, Lev Kogan, Kino i zritel’: Opyt konkretno-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia (Moscow: 
Iskusstvo, 1968). 
34 See, Filipp Ermash, “O khode vypolneniia reshenii XXV s”ezda KPSS po usileniiu roli kino v 
ideinom, nravstvennom i esteticheskom vospitanii trudiashchikhsia, po povysheniiu ideino-
khudozhestvennogo urovnia vypuskaemykh kinofil’mov i uluchsheniiu kinoobsluzhivaniia 
naseleniia,” IK, no. 7 (1978), 20. 
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each studio to have “its own form of contact with the spectator.  […] The value of 
this reorientation is [there is] a film for each audience.”35   
In fact, Ukrainian Goskino along with the SKU was firmly committed to 
appeal to an imagined Ukrainian spectator, particularly after film sociologists 
demanded that the industry understand audiences as “differentiated” according 
to age, sex, nation and education categories.  The circulation of the Ukrainian-
language film press – constituting the monthly magazine Novyny kinoekrana 
(Screen News) and the weekly newspaper Na ekranakh Ukrainy (On Ukrainian 
Screens) – continued to grow into the early 1970s.36  The latter, moreover, listed 
as their goal, to advertise the best of Soviet cinema, but “Ukrainian cinema in 
particular.”37  A sociological study conducted with spectators in the republic in 
1972, however, determined that Ukrainians were largely indifferent to such 
promotion of Ukrainian films.  Audience researchers discovered that Ukrainian 
spectators enjoyed Bykov’s Only the Young, but then, so did everyone else.  
After hearing the dismal results of the study, Dovzhenko Studio’s SRK head 
Petro Kuvyk stated that they were “dangerous to publish,” especially in light of 
Romanov’s statements to the effect that republican films had to perform well at 
home to ensure approval for broader distribution.38  Predictably, such 
promotional focus on Ukrainian production did not correspond to how distribution 
organs chose to act.  The head of Ukrainian UKK, in fact, told the SKU that they 
needed to de-emphasize Ukrainian films during the annual Cinema Days event in 
1973 to guarantee a larger turnout.39 
Ermash’s Goskino proposed that republican studios could survive only 
provided they undertook further economic restructuring.  In order to save money 
on personnel, Dovzhenko Studio was forced to introduce the practice of hiring 
directors on contract rather than working for a salary.40  Dovzhenko Studio, 
                                                 
35 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 788, l. 182-83. 
36 NK had a stable circulation of 500,000 throughout the 1970s.  Compare this to the circulation of 
the all-Union equivalent Sovetskii ekran (The Soviet Screen), which had a print run of 1,700,000 
during the same period.   
37 TsDAVOU, f. 4623, op. 1, d. 925, l. 19. 
38 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2536, l. 7-19, 127. 
39 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 665, l. 60. 
40 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2806, l. 8-9. 
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under the management of Al’bert Putintsev since 1973, tried ever harder to make
films that sold, while answering the increasingly difficult political demands to 
make zakaznyi films that did not.  From 1965 to 1975, the average film released






                                                
41 
Zemliak stated in the mid-1970s that Ukrainian films were now little 
different from central productions, except that the former were not as good.  
While attendance was declining everywhere in the Soviet Union,42 films from 
Kyiv experienced this decline to an unprecedented level.  Most of the pos
generation of studio directors moved to the growing field of television production, 
discovering in it more money and more creative support than for feature 
filmmaking.  While Dovzhenko Studio began to produce films made for television 
by the early 1960s, it was organized separately from features, with much greater 
input from Mosfil’m’s television studio Ekran, and central Goskino.  In late 1971, 
Zemliak complained that this shift to television impoverished screenwriters due to 
the practice of using Moscow writers for television.  In a sense, Zemliak believed, 
television was “de-nationalizing” for its refusal to support Ukrainian writers, the 
latter constituting the very root component of national culture itself.43  In 
accepting this notion, however, the problem was much greater than Zemliak 
articulated it, as Dovzhenko Studio employed Moscow screenwriters not only for 
television production, but also in growing numbers for feature films.  Of the 
screenwriters listed among the “leaders in distribution” in Figure 5.1, only three 
were members of the screenplay studio.  At the same time, the composition of 
directors, actors and other creative personnel working on Dovzhenko Studio 
productions continued to be drawn from its permanent base of cadres, largely 
because this was an economically sound practice.  Yet, as story and narrative 
became the keys to increasing attendance, Goskino found it no great expense to 
hand out screenplays from Moscow to the Union republics, and in the process to 
give up on solving the problem locally.  As Larysa Briukhovets’ka writes,  
 
41 Vlasov, 9. 
42 See my data on film attendance in First, “From Spectator to ‘Differentiated’ Consumer,” 327. 
43 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2426, ll. 11-12. 
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The screenplay problem was never seriously analyzed or untangled.  But 
if there is an analogy with social life, then in Ukraine the highest 
authorities also did not have their own ‘screenwriters,’ but ‘fulfilled the 
roles’ behind the screenplay created in Moscow.44  
 
Thus, Goskino had solved the “problem of national cadres” superficially, with a 
mind toward efficiency, and without, in the end, disrupting the main line of 
industry policy, oriented toward profitable genre productions and zakaznye temy. 
 
“National Character” Between Realism and Visuality 
 
Despite this growing orientation away from the principle of authorship 
toward audience politics, the issues surrounding “national cinemas” in the Union 
republics and the problem of representing “national character” dominated Union 
and industry discussion from the late-1960s to the mid-1970s.  While the 
“problem of national cinema” emerged in the press during the earlier part of the 
decade, the issue coalesced in early 1967 during a SK Plenum dedicated 
exclusively to the “condition and problems in the development of national 
cinemas in the USSR.”  In his opening address to the Plenum, Kirghiz writer and 
screenwriter Chinghiz Aitmatov told the delegates: “Today in all the Union 
republics, their own cinemas are being made and are functioning.”45  He noted 
that “national studios” made over 60% of the films produced in the USSR, and 
that “national films” were appearing at international film festivals “as the best 
works of the year.”  From this, he concluded, “National cinema is becoming the 
problem number one” within the industry.  Yet, in the absence of agreement or 
even a solid definition of “national character” that came out of these debates, the 
issue was determined to be a problem of “realism.”  This resolution was in 
distinction to “Ukrainian poetic cinema’s” articulation of ethnic difference.  While 
the discourse surrounding “realism” functioned within audience politics – as in, 
“the masses demand a realist art” – it also served the goals of demanding a 
                                                 
44 Larysa Briukhovets’ka, Prykhovani fil’my: Ukrains’ke kino 1990-kh (Kyiv: ArtEk, 2003), 28-29. 
45 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 67, l. 11. 
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representation of non-Russians divorced from a spectacle of folkloric 
backwardness or ethnographic curiosity. 
Such debates about “national character” emerged in film criticism 
simultaneous to the “poetic / prosaic cinema” debate.  In his resolution to this 
latter debate, Efim Dobin examined Dovzhenko’s cinema poetics in terms of a 
rendering of folklore and landscape, which was compatible with the heroic and 
patriotic narrative.  The function of the image, however, worked within the realm 
of metaphor, assimilating the human subject with the landscape, which served to 
make sense of the particular Ukrainian experience during the Revolution and 
Civil War, industrialization and collectivization (Dovzhenko’s subjects).  The 
question remained as to how Soviet cinema was to interpret the ethnographic 
features of the human landscape (or, ethnoscape, as I here refer to it) as it was 
defined in relation to a particular people or nationality. 
 Soviet critics in the 1960s rejected “faceless” cosmopolitanism, 
demanding that the human subject “carry” the features of his or her nationality, 
lest he or she become, in Vissarion Belinskii’s oft-quoted words, an “abstraction.”  
As I explored in Chapter one, within the folkloric mode of representing the non-
Russian, this demand worked itself out literally in the sense that Cossacks wore 
embroidered shirts, Khmel’nyts’kyi carried his bulava, and his hair was cut in the 
iconic khokhol style.  In a February 1964 article in Iskusstvo kino, Ukrainian critic 
Borys Buriak argued that, in examining the elements of national particularity in 
film, Soviet filmmakers and critics needed to move past outward features, that is, 
characteristics, and attempt to understand aspects of “national character.”  In this 
way, he disagreed with Mikhail Klado, who wrote that the national could only be 
revealed in a work’s artistic texture after the generally human or the social 
aspects are revealed.46  Buriak stated that such a conception has led to a film 
being nationally “dressed” in later directorial treatment, while not located at the 
work’s origin.  In other words, “national character” was not simply the local 
expression of a mobile folkloric form of representing the non-Russian. 
                                                 
46 See my examination of Klado’s article within the “theatricality” debates in Chapter 1.  M. Klado, 
“Natsional’noe – v konkretnom,” Druzhba narodov, no. 6 (June 1959), 169-180.  
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Buriak stated, “A real artist sees the national first of all in the sphere of the 
spiritual, the laboring, and the psychical, and not only in the folkloric and 
ethnographic.”  Following Bulgarian philosopher Tikhomir Pavlov, Buriak argued 
that the nation constituted a “collective individuality.”  Although he suggested that 
socialist nations would begin to exhibit similar common features as they came 
together in harmony [sblizhenie], he did not accept that “the ideal” of “national 
character in our time is already corresponding to the ideal of the communist 
character.”  In other words, Buriak stated that “national character” (i.e., Russian, 
Ukrainian, etc.) and “civil character” (i.e., Soviet) continued to provoke different 
sentiments in films, despite some convergence of the two.  Just as Dobin found 
in his examination of Dovzhenko’s poetics, so did Buriak discover “national 
character” in Vasyl’ Bozhenko.  For the same reason, Buriak noted that one of 
the problems with Vera, the heroine in The Cranes are Flying, is that she 
resembled a woman of any nationality more than she embodied the specific 
features of a Russian woman.47 
In this comparison between Veronika’s and Bozhenko’s national 
character, language plays a minor role.  After all, Bozhenko speaks Russian in 
Shchors but “spiritually” embodies the Ukrainian national character, while 
Veronika, who also speaks Russian, fails to do the same for the Russian national 
character.  In this way, he disagreed with the position that, without the Ukrainian 
language, Ukrainian national cinema could not exist.48  To counter the language 
argument, Buriak offered the example of the early Gogol’.  He stated that in the 
Russian language of the latter, there is also “the originality of Ukrainian speech.”  
Buriak did not intend to promote the use of surzhyk as “Ukrainian poetic cinema” 
did, but attempted to delineate an “internal” dynamic of “national” speech, its non-
syntactic, and indeed, non-semantic quality.49  As with Dobin’s work, in Buriak’s 
efforts to mediate between an excess of signification (association, metaphor, 
visuality, essentialization) and its denial (narrative, plot, literaturnost’, civic over 
                                                 
47 Boris Buriak, “Internatsional’noe – ne beznatsional’noe,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 2 (Feb 1964), 26-
36. 
48 See, for example, Mykola Makarenko, “Gliadia v koren’,” Sovetskaia Ukraina, no. 1  (1961), 
115. 
49 Buriak, 26-36. 
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national consciousness), his criticism looses its instructive content.  Apart from 
mere example, he failed to demonstrate how Soviet filmmakers could convey the 
features of “national character,” or even general principles of how roles could 
embody nationality.   
Such open questions about national representation did not go away.  
Despite Sergei Gerasimov’s comments in December 1966 not to disturb the 
“swamp” that was national cinema lest it become, in the articulation of it as a 
“problem,” an “active power in the enemy’s hands,” the Union of 
Cinematographers met in a January Plenum to address specifically the issue of 
“national character.”50  In Gerasimov’s comments on a draft of Aitmatov’s 
speech, he feared the barrage of complaints from republican filmmakers that 
would inevitably emerge from such a Plenum.  In turn, such acknowledgement 
from non-Russian filmmakers in the Soviet Union that the “nationality question” 
had not been resolved might be mobilized to justify contemporary charges 
emanating from the US and Western Europe about the “imperial” nature of the 
Soviet state in relation to its national minorities.51  Film critic and cultural 
apparatchik Aleksandr Karaganov was concerned more specifically about the 
implications for Ukrainian nationalism after hearing Aitmatov’s contentious 
speech in December.  He blurted out at the end of the meeting that he perceived 
“a minor manifestation of nationalism [in Aitmatov’s speech], which might be the 
object of investigation at a party meeting.”  He stated that giving Aitmatov such 
permission to speak about the “problem” of non-Russian representation in an 
open forum “could bring a Ukrainian under the yellow flag.”52   
Nonetheless, the Central Committee and Goskino permitted Aitmatov to 
give his speech during the January Plenum, during which he took up the problem 
of defining and representing “national character.”  In his distaste for films 
                                                 
50 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 50, l. 17. 
51 See, David J. Dallin, The New Soviet Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951); The 
Soviet Prisonhouse of Nationalities (Calcutta, 1955); Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire 
(New York: Praeger, 1965). 
52 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 50, l. 38.  The yellow flag was identified in connection with Ukrainian 
nationalism during the Civil War and during World War II.  When Ukraine declared independence 
in 1990, leaders of the new state chose a yellow and blue flag, the same one that flew during the 
Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1917-18. 
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“deprived of national features,” which were “accomplished in a faceless space, 
and in the atmosphere of ‘statistical-mean’ people,” Aitmatov extolled the 
ethnographic position, one in which land and people were inextricably and 
primordially linked.53  The writer laid out the basis for a discussion of the 
problem, explaining that the concept of “national character” came down to the 
question of “embodying national originality.”54  Here, however, he took a step 
back, stating that “national originality” should not become “an end in itself 
[samotsel’],” which would take a work down the road of “exotic stereotypes and 
stylizations” (i.e., the problem that Dovzhenko Studio identified in Illiashenko’s 
footage).  He identified two incorrect positions in this debate:  “One affirms tha
national character is almost a doubtful concept, almost a prejudice, and anothe
fetishizes national character, and elevates it to a dogma like an age-old and 
constant quality.”  In attempting to answer these straw-man positions from a 
materialist perspective, Aitmatov, like Buriak, continued to straddle both: “Of 
course, national character exists in nature [italics mine] as psychological 










                                                
55  Aitmatov took us back to square one in denying the applicab
of the folkloric / ethnographic mode of representation as a “prejudice,” while 
affirming the “natural” quality of nationality, which was nonetheless 
ally” determined. 
At this point, Aitmatov relied on example to convey his argument, 
that Rezo Chkheidze’s hero in Father of a Soldier (Otets soldata, 1965) 
represented the height of Soviet cinema’s exploration of national character. 
once a plot-driven vehicle that uses a similar mechanism of travel between 
“home” and “front” as Grigorii Chukhrai’s Ballad of a Soldier (Ballada o soldate, 
1959) to convey the effects of war on ordinary people, Chkheidze’s film wa
preoccupied with the “national originality” of the title character, an elderly 
Georgian wine grower Georgii Makharashvili.  The old man leaves his village in 
 
53 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 67, l. 14. 
54 Ibid., l. 7. 
55 Ibid., 38-39. 
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the waning days of the war to search for his wounded son, eventually convincing 
the Soviet army to enlist him as a soldier so that he can travel to the Eastern  
 
Figure 5.4. The Georgian talks to grapes in Chkheidze’s Father of a Soldier 
(1965) 
 
Front as it entered Germany.  Makharashvili makes it to the Reichstag during 
Battle of Berlin where he finds him among the famous 756th Rifle Regiment as 
the soldiers take control of the building.  The two spo
the 






Nonetheless, Makharashvili functions as static spectacle within the film, and a 
, a dying German soldier shoots the son in the back, killing him.  The film 
ends as Makharashvili weeps over his son’s body.   
While the narrative represented little that was new to the Soviet war film 
during the Thaw, its novelty for spectators was the character’s otherness.  Wi
Makharashvili’s awkward, enormous body and thick mustache dominating almost 
every shot, his comically broken Russian speech, and organic attachment to 
wine, Chkheidze’s hero constituted an ethnic stereotype placed within a comm
Thaw-era Soviet narrative (Figure 5.4).  In its method of pasting trans-historica
“national color” onto a hegemonic plot of martyrdom and victory in the Great 
Patriotic War, Father of a Soldier functioned as a Thaw-era re-working of the 
Stalinist folkloric.  While positioned as a protagonist who never sheds his ethnic
otherness, Chkheidze refuses to treat this as a failure to conquer backwardness.  
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protagonist who merely watches the historical narrative of the Second World War













cularized as Makharashvili moves among ethnically neutral Soviet 
soldier
r 
                                                
56 based o
this union of “national character” with a realist plot, Mikhail Kalatozov, hims
Georgian by nationality, complained of the “fetishization” of the “Georgian 
national character” in Father.  He told Aitmatov in December that the film “shou
not have become the echelon of Georgian cinema.  It’s evidently necessary to 
specify this, because othe
ter will appear.”57 
Aitmatov responded that he could not explain what exactly composed 
“national character,” and that one could only understand it within oneself.  In an
attempt to get around this problem – to deal with it practically – he stated tha
“national character had nothing in common with an idealization of a certain 
national trait or custom; rather, part of a film’s realism necessitated a cor
representation of national character.”  Kirghiz director Tolomush Okeev 
responded to Aitmatov’s speech in affirmation of the “realism of national 
character.”  In this formulation, “accuracy [tochnost’]” was more important than a
poetic form of “authenticity [podlinost’].”  Here, Okeev stressed similarity within 
difference: “We also love, we also suffer and also die, like everyone, but we take 
different paths to this.  So allow us to talk about it.  It’s not necessary to cut us all 
with the same scissors.”58  Yet, the principle that Aitmatov and Okeev arti
in fact denied the importance of Father of a Soldier, because he failed to 
acknowledge the contrivance of the hero’s journey, along with the fact that 
Chkheidze forces his hero to embody his nationality over his personality, which
then specta
s.   
Much of what constituted the visuality of “national character” was unde
attack for its lack of realism.  In fact, “national character” seemed as hard to 
define visually, as it was to deny narratively.  The January Plenum shifted focus 
 
56 For a Georgian film, Father of a Soldier became a box office hit with 23.8 million tickets sold in 
1964.  See, Domashniaia sinematika: otechestvennoe kino, 1918-1996, eds., Sergei 
Zemlianukhin and Miroslava Segida (Moscow: Dubl’-D, 1996), 310. 
57 RGALI, f. 2935, op. 4, d. 50, l. 22-23. 
58 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 70, l. 5. 
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by the second day, to tangible questions of production facilities, budgets, salarie
and problems with distribution.  Many of the representatives from the republics 
spoke about the increasing impoverishment of “national” studios, and harangued 
Goskino for its “extrem
s 











etics.  In 
myr 
 
                                                
to “the periphery.”59   
 With this focus on “realism” as the basis of national character, studio 
authorities demanded closer attention to screenplays.  The Resolutions to t
January Plenum complained of the “poverty of the screenplay portfolio” at 
republican studios, along with the “inoperativeness of resolving questions abou
including screenplays in the thematic and production plans.”  The Resoluti
mentioned nothing about the discussion of “national character,” precisely 
because the Plenum resolved nothing.  Instead, republican studios were blamed 
for releasing “superficial and weak films, provoking the legitimate dissatisfac
of spectators.”60  An event initiated as a forum for republican filmmakers to 
discuss the “problem” of national cinemas in the USSR ended with an indictmen
against the very people who articulated it as such.  For Goskino, if the prob
was a lack of rea
y basis.” 
The “screenplay problem” had its origins much earlier, and was the reason
that many republican studios – Dovzhenko Studio and Gruziia-Fil’m in particular 
– established a staff of salaried writers in the early 1960s.  Yet, complaints 
the exorbitant cost of maintaining these writers emerged almost instantly.  
Moreover, a common concern during the crisis of 1965-66 was that director-
auteurs were diverting from the screenplays to engage with formalist po
this exclusive attention to the screenplay problem, however, we see a 
corresponding attack on visuality.  Iurii Illienko and set designer Volody
Tsyrlin were particularly concerned about these implications when the 
“screenplay problem” reemerged in the later part of the decade, precisely
because it meant that authorities had rejected the “visual” dimensions of 
 
59 See, esp. Sharshen Usubaliev’s remarks on the third day of the Plenum: Ibid., l. 20. 
60 RGALI, f. 2936, op. 4, d. 71, l. 2. 
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representing “national character.”  During a March 1968 studio conferenc
Tsyrlin broached the topic of the increasingly underrepresented topic of 
“izobrazitel’nost (visuality)’” in cinema.  Illienko assented, saying, “It is not cinem
that has harmed film dramaturgy, but in particular it is film dramaturgy that has 
harmed film art[…] They want to rob cinema of the r
e, 
a 









for “poetic cinema” – but also greater inflexibility in relation to thematic plans and 
                                                
nd to make it an appendage of literature.”61   
Tsyrlin and Illienko expanded on this “offence” to film art in a series of 
articles in the studio newspaper, Za Radians’kyi fil’m (For Soviet Film), during 
late-1969.  The former opened the debate on October 8th with “The Problem of 
Visuality and the Tendency of Criticism,” where he argued that, while Ukrainian 
cinema has become increasingly “visual” during the 1960s, film critics continu
to write about it as if it were a “literary” form, with their examination limited to 
narrative and “philosophy.”  Tsyrlin contended that critics refused to discu
film’s “visual culture” because they remained unknowledgeable about its 
functioning.  Moreover, filmmakers and screenwriters needed to study pai
and other visual arts, in addition to literature, to understand how to make 
interesting pictures.62  In a somewhat self-serving gesture, Illienko continued
discussion on October 22nd in his article, “Triunity,” where he referred to the 
profession of cinematographer as the most important of a film’s three “authors,” 
alongside the director and screenwriter.63  Pointedly calling the cinematogr
turned director turned screenwriter a “samoznavets’,”64 film critic Iu. Levin 
countered in the November 19 issue that Illienko’s idea was “original, but not 
credible.”  As Levin perceived the issue, perhaps correctly, Illienko continued to 
adhere to a principle of “vne kolektiva” authorship.  Just as Truffaut understoo
1954 when he wrote “A Certain Tendency in French Cinema” for Cahier
cinéma, however, Illienko knew that the industry’s focus on screenplay 
production meant not only disinterest in visual experimentation – the very basis 
 
61 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2159, l. 92. 
62 V. Tsyrlin, “Problema zobrazhennia i tendentsiia krytyky,” Za Radians’kyi fil’m, October 8, 1969, 
2. 
63 Iurii Illienko, “Tryiednist’” Za Radians’kyi fil’m, October 22, 1969: 2. 
64 The Ukrainian word, “samoznavets’” literally means, “a scholar of oneself.”  
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the homogenization of film narrative and structure.65  The delineation of a 
“screenplay problem” was seen in the late 1960s as an official policy meant to 
undo, not only the principle of film authorship of the mid-60s, but also erode 
studio independence.   
Illienko would not have necessarily had to read French in order to possess 
the words to identify the “screenplay problem” in the 1970s as a move against 
visuality and thus the “poetic” principle of national representation itself.  In 1967, 
Il’ia Vaisfel’d wrote – in relation to Hollywood, of course – about the “struggle for 
saving cinema’s national self-dependency against the expansion of capitalist film 
monopolies with their ideology of ‘commercial realism.’”66  Within the present 
climate of increasing centralization and renewed appeals to “realism,” such 
statements could not but ring a bell with republican filmmakers.  In removing 
visuality from the question of “national character,” suggesting instead that it 
constituted a problem of “realism,” authorities consciously affected the ways that 
filmmakers could articulate nationality.  While the promotion of “national cinemas” 
in the Union republics remained official policy, with articles on the topic appearing 
in Iskusstvo kino and Voprosy kinoiskusstva throughout the early 1970s, the 
content of these pieces represented little of interest on the topic, with the only 
significant development being a discursive shift from the plural “national cinemas” 
of the 1960s to the singular “multinational Soviet cinema.”  For the most part, 
these articles merely conveyed the standard narrative of republican studio 
construction, a description of the major works within the canon of each of the 
republics,67 and affirmed the party’s commitment to both internationalism and 
“multinationality.”68  Multinationality would remain little more than an abstraction, 
and increasingly devoid of a “realist” content.  After all, if the social reality of 
                                                 
65 François Truffaut, “A Certain Tendency of the French Cinema,” in Movies and  
Methods: An Anthology, vol. 1, ed., Bill Nichols (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 
224-236. 
66 I. Vaisfel’d, “Natsional’noe – internatsional’noe,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 9 (Sept 1967), 21. 
67 In Ukraine, this canon would have included Dovzhenko’s major work beginning with Earth, 
Savchenko’s work from Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi onward, Denysenko’s A Dream, and 
Paradzhanov’s Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors. 
68 L. Mamatova, “Letopis’ bratstva,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 12 (Dec 1972), 104-133; Armen 
Medvedev, “Veter veka: Zametki o problemakh i fil’makh mnogonatsional’noi sovetskoi 
kinematografii,” Iskusstvo kino, no. 6 (June 1973), 1-25. 
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Ukraine was that the majority of Ukrainians not only knew Russian but were also 
conversant in it, what principle dictated the continued promotion of Ukrainian-
language culture? 
 
“De-Nationalization” in the Post-Shelest Era 
 
Ivan Dziuba, in following the logic of 1920s Ukrainianization framers 
Oleksandr Shums’kyi and Mykola Skrypnyk, identified the problem of Russian-
speaking Ukrainians as enforced de-nationalization, and that the purpose of 
vernacular culture was not to reflect contemporary reality necessarily, but to help 
such Russified Ukrainians come to self-consciousness.  The principle that 
grounded these assumptions was Leninism itself, in addition to socialist realism 
in its forward-looking and pedagogical function.  In fact, CPU First Secretary 
Petro Shelest, in addition to Iurii Illienko and, oddly enough, Sergei Paradzhanov, 
were individuals who came to “national” consciousness within the particular 
cultural politics of Ukraine after Stalin.  Each of these individuals shared the 
assumption that “de-nationalization” was a real danger to Ukrainians, and 
accepted that promotion of national culture took precedence over the free-market 
principle of representing the “reality” of national character, a component of which 
admitted the absence of a unique Ukrainian public. 
As these developments were occurring within the Soviet film industry, 
Ukrainian politics took a potential turn for the better for members of the nationally 
conscious Kyiv intelligentsia.  While 1968 had definitive implications for how the 
party interacted with filmmakers and other members of the creative intelligentsia, 
with Josephine Woll calling this year the end of the Thaw, Brezhnev considered 
the CPU under Shelest as nothing if not loyal.  Shelest had been the most vocal 
member of the Politburo in support of intervention in Czechoslovakia, and as 
such, Brezhnev continued to give him some leeway in his choices for 
appointments in the CPU apparatus.  As Andrii Skaba relinquished his position 
as CPU Ideological Secretary to head the Institute of History at the Ukrainian 
Academy of Sciences in 1968, Shelest replaced him with chemist Fedir 
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Ovcharenko.  Known as having liberal tendencies with regard to questions of 
nationalities policy, Paradzhanov wrote to the Secretary in 1969 on the 
importance of counteracting Goskino’s developing policy of sabotaging 
republican studios, and his own work in particular.  Written in Russian, and 
translated into Ukrainian by Dziuba, Paradzhanov identified himself as the 
director of Shadows, a film, he claimed, that was the “first in many years to bring 
international prestige to Ukrainian cinema.”  He stated that his film sparked the 
“original Ukrainian poetic cinema of the 1960s, the Kyiv school of poetic 
cinema.”69  Unfortunately, he claims, the “school” was now “paralyzed” from 
bearing its “mature fruit.”  He stated, “Such searches are oh so necessary today, 
because art cannot survive on mass commercial products or on the average, 
generally accepted level [of production…]”70  Paradzhanov appealed to Ukraine’s 
“poetic” traditions contained in the “experimental” work of Oleksandr Dovzhenko, 
a man who took “risks” in his use of symbols and metaphor.  In admitting that he 
was Armenian rather than Ukrainian, he stated that he stayed in Kyiv despite 
offers to work at Armen-fil’m, because he “fell in love with Ukrainian culture, I 
grew with it as an artist and I cannot conceive of my work without it.”  
Paradzhanov, in the end, appealed to Ovcharenko to step in to help him make 
his adaptation of Kotsiubyns’kyi’s Intermezzo, which he was having difficulty 
getting off the ground.71   
After his letter, Shelest offered Paradzhanov an audience, during which 
the First Secretary offered the director an opportunity to work on a kolkhoz-
themed screenplay entitled Earth, the Earth Once Again (Zemlia, shche raz 
zemlia).  The element of thematic repetition present even in the title must have 
turned off Paradzhanov and he declined.  After the studio finally put the skids on 
Intermezzo in early 1972, the director left for Moscow with the hope of working 
with Viktor Shklovskii on a made-for-television adaptation of Hans Christian 
Anderson’s Miracle in Odense.  He returned to Kyiv only once more during his 
                                                 
69 “Lyst Serhiia Paradzhanova Ovcharenku,” in L. Briukhovets’ka, ed., Poetychne kino: 
zaboronena shkola (Kyiv: ArtEk, 2001), 270. 
70 Ibid., 271. 
71 Ibid., 272. 
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life, after hearing that his son, Suren, had contacted typhus in December 1973.  
While waiting at the station for his train back to Moscow, Kyiv militsiia officers 
arrested him.  By this time, Ovcharenko had returned to life as an apolitical 
chemist at the Academy of Sciences, and Shelest was living on a pension in 
Moscow, forced into early retirement.  In this letter to Ovcharenko, unthinkable 
under Ideological Secretary Valentyn Malanchuk and First Secretary Volodymyr 
Shcherbyts’kyi, we find Paradzhanov attempting to speak to both Ukrainian 
nationality politics of the 1960s, which increasingly found support among certain 
top-ranking members of the party, and to concerns about Soviet cinema’s 
commercialization.  Essentially, Paradzhanov saw these two problems as 
necessarily linked.  Moreover, we see the director perhaps opportunistically 
appealing to a Ukrainian nationality politics in 1969, something absent from his 
1957 letter to the studio director and the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture (see 
Chapter 2).  In this earlier letter, Paradzhanov appealed exclusively to the 
cultivation of personal expression and “vne kolektiva” production, indicating that 
the nationality question was no longer linked to the Thaw-era problematic of 
personal authorship.  Instead, Paradzhanov appealed exclusively to his 
contribution to a system of national representation, which had its origins in 
Dovzhenko’s work.  
Into the late 1960s, Shelest too began questioning cultural policies 
emanating from Moscow, and as such was both fearful of Paradzhanov the 
individual, but remained proud of his work in and for the republic.72  Around the 
time that Paradzhanov wrote to Ovcharenko, Shelest complained in his diary of 
certain “political figures in Moscow, who are scared of anything non-Russian, 
who treat it with a certain distrust, even contempt, and reveal flagrant [makhrovyi] 
great-power chauvinism.”73  Shelest identified CPSU Ideological Secretary 
Mikhail Suslov as first among these “chauvinists.”  In appropriating such a 
language directly after discussing a campaign to discredit Ivan Dziuba, we 
cannot help but wonder if the dissidents’ ideas had made an impression on the 
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73 “Spohady i shchodennykovi zapysy Petra Shelesta,” in Iurii Shapovala, ed., Petro Shelest: 
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First Secretary.  After all, Dziuba identified the same fear of the non-Russian in 
Internationalism or Russification? when he argued that any mention of “National 
sentiment, consciousness and duties” necessarily entailed the label of “bourgeois 
nationalism” in the Soviet Union, despite the sound Leninist principles that 
underlie these notions.  Yet, as is evident in Shelest’s implementation of Dziuba’s 
language, “national sentiment, consciousness and duties” remained at the root of 
mainstream cultural and political discourse into the late-1960s.  Dziuba was 
attacked, not because he chose to criticize recent interpretations of Leninist 
nationalities policy, but because he “played into the hands of the enemies” by 
airing his concerns, and refusing to acknowledge the positive work that LNP had 
done for Ukraine.  In a letter to the CPSU Central Committee, Shelest addressed 
Dziuba’s and others’ critique, not with mere condemnation of the very mention of 
Ukrainian national sentiment, as Dziuba might have expected, but with 
arguments that disputed his claims, while specifying further work in developing 
certain areas of cultural life in the republic that essentially would respond to the 
substance of his petition.74 
In his diary, Shelest registered increasing annoyance with what he 
perceived as an anti-Ukrainian bias in Moscow.  On one occasion, he wrote that 
Brezhnev had asked him why Ukrainians still insist upon speaking Ukrainian.  To 
Shelest, Brezhnev was questioning the very basis of Ukrainian nationality in the 
Soviet Union, and now believed that he had to respond in an official capacity to 
this claim from the center.  The result, Oh Ukraine, My Soviet Land (Ukraino, 
nasha Radians’ka, 1970) addressed a number of general historical and 
geographical sites of importance for justifying the Ukrainian nation, primarily 
located in a pre-revolutionary and non-Russian Ukraine.75 
Simultaneously, Vitalii Fedorchuk was appointed Ukrainian KGB head, 
with the support of Shelest rivals under Shcherbyts’kyi within the CPU apparatus.  
According to Borys Lewytzkyj, Fedorchuk was responsible for spreading anti-
Shelest propaganda within the Central Committee of the CPU and CPSU, 
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suggesting that the First Secretary was attempting to promote the dissident and 
nationalist movements, in addition to the removal of Brezhnev.  In April 1971, 
Shelest was removed from his posts as CPU First Secretary, and Chairman of 
the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, in addition to his spot on the CPSU Politburo.  
Shcherbyts’kyi took his place in all three arenas.  Brezhnev made it clear when 
Shelest asked him the reason for his removal that it was based on Fedorchuk’s 
and Shcherbyts’kyi’s efforts.76  In 1973, Shelest was removed from all official 
duties, and went on a pension.   
While Shelest did in fact accept some of the principles of the dissident 
movement, as he rose in his political career within the same cultural milieu, the 
accusations that led to his removal were preposterous.  After all, Shelest lived 
the rest of his life in Moscow, and even refused to endorse Ukraine’s declaration 
of independence in 1990.  But Paradzhanov and others involved in the Ukrainian 
film industry addressed Shelest and his people in the CPU Central Committee 
within the idiom of the development of Ukrainian culture and the assertion of a 
personal ideological commitment to such a project against the rising tide of “de-
nationalization” emerging in the form of Soviet cinema’s commercialization.  
 
Trudnye fil’my and kassovye fil’my 
 
Within this increasing emphasis on the quantitative dimensions of 
audience politics, “poetic cinema” directors had to speak to broader concerns 
beyond the principle of national authorship.  Yet, Iurii Illienko seemed to move in 
the opposite direction with his adaptation of Gogol’s St. John’s Eve (Vecher na 
Ivana Kupala, 1968), an eclectic mix of Ukrainian folkloric motifs and encounters 
with the supernatural, visual humor and farce, a story of forbidden love, and 
couched political critique.  Stylistically, the film contains frequent narrative lapses, 
jump cuts, a moving camera, and tableaux images.  Employing a film solarization 
technique that Illienko used in the fight between Ivanko and Iurko in Shadows of 
Forgotten Ancestors, St. John’s Eve distinguishes between the “real” and the  
                                                 
76 Quoted in Iurii Shapovala, “Petro Shelest u konteksti politychnoi istorii Ukrainy XX stolittia,” in Petro 








Figure 5.5. Translating the early Gogol’ to the screen in St. John’s Eve: the 
devil as Cossack (top) and the possessed hero, Petro (bottom). 
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world of the supernatural with different color schemes.  Some scenes are viewed 
through a negative print, and others contain only tones of blue or orange (Figure 
5.5).  By the second part, as witches and devils possess Petro, the hero, the film 
degenerates into absurdist constructions, as if the spectator were experiencing 
the same process.  In mixing the symbolic world of Ukrainian folklore and the 
presence of Cossacks and other historical / mythological figures with such a 
dynamic and de-familiarized literary terrain, Illienko’s film functioned as a 
complex, intellectual parody of the Stalinist folkloric.   
Written by Illienko himself, and shot by his older brother Vadym (who 
previously worked on Viktor Ivanov’s Oleksa Dovbush), St. John’s Eve was to be 
a completely “vne kolektiva” and author-driven production.  When he and Ivan 
Drach (who had taken the film on as screenplay editor) proposed the Gogol’ 
adaptation, they imagined it as a second chance to establish a national cinema 
based on the “mark” of intellectual authorship.  This time couched behind the 
language of classic literary adaptation, however, Illienko found an audience at 
the studio and within the CPU leadership largely receptive to the project, despite 
the director’s political failure with A Well for the Thirsty.  Critic Mikhail Bleiman, 
who reviewed politically questionable screenplays for central Goskino during the 
late-1960s and early-1970s, gave the go ahead, stating, “Illienko ‘finds’ his theme 
in Gogol’, and in my opinion, he finds it convincingly.”  While discovering 
“shortcomings” in the second half of the film, which significantly “departed from 
Gogol’s literary basis,” Bleiman concluded, “Iu. Illienko is a talented man and 
works seriously.  It seems we see the same thing in the screenplay written by 
him.  Thus, it is possible to have faith in its author and director.”77  From the 
importance that Goskino placed on Bleiman’s opinions, we may assume that the 
industry continued to promote the principle of individual authorship.  With St. 
John’s Eve, however, we begin to see the very significance of the industry’s drive 
toward selling a profitable commodity.  While Illienko’s 1968 production was his 
most experimental film before restrictions were lifted during glasnost’, it signaled 
the growing divide between what critics were calling “difficult” films (trudnye 
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fil’my) and commercial productions (kassovye fil’my).  As in Western Europe after 
the emergence of Italian Neo-realism, the French New Wave, and New German 
Cinema, the Soviet film industry was losing its own claim to represent the 
cultured middle.78 
Osyka too had successfully played the adaptation card to receive 
permission to make his author-driven film, The Stone Cross (Kaminnyi khrest, 
1968), based on two short stories (“The Stone Cross” and “The Thief,” both 
published in 1900) by Galician novelist Vasyl’ Stefanyk.79  The Russified Osyka 
initially proposed an adaptation of an Andrei Platonov story, but Tsvirkunov 
reportedly told Osyka, “In Ukraine we have our own Platonov, one who is closer 
to us.”80  Thereafter, the director found a Russian translation of Stefanyk, 
coincidentally with commentary by Platonov, believing that with this he had found 
the “Ukrainian Platonov.”81  Having discussed Stefanyk’s significance for 
Ukrainian culture with Osyka, Drach then agreed to write the screenplay.  
Stefanyk’s oeuvre included 59 short stories, many of them only a few pages long, 
and which attempted at a description of “slice of life” events in the lives of poor 
Galician peasants.82  With his extensive merging of dialect with literary Ukrainian, 
Stefanyk became an ideal author to adapt in light of the success with this method 
in Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors.  Drach’s narrative merge of “The Stone 
Cross” with “The Thief” with the same protagonist of Ivan Didukh attempted at a 
more complete literary form than Stefanyk had originally established with them.  
Yet, as was Osyka’s penchant for stylistic eclecticism, the two stories remain 
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noticeably cut off from each other.  The overarching narrative, however, tells of 
an impoverished Galician peasant, who is forced in his old age to leave his home 
and set out with his children for Canada in search of work.  The bulk of the story 
deals with his going away party, at which his entire village makes an appearance.  
In this first scene, taken from “The Thief,” Didukh discovers a thief in his barn, 
whom he stabs in the leg with a pitchfork before inviting him to drink with his 
neighbor.  After drinking and discussing the contemporary state of politics and 
the reasons for Ukrainians leaving their native land, Didukh beats the thief to 
death.  The going-away party is less realist in style, incorporating local song and 
other elements of ethnographic spectacle and local ritual, as a mobile camera 
surveys the guests wishing Ivan farewell.  As the Didukh family prepares to leave 
at the end of the party, they change out of their “native” clothing into urban formal 
wear.  The film ends as they pass a stone cross on a hillside. 
As was now a standard-bearer of “Ukrainian poetic cinema,” Osyka shot 
the film in Stefanyk’s native Pokuttia village of Rusiv, using actual residents as 
extras.  In a language that should be familiar, Ukrianian critic Liudmila 
Lemesheva wrote, “Stefanyk’s fellow countrymen did not perform in this film, but 
seemingly continued to live their ordinary lives.”  In The Stone Cross, Lemesheva 
posited, “Life, seen and constructed according to artistic rules, coincided with real 
life.”83  Yet, as with the claim that associated contemporary Hutsuls with those 
represented in Shadows, authorities would have been hesitant to agree with such 
a trans-historical claim because it denied the principle of development.  As the 
Hutsul who wrote to Novyny kinoekrana (cited in Chapter 4) implied, these 
images were “not us.”  Although Lemesheva probably did not intend to imply this, 
but in her affirmation of the collision of the “constructed” and the “real,” we 
understand that the “not us” only became “us” when the cameras were rolling.   
In attempting to present the realism of “national character,” the first scene 
of The Stone Cross constituted a realist film, with its emphasis on dialogue and 
traditional framing techniques.  Only the minimalism of the narrative and the 
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seeming lack of character motivation in killing the thief, stand out as elements of 
experimentation.84  The film follows a standard narrative development, in which 
the camera is invisible, and cinematic conventions of continuity are not broken, 
for the most part.  The scene, during which the three drink, particularly accepts 
realist convention, even while it serves the function of coloring in the film’s 
nationality with the use of Pokuttia dialect and local costume.  Similarly, the thief 
sings to the others after finished drinking, and the on-screen music is within the 
narrative, rather than being performed as a self-contained spectacle, as in 
Pyr’ev’s and Paradzhanov’s work.  Osyka fixates particularly on the land, but not 
for its beauty.  In fact, the land is infinitely gray, dry, and only intriguing insofar as 
it is uniform and inhospitable.  But the hero’s tragedy is not the social aspects of 
poverty itself (what the studio sold the film as to Goskino), but the disconnection 
between land and human subject, which further posits that human misery 
emerges out of natural or biological conditions rather than social conditions.   
As a film that addressed the problem of “realism” and “national character,” 
The Stone Cross garnered serious accolades at the studio and in Ukrainian 
Goskino in February 1968.  Nonetheless, Osyka’s Stone Cross, like Illienko’s 
very different St. John’s Eve, remained a “difficult” film, in part because few non-
Ukrainians (or Ukrainians for that matter) were familiar with Stefanyk’s work.  
Osyka, as I suggested, had never heard the name until Drach helped him along 
his journey to Ukrainian literary consciousness with the Russian translation.  
Thus, organs of distribution were more reluctant than ever to risk not fulfilling 
their plans with regular screenings of Osyka’s film.  Consequently, The Stone 
Cross failed to draw even the abysmal 3.5 million spectators that his directorial 
debut did, the latter perhaps possessing some draw based on marketing the film 
as part of the Victory Day commemorations of the mid-1960s.  In fact, both 
Illienko’s St. John’s Eve and Osyka’s Stone Cross sold under 1.5 million tickets 
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each, with close to a third of these in Ukraine.85  SK First Secretary Lev 
Kulidzhanov mentioned St. John’s Eve as a film that succeeded on the “festival 
circuit” but did nothing to help “solve the problem of the spectator.”86  In a reprise 
of the Dnipropetrovsk engineer’s letter regarding Shadows, one spectator wrote 
to the Central Committee after viewing St. John’s Eve, calling it an 
“unwholesome phenomenon.”87   
The pattern of screening the two films, which coincided with each other in 
spring 1969, demonstrated that UKK had more in mind than simply limiting its 
time in theaters.  The Stone Cross ran in four different theaters in Kyiv from April 
21 to May 4, and St. John’s Eve in three theaters from April 24 to May 25.  
Interestingly, the venues for both films also coincided: Ukraina, Leningrad and 
Dovzhenko.88  These theaters were also the venues that showed Shadows and 
Love Awaits Those Who Return for the longest period.  Thus, in consciously 
directing such “difficult” films toward particular movie theaters, UKK was acting in 
accordance with Western film distribution principles of differentiated marketing of 
“popular films” and “art films.”89  
Despite doing nothing to “help solve the problem of the spectator,” St. 
John’s Eve and The Stone Cross were “good” adaptations, each receiving first-
category ratings, and praise from major Soviet critics of all persuasions.90  They 
succeeded in conveying the unique style of the early Gogol’, with his mix of 
Ukrainian folklore, comedy and social critique, and the dismal mood of Vasyl’ 
Stefanyk’s work.  While the films of 1965 came out in answer to the demand for 
images of the Ukrainian “contemporary,” it was in this ethnographic style of 
representation, which the regime understood as firmly located in the pre-socialist 
past, that they perceived an anti-Soviet position.  Illienko’s and Osyka’s response 
to 1965, then, became a return to the “actual” past, where such “negative” 
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imagery would be allowed, even if it continued to be discouraged to work on non-
contemporary themes. 
Yet, as Kulidzhanov suggested, Illienko and Osyka continued to refuse to 
participate in the new audience politics, and “Ukrainian poetic cinema” came to 
be the clearest indication that Soviet cinema more broadly was divided between 
“trudnye fil’my” and “kassovye fil’my.”  In an article for Sovetskii ekran, critic 
Tatiana Ivanova identified in Illienko’s recent work the high-water mark of the 
“difficult film.”  According to her definition, the “difficult film” was one in which an 
“obviously high level of artistry” did not meet with a “wide success with the 
spectator [zritel’skii uspekh].”91  In her argument, while Paradzhanov’s Shadows 
constituted a “difficult” viewing experience for many spectators, St. John’s Eve 
developed the “genre” of the “difficult film” to its extreme.  Thus, while she did not 
deny that he adapted Gogol’ correctly, the results perhaps suggested that this 
was not a useful story to adapt in the first place.  On the other hand, when writing 
in “Triunity,” Illienko considered Gogol’s evocation of visuality in his early work to 
be an indication that it was ideal for adaptation, precisely due to its lack of 
literaturnost’.  Ivanova concluded that a division now existed in Soviet cinema 
between the “difficult” film and the “commercial” film, to which filmmakers needed 
to mend.92 
The next films that Illienko and Osyka made – White Bird with a Black 
Mark (Bilyi ptakh z chornoiu oznakoiu, 1970) and Zakhar Berkut (1972), 
respectively – were historical epics, slotted to become major box office 
successes.  In accepting that Illienko and Osyka were the two most talented 
directors at Dovzhenko Studio in the early 1970s, authorities in Ukrainian 
Goskino and the Central Committee believed that, if the two accepted that an 
appeal to actual spectators was important, their abilities could be harnessed for 
the continued benefit of Ukrainian cinema.  When Illienko began working on his 
Great Patriotic War film set in Bukovyna in late 1969, he was the youngest 
member of the collective to hold the prestigious position of director-producer, 
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highest category (rezhiser-postanovshchik vyshchoi kategorii).  White Bird was to 
be the showcase film from Ukraine for the 25th Anniversary of Victory Day, while 
Osyka’s story of medieval Carpathian tribes uniting against a Mongol invasion 
cost the studio close to 1.5 million rubles, by far the largest budget for any one-
part film made at Dovzhenko Studio to date.93 
In many ways, Illienko’s White Bird was his most successful and 
accessible film thus far.  Iurii Lysenko, no longer fed up with the “morons in the 
pictures,” commented that White Bird represented the first time that the “new 
methods” were used for a “civil theme.”94  Iurii Novykov noted the beginning of a 
“new cinematic phenomenon [of] an amalgamation of poetic and realist 
cinema.”95  The Dovzhenko Studio Artistic Council called Illienko’s completed film 
“traditional” in terms of plot development and narration, but “innovative” in terms 
of the “directorial treatment,”96 here suggesting the positive role of its “visual 
culture.”  He had definitively moved away from the avant-garde experimentation 
of St. John’s Eve, and made a Great Patriotic War epic about the Zvonar’ family 
in Bukovyna, each member of which goes in a different ideological direction.  The 
screenplay’s co-author, Mykolaichuk, played the role of Petro, the social hero 
who joins the Soviet Army, while Bohdan Stupka, a young actor at L’viv’s 
Shevchenko Theater, played his brother Orest, who joins Bandera.  The third 
brother, Heorhii, wavers between the two until their sister Dana is raped by 
Banderists, and afterwards becomes a committed communist.  The locating of 
ideological divergence within the family is a persistent motif in Ukrainian 
literature, emerging, for example, in Gogol’s Taras Bul’ba, Dovzhenko’s 
Zvenyhora and Iurii Ianovs’kyi’s novel Riders (Vershnyky), the latter most famous 
for Savchenko’s 1939 adaptation.97  While such a narrative trope defines a 
“good” brother and a “bad” brother, it does so while maintaining the 
comprehensibility of the “bad” brother’s motives.  This was the problem that was 
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the basis of Illienko’s film: Orest’s character remains the most compelling 
personality, while Mykolaichuk’s Petro is superficially drawn, almost unbelievable 
in his seemingly natural commitment to communism.  Members of the CPU 
Central Committee immediately perceived this possibility in the screenplay, and 
Goskino refused to approve Mykolaichuk for the role of Orest, for whom he had 
written it.98  While the film won the Grand Prize at the Moscow International Film 
Festival in 1971, local authorities, especially the L’viv miskom, called the film 
“socially harmful” for its assessment that the Banderist movement was not 
aligned with Nazi Germany.99  Shelest, however, liked the film tremendously 
upon viewing it privately and permitted its distribution in Ukraine.100 
The film’s narrative, which takes place during World War II and the 
struggle between Nazi collaborators, the OUN, and Soviet partisans, follows a 
standard plot found in many post-Stalinist Soviet war films that focus on everyday 
life and suffering during the war,101 but serves to nationalize the conflict, making 
it specific to the particular experience of Bukovynian peasants.  Apart from the 
narrative we find the essential questions, which the film addresses: the 
reconciliation of a folkloric and ahistorical past with the needs of a materialist 
worldview.  The film is not really about ideas; rather, it is about the presentation 
of various facets of rural life in Western Ukraine; the dialogue is frequently poetic 
or lyric in quality, and the characters both inhabit and perpetuate the folkloric.  
Objects from everyday life fill the scenes, and constitute the film’s spectacle.  
This is emphasized by placing humans and objects self-consciously within 
frames, constructed out of the fabric of the scene.   
White Bird possessed many of the same features as Shadows, evident in 
its emphasis on color and camera techniques directly in line with Illienko’s work 
on Paradzhanov’s film.  Moreover, the film contains frequent breaks in the 
narrative to accommodate the presence of folkloric display (dance, diegetic  
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Figure 5.6. Ethnographic survey of Bukovynian peasant faces in Illienko’s White 
Bird with a Black Mark (1971) 
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music, and tableaux).  White Bird, nonetheless, remained more of a complex 
psychological investigation of the main characters than any prior work of 
“Ukrainian poetic cinema,” and its narrative followed classic norms in its 
emphasis on continuity and motivated action.102  In many respects, these two 
aspects of the film are sharply distinguishable:  Spectacle is delineated from 
narrative content, and the rhythmic flow of the camera contrasts with the static 
framing devices that owe much to the style contained in Shadows of Forgotten 
Ancestors.  
Authorities at Dovzhenko Studio engaged with new “consumerist” 
audience politics when attempting to find both a differentiated audience (locally in 
the Carpathians and nationally in Ukraine) and a mass audience for Illienko’s 
White Bird.  This was the first film that Ukrainian Goskino test marketed in the 
republic before sending it to Moscow for all-Union release.  Before the Russian 
dubbed version was even completed, Dovzhenko Theater near the studio 
screened the film twice in March 1971.103  The following week, White Bird made 
its controversial appearance at the 24th Congress of the CPU, after which the film 
was pulled from distribution owing to the concerns of several Western Ukrainian 
obkom Secretaries about the nationalist implications of the film.104  Over the 
summer, Illienko’s film was released in several key spots in the republic as part 
of a traveling “National Film Festival [narodnyi kinofestival’]” that showcased 
Dovzhenko Studio productions.105  S. P. Ivanov wrote to the Cultural Section of 
the CPU that, during the test release of the film in Ukraine, the film performed 
extraordinarily well in the Western Oblasts, offering the “remarkable” figure that 
50% of the people in L’viv oblast’ saw the film.106  In distinction to earlier works of 
“Ukrainian poetic cinema,” letters in the studio archive were entirely positive 
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about White Bird.107  Moreover, during a 1971 sociological study conducted at 
the Kyiv aircraft construction plant, audiences evaluated Illienko’s film highly 
during a private screening.108  During the 2nd Congress of the SK, Kulidzhanov 
finished his speech about the “problem of the spectator” with a positive word 
about White Bird, suggesting that it was a film that attempted to reconcile the 
growing divide between “trudnye fil’my” and “kassovye fil’my.”109   
Nonetheless, with Shcherbyts’kyi’s rise to power in late 1971, the film 
continued to have a highly limited distribution.  In Kyiv, White Bird played only at 
the Ukraina throughout September and October, and then briefly at 
Kinopanorama after the wide-screen version was released in January.110  
According to the test marketing, White Bird could have been at least a minor box 
office hit, but the Shcherbyts’kyi regime was clearly concerned with other 
problems of an exclusively ideological nature.  In fact, it appears that, in this 
case, it was the film’s very potential for popular consumption that turned CPU 
officials against it.  
Leonid Osyka’s Zakhar Berkut (1972) represented a further attempt at 
melding the visual techniques and Ukrainian classic literary material of “poetic 
cinema” with an objectively determined set of criteria that would appeal to Soviet 
audiences.  Based on stories contained in the Galician-Volynian Chronicle and 
the 1883 novel by Ivan Franko, Osyka’s film was a big-budget national-historical 
epic about the title character who unites the Carpathian tribes against the Mongol 
invasion of 1241.  The production of the film was incredibly taxing on both the 
studio’s resources, and on Osyka himself (who began drinking heavily at the 
time).  In fact, Zakhar Berkut did not seem to fit with his style of making small, 
“quiet” films like Stone Cross.  In October 1969, S. P. Ivanov wrote to Aleksei 
Romanov on the possibility of increasing the studio’s overall production budget 
from 3,480,000 to 3,922,000 rubles, owing to the anniversary year productions 
                                                 
107 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2605, l. 58-59. 
108 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2536, l. 12. 
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and the “extremely complicated” production of Osyka’s film.111  Zakhar Berkut 
was to be a mainstream historical epic – an “Americanization of Franko,” as one 
contemporary critic put it112 – along the lines of Oleksa Dovbush in its genre-
driven iconography, but which would employ the “new methods” of “Ukrainian 
poetic cinema” to explore the Carpathian ethnoscape.  In fact, the historical epic, 
to which Osyka’s film most strived to emulate was the work of Romanian director 
Sergiu Nicolaescu, whose elaborate historical epics The Dacians (1966) and 
Mihai Viteazul (1970-71) offered comparable national origin myths emerging from 
the union of pre-national Carpathian tribes against invaders from the East 
(Mongols in Osyka’s case and Turks in Nicolaescu’s films). 
Key to both Illienko’s White Bird and Osyka’s Zakhar Berkut was the 
industry’s re-investment with visuality, but in the latter case only as a means to 
cash in on what authorities in Goskino saw as a successful model through which 
Hollywood recouped its profits after the late-1950s and early-1960s losses.  The 
most obvious example of epic filmmaking in the Soviet Union was Sergei 
Bondarchuk’s mammoth four-part adaptation of Lev Tolstoi’s War and Peace 
(Voina i mir, 1965-67).  Bondarchuk’s next film, Waterloo (Vaterloo, 1970), was a 
sprawling historical epic about Napoleon’s final battle, which featured Rod 
Steiger as the title character, Orson Welles as King Louis XVIII, and 20,000 
extras.  While a phenomenal box office flop upon its release in 1971, during its 
production Dovzhenko Studio viewed Osyka’s film as means to prove that 
Ukraine could be trusted to deliver a similar product for domestic and 
international consumption.  From the very beginning, however, Kyiv filmmakers 
realized that, despite the extraordinary budget Osyka commanded, Goskino had 
bigger fish to fry.  Resentfully, Levchuk stated during a meeting of the studio 
Artistic Council, “If Bondarchuk had 1200 horses, then Osyka should have 1500 
horses!”113  Authorities at Mosfil’m, however, continually ignored the film’s 
production manager’s requests to use Bondarchuk’s horses after he was done 
with them.  Eventually responding that they couldn’t transport the animals to 
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Osyka’s desired location in the Carpathians, Bondarchuk’s production crew 
refused.  This refusal infuriated Osyka and the studio, because Bondarchuk 
himself was in the process of shooting a battle scene for Waterloo in the trans-
Carpathian city of Uzhhorod around the same time.114  In the end, they had to 
shoot Zakhar Berkut in the unlikely location of the Tian Shan mountain range of 
Central Asia, an area that resembles the Ukrainian Carpathians about as much 
as the Appalachians resemble the Rockies, and Osyka had to make due with 
horses rented from local kolkhozy.115  Osyka was livid with such privilege that 
central directors received at the expense of those on the “periphery,” especially 
as Bondarchuk had initially made a name for himself as an actor at Kyiv Studio in 
the 1950s, playing such prestigious roles as Taras Shevchenko in Savchenko’s 
1951 production and the title character in Levchuk’s Ivan Franko in 1956.  When 
Bondarchuk expressed a desire to make Gogol’s Taras Bul’ba at Dovzhenko 
Studio as a co-production with Mosfil’m and Vidino de Lerentis studio in Italy in 
1972, Osyka blurted out during a studio meeting, “Now Bondarchuk will exploit all 
of us.  We will work like we are in Hollywood.”116 
While the studio and Ukrainian Goskino offered the film praise, and 
audiences liked it for the most part,117 the shifting political situation in the republic 
at the time of its release limited its distribution.  After Ovcharenko’s ouster, his 
replacement as Ideological Secretary Fedir Malanchuk demanded a total halt to 
historical themes, on the basis that they had ceased to be relevant to Ukraine.118 
During a CPU Plenum in May 1974, First Secretary Shcherbyts’kyi finally ended 
all discussion of “Ukrainian poetic cinema:”   
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Some time ago, examples of so-called “poetic cinema” with its stress on 
abstract symbolism and sharply accented ethnographic ornamentation 
were treated by individual filmmakers almost as the leading principles of 
the development of cinema art in Ukraine.  These views, it is necessary to 
say, have been overcome.119 
 
The First Secretary’s remarks about “poetic cinema” in particular were printed in 
all the major Ukrainian-language newspapers and journals dedicated to literature 
and art (Kul’tura i zhyttia, Literaturna Ukriana, Novyny kinoekrana, Radians’ka 
kul’tura).  While Moscow critics continued to discuss “poetic cinema” in the 
central press after Shcherbyts’kyi’s speech, the problem had been “overcome” in 
Ukraine, and it was no longer a topic in republican-level discourse.  During the 
Malanchukshchyna of the mid-to-late-1970s, both historical directors and those 
who regularly worked within “national” thematics found it difficult to find work.  
Most affected, however, was Mykolaichuk, whose health and career took a nose-
dive.  For five years, he played nothing except bit parts in Ukrainian films, in 
addition to a few small roles at Mosfil’m and in a Bulgarian production.  Central 
Goskino in fact deliberately sabotaged his career, as they halted production on 
an informational bulletin on the actor, meant for popularization purposes in 1974, 
directly after Shcherbyts’kyi’s speech.120  
In September 1974, Vasyl’ Bol’shak sent an order to Soveksportfil’m to 
remove both White Bird and Zakhar Berkut from future distribution abroad.121  At 
this point, even the possibility of generating revenue from these two celebrated 
syntheses of “poetic” and “realist” Ukrainian cinema proved too dangerous for the 
mature period of Shcherbyts’kyi’s stagnation regime. 
 
Tymofii Levchuk and the Poetics of Stagnation 
 
 The new head of Ukrainian Goskino’s SRK, Carpathian highlander Petro 
Kuvyk, announced in 1972 that the studio thematic plan for the next four years 
                                                 
119 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 2, d. 101, l. 37-38. 
120 Liudmyla Lemesheva, “Deshcho z osobystoho zhyttia krytyka,” in Poetychne kino: zaboronena 
shkola, 306. 
121 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 32, d. 878, l. 156. 
 301
had only three “directions [napriamky],” in which filmmakers could work: The first 
field included the ubiquitous yet ambiguous category of “our contemporary.”  
Second, Ukrainian directors could work in the realm of “adaptations of Russian 
and Ukrainian classics.”  Finally, Kuvyk mentioned adventure films.  Fresh from 
the trying experience of Zakhar Berkut, Osyka stated that he saw nothing to work 
on in the next four years.122  During a subsequent meeting about the 1974-1975 
plan, Levchuk noticed that there was only one film on a “Ukrainian theme,” his 
own Ukrainian partisan epic, Carpathians, Carpathians (Karpaty, Karpaty, 
1976).123   
A decade before this dismal meeting, in the midst of debates about “poetic 
cinema” and the “revelation” of Paradzhanov’s Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, 
critic Mykola Berezhnyi gave the First Secretary of the SKU a slap in the face 
with his statement, “We don’t need to produce Levchuks at the studio, but 
Dovzhenkos, because it’s a bad soldier who doesn’t want to be a general…”124  
In 1941, the recent graduate of the Kyiv Film Institute and assistant director on 
Ihor Savchenko’s Riders, had enlisted in the Soviet Army on the day after the 
Germans invaded the Soviet Union. The Soviet press wrote about his exploits on 
the Ukrainian Front, and he was awarded the highest medal for combat, Hero of 
the Soviet Union.  Nonetheless, Levchuk remained a petty officer at the war’s 
conclusion, while Dovzhenko, who had no combat experience, left the service 
with the rank of polkovnyk (Colonel), and who spent the war organizing 
documentaries in Central Asia and Bashkiria, only briefly appearing on the 
front.125  Thus, Berezhnyi’s statement was not entirely fair, especially since 
Levchuk did in fact make a number of Ukrainian-themed films during his long 
career, including a three-part history of a family of Arsenal factory workers and 
their children, and a bio-pic on the life of Ivan Franko.  As a member of the 
Verkhovna Rada, he traveled to New York, Paris, Munich, and Winnipeg to 
speak to Ukrainian émigré communities, embodying a role different from that of 
                                                 
122 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 632, l. 120. 
123 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 705, l. 28. 
124 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 285, l. 49. 
125 See, George O. Liber, “Dovzhenko’s War,” in Alexander Dovzhenko: A Life in Soviet Film 
(London: BFI Publications, 2002), 186-212. 
 302
Mykolaichuk, but nonetheless served as an important messenger from the 
batkivshchyna.  As the First Secretary of the SKU, Levchuk gave strong support 
to both Paradzhanov and the promotion of a dovzhenkovskaia poetika 
throughout 1964-1967.  He, nonetheless, believed in the party, and blindly 
accepted CPU policy, giving the order to expel Paradzhanov from the SKU as 
soon as he was arrested, citing the director’s lack of involvement in Union 
activities as justification.126 
Moreover, his work during the first half of the 1960s seemed strangely out 
of touch with the cultural politics and aesthetic interests of Dovzhenko Studio 
during this time.  In 1962, he made The Law of Antarctica (Zakon Antarktida) 
about Soviet Antarctic explorers who rescue a team of Belgian geologists; in 
1964, Cosmic Alloy (Kosmicheskii splav) about a factory that produces rockets 
for space travel; and in 1966, Two Years above the Abyss (Dva goda nad 
propast’iu), about Ivan Kudry and the Kyiv underground during the Nazi 
occupation.  Apart from the latter film, which dealt with a “local” topic and became 
a “leader in distribution” with 30.7 million tickets sold in 1967, Levchuk appeared 
to his colleagues as a “zakaznyi rezhiser,” a director who took on films that the 
CPSU ordered directly, without consideration of the particular goals of the studio 
or the potential audience for such films.127 
 Perhaps in an attempt to re-assert his relevance at the studio, Levchuk 
fought hard for his next project, his long-term dream to adapt Ukrainian novelist 
Natan Rybak’s Honoré de Balzac’s Mistake (Oshibka Onere de Bal’zaka, 1968) 
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about the French writer’s journey to the Russian Empire to re-kindle a love affair 
with Polish noblewoman Ewalina Hańska, whom he goes on to marry five months 
before his death in March 1850.128  In early 1967, Levchuk provided an 
explanation of the screenplay, in which he stressed Balzac’s relations and 
knowledge of the Ukrainian people as he traveled around the countryside.  He 
wrote that the “film permits a spontaneous and […] deep revelation of the picture 
of life of our people […]  In comparison to the novel, the screenplay has 
significantly expanded Balzac’s acquaintance with the Ukrainian people, not only 
in Verkhovyna, but also in Kyiv.”  The film begins in Paris, with Balzac arranging 
travel to the Russian Empire, as much to evade his creditors as to see Hańska.  
As Levchuk implied in his explanation, however, the narrative motivation for the 
famous writer is but a weak devise to establish the fictional connection between 
Ukraine and the founder of “critical realism,” at once a celebrity association 
written upon the entire nation and a view of that nation read through the eyes of a 
famous tourist.  As the writer passes through customs into the empire, he is 
greeted with a singing troupe of four men dressed in keptari and highlander hats.  
Balzac pauses to watch the spectacle, before moving on.  We cut to a wide-angle 
mountain view as the narrator speaks: “There she is, Ukraine, a mysterious and 
unknown land.”  Balzac gathers Ukrainian dirt into his hands, pressing it against 
his face with pleasure.  He immediately meets a Kyiv professor of archeology, 
who shows him “wealth under the Ukrainian earth.”  The film constantly forces its 
hero to recognize the beauty of Ukraine’s landscape, people and history, which 
remains unmotivated in the narrative, and furthermore absent in the Stalin-era 
novel, from which Levchuk adapted Balzac’s Mistake. 
In his explanation, however, Levchuk was clear to emphasize that his 
“Balzac in Ukraine” story, as he called it, would not be a work of “Ukrainian poetic 
cinema,” as he stressed the strength of the actors over the “succulence of 
material accessories.”129  Balzac’s relationship with Hańska is, in fact, de-
emphasized in Mistake, with the man who erected the “bridge between critical 
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realism and socialist realism”130 traveling through Ukraine as a privileged tourist, 
first making stops in the “mysterious” Carpathians and heading East toward Kyiv 
to see Saint Sofiia (Figure 5.7).  While in Verkhovyna, Balzac makes friends with 
a young serf of the Hańska family, Levko, played by Ivan Mykolaichuk.  While a 
minor character in both Rybak’s novel and his updated 1965 screenplay, the 
violin-playing and highly literate (he claims to read Balzac’s work, in addition to 
that of Pushkin and Shevchenko) prodigy Levko took center stage in both 
Levchuk’s narrative and in promotional materials on the film.  Rather than the 
hulking and rather ugly Viktor Khokhiarkov as Balzac, Na ekranakh Ukrainy and 
Novyny kinoekrana featured stills of Mykolaichuk in the film.131  When the SKU 
nominated the film for a Shevchenko Prize, they stated that ultimately the film 
was “about the Ukrainian people.”132  Nonetheless, Balzac’s Mistake is not 
“poetic cinema,” but not necessarily for the reason that Levchuk cited above, with 
his statement about the “succulence” of material culture.  The director made the 
film in a classic realist style, with its folkloric material properly motivated, if not 
through the narrative, then essentially through the spectator’s ideological 
alignment with the hero and his vision.  The film does not present the Carpathian 
exotic directly to the spectator (see Figure 5.6); rather, its consumption contains 
a diegetic origin in the figure of the Balzac-tourist. 
In 1973, Levchuk began work on The Ballad of Kovpak (Duma pro 
Kovpaka), his most extensive and expensive project of his life, which was to 
commemorate the heroic sacrifice of the Ukrainian partisan movement during the 
Great Patriotic War.  General Sydir Kovpak was an ideal subject, in which to 
explore this topic, first due to his impeccable record during the Civil War, serving 
under the real Vasilii Chapaev, and during the second world war, where he 
became one of the most decorated non-Russian officers, awarded Hero of the 
Soviet Union twice, and the Orders of Lenin, Krasnoe znamia, Suvorov, and  
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Figure 5.7. Balzac, the celebrity tourist in Ukraine in Balzac’s Mistake: (top) 
listening to Hutsuls sing in the Carpathians; (bottom) listening to a bandurist on 
Sofiia Square in Kyiv 
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Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi.133  Moreover, Kovpak was one of the few ethnic 
Ukrainian civilians who had led Ukrainian partisan forces during the war, the 
majority of whose leaders were appointed from among Red Army officers in 
Moscow.  Thus, the image of Kovpak possessed both a legitimate political 
meaning for the Brezhnev-era USSR, and a safe ethnic meaning for Ukrainian 
cinema after the denouncement of “Ukrainian poetic cinema” under the 
Shcherbyts’kyi regime.  Levchuk’s trilogy followed Kovpak’s group from their 
inception in the Sumy region of Northeastern Ukraine in late 1941, to actions in 
the central Ukrainian Kyiv and Zhytomyr provinces in 1942, to their major raid of 
the Carpathians in 1943, the latter of which helped destabilize the German 
occupation of Ukraine.   
The Ballad of Kovpak essentially occupied Levchuk for most of the 1970s, 
with the final part released in 1978.  The trailer for the final part of Levchuk’s film, 
Carpathians, Carpathians (Karpaty, Karpaty, 1978), is instructive for its 
juxtaposition of historical / mythological time grounded in the Carpathophilia of 
the previous decade, and “the contemporary,” the latter represented by the 
mobile tourist.  The trailer’s narrator begins in voice-over: 
Far away under the sound of the trembita’s voice.  The boundless 
expanse of the Carpathians is opened before one’s gaze.  The 
mountaintops swim in hazy fog, the rugged forests, and the green cover of 
the mountain-valleys [ukr].  Tiny little houses in valleys [rus], emerald 
sparks of the waterfalls of the mountain streams… 
  
We hear the distant sound of the trembita and then silence.  The trailer cuts to 
the sharp bend of a contemporary highway.  Cars and tourist buses fill the 
screen.  One of the buses stops on the edge of the highway, and people dressed 
in modern clothing exit to get a glance at one of these “eternal” mountain valleys.  
The narrator returns: “This is the Carpathians.  A colorful corner of Soviet land, a 
region of fairy-tale beauty, and hospitable and talented people.  Come and see 
the beauty… listen to this silence and for once recall those who obtained it for 
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us...”  Another group of tourists finds themselves in a picturesque glade, and we 
hear laughs, cries of delight, juxtaposed with amateur photographs and home 
movies.  The trailer ends with an image of a monument to Kovpak located in the 
Bukovyna city of Chernivtsi and then cuts to the partisan leader’s grave in Kyiv.  
Unlike the narrative teleology contained in the Stalinist folkloric, Levchuk’s 
cinema epic and the corresponding trailer does not end with a message of 
Ukrainian-Russian union, but of continuity between Eastern and Western 
Ukrainian space, the trailer offering further contextualization for the contemporary 
viewer with its suggestion that they owe their present consumer abundance to 
the generation that its director comprised.134 
Both the Kovpak trilogy and Balzac’s Mistake established a Carpathian 
imagery within an aesthetics of stagnation, an aesthetics which normalized the 
space as a tourist destination for an all-Union audience.  At the same time, these 
two works, along with Zakhar Berkut, were pricey endeavors for Dovzhenko 
Studio, for which it lost hundreds of thousands of rubles when they failed to turn 
out audiences, and contributed to the impoverishment of the studio by the end of 
the decade.135 
Like many directors who themselves were participants in the Great 
Patriotic War, Levchuk made war films for personal reasons.  Vasyl’ Illiashenko, 
who had an unusual soft spot for Levchuk in his ordinarily bitter heart, reads into 
the First Secretary the role of a new 1970s auteur, one who was equally 
concerned with personal expression as with answering the ideological demands 
of the Brezhnev era.  “For such artists,” Illiashenko writes, “the theme of the war 
was an inner necessity for them, the essence of their work, and there was a 
continual need for them to speak about it.  [Levchuk’s] friends who did not return 
from the battlefield belong to the director’s creative conscience.”136  Illiashenko 
calls the story “authentic, realistic, and original.”  The attention is on the soldiers 
themselves, and even the leaders are hardly distinguished from the infantry.  
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Whereas the cult of the Great Patriotic War was increasingly localized by the 30th 
Anniversary of Victory Day in May 1975, with more monuments constructed 
celebrating and commemorating the local dynamics of both heroics and suffering, 
mainstream filmic representation was characterized by Iurii Ozerov’s Liberation 
(Osvobozhdenie, 1970).  Ozerov’s five-part epic deals with the five “great battles” 
of the war, from Stalingrad, Kursk, the Dnipro, Minsk and Berlin.  Kovpak 
screenwriters Igor’ Bolgarin and Viktor Smirnov, themselves Russians working in 
Moscow, perceived their film as a direct response to Ozerov, with the latter’s 
aesthetic of placeless epicality, which narratively foregrounded the march toward 
victory.  They viewed the Kovpak trilogy as a localized tribute to the Great 
Patriotic War, in which real people – not just leaders – carried on their everyday 
lives in the midst of fighting behind enemy lines, initially as the losers of the 
conflict.  While appealing to such a Thaw-era “cult of the little guy,” the Ballad of 
Kovpak also aimed at a nostalgic rehabilitation of Stalin and Stalinist culture.  
Carpathians, Carpathians begins, for example, with Kovpak and his men 
watching Vladimir Petrov’s famous historical-biographical film Kutuzov (1944) 
about the Russian general’s defeat of Napoleon in 1812.137  And the relationship 
between the folksy Kovpak and the politically knowledgeable commissar Semën 
Rudnev consciously evokes the central relationship in the Vasil’ev Brothers’ 
Chapaev (1934).  Moreover, Levchuk features Stalin himself prominently in the 
film, serving as the cerebral center of the Kovpak group’s activities.  In its retro 
agenda, the film attempts at re-familiarizing Ukrainian space through a 
recognizable plot of Ukrainian partisan victory in the Great Patriotic War.  At the 
same time, the film does not return to a domesticated notion of a Stalinist 
folkloric, as even the ethnographic techniques of “Ukrainian poetic cinema” find 
their appearance in Levchuk’s occasional treatment of Carpathian partisans.  The 
camera frequently pans across partisan faces, presenting them as both Soviet 
soldiers and local attraction (Figure 5.8).  The Ballad of Kovpak appeals to the 
classics of the war genre – from the Stalin era – but locates the conflict in a  
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Figure 5.8. Ethnographic survey of partisan faces in Levchuk’s Carpathians, 
Carpathians (1976) 
 
canonical Ukrainian “poetic” ethnoscape.  The promotion of the film returns us 
full-circle to the tourist view, but in this case, it is one mediated through the 
window of a fast-moving vehicle, with only brief spots to park and look at 
mountain vistas, rather than the close gaze on authentic life that Ranok promised  
its readers over a decade earlier with Camp Hutsul’shchyna.  The only space for 
historical exploration is in the nostalgically familiar space of Levchuk’s film. 
 
The End of “National Cinemas” in the USSR 
 
With the decline of a studio-supported auteurism by the early 1970s, along 
with a declining space for national representation, the auteurs themselves turned 
inward, and suffered a number of personal crises.  Sergei Paradzhanov went to 
prison in 1974; Illienko and Kadochnikova divorced while shooting To Dream and 
To Live (Mriiaty i zhyty, 1974) during the same year; and Osyka turned 
increasingly to the bottle, eventually abandoning experimental cinema entirely for 
steady work making zakaznye fil’my.  One of the major debates of the mid-1970s 
in the SKU Presidium was not about film at all – the Union had long since 
determined that they would have no creative input at Dovzhenko Studio – but 
about their disappointment with their Union hall, Budynok Kino.  Filmmakers 
complained of bad food and poor service in the cafeteria, prostitutes at the bar, 
and a general unsightly appearance to the place.  The projectionist at their 
exclusive theater frequently showed up for work drunk.  When the manager of 
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Budynok Kino appeared before the Union to answer for this state of affairs, he 
blamed the lack of funds.138  They couldn’t pay the standard wage for restaurant 
employees and projectionists, and so many of them left at the first opportunity, 
with only the bad apples remaining behind.  With the SKU budget correlated to 
the box office performance of Ukrainian films, the Presidium had to cut costs 
significantly as audiences declined during the 1970s.  The Union continued to 
recoup some losses with the mild profits garnered from publication of Novyny 
kinoekrana and such blockbusters as Leonid Bykov’s Only the Old Go to Battle 
and Sulafim Tsybul’nyk’s Inspector of Criminal Investigations, but apparently not 
enough to maintain the respectability of the Union hall. 
During a speech delivered in Minsk in December 1971, Paradzhanov 
stated, among many other “demagogic” comments that attracted the KBG’s 
attention that day,139 “The audience doesn’t understand my films, and I have no 
desire to apologize to them.  It seems to me that the time has come when the 
audience should apologize to the artist.”140  This hypothetical and largely 
discursive audience that did not understand Paradzhanov, who had written 
pages of letters heaping all manner of insults upon his work, was now ruining his 
career.  This “audience” would not let him work in Ukraine, and he demanded 
that they feel sorry for him as an auteur.  The cynicism with which Kyiv 
filmmakers treated “the audience” was also evident in the growing lack of 
involvement many of them had in public activities like the annual Cinema Days 
event in early September.141  From the classic narrative style of Illienko’s White 
Bird with a Black Mark, we see that he in fact attempted to approach the new 
                                                 
138 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 788, ll. 1-7. 
139 Paradzhanov’s speech in Minsk on December 1, 1971 was transcribed by security operatives 
assigned to the Belorussian Komsomol.  KGB chairman Iurii Andropov then sent the speech to 
Ideological Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Suslov.  Petro Shelest and the 
Belorussian Central Committee were also informed of the speech.  See, James Steffen, “Sergei 
Parajanov’s Speech in Minsk before the Creative and Scientific youth of Byelorussia on 1 
December 1971,” Armenian Review 47, nos. 3-4, 48, nos. 1-2 (2001-2002), 13. 
140 Ibid., 17. 
141 See, for example, Mykola Mashchenko’s comments on the eve of Den’ kino-73: He 
complained that filmmakers were not as interested in the day as they used to be.  To increase the 
level of participation, he suggested that it be mandatory that shooting should stop on Den’ kino so 
that all the filmmakers could take the time to meet with spectators instead of working.  
TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 665, l. 56 
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audience politics of the Soviet film industry at end of the 1960s, but political 
changes at the top of the CPU prevented him from being successful in this order.  
It seemed evident to Illienko in particular that “popular cinema” alone was not 
what the new studio and Goskino leadership wanted from him; rather, they 
expected him to start making films like everyone else, so that his very image as 
an auteur would disappear.  After all, auteurs produced expectations with 
spectators, which could not be controlled by thematic, production and distribution 
plans.  As an auteur-driven project, “Ukrainian poetic cinema” carried meaning 
above and beyond the films contained with its oeuvre, to the very people 
associated with it, and the people associated with them.  By 1972-74, this not 
only included a number of convicted Ukrainian nationalists, but also Paradzhanov 
himself, whose very name disappeared from print until his return to public life in 
1983.  While the Shelest period included an official outlet for promoting Ukrainian 
difference, the Shcherbyts’kyi regime delineated all Ukrainian-language cultural 
activity as at least suspect.  Nonetheless, the CPU First Secretary continued to 
promote the separate status of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, even if he 
promoted the cultural status of Ukraine as Russia’s “little brother.”142 
While Ukraine experienced a sharper rise from a completely disrespected 
studio to one of the most innovative spaces of Thaw-era cultural production in the 
1960s, Dovzhenko Studio also experienced a much sharper decline than 
Moscow during the following decade.  By the mid-1970s Kyiv Studio had very 
clearly become peripheral to Soviet cinema.  In August 1975, the relatively young 
Volodymyr Denysenko said during a meeting to discuss the thematic plan: “I read 
the prospective plan and thought that it’s time for me to go on a pension,” 
indicating the close of an era that he in part initiated with the production of A 
Dream in 1964.143  During the Third Congress of the SKU in 1976, amid dutiful 
praise for Brezhnev and other rote speechification, the minutes of the Congress 
made note that Union members cheered loudly for the first time as screenwriter 
                                                 
142 Jaroslaw Pelenski, “Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine (1963-1972): A Revival of 
Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism,” in Peter J. Potychnyj, ed., Ukraine in the Seventies: Papers 
and Proceedings of the McMaster Conference on Contemporary Ukraine, October 1974 (Oakville, 
Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1975), 296. 
143 TsDAMLMU, f. 670, op. 1, d. 2997, l. 62. 
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Ievhen Onopriienko read a proposal that the Union intended to submit to the 
Central Committee.  The proposal sought to place the SKU on equal footing with 
the Union of Cinematographers in the Russian Federation, the members of which 
“had the right to an additional 20 meters of living space.”144 
During a December 1980 Plenum of the Union of Cinematographers, 
Chinghiz Aitmatov returned to the topic of “national cinemas” in the USSR.  This 
time, however, he offered a much grimmer picture than in 1967.  Instead of the 
excitement, mixed with caution, that he expressed 13 years prior, now he stated:  
Today, the condition of national cinema provokes definite anxiety.  
Recently – during the second half of the 70s – a significant receding of the 
wave of cinema’s development has taken shape in the provinces [na 
mestakh] […] The brilliance, expressiveness, originality and specificity of 
national pictures are increasingly fading, and more often a certain general 
graded tendency toward leveling makes itself felt, both within the content 
and in the form of national art’s appearance.  Facelessness is knocking at 
the doors of the national studios…145 
 
While only diagnosing the problem, Aitmatov’s words conformed to earlier 
anxieties about the “de-nationalizing” effects of commercial cinema.  The 
previous year had seen the release of the two largest box offices successes in 
Soviet history – the adventure film, Pirates of the 20th Century (Piraty XX veka, 
Boris Durov, 1980), which sold 87.6 million tickets, and Vladimir Men’shov’s 
famous melodrama, Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears (Moskva slezam ne 
verit, 1979), selling over 84 million.146  The “national” studios had failed to find 
their “mark” in this new profit-minded industry, nor was such an industry even 
interested in cultivating the “national theme.”  The CPSU of the late 1970s 
viewed non-Russian representational politics as increasingly disconnected with a 
quantifiable “mass audience,” on the one hand, but also in line with the now-
defeated nationalist movements in the Union republics, most notably in Ukraine, 
on the other.   
 
144 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 932, l. 69. 
145 Quoted in Valerii Golovskoi, Mezhdu ottepel’iu i glasnost’iu: Kinematograf 70-kh (Moscow: 
Materik, 2004), 80. 
146 First, “From Spectator to ‘Differentiated’ Consumer,” 342. 
Conclusion 
 




“The explosion will not happen today.  It is too soon… or too late.”1 
 
 Historians like explosions.  For good reason, prior historiography on the 
nationality question in the Soviet Union was centered on the explosive events of 
the first half of the twentieth century.  Beginning with Stalin’s 1913 tract, 
“Marxism and the National Question,” the Bolsheviks began to define and re-
define their policy toward the non-Russian minorities in the Russian Empire to 
reflect their beliefs about the rights of nations within multinational states.  
Historians Richard Pipes, Terry Martin, as well as 1960s Ukrainian dissident Ivan 
Dziuba and many others, have shown that the practice of governing a 
multinational state differed greatly from Lenin’s principle of “national self-
determination.” 2  A combination of the Bolsheviks’ own imperial ambitions and 
the contingencies of revolution, war, and the massive social upheavals that 
emerged from large-scale industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture, 
in addition to ideological disputes within the party leadership and between 
Moscow and the national republics on the nationality question, often eroded such 
a lofty principle.  Yet, as Yuri Slezkine has argued, the core assumptions behind 
Soviet nationalities policy—that nations possess their own cultures and 
contiguous territories—contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet Union along 
national lines.  In posing the “national question,” the Soviet regime never 
sufficiently resolved the tensions between particularistic identities and allegiance 
                                                 
1 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, tr. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 
1976), 7. 
2 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). 
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to a centralized state and an ideology that eschewed nationalism as a holdover 
of bourgeois societies. 
This project, which looks at the nationality question in Ukrainian cinema 
during the long 1960s, has had a more modest aim in addressing the problem of 
representing national difference.  In so doing, however, I hoped to point to the 
ways that the Soviet Union, with its entrenched and seemingly impenetrable 
political culture, engendered new ways of thinking about nationality.  It was 
during these more peaceful times, I have suggested, that Ukrainians could 
consider what it meant to belong to a particular nationality, apart from the legal 
category on line four of Soviet internal passports.  I began with the question of 
whether or not nationality even mattered, but if so, how and why it mattered.  The 
question seemed important because most scholars now affirm that nationalities 
policy was the principal context from which to view the national independence 
movements of the late-1980s.  Whereas earlier scholars highlighted the history of 
discriminatory and repressive policies against non-Russians in the Soviet Union, 
historians now spoke of the state’s cultivation of “ethnic particularism.”  Slezkine, 
for example, writes, “In a country free from social conflict, ethnicity was the only 
meaningful identity.  This was the legacy that Stalin bequeathed to his 
successors and that survived 1984 to haunt Gorbachev and his successors.”3  In 
this claim, he asks us to take him at his word.  After all, we know what happened 
to the USSR.  Suny also argues for continuity of nationalities policy between 
Stalin and Gorbachev, highlighting the continued presence of indigenization 
practices, albeit alongside Russification measures.  Under Brezhnev in particular, 
Suny finds that Moscow/republic relations were stabilized with the placement of 
loyal leaders within republican party apparatuses; First Secretaries, who 
nonetheless knew how to speak to local concerns when necessary.4  In my 
examination of Ukrainian cinema, however, I have discovered other questions 
related to nationality besides these explicitly political concerns over the nature of 
 
3 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism” Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994), 449. 
4 Ronald Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 102-24. 
power between center and periphery, and the negotiation of state concerns and 
national concerns, issues which arose with the formation of the Soviet Union as a 
federal, multinational state.   
Rather than examine the level of national consciousness that Ukrainians 
had, or for whom identity mattered, this dissertation has sought to investigate the 
very problems of representing Ukraine on film.  For a new generation of 
Ukrainian artists, writers and intellectuals who grew up after the formation of 
nationalities policy, in the urban “factories of Russification,” as Dziuba called 
eastern Ukrainian cities, Ukrainian identity could not be assimilated 
unproblematically.  Instead, the 1960s appear as a period during which cultural 
producers had less certainty about what it meant to be Ukrainian in the first 
place.  This feeling of alienation that 1960s filmmakers in particular felt from their 
ascribed nationality and their subsequent desire to re-discover an ethnic identity 
contributed to the style of modernist self-expression that characterized what was 
called “Ukrainian poetic cinema.”  
At the Oleksandr Dovzhenko Feature Film Studio in Kyiv, its new 
leadership under Vasyl’ Tsvirkunov, Vasyl’ Zemliak and Sviatoslav Ivanov, 
embarked on a project to revive a declining film production facility.  To do so, 
they believed their task was not only to create a financially independent 
enterprise, with its own native-born staff, but also to renew respect for Ukrainian 
cinema more broadly.  The studio believed that such respect would only come 
with a new image of the republic and its people.  A legitimate “national cinema” 
would only emerge if filmmakers could reject the familiar image of Ukrainians as 
backward peasants in folk costumes presented on the screen for popular 
amusement.  In the studio’s desire for aesthetic sophistication, Tsvirkunov sought 
a new cohort of young Ukrainian directors, cinematographers and screenwriters 
educated at the All-Union Film Institute in Moscow.  These young cosmopolitans 
– Iurii Illienko, Leonid Osyka and Ivan Drach among others – were initially more 
invested in the cultural politics of the Thaw more generally than they were in the 
particular problem of Ukrainian identity.  In engaging with the Ukrainian theme, 
these young filmmakers also had to learn what it meant to be a specifically 
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Ukrainian filmmaker and the demands that such an ascribed identity placed on 
them.   
Thus, this generation of Ukrainian filmmakers and writers who worked at 
Dovzhenko Studio were more interested in personal expression than national 
independence for Ukraine, even if their cultural interests brought them into 
contact with dissident nationalists.  And while many of these filmmakers would 
later support the nationalist party, Ukrainian People’s Movement (Narodnyi rukh 
Ukrainy), during the late 1980s, they proudly called themselves “Soviet” during 
the 1960s.  Yet, in calling themselves “Soviet,” they nonetheless rejected what 
they considered as the homogeneity of contemporary life in the country.  For 
them, the filmic exploration of Ukrainian nationality was an attempt to highlight 
the maintenance of diverse cultures within the Soviet Union.  Consequently, they 
attempted to show, not the canonical ethnic spaces and character types – “those 
notorious attributes,” as one Ukrainian writer called them – that emerged in 
Stalinist Ukrainian cinema, but a new and unfamiliar imagery of the republic and 
its people, an imagery they believed was more “authentic.”   
Nonetheless, the very means through which the Stalinist state reduced the 
meaning of nationality to the safe space of folklore became the basis of this new 
interest in national identity during the 1960s.  Ukrainians became knowable in 
Stalin-era cinema through folkloric spectacle – costumes, songs, dances, the 
Cossack khokhol – and Ukraine itself through a bucolic imagery of thatched-roof 
houses, sunflowers, the steppe, and the Dnipro River.  At the same time, the 
Stalinist Ukrainian hero was able to transcend narrow alignment with nation and 
landscape to become a historical and political actor, thus firmly dividing a 
timeless Ukrainian space from a modern Soviet (or Russian) space.  The plots 
and imagery of 1960s Ukrainian cinema frequently returned to folklore for its 
material, locating Ukraine within a colorful pastoral.  This similarity adds 
considerable weight to Serhy Yekelchyk’s claim that the Stalinist vision of 
Ukrainian history remained hegemonic throughout the Soviet period, with even 
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dissidents mobilizing its imagery.5  This later interest in folklore in Ukrainian 
cinema, however, had different intentions.  Instead of Ukraine as a comedic 
space, filled with familiar and colorful peasants, filmmakers in the 1960s sought 
to render rural Ukraine as an unusual space, and called attention to the 
specificity of Ukrainian folklore.  For urban and “Russified” sensibilities, a 
representation of an “authentic” Ukraine would have to be strange, unfamiliar and 
somehow “savage.” 
In appealing to an ethnographic and authentic style of modernist 
representation, Paradzhanov, Illienko and Osyka conceived of their audience 
differently than Stalinist directors like Ivan Pyr’ev.  Whereas the latter’s films were 
clearly intended for popular consumption, in its mobilization of common comedic 
stereotypes to render non-Russians on screen, the “poetic” directors addressed 
their “difficult” films toward an educated and Ukrainian audience, one whose 
tastes in film dovetailed with European art cinema. But these filmmakers too 
were implicated in new conceptions of a mass media-consuming public.  These 
filmmakers went from having a conception of an elite and knowledgeable 
audience for their work, to cynicism over the existence of a specifically Ukrainian 
public at all.   
This dissertation has posited a multidimensional cause for the re-
emergence of the nationality question after Stalin, which was located in Thaw-era 
discourse on personal expression, authenticity, and resistance to conformity.  
Moreover, the search for meaning in nationality through cultural production did 
not aim to destroy the Soviet system; it merely made a claim for recognition of 
both national difference and of the artist as the producer of national meaning.  In 
this way, we cannot look for a direct continuation from the Stalinist folkloric to 
“Ukrainian poetic cinema” to the independence movement of the late 1980s.  The 
latter had much more to do political developments in the USSR more broadly, 
whereas the cultural concerns of the 1960s involved a search for meaning in 
                                                 
5 Yekelchyk argues in his conclusion that the sixties generation – the shestidesiatniki – were 
mere products of “Stalin’s empire of memory,” which “failed to produce a non-national” means for 
interpreting Soviet society and history.  Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations 
in the Soviet Historical Imagination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 160. 
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national categories.  But what we can say about the period in Ukraine is that 
cinema established new expectations about the role of the individual in making 
nationality meaningful, outside of political negotiations.  In this case, national 
difference, a collective identity, became encoded in the politics of individualism 
and authorship that characterized the cultural Thaw as a whole.   
  
*   *   * 
2004, the year that I began thinking about the topic of this dissertation, 
briefly saw Ukraine in newspaper headlines around the world, as hundreds of 
thousands of people gathered in Kyiv to protest an apparently fraudulent election.  
In what came to be known as the Orange Revolution for the color that opposition 
leader Viktor Yushchenko had chosen to represent his party, the mass protest 
forced a reelection, which was monitored by international observers and 
eventually confirmed the opposition’s victory.  Perhaps because I had my mind 
on 1960s cinema, I did not have a very clear conception of what seemed to me 
as Yushchenko’s vague political platform, with its mix of free market liberalism, 
soft nationalism, and a pro-Western populism.  His campaign slogan, “I believe I 
know we can,” or, in its shortened form, “Tak! (yes),” seemed like a good youth 
marketing campaign, however, and the words adorned orange coffee mugs, 
scarves, pens, and other “revolutionary” memorabilia for sale on any block in 
downtown Kyiv during and after the historic events.  While Yushchenko’s 
opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, responded with his own color (blue), the products 
were not forthcoming, and his vastly outnumbered supporters relied on hand-
made sashes to convey their allegiances.  More than a consistent political 
ideology, Yushchenko was able to mobilize imagery attractive to young voters 
who considered their country to be a legitimate member of the European 
community.  At the same time, the opposition leader’s name was attached to the 
familiar objects of a nationalist agenda, and supporters adorned keptari and 
Cossack hats, while Yanukovych’s base performed their regional and ideological 
allegiances wearing miners’ hard hats.   
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Some of the top names in Ukraine’s nascent pop music scene contributed 
to the best-selling soundtrack to the revolution, Orange Songs (Pomaranchevi 
pisni), including five-times Platinum recording artist and 2004 Eurovision Song 
Contest winner Ruslana Lyzhychko.  An avid Yushchenko fan, Ruslana’s video 
for her hit single, “Wild Dances (Dyki tantsi),” includes images of attractive and 
shirtless Cossacks mock fighting and dancing with battleaxes, Hutsuls playing 
trembity against the backdrop of a Carpathian vista, and protesters on the 
Maidan, rapidly juxtaposed with Ruslana and a group of male dancers self-
consciously evoking the visual presence of Britney Spears.6  Such an MTV 
folkloric mode of Ukrainian consumer culture inserted these iconic images from a 
mythical past and present into the conventions of the music video.  Moreover, in 
this culture of affirmative politics and fashionable abundance, Ruslana 
successfully resisted a reduction of the meaning of these images to the level of a 
national kitsch.  In the lack of irony attached to their popular consumption, such 
iconography associated with both a Stalinist representation mode and 1960s 
“Ukrainian poetic cinema” became important elements of a contemporary 
Ukrainian mass culture. 
Nonetheless, this dissertation is about people who failed, and who wrote 
and made films about failure and loss.  Dissident Ivan Dziuba’s Internationalism 
or Russification? was not a nationalist rallying cry to resist Russian “colonialism” 
or Soviet “empire;” rather, it was a melancholic and deceptively personal 
meditation on what he called “de-nationalization.”  None of the works of 
“Ukrainian poetic cinema” during the decade between 1964 and 1974 provide us 
with any sense of hope for such an affirmative Ukrainian mass culture.  Even the 
celebratory atmosphere that surrounded Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors was 
odd, considering that it very directly addressed a lost people, implicitly 
juxtaposed against the sterility of a modern and inorganic Soviet society.  
Ukrainian poetic cinema, as well as the dissident movement itself, was produced 
by people who were part of a Soviet mobile society, auteurs or “samoznavtsy” 
 
6 In the Ukrainian version of Ruslana’s “Wild Dances,” she speculates that, if not for the example 
of “the beautiful Britney,” she could not have been a singer. 
who were themselves “de-nationalized,” but who were forced to work within the 
idiom of national representation.   
 Within this interplay of the production and reproduction of images, Ivan 
Mykolaichuk was able to function as an ideal embodiment in Ukrainian cinema, 
wherein the nationalist potential of Cossacks and Hutsuls could be ascribed the 
value of personal expression.  Mykolaichuk died of a “prolonged illness” on 
August 3, 1987, at the young age of 47.  The SKU Secretariat and Dovzhenko 
Studio immediately resolved to cover the costs of a monument to the actor and 
burial in the prestigious Baikova Cemetery in Kyiv, a space where the major 
political and cultural leaders of the republic were interred.  The union also funded 
a memorial plaque to be placed on his modest apartment at 5 Serafimovych 
Street, and asked the Chernivtsy Oblast Party Committee to establish a school 
and film museum in Mykolaichuk’s native Carpathian village of Chortoryiia in his 
honor.  Finally, the SKU promised to provide “personal assistance” to the actor’s 
son, Taras Ivanovych, until he came of age, and to give an additional 5000 rubles 
to Mykolaichuk’s destitute wife, Marichka.7  Despite the desperate conditions, in 
which the actor seemingly spent the last years of his life, 1987 marked the 
reemergence of “Ukrainian poetic cinema” in public discourse.  Russian critic 
Liudmila Lemesheva published the first monograph on the topic, Ukrainian 
Cinema: The Problem of One Generation, after which a flurry of memoirs, critical 
analyses, documentaries, poetry and biographies dedicated to the actor followed, 
in addition to ones dedicated to Paradzhanov, Illienko and Osyka.  From the late 
1980s to the early 1990s, film culture in Ukraine seemed to be thriving in the 
absence of actual films, and solely on the momentum of memorializing the 
1960s-era Ukrainian auteur.   
Despite the canonization of “Ukrainian poetic cinema” and its auteurs by 
the glasnost’ generation of Ukrainian films scholars, and the popularization of its 
imagery, the younger cohort who graduated from KITM after independence now 
speaks of moving away from “shadowism [tinizm],” an explicit rejection of the 
ethnographic imagery of the 1960s.  In a statement reminiscent of that very 
                                                 
7 TsDAMLMU, f. 655, op. 1, d. 1685, ll. 15-16. 
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period, however, Columbia University Ukrainian literary scholar, Yuri Shevchuk, 
recently stated, “Ukrainian cinema does not begin and end with the poetic 
cinema of Dovzhenko, Paradzhanov, Osyka, […] Illienko[…] There are other 
Ukrainian film schools, other filmmakers[…]”8  Shevchuk expressed a similar lack 
of comfort with narrowing the possibilities for “Ukrainian national cinema” to a 
rural vision of the now independent nation.  While admitting that Odessa 
filmmakers were uninterested in the politics of Ukrainian national identity during 
the Shelest period itself, Shevchuk now seemed all too willing to examine their 
work within a newer, more inclusive notion of Ukrainian national cinema, 
precisely because such individuals were not interested in these problems.  
Perhaps the mark of a modern nation, he implies, was the ability of its artists and 
writers to simply ignore its meaning-producing qualities and canon of national 
images.  In the absence of a Soviet culture industry that promoted folklore as the 
essence of “national character,” the imagery of Ukrainian poetic cinema appears 
hopelessly outdated, even though its auteurs continue to be celebrated icons of a 
nascent Ukrainian cultural movement. 
Yet, without the historical presence of Soviet Ukrainian cinema’s specific 
visual qualities, I do not believe that Yushchenko and Ruslana could have 
mobilized such an imagery in contemporary Ukraine.  These images of Cossacks 
and Hutsuls remain images to be inhabited and performed, rather than lived and 
experienced.  They continue to be exotic tropes of self-expression, rather than 
the basis for a long-term political project.  After all, the Orange coalition quickly 
disintegrated after taking power in early 2005 when it became evident that, within 
the political imaginary of the revolution existed highly divergent ideas about 
Ukraine’s economy and foreign policy.   
I find it striking that filmmakers and critics continue to debate many of the 
same issues in an independent and capitalist Ukraine as they did in the 1960s, 
not only between “poetic” and “realist” modes of representing the nation, but also 
concerning the source of financing film production and questions of linguistic 
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Maidan: An Internet Hub for Citizens Action Network in Ukraine, accessed online: 
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policy.  Most striking, however, is the question of how to maintain Ukrainian 
cinema in the first place, in the absence of a centralized state that had the power 
to maintain a certain level of production apart from the direct constraints of 
consumer demand, and a state that considered cinema a necessary political 
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A Poem about the Sea [Poema o more]. Iuliia Solntseva, Mosfil’m, 1959. 
 
The Prostitute [Poviia]. Ivan Kaveleridze, Dovzhenko Studio, 1962. 
 
The Restless Youth [Trebozhnaia molodost’]. Aleksandr Alov and Vladimir  
Naumov, Kyiv Studio, 1954. 
 
The Riders [Vershnyky]. Ihor Savchenko, Kyiv Studio, 1939. 
 
Sayat-Nova. Sergei Paradzhanov, Armen-fil’m, 1968. 
 
Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors [Tini zabutykh predkiv]. Sergei Paradzhanov,  
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St. John’s Eve [Vecher na Ivana Kupala]. Iurii Illienko, Dovzhenko Studio, 1968. 
 
The Stone Cross [Kaminnyi khrest]. Leonid Osyka, Dovzhenko Studio, 1968. 
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1965. 
 
Where Human Blood is Not Found [Krov liuds’ka – ne vodytsia]. Mykola  




White Bird with a Black Mark [Bilyi ptakh z chornoiu oznakoiu]. Iurii Illenko,  
Dovzhenko Studio, 1970. 
 
Zakhar Berkut. Leonid Osyka, Dovzhenko Studio, 1971. 
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Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshyi orhaniv vlasti Ukrainy (TsDAVOU) 
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